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 ABSTRACT 
 
The guiding premise of this thesis is that the concept of historical time constitutes a distinct 
philosophical problem for Karl Marx’s work. Marx does not examine the relationship between 
time and history in his work, rendering the historicist framework of linear, progressive time 
the overriding framework through which he understands this relationship. However, the larger 
problem is that, despite this lack, the philosophical originality and critical function of Marx’s 
work is in no small measure defined by the contribution it makes towards our understanding 
of this relationship. Therefore, this thesis argues that it is necessary to construct a concept of 
historical time out of Marx’s work. Methodologically, this begins with an outline of the broad 
contours of the materialist concept of history in The German Ideology, and a temporal reading 
of the historical act – the creation of the means of human life – on which this concept is based. 
This reading is then ontologically grounded, first by Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time, in 
order to establish how the act as such temporalises, and then by Jean-Paul Sartre’s Critique of 
Dialectical Reason, in order to grasp how this temporalisation can be thought in relation to 
the movement of historical totalisation, which is to say the ongoing totalisation of the time of 
all human lives. In short, Heidegger and Sartre enable us to secure labour and need – the two 
concepts upon which the materialist concept of history depends – as the two basic forces upon 
which historical temporalisation depends. Yet if, as Marx’s Capital reveals, the specifically 
capitalist category of ‘abstract labour’ is the condition of thinking the transhistorical category 
of ‘labour in general’, and if abstract labour exists to satisfy capital’s need to self-expand, not 
the human’s need to live, then capital – not the human – is the condition of thinking history. 
Capital and its times give history its intelligibility, such that capitalism is the only standpoint 
(to date) from which ‘history as such’, ‘history itself’, can be conceived. However, the concept 
of historical time cannot simply register that capital makes the category of history possible. It 
must also account for the historically changing character of the relationship between time and 
history, and hence the possibility of social and historical time after capitalism. 
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Introduction 
Marx, Time and History 
 
Economy of time. To this all economy ultimately reduces itself.1 
 
What does Marx’s work tell us about the relationship between time and history? In short, this 
thesis maintains, quite little and a significant amount at the same time. Quite little, because 
nowhere in Marx’s oeuvre is there a sustained examination of this relationship; a significant 
amount, because this oeuvre constitutes one of the greatest, if still largely untapped, resources 
with which to comprehend this relationship in the modern European philosophical tradition 
more generally. This relationship has of course been examined within Marxism since Marx’s 
time (the work of Walter Benjamin, Louis Althusser, Jean-Paul Sartre and Ernst Bloch being 
prominent examples2), but the fact remains that Marx’s contribution to our understanding of 
this relationship is still largely in the dark. This thesis is an attempt to bring this contribution 
to light, and to do so through the concept of historical time. Broadly speaking, this is a concept 
that not only registers the relationship between time and history, but the historically changing 
relationship between time and history. There is no readily identifiable concept of historical 
time in Marx. He never provides us with anything like – to use Althusser’s words – ‘an outline 
for a concept of historical time’. Nonetheless, there is, this thesis argues, a concept of historical 
time that can be systematically constructed out of Marx’s work.  
 If there is a single work that is the inspiration for this thesis, it is The German Ideology3. 
The premise of this thesis is that something like ‘a materialist concept of history’ exists within 
                                                          
1 Karl Marx, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy (Rough Draft) [1857-8] 
(hereafter Grundrisse), trans. Martin Nicolaus (London and New York: Penguin Books, 1993), 173. 
2 See, in particular, Walter Benjamin, ‘On the Concept of History’ [1940], trans. Harry Zohn, in Walter 
Benjamin: Selected Writings, Volume 4, 1938-1940, ed. Howard Eiland and Michael W. Jennings 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003), 389-400; Louis Althusser, ‘The Errors of Classical 
Economics: an Outline for a Concept of Historical Time’, in Louis Althusser and Étienne Balibar, 
Reading Capital [1968], trans. Ben Brewster (London: Verso, 1997), 91-118; Jean-Paul Sartre, 
Critique of Dialectical Reason, Volume 1: Theory of Practical Ensembles [1960] (hereafter CDR 1), 
trans. Alan Sheridan-Smith (London and New York: Verso, 2004); and Ernst Bloch, ‘Nonsynchronism 
and the Obligation to its Dialectics’ [1932], trans. Mark Ritter, New German Critique 11 (Spring 1977), 
22-38. ‘Nonsynchronism’ is a translation of the German word Ungleichzeitigkeit, which is better (and 
more literally) rendered as ‘non-sametimeliness’. This essay is also published in Ernst Bloch, Heritage 
of Our Times [1935], trans. Neville and Stephen Plaice (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 
1990). 
3 The English language edition of The German Ideology used in this thesis is Karl Marx and Friedrich 
Engels, The German Ideology [1845-6] (hereafter GI), trans. S.W. Ryazanskaya (London: Lawrence 
& Wishart, 1965). When the translation of passages within this and other English language editions of 
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The German Ideology, which is to say that this work provides us with the means of thinking 
a ‘materialist concept of history’. This position is not without its critics (which would possibly 
include Marx himself, who famously suggested in his preface to A Contribution to the Critique 
of Political Economy that The German Ideology was best left to ‘the gnawing criticism of the 
mice.’4) As Chris Arthur has recently reminded us, the expression ‘a materialist conception of 
history’ is simply not within the pages of The German Ideology.5 Marx and Engels speak of 
‘practical materialists’, a ‘communist materialist’, the ‘materialist outlook’ [materialistischer 
Anschauung], a ‘materialist basis’ of historiography, and even their ‘conception of history’ 
[Geschichtsauffassung], but there is, strictly speaking, no mention of ‘a materialist conception 
of history’. The actual appearance of the name notwithstanding, this thesis proceeds from the 
premise that there is a distinctive conception of history – one consistent with ‘the materialist 
outlook’ – which can be articulated as a concept – a philosophical concept – of history. Hence 
this thesis ‘agrees’ with Massimiliano Tomba’s assertion that ‘“Historical materialism” as a 
theory of history or a materialist conception of history does not exist’6, not because there is 
no theory of history or materialist conception of history in The German Ideology, but because 
Marx and Engels never use the term ‘historical materialism’ in The German Ideology. Indeed, 
this thesis argues, it is precisely the existence of a materialist concept of history in The German 
Ideology that destabilises the codified tradition known as ‘Historical Materialism’. This does 
not mean that The German Ideology presents us with a readymade concept of history. Far from 
it. As a manuscript, The German Ideology is – to put it bluntly – a mess. And this is not simply 
because it has been organised in various different ways by various different editors throughout 
history, such that it is dubious to speak of ‘The German Ideology’ as such.7 More importantly, 
The German Ideology is, common to all its historical manifestations, a hodgepodge – a collage 
– of overlapping political, philosophical, economic and historical insights, characterised by a 
                                                          
German works are modified, the German edition will be cited first, followed by the English language 
edition in parentheses.  
4 Karl Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, [1859] (hereafter Contribution), 
trans. S.W. Ryazanskaya (New York: International Publishers, 1970), 22. 
5 See Arthur’s review of Terrell Carver and Daniel Blank’s Marx and Engels’s “German Ideology” 
Manuscripts: Presentation and Analysis of the “Feuerbach Chapter” (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2014), and A Political History of the Editions of Marx and Engels’s “German Ideology” Manuscripts 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), in the online resource Marx and Philosophy Review of Books,  
http://marxandphilosophy.org.uk/reviewofbooks/reviews/2015/1846 (accessed 1 July 2015).  
6 Massimiliano Tomba, Marx’s Temporalities, trans. Peter D. Thomas and Sara R. Farris (Chicago: 
Haymarket Books, 2013), vii. Tomba continues: ‘“Historical materialism” is not a passe-partout for 
the comprehension of history, but a practical mode of intervention into history.’ Ibid. This argument is 
misleading, because it implicitly suggests that the philosophy of history is essentially indifferent to the 
‘practical mode of intervention into history’. It relegates the existence of the materialist concept of 
history – indeed the concept as such – to ‘passe-partout’ comprehension, to pure thought.  
7 On this point, see again Arthur’s review of Carver and Blank’s work in Marx and Philosophy Review 
of Books (see footnote 5).  
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haphazard mixture of historical and transhistorical claims, which is to say claims specific to a 
single mode of production (particularly capitalism) and claims meant to be grasped at either 
the level of all human history to date, or all human history to date and speculatively to come. 
Added to this is the fact that the reception of The German Ideology has always been dominated 
by the so-called ‘Feuerbach Chapter’ (in most editions the first chapter), obfuscating the fact 
that the vast majority of the manuscript is actually a critique of the ‘Young Hegelians’ Bruno 
Bauer and – most notably – Max Stirner. For Gary Browning, this ‘exclusive focus upon the 
opening section of The German Ideology…underrates this devotion of attention towards 
Stirner and neglects the provenance of parts of the opening section in critical reflection upon 
Stirner.’8 This thesis is complicit in Browning’s charge: it concentrates exclusively on the so-
called ‘Feuerbach Chapter’. But it does so in such a way which demonstrates that a ‘materialist 
concept of history’ not only exists in The German Ideology, but is of great consequence to the 
philosophies of history and time alike.  
 This thesis – particularly Chapter 1 – is therefore undeniably a work of reconstruction. 
It formulates the meaning of certain categories in Marx’s work in ways which Marx did not 
necessarily do himself. The most notable example here is the formulation of ‘the economic’ 
as ‘the social production of the means of life’. In other words, human being’s social production 
of the means of their existence permeates the ‘Feuerbach Chapter’, but nowhere do Marx and 
Engels – at least explicitly – state that this social production constitutes the meaning of ‘the 
economic’. However, it is the contention of this thesis that ‘the economic’ must be figured as 
‘the social production of the means of life’, because to do so opens up the wealth of social and 
historical insight that Marx’s works contains. It allows us to approach ‘the economic’ as a rich 
philosophical concept in its own right, as an ontological concept that designates the meaning 
of ‘human being’ itself. This is, as we will see, the basis from which – to invoke the quotation 
that frames this introduction – ‘the economic’ and ‘the economy’ can be grasped as indelibly 
temporal categories in ways beyond, but not necessarily in tension with, Marx’s understanding 
of their temporal bearings. This is also the basis from which certain passages in The German 
Ideology take precedence over others. Of particular note here is the passage containing Marx 
and Engels’s description of what they call ‘the first historical act’ (which, at the outset, we 
should point out is a necessarily ongoing ‘first historical act’). Indeed, the intelligibility of not 
only Chapter 1 but the entirety of this thesis hinges on attaching to the first historical act and 
its temporality a philosophical importance which undoubtedly exceeds what Marx and Engels 
                                                          
8 Gary K. Browning, ‘The German Ideology: the Theory of History and the History of Theory’, History 
of Political Thought 14:3 (Autumn 1993), 456. According to Browning, The German Ideology ‘should 
be analysed and interpreted as an integral whole’, such that ‘its various sections are intimately related 
to one another and share a community of purpose and character.’ Ibid. 455. 
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intended – and surely even imagined – when they wrote The German Ideology. Finally, this 
thesis constitutes a reconstruction of Marx’s work insofar as it prioritises certain categories in 
his canon over others. It does this not only within the framework of the materialist concept of 
history but across Marx’s work more generally. Certain categories, first and foremost ‘labour’, 
‘need’ and ‘life’, are prioritised over others, namely class and class struggle. This thesis does 
this not to dismiss the importance of class and class struggle, but to underscore the extent to 
which the philosophical and historical intelligibility of concepts such as class (and the division 
of labour from whence classes arise) is ultimately based in the categories of labour and need. 
Class and class struggle are, as we will learn, ontologically ‘down the line’ from labour and 
need. One of the basic concerns of this thesis – at least its first half – is to develop what might 
be called a ‘transhistorical materialist concept of history’. Hence if one wishes to take the line 
that, famously, ‘the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles’9, 
this thesis argues that this stance can only be philosophically sustained after the transhistorical 
dimensions of Marx’s concepts of labour and need have been established.  
 This prompts a brief digression on the difference between the ‘transhistorical’ and the 
‘historically specific’ in Marx. This is a difference which must first be approached from the 
standpoint of Marx’s conception of ‘mode of production’. In short, the ‘transhistorical’ is that 
which is common to all modes of production, although the ‘all’ in this formulation must, as 
earlier suggested, be differentiated between, on the one hand, all modes of production to date, 
and, on the other, all modes of production to date and those (speculatively) to come. Categories 
such as wealth, life, labour, need and, as we will see, time, are in this sense transhistorically 
valid: they exist, and will exist, in the words of The German Ideology, throughout ‘all human 
existence’ and ‘all history’.10 In contrast to this, the ‘historically specific’ signifies that which 
is specific to a particular mode of production, such that capitalism is a ‘historically specific’ 
form of the production of the means of life and thereby a ‘historically specific’ articulation of 
the relationship between the forces and relations of production. For this reason, ‘historical 
specificity’ in Marx should not, at its most basic level, be understood as the difference between 
1860s England and 1960s France (this is historicism), but rather as the difference between one 
mode of production and another. But what must be emphasised here is that – in Marx – the 
‘transhistorical’ is not an ‘ahistorical’ category: it does not represent that which is somehow 
‘above’, ‘beyond’ or ‘outside’ of history altogether. The ‘trans’ within Marx’s transhistorical 
registers that which exists within, throughout and across all human history, not that which is 
                                                          
9 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party [1848], trans. Samuel Moore 
(London: Verso, 1998), 34. 
10 Marx and Engels, GI, 48. ‘Class’ can be conceived in transhistorical terms, but only on the condition 
that its transhistoricality ends with the (speculative) chronological end of capitalism.  
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outside of history. Transhistorical categories such as wealth are therefore not ‘natural’ (in the 
ordinary sense of the term) categories. This is crucial, because the transhistorical dimensions 
of Marx’s work are too often overlooked, if not outright dismissed, through invocations of the 
‘historical specificity’ of this work. The problem here is that when the ‘historical specificity’ 
of Marx’s work is invoked without any reference to its relation to the transhistoricality of his 
work, historicism becomes the tacit framework of history and historical time. Capitalism is a 
historically specific mode of production, but this can only be grasped in relation to the concept 
of history that renders this specificity intelligible. More often than not, those readers of Marx 
who critically employ the ‘historical specificity’ of his work never establish this relation.11 
 The transhistorical categories of labour and need are important, because they introduce 
the possibility of constructing a concept of historical time out of Marx’s work. Indeed, if there 
is a single question that guides this thesis, it is this: how do we reconstruct Marx’s materialist 
concept of history as a concept of historical time? The answer to this question begins with a 
temporal reading of the materialist concept of history. Specifically, it begins with a temporal 
reading of the ‘first historical act’ – the social production of the means of life, which is, as we 
will consider, internally differentiated between the creation of the means of satisfying existing 
needs and the creation of new needs. And what we will discover with this reading is that the 
materialist concept of history enables an incipient conception of historical time which deviates 
from – in fact stands in opposition to – the predominant framework through which historical 
time is comprehended: historicism, which is to say – after Benjamin – the suffocating confines 
of ‘homogenous, empty time.’12 Therefore, one of the premises of this thesis is that a temporal 
reading of the materialist concept of history – the first but by no means the only step towards 
developing a concept of historical time in Marx – de-codifies the codified tradition known as 
‘Historical Materialism’13. So-called ‘Historical Materialism’ (again, a term never used by 
Marx himself) has for too long suffered, at the hands of Marxists and non-Marxists alike, from 
what Harry Harootunian aptly describes as the ‘narrative and continuist story line that move[s] 
like a fast-moving express train for a predetermined destination.’14 A temporal reading of the 
                                                          
11 Moishe Postone’s Time, Labor, and Social Domination: a Reinterpretation of Marx’s Critical Theory 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993) is at the forefront of this problem. Postone repeatedly 
calls upon the authority of the ‘historically specific’ character of Marx’s work – ad nauseam – but he 
never considers what concept of history renders this character intelligible. Indeed, for Postone, Marx’s 
‘historically specific social theory’ is completely at odds with the philosophy of history, such that ‘the 
historical specificity of the critique of political economy delineates Marx’s final break with his earlier 
transhistorical understanding of historical materialism and, hence, with notions of the philosophy of 
history [Geschichtsphilosophie].’ Ibid. 140, 258.  
12 Benjamin, ‘On the Concept of History’, 395. 
13 This thesis avoids the use of the term ‘historical materialism’ without the indefinite article ‘a’. 
14 Harry Harootunian, ‘Historical Materialism’s Task in an “Age of Globalization”’, Radical History 
Review 79 (Winter 2001), 95. 
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materialist concept of history – Chapter 1 – thus uncovers, in the spirit of Benjamin, Althusser, 
Sartre and Bloch, a distinctly non-linear temporality at the heart of history.  
 At this point, it is vital to outline three deeply intertwined (and admittedly jargonistic) 
concepts which receive their fullest philosophical exposition in Chapter 2, but which guide 
this thesis as a whole. The first of these is what, in the existential-phenomenological tradition, 
is usually referred to as ‘temporalisation’. Broadly speaking, temporalisation means the active 
production of a dynamic difference and relation between the past, the present, and the future. 
In this regard, if ‘temporality’ signifies a dynamic relation between the past, the present, and 
the future, temporalisation is the active production of temporality. This is the sense in which, 
after Martin Heidegger, the movement of existence ‘temporalises itself’ – it is the creation of 
the three primary coordinates of human time. The concept of temporalisation is quite crucial, 
because it is the philosophical basis upon which the possibility of a temporal reading depends. 
Insofar as a ‘temporal reading’ of anything – a concept, a practice, a phenomenon, etc. – is 
sustainable, it must provide an account of temporalisation in order to ground its reading. This 
dovetails with the previously stated aim of destabilising the dominant temporality of Historical 
Materialism (the linear, progressive time of historicism). The concept of temporalisation is 
inherently critical: it upends how we (to use a Heideggerian expression) ‘initially and for the 
most part’ comprehend action, activity, and the act themselves.15 Temporally speaking, the 
sense in which Marx’s concept of ‘the economic’ is an inherently critical concept – the sense 
in which ‘the social production of the means of life’ is an inherently critical way of configuring 
history – comes to light through the concept of temporalisation.  
 The second concept which guides this thesis is a concept without which history cannot 
be thought, and is therefore a concept without which we cannot develop a concept of historical 
time in Marx. This concept is totalisation. The problem of totalisation is at the heart of every 
modern, post-Enlightenment philosophical conception of history (this includes the materialist 
concept of history). This is because – as Chapter 2 contends – every modern concept of history 
is, whether it registers it or not, a concept of history structured by the idea that history is the 
ongoing totalisation of the time of all human lives. That is, totalisation is what gives the notion 
of ‘history’ as a collective singular – as a whole – its intelligibility. As we will see, coming to 
grips with the concept of totalisation – and this comes out of our analysis of Heidegger and 
Sartre in Chapter 2 – is predicated on dissociating ourselves from the ordinary understanding 
                                                          
15 On rare occasions, ‘temporalisation’ will be employed to denote a temporal reading itself, such that 
one might ‘temporalise a concept of history’, such that ‘temporalisation’ renders explicit the concept’s 
implicit temporality, renders explicit the implicit temporalities of the practices and phenomena that this 
concept registers. However, the vast majority of the use of ‘temporalisation’ in this thesis is faithful to 
the existential-phenomenological tradition: it denotes the production of temporality by the act itself.  
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of totalisation. Broadly speaking, totalisation is not, as it is often understood to be, a process 
of unification that is subsequent to an existing state of difference. Totalisation is not the adding 
up of innumerable multiplicities into a single whole. Rather, totalisation is the production of 
difference, a unification whose unity is the process of its differentiation. In this way, a ‘whole’ 
has unity precisely because this unity is the process of its differentiation. Totalisation must be 
conceived at multiple levels – at the level of the individual, at the level of the social, and at 
the level of history itself. It is therefore not only necessary to speak of ‘individual totalisation’ 
(this is the sense in which an individual act totalises the material field of which it is a part), as 
opposed to ‘social totalisation’ and ‘historical totalisation’, but equally to address the relation 
between these different levels. Whereas, as we will see, Heidegger’s work does not adequately 
address this relation, Sartre’s work does. Specifically, Sartre provides a framework through 
which ‘historical totalisation’ might be understood as the ongoing totalisation of all individual 
and social totalisations. To put this within the terms of The German Ideology, we might state 
then that ‘history’ is the ongoing totalisation of each and every ‘first historical act’ (considered 
from the standpoint of both its individual actors as well as the sociality of the act itself). It is 
also necessary to state here that there is an indissociable relationship between totalisation and 
temporalisation. In short, the very intelligibility of temporalisation proceeds from totalisation. 
Totalisation is the material basis from which temporalisation is itself a unification whose unity 
is the process of its differentiation (in this case the differentiation between the past, the present, 
and the future). Thus if history is the ongoing totalisation of each and every first historical act, 
it is likewise the ongoing temporalisation of each and every first historical act. As we will see, 
the first historical act – the social production of the means of life – provides us with a possible 
model of historical time, but only inasmuch as all first historical acts are themselves totalised 
and temporalised. 
This leads us to the third and final concept, one which indisputably has a Heideggerian 
and Sartrean provenance, but which is also used by neither Heidegger nor Sartre. This concept 
is historicalisation. At its most basic level, ‘historicalisation’ denotes any individual or social 
act, process or movement which produces history. That is, historicalisation is any individual 
or social act, process or movement whose totalisation and temporalisation is, on some level, 
constitutive of history. In Marx’s terms, historicalisation registers the production of the means 
of satisfying existing needs and hence the creation of new needs. Historicalisation is obviously 
not a concept which Marx uses, but it is, this thesis contends, productively integrated into his 
work. First and foremost, this is the sense in which labour historicalises: labour – and this is a 
concern of every chapter of this thesis – constitutes history. Labour does not just temporalise. 
It does not just create time. It historicalises. It creates time that is itself constitutive of history. 
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In short, historicalisation is the production of historical time. We must clearly differentiate 
historicalisation from ‘historicisation’: whereas historicalisation is an ontological concept that 
registers the creation of history itself, historicisation is an epistemological concept inseparable 
from its origins within historicism. This is the sense in which to ‘historicise’ something is to 
place it in its particular historical context, its ‘particular time and place’. Historicisation is the 
meaning of the ‘historical specificity’ of something (such as capitalism). Historicalisation, this 
thesis argues, is the condition of possibility of historicisation. Historicisation is ontologically 
grounded by historicalisation.  
 Two points follow from this conceptual outline. First, it is important to highlight at the 
outset that the ‘history’ which features in this thesis is, as earlier indicated, a distinctly modern, 
post-Enlightenment understanding of history. After Reinhart Koselleck, this is history as ‘the 
collective singular form of Geschichte, which since around 1780 can be conceived as history 
in and for itself in the absence of an associated subject or object.’16 In Sartre’s words, this is 
history conceived at the level of ‘one human history, with one truth and one intelligibility.’17 
Unless otherwise indicated, the ‘history’ in this thesis is not, as one might put it, the ‘history 
of the historians’ (methodologically speaking, the empirical comprehension of history which 
structures most academic history departments), nor is it the kind of history associated with the 
theological tradition, which is to say history as the independent otherness of God.  
 The second point is more substantial. In fact, it is the essential point of the second half 
of this thesis. This point is a direct response to Sartre’s position, as we will learn, that historical 
totalisation is a totalisation which does not have a totaliser. In other words, according to Sartre, 
the ongoing totalisation of all individual and social totalisations exists, but this is a totalisation 
without a totaliser. In opposition to this, the second half of this thesis maintains that one of the 
philosophical consequences of Marx’s critique of political economy (e.g. from the Grundrisse 
onwards) is that, contrary to Sartre’s position, there is a totaliser that totalises and temporalises 
history. It is capital. This does not mean that capital has existed in all human history to date, 
or will exist in all human history from now, but it does mean that, as the comprehensive subject 
of the mode of production to which it gives rise, capital historicalises, and it does so in such 
a way that it is the condition of thinking the materialist concept of history (if not the modern, 
post-Enlightenment conception of history more generally). The arguments of Chapters 3 and 
4 are thus simultaneously ontological and epistemological. Chapter 3 begins building the case 
for grasping capital as the condition of thinking history by arguing that, consequent to the fact 
                                                          
16 Reinhart Koselleck, Future’s Past: on the Semantics of Historical Time [1979], trans. Keith Tribe 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 236. 
17 Sartre, CDR 1, 69. 
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that the specifically capitalist form of labour known as ‘abstract labour’ is the condition of 
thinking Marx’s transhistorical category of labour (or ‘labour in general’), the totalising and 
temporalising power of abstract labour is a fundamental dimension of capital’s historicalising 
power. In the wake of the examination of Marx’s concepts of ‘necessary’ and ‘surplus-labour’ 
in Chapter 3 (concepts that also owe their intelligibility to abstract labour), Chapter 4 rereads 
the production-process of capital – the valorisation-process – as the production of historical 
time, indeed as the production of the kind of historical time upon which every modern concept 
of history – the materialist concept of history included – depends. The production-process of 
capital, we will see, is precisely what makes possible our understanding of some of the most 
basic qualities of history itself: it not only exists ‘it itself and as such’, but its time never stops.  
 On the surface of things, it may seem ironic – if not problematic – that a thesis about 
history and historical time in Marx pays little attention to Marx’s actual historical writings. 
Yet the absence, for instance, of The Eighteenth Brumaire or Marx’s later writings on Russia 
should not be interpreted as indifference towards the ‘real history’ that these writings register. 
The reason why the philosophical dimensions of The German Ideology receive such attention, 
why these dimensions are subsequently read through Heidegger and Sartre, and finally why 
the economic writings (the various drafts of Capital) are the near-exclusive focus of the latter 
half of this thesis, is not because Marx’s historical writings are in any sense unimportant, but 
because the intelligibility of their ‘history’ depends on what Sartre calls the ‘formal structures’ 
of history (just as these formal structures depend on ‘real history’). The point here is that there 
can be no appeal to an unadulterated ‘real history’ as a fundamental-ontological baseline from 
which the formal structures of history are ‘derived’.18 ‘Real history’ and its formal structures 
are dialectically dependent on one another.  
 On the surface of things, this thesis may also come across as indifferent to the politics 
of historical time. This thesis does not, as earlier suggested, thematise class struggle, nor does 
it engage what in The German Ideology Marx and Engels call ‘the communist consciousness’ 
– the ‘consciousness of the necessity of a fundamental revolution’ – something which is for 
them a ‘conclusion’ of ‘the conception of history we have sketched.’19 Its purpose is rather to 
investigate, at a philosophically basic level, Marx’s contribution to our understanding of the 
                                                          
18 István Mészáros’s critique of Sartre, particularly his The Work of Sartre: Search for Freedom and 
the Challenge of History (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2012), comes dangerously close to this 
position. For all of his appeals to ‘real history’, Mészáros does not dialecticise its relation to the formal 
structures of history. Rather, ‘real history’ functions as a fundamental-ontological baseline for him, 
from which, it seems, the formal structures are derived. This is rather ironic, insofar as Mészáros places 
himself directly in line with Heidegger’s ‘fundamental ontology’, albeit in an inverted form. Heidegger 
is a consistent target of critique across Mészáros’s work. 
19 Marx and Engels, GI, 94. 
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historically changing relationship between time and history. Yet in the end, this understanding 
is – it cannot but be – a political understanding. As the conclusion to this thesis discusses, the 
concept of historical time matters not only because it unsettles the authority of historicism and 
because it establishes capital as the condition of thinking history, but also because it compels 
us to think beyond the historical time of capital, which is to say that it compels us to register 
the possibility of social and historical time after capitalism. This is the definitive philosophical 
and political problem of the concept of historical time: if capital makes possible the (modern) 
category of history, how do we think history beyond capital? To put this another way: what is 
the difference, and what is the relation, between the historical time of capital and the time of 
history? This is not a thesis about politics, at least not directly. But it is not thereby indifferent 
to the politics of historical time.  
11 
 
Chapter One 
A Materialist Concept of History: a Temporal Reading 
 
 
Modern political thought has concentrated its attention on history, and has not 
elaborated a corresponding concept of time. Even historical materialism has until now 
neglected to elaborate a concept of time that compares with its concept of history.1 
 
 
 
There are a variety of reasons why the philosophical potential of The German Ideology is far 
from being realised, but perhaps no reason stands out more than the fact that Marx and Engels 
provide no analysis of the relationship between time, temporality and their materialist concept 
of history. In other words, they do not consider the intrinsic temporalities of complex practices 
and phenomena including the social production of the means of life, the creation of new needs, 
the dialectic of the forces and relations of production, and the division of labour. In Marx, ‘the 
human’ is a fundamentally economic and historical being, but how is it thus a fundamentally 
temporal being? What impact would a temporal reading of Marx’s concept of the human have 
on his materialist anthropology? The German Ideology introduces us to the complex relations 
between the natural, social and historical aspects of human being, yet the ontologically basic 
relationship between materiality and temporality in Marx is unclear. This relationship must be 
systematically investigated, such that our understanding of the ‘materiality of time’ is enriched 
by the materialist concept of history and Marx’s philosophy more generally.2 
In its extension of the ‘new materialism’ of the Theses on Feuerbach, its transformation 
of an ‘ontology of praxis’ into an ‘ontology of production’, The German Ideology establishes 
a new relationship between praxis and poiêsis.3 This relationship is, to be precise, doubly new. 
It is new to the history of philosophy, because it breaks with a tradition of separation between 
praxis and poiêsis beginning with Plato and Aristotle and sustained up through Kant’s critical 
philosophy. Yet it is also, and of greater consequence, new to the philosophy of history. The 
German Ideology collapses the barrier between self-transformative action by free humans and 
                                                          
1 Giorgio Agamben, ‘Time and History: Critique of the Instant and the Continuum’, in his Infancy & 
History: Essays on the Destruction of Experience [1978], trans. Liz Heron (London and New York: 
Verso, 1993), 91. Agamben continues: ‘the vulgar representation of time as a precise and homogenous 
continuum has thus diluted the Marxist concept of history: it has become the hidden breach through 
which ideology has crept into the citadel of historical materialism.’ Ibid. Problematically, ‘historical 
materialism’ functions as a self-evident subject in this passage.  
2 Étienne Balibar states that ‘…Marx's philosophy, whether or not it is in a finished form, sets itself the 
task of thinking the materiality of time.’ Étienne Balibar, The Philosophy of Marx, trans. Chris Turner 
(London and New York: Verso, 1995), 81. 
3 Ibid. 35, 40-1. 
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the necessary production of objects for use, concretises this collapse in its demarcation of ‘the 
economic’ as the social production of the means of life, and thereby establishes a philosophical 
basis from which ‘history’ becomes a speculative and experimental concept. The implications 
of this are diverse and radically open. At a basic level, we must recognise that any historical 
logic fundamentally structured by the ongoing objectification of human practice must express 
an unpredictable future, which in turn opens up the meaning – and temporality – of concepts 
such as ‘historical rationality’, ‘historical change’, ‘historical progress’, ‘historical evolution’, 
‘historical development’ and so forth. In consideration of class struggle, for instance, Balibar 
argues that ‘Marx resorted less and less to pre-existing models of explanation and increasingly 
constructed a rationality which had no real precedent…in the incessant transformation of its 
conditions and forms…class struggle is its own model.’4 In this way, the importance that Marx 
attaches to conflict (not only class struggle but more generally the conflict between the forces 
and relations of production) is not just a political matter: its temporal dynamic philosophically 
registers the concept of history as necessarily open and incomplete.  
The ground of the concept of materialism in The German Ideology is labour: social and 
economic activity which is indissociable from and yet irreducible to the organic and inorganic 
matter that this activity works with and upon. The German Ideology thus reinforces what the 
Theses on Feuerbach first introduces: a distinctly practical, rather than matter-based, concept 
of materialism. As the social production of the means of life, labour is the ontological ground 
of the historical movement between praxis and poiêsis, between, that is, the realms of freedom 
and necessity. In short, for Marx, labour historicalises: it produces history.5 The consequences 
of this are extensive. If labour historicalises, it must also temporalise. Labour must be grasped 
as an indelibly temporal concept in Marx, not simply because, as an act, it intrinsically creates 
time, but because it is an act which is directly constitutive of history. History is an essentially 
temporal process, and hence any concept of history, materialist or otherwise, is an essentially 
temporal concept, one which cannot be thought in isolation from the philosophy of time. We 
might suggest then that if The German Ideology specifies praxis as ‘production’, and if labour 
is necessary to think the concept of ‘mode of production’, then temporality is a condition of 
thinking human ontology in Marx. Temporality confirms the philosophical status of ontology 
in Marx: ‘mode of production’ cannot be registered as an ontological category, and cannot be 
internalised to the philosophy of history, without systematically investigating the relationship 
                                                          
4 Ibid. 96. On the question of progress, see Chapter 4 of Balibar’s The Philosophy of Marx: ‘Time and 
Progress: Another Philosophy of History?’ 
5 A transhistorical category, and a condition of thinking Marx’s concept of ‘mode of production’, labour 
mediates what Marx calls the ‘metabolism’ [Stoffwechsel] between humanity and nature.  
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between labour and temporality in Marx.6 It is unclear to what extent, if any, Marx saw his 
intervention into the philosophy and politics of materialism in these terms. To be sure, Marx  
analyses labour and temporality in conjunction with one another, and yet these analyses, most 
notably that of the concept of ‘labour-time’ itself, are by and large framed by the temporalities 
of capital, particularly the quantifiable, durational time of what we will consider in Chapter 3: 
abstract labour-time. There are helpful passages in the Grundrisse, from broadly Aristotelian 
positions (‘since labour is motion, time is its natural measure’) to critical extensions of Hegel 
(‘labour is the living, form-giving fire; it is the transitoriness of things, their temporality, as 
their formation by living time’7), but the fact remains that the context of these passages is the 
temporalities of capital, temporalities which are inseparable from and yet cannot be conflated 
with the temporalities of history. This much is clear: if labour historicalises, then any attempt 
to establish the philosophical priority of the concept of historical time must begin by exploring 
the manifold dimensions of the ontological relationship between labour and temporality. The 
materialist concept of history in The German Ideology must be reread temporally: the human 
must be rendered temporal in its economic and historical being. 
The removal of a fixed distinction between praxis and poiêsis in The German Ideology 
is sustained by a unique philosophy of history. As Balibar puts it, ‘there is never any effective 
freedom which is not also a material transformation, which is not registered historically in 
exteriority. But nor is there any work which is not a transformation of self, as though human 
beings could change their conditions of existence whilst maintaining an invariant “essence”.’8 
In Marx, after 1845, ‘materialism’ must already be a historical materialism if it is to have any 
meaning as a practical and social materialism. To be sure, temporality is introduced by Marx’s 
practical materialism in the Theses on Feuerbach, inasmuch as ‘sensuous human activity’ is 
an implicitly temporal concept. At the same time, the temporality of practice is not redeemed 
by these theses. This redemption is left to The German Ideology, wherein the temporality of 
practice is grounded by the historicalising concept of need. Because it historically grounds the 
materialism of the Theses on Feuerbach, The German Ideology introduces a distinct historical 
temporality to labour as practice immanent to need. Does The German Ideology enable us to 
                                                          
6 William Haver’s contention that ‘…in Marx, the mode of production is ontology. There is nothing 
outside a mode of production…’ is only sustainable from the standpoint of the philosophy of time. 
William Haver, ‘For a Communist Ontology,’ in The Politics of Culture: Around the Work of Naoki 
Sakai, ed. Richard Calichman and John Namjun Kim (London and New York: Routledge, 2010), 107. 
7 Marx, Grundrisse, 205, 361. The latter quotation reworks Hegel’s position in the Logic that ‘matter 
is that which is indifferent to form.’ See G.W.F. Hegel, The Science of Logic [1812], trans. A.V. Miller 
(London: George Allen & Unwin, 1969), 451. Still, it is unclear in this passage if the human is itself 
included within the realm of ‘things’. Minus such inclusion, the indifference between ‘living time’ and 
the ‘temporality of things’ cannot be historicised. 
8 Balibar, The Philosophy of Marx, 40. 
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read materiality as temporality in Marx? This remains to be seen.9 As Althusser puts it, we 
are still far from clearing up ‘the confusion that surrounds the concept of history.’10 To invoke 
Marx, the unexplored interchange [Austausch] between materiality and temporality heightens 
the need to address the following questions: what are the philosophical outcomes of a temporal 
reading of Marx’s practical, social, and historical materialism? What interpretive possibilities 
are introduced? If Marx’s materialism is in fact a ‘new’ materialism, does it thereby introduce 
a new temporality? That is, does this materialism affect a new configuration between the past, 
the present and the future? If The German Ideology subjects the materialism of the Theses on 
Feuerbach to a historical logic, is a new historical temporality thereby produced? What light 
do these questions shed on the relationship between time and history, if indeed the concept of 
one poses a problem for the philosophy of the other?11 These questions mark the beginning of 
the central problem of this thesis: how do we critically reconstruct Marx’s materialist concept 
of history as a concept of historical time? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
9 Haver goes so far as to claim that ‘for Marx, materiality and temporality are the same thing.’ Haver, 
‘For a Communist Ontology’, 114. However, the problem of history is noticeably absent from his 
analysis. This reading hinges on developing a concept of materiality [Materialität] that simply put does 
not exist in Marx’s corpus. This concept would emerge from – and yet would need to ontologically 
ground – Marx’s critical reconstruction of materialism [Materialismus] in the Theses on Feuerbach as 
a dynamisation of the subject-object relation in modern (post-Kantian) epistemology. 
10 Althusser, ‘The Errors of Classical Economics: an Outline for a Concept of Historical Time’, 93. 
11 Peter Osborne, ‘Marx and the philosophy of time’, Radical Philosophy 147 (January/February 2008), 
15. 
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1.1 A Practical Materialism: the Theses on Feuerbach 
 
The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism (that of Feuerbach included) is 
that objectivity [der Gegenstand], actuality, sensuousness, is grasped only in the form 
of the object [Objekt] or of intuition [Anschauung], but not as sensuous human 
activity, praxis, not subjectively. Hence, in opposition to materialism, the active side 
was developed abstractly by idealism, which naturally does not know actual, sensuous 
activity as such. Feuerbach wants sensuous objects, really distinguished from thought-
objects, but he does not comprehend human activity itself as objective activity 
[gegenständliche Tätigkeit]…therefore he does not comprehend the significance of 
“revolutionary”, of “practical-critical” activity.12 
 
 
The materialist concept of history must initially be approached from the standpoint of Marx’s 
critical reconstruction of the concept of materialism. Written in Brussels during the spring of 
1845, Marx’s eleven Theses on Feuerbach (hereafter Theses) reject the notion that a sensible 
object of appearance [Gegenstand], and thus actuality and sensuousness, are captured only by 
intuition or only as an object of knowledge [Objekt]. The first thesis (above) directly targets 
the ‘old’ or substantialist (which is to say, matter-based) materialism, which is polemically 
and reductively assigned to Feuerbach, so as to create space for a ‘new’ or practical (which is 
to say, human-based) materialism. At a basic level, the chief defect of existing materialism is, 
according to Marx, that it is pre-Kantian: it has no viable concept of the subject. At the same 
time, and of equal philosophical importance, Marx critiques the character of Kant’s subjective 
constitution of objectivity [Objektivität] on which Feuerbach’s materialism relies. The Theses 
are a critical extension of the subject-object relation of modern epistemology as inaugurated 
by Kant: an extension, because they constitute the first materialism of the subject within the 
Kantian tradition; critical, because they reject the sensuously passive and hence ideally active 
character of the subject-object relation in Kant’s transcendental logic. In his declaration that 
objectivity, sensibility and actuality are not comprehended subjectively by existing discourses 
of materialism, Marx not only dismisses the old metaphysics of matter in these discourses, but 
confronts the very dynamic of subjectivity in Kant. The transformation of a sensible object of 
appearance [Gegenstand] presented to consciousness by intuition into an object of knowledge 
[Objekt] is a movement – from actual passivity to ideal activity – which defines the subject in 
Kant. It is a movement that authorises the universality and necessity of the pure concepts of 
                                                          
12 Karl Marx, Thesen über Feuerbach [1845] (hereafter TüF), in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Marx 
Engels Werke (hereafter MEW), Band 3 (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1978), 5 (Karl Marx, Theses on 
Feuerbach (hereafter ToF), in Karl Marx, Early Writings, trans. Rodney Livingstone and Gregor 
Benton (London and New York: Penguin Books, 1992), 421-22).  
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the understanding. To suggest, as Marx does, that objectivity, sensibility and actuality are not 
grasped subjectively by all hitherto existing materialism is to suggest, against Kant, that the 
subject can be nothing else than sensuous human activity itself, nothing else than practice.13 
As Balibar asserts, in the wake of the Theses, ‘…the only true subject is the practical subject 
or the subject of practice or, better still, that the subject is nothing other than practice which 
has always already begun and continues indefinitely.’14  
There are two outcomes which emerge from this practical materialism, one explicit and 
one implicit, each relying on the other and constituting a tension in relation to the other. First, 
as an explicit epistemological critique of an epistemological discourse, Marx’s Theses actively 
dialecticise the subject-object relation, such that sensuous human activity destabilises any self-
sufficient barrier between the subject and the object, or between the ‘knower’ and the ‘known’. 
It is in this context that Wal Suchting contends that subject and object are not pre-constituted 
before practice, but rather ‘constituted within’ it.15 Second, Marx’s speculative redefinition of 
the subject as practice generates a (still implicit and underdetermined) claim on behalf of the 
ontological basis of this epistemological discourse. In this regard, the subject and the object, 
be they defined as the representative capacity of the human [Gemüt]16 and that which stands 
against it [Gegenstand], or dialectically rendered as sensuous activity on either pole, become 
in Marx epistemological derivations of an ontologically basic practice. In his transformation 
of a distinctly epistemological problematic, Marx enables the creation of a concept of practice 
which moves dialectically and unevenly between epistemology and ontology. If this concept 
grounds the subject-object relation of modern epistemology, the ‘is’ and the ‘practice’ within 
Balibar’s formulation ‘the subject is practice’ not only function as the copula and the predicate 
of a philosophical proposition, but, after Hegel, represent dialectical moments of a speculative 
absolute identity which is not a substantial but rather, as we will now see, a relational ontology. 
                                                          
13 Praxis implicitly stands in as the meaning of ‘practice’ in the Theses. Marx never outlines a concept 
of ‘practice’ as epistemologically or ontologically distinct from praxis, in the Theses or elsewhere, but 
it is possible to suggest that the movement from an ontology of praxis to an ontology of production – 
that is, the movement from the Theses to The German Ideology – marks the development of a historical-
ontological concept of practice within which the differentiation of practice from praxis, and the 
inseparability of praxis and poiêsis, is established. After The German Ideology, practice is not just 
ontologically basic to the subject-object relation of modern epistemology, as is offered by the Theses, 
but historically-ontologically basic to the praxis-poiêsis relation as well. It is Marx’s specification of 
practice as labour, as the social production of the means of life, that secures the removal of the 
separation between praxis and poiêsis. 
14 Balibar, The Philosophy of Marx, 25. 
15 W.A. Suchting, Marx and Philosophy: Three Studies (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1986), 57. 
16 Gemüt is a notoriously difficult concept to translate. In Kant, as elsewhere, it signifies the human 
mind, soul, consciousness, spirit, disposition and body. What is evident is that Gemüt is a concept that 
exceeds the summation of its constituent parts, including the human [Mensch] and the understanding 
[Verstand]. ‘The representative capacity of the human’ is a clunky placeholder, but preferable to 
reductive and exclusive translations such as ‘the mind’. 
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Consider Marx’s sixth thesis on Feuerbach:  
 
 
Feuerbach resolves [auflösen] the religious essence into the human essence. But the 
human essence is no abstraction inhabiting each single individual. In its actuality it is 
the ensemble [das Ensemble] of social relations. Feuerbach, who does not enter into a 
critique of this actual essence, is hence compelled: (1) to abstract from the historical 
process and to fix the religious sentiment [Gemüt] as something by itself and to 
presuppose an abstract – isolated – human individual; (2) essence, therefore, can be 
comprehended only as ‘genus’, as an internal, mute generality which naturally unites 
the many individuals.17 
 
 
The first thesis does not consider the meaning of ‘the human’ in its redefinition of objective 
activity as sensuous human activity. The sixth thesis, on the other hand, directly confronts the 
question of human essence in a fashion that confirms the status of Marx’s materialism as new. 
What grounds this confirmation, such that a new concept of the human and a new concept of 
essence emerge – and emerge, moreover, as conceptually dependent on one another – is the 
fact that Marx explicitly poses this question at the level of actuality [Wirklichkeit].18 Marx’s 
concept of the human is not new because this human is actual: to make this claim is to forget 
Marx and Feuerbach’s indebtedness to Hegel’s position in the Logic that subjectivity resides 
in the concrete fullness of abstraction within consciousness. Rather, this is a conceptually new 
human because the actuality is here unequivocally social. Human actuality is, from the outset, 
an ensemble of social relations. Marx deliberately utilises the French term ‘ensemble’ in order 
to denote a fluid, open and indeterminate unity which evades, contra Hegel, the ‘hierarchical 
completeness associated, philosophically, with the German terms for totality (Totalität) and 
whole (Ganze).’19 Far from introducing the human as a substance with inherent attributes, the 
sixth thesis implies that it is how such attributes are relationally produced and distributed that 
constitutes its essential character. In this manner, the subject in Marx resides in [inwohnendes] 
the practical unity of the ensemble of social relations. The sixth thesis presents, although it by 
no means explicitly develops, the possibility of a historical, or better, historicalising, subject, 
one that prioritises social relations over their relata, and one that remains abstract so long as 
abstraction is not philosophically and politically actualised within isolated human individuals. 
Thus the equivalence which Feuerbach establishes between ‘genus-essence’ [Gattungswesen] 
                                                          
17 Marx, TüF, 6 (ToF, 423). Marx’s claim that Feuerbach resolves the religious essence into the human 
essence is, to be fair, highly unfair to the complex relationship Feuerbach establishes between theology 
and anthropology in The Essence of Christianity (1841).  
18 Balibar, The Philosophy of Marx, 28-9. 
19 Peter Osborne, How to Read Marx (London: Granta Books, 2005), 30. 
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and ‘nature-essence’ in The Essence of Christianity is for Marx predicated on the abstraction 
from a sensuously passive, and consequently unnatural, human, despite the fact that Feuerbach 
is quite concerned with the re-appropriation of human nature as a collective social and political 
project. The Theses profoundly rework the philosophical contours of essence. They introduce 
the possibility of granting a historical logic to the relationship between the categories of genus-
species-individual, and that between universal-particular-individual, relationships that largely 
take the form of unilateral movement in one direction or the other (nominalism or realism). It 
is the spectre of such a historical logic – unrecognised by Marx in the Theses – that potentially 
reconfigures the predominant framework through which essence is thought, let alone lived.20 
The sixth thesis prefigures, to give two examples, essence ‘lying in’ existence in Heidegger’s 
phenomenological ontology of Dasein in Being and Time (1927), and the ‘crisis’ of relations 
between art and individual artworks in Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory (1970). 
The Theses obviously disrupt the philosophy of time in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. 
For Kant, time is the a priori condition of all appearances in general (all objects of the senses), 
a necessary representation which immediately grounds inner sensible intuition (the domain of 
the soul) and mediately grounds outer sensible intuition (the appearance of things as a priori 
determined by relations of space).21 Time is thus the pure form of sensible intuition; synthetic 
a priori judgements and the understanding cannot be realised without it. The basic lesson of 
the transcendental aesthetic is that time is only empirically real because it is transcendentally 
ideal: there is no objectivity to time from the standpoint of what Kant calls the ‘thing in itself’: 
‘time is…merely a subjective condition of our intuition…and in itself, outside the subject, is 
nothing.’22 Kant develops this position further in the schematism of the pure concepts of the 
understanding (the categories). In the analytic of principles, schematism is the procedural field 
of time that mediates the subsumption of all appearances and all objects under the categories, 
that regulates the application of the categories to the manifold. This ‘third thing’, which Kant 
designates as a ‘transcendental time-determination’, is a pure mediating representation which 
stands ‘in homogeneity with’ – which harmonises – the relationship between the sensible and 
intellectual dimensions of the Gemüt.23 In the ‘A’ (or 1781) deduction of the categories, Kant 
emphasises schemata as the product of the imagination and synthesising faculty of the Gemüt, 
a priori determinations of time that realise the understanding by restricting it. In other words, 
                                                          
20 However, one could claim that the priority of existence over essence is actually already explicit in 
Feuerbach, which complicates matters, historico-philosophically. This would involve a larger appraisal 
of Marx’s (in some respects misleading) critique of Feuerbach in the Theses.  
21 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason [1781, 1787] (hereafter CPR), trans. Paul Guyer and Allen 
W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), A34/B51, 163-64. 
22 Ibid. A35/B52, 164. 
23 Ibid. A139/B178, 272. 
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the concepts of the pure understanding are capable of relation and have significance because 
they temporalise, and they temporalise because their application is necessarily limited to finite 
appearances of time and space. Thus when Heidegger reads schematism as the ‘sensibilisation 
of concepts’24, he simultaneously understands it to be temporalisation by concepts. 
This summary is provided in order to underscore the fact that Kant’s philosophy of time 
is not a means with which to undertake a temporal reading of the materialist concept of history. 
Epistemologically, insofar as it extends the subject-object relation in Kant, Marx’s grasping 
of the object of appearance as sensuous human activity, which is grasped, further, by sensuous 
human activity, and therefore by the open unity of the ensemble of social relations, effectively 
precludes the use of Kant’s schematism, because, ontologically, a subject which is practice is 
the place of this transcendental time-determination. As the subject in Marx, sensuous human 
activity is the performance of the temporal function of the imagination in Kant, and it thereby 
precludes the separation of this function from the manifold of intuition. Simply put, it makes 
no sense to suggest that Marx’s concept of practice (and thus history) is temporally intelligible 
through Kant’s schemata. We must add, moreover, that this is true on Kant’s own terms. From 
the standpoint of the Critique of Pure Reason, ‘practice’ is not only not present in the table of 
categories (it is not one of the ‘ancestral concepts’ [Stammbegriffe] of the pure understanding), 
but it is also not a ‘predicable’ concept (derivative concepts that owe their intelligibility to the 
categories).25 In sum, for Kant, practice is not an epistemological concept. Its conceptual status 
is rather presented in the 2nd Critique – the Critique of Practical Reason – wherein it comprises 
the practical ‘deployment’ of reason. Hence Marx’s rejection in the Theses of any systematic 
distinction between a transcendental aesthetic and transcendental analytic, between sensibility 
and conceptuality, is in a sense confirmed by the impossibility, for Kant, of affording practice 
the power of temporalisation by way of the schematism of the categories. If practice is in some 
manner the persistence of the real in time and the condition of possibility of thinking temporal 
succession, the schema of substance26 cannot secure this for us. More fundamentally, if, as it 
is possible to argue, practice is constitutive of the entire scope or ‘field of time’ [Zeitinbegriff] 
itself, the schema of modality27 cannot secure the significance [Bedeutung] of this. 
                                                          
24 Martin Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics [1929], trans. James S. Churchill 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1965), 102. Given his overall project, it is not surprising that 
in his reading of schematism Heidegger proclaims that ‘…these eleven pages of the Critique of Pure 
Reason form the heart of the whole work’, and moreover that ‘…transcendental schematism determines 
the essence of ontological knowledge.’ Ibid. 94, 110. 
25 See Kant, CPR, A82/B108, 213. 
26 Ibid. A144/B184, 275. 
27 Ibid. A146/B185, 276. 
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Kant’s critical philosophy cannot explain the temporalising power of practice (at least 
as Marx reconceives practice in the Theses), and thus is not a philosophical basis of a temporal 
reading of the materialist concept of history. But what of Hegel? Is it possible to take a cue 
from the preface to Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit and to claim, first, that the concept must 
incarnate itself in existence, become a phenomenon which can only exist through time and in 
space, and, second, to suggest that existence must make itself adequate to the concept? Hegel 
makes this assertion in his differentiation of philosophy from mathematics, in his dissociation 
of philosophy from the unessential, lifeless purpose of mathematics registered by the concept 
of magnitude. For Hegel, as against pure and applied mathematics alike, time in philosophy 
‘is the existent concept itself [der daseiende Begriff selbst].’28 Yet to extend this function and 
scope of the Concept [der Begriff] in Hegel to the materialist concept of history in The German 
Ideology is to overstep the bounds of what kind of ‘concept’ this concept of history is. It is to 
attribute an ontological (temporalising) power to what in The German Ideology is the thought 
of something (in this case, ‘history’), as against the attribution of this power to what is being 
thought (for instance, ‘history’ as practice immanent to human need). In other words, it is one 
thing to state that the materialist concept of history registers (or rather, as this thesis seeks to 
do, can be made to register) that time and space are actively produced by what is being thought 
by this concept29, but it is quite another to declare, as Hegel effectively does, that it is because 
of the concept itself that there is time and space. In other words, Hegel’s ‘concept’ is not the 
same kind of ‘concept’ that the materialist concept of history is. There are two different kinds 
of ‘concept’ at work here, such that Hegel’s concept actually incarnates itself in existence and 
compels this existence to become adequate to it. It would seem (at least for now30), then, that 
Hegel’s concept is not what we need: to extend the temporalising power of this concept to the 
materialist concept of history does not, like Kant’s schematism, provide us with the basis that 
we are after. There are things to be gleaned from Hegel’s Phenomenology (the constitution of 
                                                          
28 G.W.F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit [1807], trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1977), 27. ‘Time is the concept itself, that there is.’ Ibid. 487. For Hegel, this is the standpoint 
of absolute knowing [absolute Wissen], the pure movement of self-consciousness knowing itself as 
self-consciousness. Time as the concept itself is a standpoint which can only ever be taken in an open 
historical present. Hegel does not speak of absolute knowing as a closed or achieved content. There is, 
in other words, no such thing for Hegel as ‘absolute knowledge’. 
29 This dovetails with Haver’s argument (in specific reference to Marx’s analysis of the circulation of 
money in the Grundrisse) that ‘it is not merely that circulation occurs within the putatively a priori 
coordinates of time and space; it is more radically the case that circulation as such…determines the 
fact that there is time and space.’ Haver, ‘For a Communist Ontology’, 113-14. 
30 However, and this is the task of Chapters 3 & 4, one can make the case, as much of the literature in 
so-called ‘Systematic Dialectics’ has done, that Marx’s concept of ‘capital’ registers capital as the 
concept (in the Hegelian sense). The same cannot be said of ‘history’: it is not this kind of concept, but 
rather the name of something which, as we will later examine, capital is the condition of thinking.  
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movement as negativity in ‘labour’ first and foremost amongst them), yet we must, at least for 
now, proceed with a temporal reading of the materialist concept of history without an adequate 
understanding of the inherently temporalising power of sensuous human activity itself. 
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1.2 A Materialist Concept of History: The German Ideology  
We now turn to The German Ideology. In ‘Opposition of the Materialist and Idealist Outlook’, 
the initial section wherein the contours of the materialist concept of history are outlined, Marx 
and Engels establish the ‘first premise of all human history’ through three postulates: 
 
(1) The first premise of all human history is…the existence of living human individuals. 
Thus the first fact to be established is the physical organisation of these individuals 
and their consequent relation to the rest of nature… 
 
(2) Humans can be distinguished from animals by consciousness, by religion or anything 
else you like. They themselves begin to distinguish themselves from animals as soon 
as they begin to produce their means of life [ihre Lebensmittel zu produzieren], a step 
which is conditioned by their physical organisation. By producing their means of life 
humans are indirectly producing their material life…  
 
(3) The way in which humans produce their means of life depends first of all on the nature 
of the means of life they actually find in existence and have to reproduce. This mode 
of production must not be considered simply as being the reproduction of the physical 
existence of the individuals. Rather it is a definite form of activity of these individuals, 
a definite form of expressing their life, a definite mode of life on their part. As 
individuals express their life, so they are. What they are, therefore, coincides with their 
production, both with what they produce and with how they produce. Thus what 
individuals are depends on the material conditions of their production.31 
 
 
 
The German Ideology adds a distinct historical logic to the new materialism of the Theses. It 
also, as we will now consider, adds a distinct historical logic to the philosophical anthropology 
of the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 184432 (hereafter 1844 Manuscripts) and 
the Excerpts from James Mill’s Elements of Political Economy.33 The materialist concept of 
history in The German Ideology is predicated upon a materialist concept of anthropology: for 
                                                          
31 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Die deutsche Ideologie (hereafter DI), in Marx and Engels, MEW, 
Band 3 (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1978) 20-1 (GI, 42). In addition to its colloquial meaning as victuals, 
Lebensmittel can be translated as ‘means of subsistence’, ‘means of existence’ and ‘means of life’. 
‘Means of subsistence’ is the predominant and weakest choice, as it exclusively emphasises ‘the 
reproduction of the physical existence of…individuals’, a dimension in which Marx’s concept of ‘life’ 
[Leben] is necessarily grounded, but which it also profoundly expands.  
32 See Karl Marx, The Economic & Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 [1844] (hereafter EPM), trans. 
Martin Mulligan (New York: International Publishers, 1964). The German edition cited in this thesis 
is Karl Marx, Ökonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte aus dem Jahre 1844 (hereafter OPM), in Marx 
and Engels, MEW, Band 40 (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1968). 
33 See Karl Marx, Excerpts from James Mill’s Elements of Political Economy [1844] (hereafter JM), 
in Marx, Early Writings, 259-78. The German edition cited in this thesis is Karl Marx, Auszüge aus 
James Mills Buch Élémens d'économie politique (hereafter AJM), in Marx and Engels, MEW, Band 
40 (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1968). 
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Marx, ‘the human’ is a kinetic, economic being, which means that it is the very activity of the 
social production of the means of life. At first glance, this concept of the human does not seem 
to represent much of a departure from the 1844 Manuscripts nor the notebooks on James Mill. 
In these writings, ‘the human’ and ‘the social’ are already always tightly interwoven concepts, 
later condensed in the sixth thesis of the Theses. By 1844, the human has already been figured 
as an indelibly social being: both an individual in relation to and interchange [Austausch] with 
other individuals and that very relation and interchange itself.34 As Marx says across his 1844 
writings: ‘the individual is the social being…the human’s individual and generic life are not 
different’, ‘social being…is no abstract, universal power standing over against the individual, 
but is the essence of every individual…’, and ‘my own existence is social activity.’35 In what 
sense, then, does The German Ideology critically transform the 1844 writings? In what sense 
does it (retroactively) provide these writings with a historical logic? 
We might begin by considering the concept of nature in relation to the ‘first premise of 
all human history’. The human being does not make its own history alongside a self-sufficient 
nature, a nature in itself and as such. More radically, the first premise of all human history is 
the premise of history per se: the notion of a ‘history of nature’ in isolation from the ‘existence 
of living human individuals’ is, for Marx, nonsensical. As he puts it: ‘We know only a single 
science, the science of history. One can look at history from two sides and divide it into the 
history of nature and the history of humanity. The two sides are, however, inseparable; the 
history of nature and the history of humans are dependent on each other so long as humankind 
exists.’36 And further: ‘…nature, the nature that preceded human history, is not by any means 
the nature in which Feuerbach lives, it is nature which today no longer exists anywhere…and 
which, therefore, does not exist for Feuerbach.’37 Should humankind cease to exist, that would 
not mean that other forms of organic and inorganic matter would also not exist. Marx’s claim, 
                                                          
34 After Andrew Chitty, I translate Austausch as ‘interchange’ rather than ‘exchange’ [Tausch]. The 
former has a more expansive meaning than the latter: for Marx, Tausch denotes the exchange of private 
property, or what Chitty refers to as ‘conditional exchange’. See Andrew Chitty, ‘The Early Marx on 
Needs’, Radical Philosophy 64 (Summer 1993), 30, ft. 13. 
35 Marx, OPM, 538-39; Marx, AJM, 451; Marx, OPM, 538 (respectively, EPM, 138; JM, 265; EPM, 
137). ‘The human, much as it may therefore be a particular individual (and it is precisely its 
particularity which makes it an individual and an actual individual social being), is just as much the 
totality, the ideal totality, the subjective existence of thought and experienced society for itself; just as 
it exists also in actuality as the intuition and the actual enjoyment of social existence, and as a totality 
of the human manifestation of life.’ Marx, OPM, 539 (EPM, 138).  
36 This passage in The German Ideology is famous, in part, because it was crossed out in a final revision 
of the manuscript. This particular translation appears in Osborne, How to Read Marx, 38. Emphasis 
added. A slightly different translation of this passage also appears in a footnote in Alfred Sohn-Rethel, 
Intellectual and Manual Labour: a Critique of Epistemology [1970], trans. Martin Sohn-Rethel 
(Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1977), 18. 
37 Marx and Engels, GI, 63. 
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rather, is that these other forms of matter would be neither historical nor natural: ‘history’ and 
‘nature’ alike come to an end with the end of the human being. It is evident that, for Marx, the 
‘existence of living human individuals’ is inextricably tied to nature. But what is missing from 
the 1844 Manuscripts and the notebooks on James Mill, and what is emphasised from the very 
outset of The German Ideology, is (to rework the 1844 Manuscripts) the existence of humans 
as natural-historical beings and nature as a human-historical means of life, which is to say a 
human-historical ‘matter, …object, and…instrument of life activity.’38 The German Ideology 
clearly continues the emphasis the 1844 Manuscripts place upon humanity’s metabolism with 
nature. At the same time, this shared emphasis is critically enriched in The German Ideology, 
because it is framed by a decisive historical logic which structures human universality qua the 
objectification of its labour. This opens up the possibility of conceiving nature as an ongoing 
extension of the human, such that nature becomes humanity’s historical ‘inorganic body’. The 
explicit association between labour, universality and nature in the works from 1844 finds its 
historical-ontological ground in The German Ideology. Whilst the temporal consequences of 
this remain to be developed, we might suggest that the materialist concept of history can be 
grasped as a continual cross-fertilisation between the temporality of human activity and that 
of nature, or, in the language of the ‘materialist method’, as an ‘intercourse’ [Verkehr] between 
the inseparable temporalities of the natural-human and those of human-nature.  
Marx’s differentiation of the human from the animal originates with the notion that the 
human actively produces its means of life, whilst the existence of the animal does not exceed 
the means it discovers. For Marx, the animal does not produce its means of life, therefore its 
reproduction is wholly dependent on the discovery of that which it cannot produce, and, thus, 
of that which it is not and cannot be. Strictly speaking, Marx’s animal is ontologically static: 
it has no history, nor does it have temporality. This dovetails with Kate Soper’s assertion that 
‘all animals reproduce themselves, only human beings hitherto have reproduced themselves 
in the form of an ever-expanding social and objectively existing patrimony.’39 The animal has 
no capacity to be more than itself. That which it was, that which it is, and that which it is not 
yet collapse into one another, rendering the three dimensions of human time meaningless in 
relation to the animal. To put it another way, the human produces its own temporality, whilst 
the animal does not. The only temporality to which the human and the animal alike are subject 
                                                          
38 Marx, OPM, 516 (EPM, 112).  
39 Kate Soper, On Human Needs: Open and Closed Theories in a Marxist perspective (Brighton: 
Harvester Press; Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1981), 46. As Marx and Engels state in The 
German Ideology: ‘…the production, as well as the satisfaction…of needs is a historical process, which 
is not found in the case of a sheep or dog…although sheep and dogs in their present form certainly, but 
malgré eux, are products of a historical process.’ Quoted in ibid.  
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to is a particular temporality of nature: a cosmological time marked by a succession of instants, 
indifferent to the physiological life and death of all organisms.40 The animal is not a social, an 
economic, nor a historical being: ‘the animal does not enter into “relations” with anything, it 
does not enter into any relation at all. For the animal, its relation to others does not exist as a 
relation.’41 In some regards, there is precedence to this differentiation between the human and 
the animal in The German Ideology. The 1844 Manuscripts declare that the animal ‘produces 
one-sidedly…produces only itself,’ whereas the human ‘produces universally…reproduces 
the whole of nature.’42 Here, as elsewhere, labour distinguishes the human from the animal. 
As is well-known, Marx’s philosophical anthropology before The German Ideology is rooted 
in a deeply Romantic, positive depiction of labour. Labour is the human’s life-activity, its act 
of self-creation and self-actualisation, its becoming-for-itself, the practice that constitutes its 
existence and through which its essence, the meaning of human being, is intelligible. In the 
1844 Manuscripts, the object of labour – both material and spiritual – is the objectification of 
the human as the living genus, the materialisation of human activity in what Marx variously 
characterises as ‘true’, ‘inner’ or ‘human’ property.43 The object of labour is universal because 
it can be made, and used, by any social individual. Equally, the universality of genus-activity 
is actualised within each activity itself: each object that is produced by human labour becomes 
the representative of a particular species to which it belongs.44 That is, the human’s existence 
as a genus-being [Gattungswesen] – qua universal and consciously free being – bestows upon 
those objects that it creates (itself and other things) the status of species-being. For Marx, this 
concept of labour is what differentiates the human from the animal. 
At the same time, the 1844 writings do not thematise the idea that labour historicalises, 
that the production of the means of life is ‘a definite form of activity of…individuals, a definite 
form of expressing their life, a definite mode of life on their part.’45 How does The German 
Ideology establish the creation of the means of life as a historical dynamic? How is the concept 
of ‘life’ in Marx a distinctly historical concept? How does the production of the means of life 
– the economic – constitute the elementary content of Marx’s philosophy of history?  
                                                          
40 Osborne, How to Read Marx, 40. 
41 Marx and Engels, GI, 51. Emphasis added. 
42 Marx, EPM, 113. 
43 As Chitty reminds us, Marx’s concept of ‘true’, ‘inner’ or ‘human’ property and its differentiation 
from ‘outer’ or ‘private’ property, derives from Hegel’s conception of property as the objectification 
of free will in The Philosophy of Right (§41) and its opposition to ‘possession’ (§45). Possession is 
particular, whilst property is rational, and thereby universal (§49). See Chitty, ‘The Early Marx on 
Needs’, 30, ft. 19. This dovetails with the difference between ‘interchange’ [Austausch] as opposed to 
‘exchange’ [Tausch]. 
44 Ibid. 24. 
45 Marx and Engels, GI, 42. Emphasis added. A bit later: ‘…definite individuals who are productively 
active in a definite way enter into…definite social and political relations.’ Ibid. 46. Emphasis added. 
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At this point, it is instructive to consider three additional points made in a passage from 
The German Ideology which elaborate on the ‘first premise of all human history’: 
 
(1) …[We] must begin by stating the first premise of all human existence and, therefore, 
of all history, the premise, namely, that humans must be in a position to live in order 
to be able to “make history”. But life involves before everything else eating and 
drinking, a habitation, clothing and many other things. The first historical act is thus 
the creation of the means to satisfy these needs, the production of material life itself. 
And indeed this is a historical act, a fundamental condition of all history, which today, 
as thousands of years ago, must daily and hourly be fulfilled merely in order to sustain 
human life… 
 
(2) The second point is that the satisfaction of the first need, the action of satisfying and 
the instrument of satisfaction which has been acquired, leads to new needs; and this 
creation of new needs is the first historical act…  
 
(3) The third relation which, from the very outset, enters into historical development, is 
that humans, who daily remake their own life, begin to make other humans, to 
reproduce [fortzupflanzen] their kind: the relation between man and woman, parents 
and children, the family… 
 
These three aspects of social activity are not of course to be taken as three different 
stages, but just as three sides or, to make it clear to the Germans, three “moments”, 
which have existed simultaneously since the dawn of history and the first humans, and 
which still assert themselves in history today.46 
 
The long passage quoted here introduces a transhistorical concept of life grounded in basic 
physiological needs: food, drink, habitation, clothing and so on. Obviously, the need to sustain 
human life at its most elemental level never disappears, no matter how sophisticated economic 
activity becomes. The new needs that are created via the satisfaction of these first needs never 
leave the domain of the basic sustenance of the human, even as they are not readily identifiable 
as basic components of human life. In other words, new needs always bear some relation to 
human survival: the social production of the means of life can never be disassociated from the 
social production of the means of subsistence, even as the expression of human life exceeds, 
as Marx and Engels convey it in the earlier passage, ‘the reproduction of the physical existence 
of…individuals’. In short, The German Ideology operates with a radically expanded concept 
of subsistence registered by the concept of life. But a difficulty arises in these passages: the 
social production of the means of life includes two ‘first historical acts’. How do we address 
this apparent tension? 
                                                          
46 Marx and Engels, DI, 28-9 (GI, 48-50). 
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The answer to this begins with the multifaceted evolution of the transhistorical concept 
of need [Bedürfnis] in the 1844 Manuscripts. In this text, the social human is specified by the 
production and consumption of social objects. For Marx, the human being’s relation to these 
objects is one of appropriation: the human re-appropriates the objectification of its own life-
activity, and thereby produces a return of itself to itself as a totality. This is the ‘manifestation 
of…human reality.’47 As the bearers of human beings’ essential powers, objects affirm, and 
indeed give pleasure, to human sensuousness. As opposed to the Theses, an orthodox meaning 
of sensuousness (via Hegel and Feuerbach) is being invoked here, drawing on Kant’s Critique 
of Pure Reason and pointing to the human as an irretrievably receptive, passive and suffering 
being. In the 1844 Manuscripts, as an objective and sensuous being, the human is not merely 
a suffering [leidendes], but a passionate [leidenschaftliches], being, insofar as it feels its self-
manifestation qua labour as an affirmation of its essence. These feelings are not mere matters 
of cognition, but, for Marx, ontologically basic forces which determine the whole being of the 
human. The interchange of human activities and products cultivates [Bildung] and mediates 
human sensuousness: ‘…not only the five senses but also the so-called mental senses – the 
practical senses (will, love, etc.) – in a word, human sense – the human nature of the senses – 
comes to be by virtue of its object, by virtue of humanised nature.’48 This manifold expansion 
of the meaning of the senses goes hand-in-hand with Marx’s expansion of the philosophical 
scope of the object, labour and nature. The power [Kraft] behind this manifold expansion, this 
conceptual interdependence between the object, labour, nature and the senses, and hence this 
essential wealth of human being, is sociality itself: ‘the social character is the general character 
of the whole movement.’49 
In the 1844 Manuscripts, Marx’s conception of need is the fullest and most developed 
representation of this expansive human: ‘the wealthy human is simultaneously the human in-
need-of a totality of human life-expression; it is the human in whom its own realisation exists 
as inner necessity, as need [Not].’50 To be ‘in-need-of a totality of human life-expression’ is 
to be in-need-of the sheer diversity and refinement of the objectification of consciously free 
                                                          
47 Marx, EPM, 139. 
48 Marx, OPM, 542 (EPM, 137). ‘…established society produces humans in the entire wealth of their 
being – produces wealthy humans profoundly endowed with all the senses – as their enduring actuality.’ 
Ibid. This established society [gewordne Gesellschaft] is for Marx the meaning of communism.  
49 Marx, EPM, 137. 
50 Ibid. 144. This is a modified transcription of Chitty’s translation of this passage in the 1844 
Manuscripts, with ‘human’ replacing ‘man’ and ‘it/its’ replacing ‘he/his’. Chitty’s translation is vastly 
superior to others because it highlights Marx’s use of Bedürfnis as well as Not. The meaning of the 
latter revolves between ‘exigency’, ‘necessity’ and ‘distress’. See Chitty, ‘The Early Marx on Needs,’ 
26, 30 ft. 6. Marx’s use of Not in relation to Bedürfnis in this passage fills out the relation between 
human sensuousness and needs in the 1844 Manuscripts.  
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human life-activity as genus-activity.51 It is, as Andrew Chitty contends, the fact that ‘human 
beings express themselves through the creation of universal objects, and so the need for human 
life-expression is the need to create such objects for other human beings, i.e. to create objects 
that can in principle satisfy the needs of any human being...’52 – and we might add: for human 
beings to consume universal objects created by other human beings. In this way, human needs 
are defined by particular individuals’ needs for one another, the need to be social in the sense 
of the ‘interchange’ of individuals’ activities and products. But there is another dimension to 
need here as well. Bearing in mind that Marx’s conception of the human is both an individual 
already in relation to other individuals and that very relation itself, the totality of human life-
expression that the human needs is not reducible to an aggregate production and consumption 
of universal objects, but is equally the very interdependency between objectification (human 
property), essential activity (labour) and cultivated pleasure (sensuousness) itself. In the 1844 
Manuscripts, the human’s need to be a social relation is at once the source of its individuation, 
without which the unencumbered, consciously free refinement and diversification of needs 
cannot proceed. When, at a much later date, Marx states that in the future past of communism 
‘…labour has become not only the means of life, but life’s first need…’53, this is a speculative 
call for an indissociable social and individual life, wherein the production of new needs is the 
reproduction of the human as equally a ‘wealthy’ social relation and particular individual. For 
Marx, it is because of need that there are individuals, which is to say that need constitutes the 
ontological basis of the sociality of human individuation (there is no division of labour without 
need: the division of labour ontologically proceeds from human need).  
As with the concept of nature and the differentiation of the human from the animal, The 
German Ideology is in some respects continuous with this understanding of need in the 1844 
Manuscripts. Need is the ontologically basic meaning of life in both texts. Whilst The German 
Ideology is not premised upon an affirmation of life or a confirmation of an authentic human-
nature – a discourse shot through the 1844 texts54 – it nonetheless remains squarely within the 
bounds of the Romantic expression of the ways and means of life. It is difficult to identify a 
discourse more fundamental to The German Ideology than the production of the means of life. 
                                                          
51 For an overview of Marx’s concept of need, see Philip J. Kain, Marx and Modern Political Theory: 
from Hobbes to Contemporary Feminism (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1993), 185-86.  
52 Chitty, ‘The Early Marx on Needs’, 26. 
53 Karl Marx, Kritik des Gothaer Programms [1875], in Marx and Engels, MEW, Band 19 (Berlin: 
Dietz Verlag, 1987), 21 (Karl Marx, Critique of the Gotha Programme, in The Marx-Engels Reader, 
Second Edition, ed. Robert C. Tucker (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1978), 531). The 
German reads as follows: ‘…nachdem die Arbeit nicht nur Mittel zum Leben, sondern selbst das erste 
Lebensbedürfnis geworden…’. 
54 See, in particular, Marx’s fictional ‘conversation’ with another ‘fully human being’ in his notebooks 
on James Mill: Marx, AJM, 462-63 (JM, 277-78). 
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Yet, in nearly every other respect, Marx’s subsumption of need under a historical logic marks 
a break with the 1844 texts in ways far more consequential than the retroactive transformation 
of concepts such as nature and the human into historical concepts. ‘Need’ has not just become 
structured by a historical logic, but more crucially structures that very logic itself. The concept 
of need in The German Ideology is a vital dimension of the very meaning of historicalisation: 
insofar as labour historicalises, this cannot be comprehended apart from the production of the 
means to satisfy existing needs and the creation of new needs. Put differently, it is The German 
Ideology which philosophically enables ‘labour’ to be registered as an economic and historical 
concept, and history to be irretrievably tied to subsistence-level needs. When Marx and Engels 
speak of the material production of life itself, ‘both of one’s own in labour and of fresh life in 
procreation,’55 they are explicitly referencing the basic need of the human to subsist. This is a 
radical focussing and concretising of the 1844 Manuscripts, whereby the ‘totality of human 
life-expression’ becomes permanently connected and ultimately reducible to material life as 
such. However, this is not necessarily a limitation of the scope of the 1844 Manuscripts. There 
is no reason to believe in the wake of The German Ideology that the human cannot be rendered 
in-need-of this totality, but only that this totality is permanently grounded in the recognition 
that the human ‘must be in a position to live’. This is the reason why Marx and Engels bemoan 
the fact that: 
 
In the whole conception of history up to the present this actual basis of history has 
either been totally neglected or else considered as a minor matter quite irrelevant to 
the course of history. Hence history must always be written according to an extraneous 
standard; the actual production of life seems to be primeval history, whilst the truly 
historical appears to be separated from ordinary life, something extra-superterrestrial 
[Extra-Überweltliche]. With this the relation of humans to nature is excluded from 
history and hence the antithesis of nature and history is created.56 
 
 
The philosophy of history which Marx and Engels criticise in this passage is premised upon a 
fetishised conception – and, one might add, a de-historicalising temporality – of nature, which 
becomes the exclusive domain of the actual production of life, and which erases, as previously 
mentioned, humans as natural-historical beings and nature as a human-historical means of life. 
This philosophy of history is ideologically opposed to the conceptual status which Marx and 
Engels give to a ‘mode of production’ [produktionsweise], a concept which expresses history 
as a definite form of the production and reproduction of human life. 
                                                          
55 Marx and Engels, GI, 50. 
56 Marx and Engels, DI, 39 (GI, 59). 
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This brings us to the third ‘moment’ of history, to the place occupied by the biological 
reproduction of the human – the propagation of the human as a living organism – in relation 
to the materialist concept of history more generally. On the one hand, this reproduction is a 
philosophical problem for Marx, because the social materialism begun in the Theses and given 
historicalising power in The German Ideology is indifferent to the matter of this reproduction, 
which is to say – above all else – the procreative capacities of the human body. On the other 
hand, the meaning of history in The German Ideology is simultaneously the acknowledgement 
and perpetuation of this indifference. In this work, social activity is historical activity precisely 
because ‘life’ ontologically proceeds from the social needs of living human beings, not from 
the biological genesis of human life itself. Life is first and foremost a social category in Marx, 
such that need and labour – the two fundamental expressions of human sociality – provide life 
with its historical intelligibility. The point here is not to downplay the importance of biological 
reproduction, but rather to indicate that this third moment is only ‘historical’ by virtue of the 
fact that it is internal to the social production of the means of human life (here the ‘means’ are 
‘fresh lives’ themselves). Framed, as it is, by a relational ontology, the moment of biological 
reproduction also introduces another tenet of Marx’s philosophy of history: the production of 
the means of life is inseparable from the kind of relations that structure this production. In the 
case of biological reproduction, Marx and Engels characterise these relations as the relations 
between man and woman, parents and children, the family, and so on, relations that raise the 
question of whether ‘the economic’ in Marx is a sexed ontological category of the human, and 
thus a sexed category of history. The philosophical and political significance of this question 
is not realised by the obvious answer (the economic is undeniably a sexed category in Marx), 
but rather by the potential formation of a materialist feminism made possible by this answer. 
In The German Ideology and elsewhere, there is no evidence to suggest that Marx thinks ‘sex’ 
as anything else than biologically given (that is to say that individual human bodies are sexed 
prior to their socialisation), a testament – rich with irony – to the remarkable ideological power 
of the dominant concept of sex which, suffice to say, excises nature from history and undercuts 
the social core of Marx’s concept of the human. From the standpoint of the philosophy of sex, 
The German Ideology is complicit in its critique of ‘self-sufficient philosophy’ as being blind 
to ‘the practical activity, the practical process of the development of humans.’57 Yet it is also 
essential to state that The German Ideology potentially fosters a critical theory of sex, wherein 
‘sex’ is not a fetishised ‘natural’ given but a social relation which the production of the means 
of life reproduces and upon which it depends. Christine Delphy’s work on the relation between 
                                                          
57 Marx and Engels, DI, 27 (GI, 48).  
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materialism and oppression is the crucial point of departure here. For her, sex is a category of 
domination, a social relation of oppression wherein biological reproduction is the historically 
exploitative domain of social life as a woman. In this reading of Marx’s materialism, historical 
oppression is ‘the fundamental reality, the point of departure.’58 
It is difficult to overstate how pivotal the concept of means [Mittel] is to the materialist 
concept of history. This importance emerges with the first of the two first historical acts: the 
creation of the means to satisfy existing needs (not the satisfaction of those needs themselves). 
This emphasis on means returns us to the apparent tension between the two first historical acts 
that constitute history. The second first historical act, the creation of new needs, must now be 
examined in relation to the first first historical act, the creation of the means to satisfy existing 
needs. The issue here is not the content of new needs, but the way in which these needs – qua 
new – constitute a historical logic more generally. Marx and Engels are not confusing matters 
by identifying two first historical acts, but in fact consider the creation of the means to satisfy 
existing needs and the creation of new needs as two different expressions of one and the same 
historical act.59 In this sense, ‘means’ and ‘the new’ are conceptually indissociable in Marx.60 
The production of the means of life, not life per se, unites existing and new needs, whilst not 
collapsing the difference between the domain of the existing and that of the new. What follows 
from this is an unmistakable – if underdeveloped – historical logic. A dynamic and open ‘first 
historical act’ gives rise to a concept of history that is implicitly alien to any fixed opposition 
between the existing and the new. The notion of historical change is consequently destabilised. 
Establishing the difference and relation between one historical act and another, demarcating 
the end of one historical act and the beginning of another, becomes unsettled in the sense that 
                                                          
58 ‘Marxism is…materialist. To this extent it can be used by feminism. Insofar as materialism concerns 
oppression, and inversely if we accept that to start from oppression defines among other things a 
materialist approach, “a feminist science…wants to reach an explanation of the oppression; to do this 
it must start with it (and)…it will tend inevitably towards a materialist theory of history”…materialism 
is not one possible tool, amongst others, for oppressed groups; it is the tool precisely in so far as it is 
the only theory of history for which oppression is the fundamental reality, the point of departure.’ 
Christine Delphy, ‘A Materialist Feminism is Possible’, trans. Diana Leonard, Feminist Review 4 
(1980), 87. The quotation embedded within this passage is a self-quotation by Delphy, from ‘Pour un 
feminisme materialiste’, L’Arc 61 (1976).  
59 As Peter Osborne states, ‘Marx’s grammar is confusing (the manuscript never received its final 
revision), but there is only one act at issue here. The “production of the means to satisfy existing needs” 
and the “creation of new needs” refer to two aspects of the same act, since the production of new means 
to satisfy existing needs creates a (hitherto non-existent) need for these means.’ Osborne, How to Read 
Marx, 41. For an additional explanation of this ‘confusion’, see Soper, On Human Needs, 46.  
60 This conceptual inseparability critically enriches Marx’s understanding of the human as a ‘genus-
being’ [Gattungswesen] in the 1844 Manuscripts. If the movement of Gattungswesen is the movement 
of humans becoming more than themselves, if it denotes the movement whereby humans become 
‘more-than-human’ [Übermensch], then The German Ideology effectively stipulates that this 
movement is based in the historical and historicalising movement which is the creation of new needs.  
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it is impossible to claim that there is such a thing as ‘after’ the social production of the means 
of life. This impossibility is underpinned by the concept of means, which, like Marx’s concept 
of ‘productive force’, can (at least in part) be grasped as an objectification of a social relation 
orientated towards an end, in fact the end (teleologically speaking), which is nothing else than 
life itself. The materialist concept of history is structured by a dialectic between existing and 
new needs, which is, moreover, a necessarily open dialectic, because the end (chronologically 
speaking) of the first historical act is, strictly speaking, unintelligible. Thus the question arises: 
is there a historical temporality to be disinterred from this?  
Marx and Engels never offer a temporal reading of the first historical act, but it is useful 
to make two broad observations. First, a dialectical interplay between the present and the past 
is signalled by the premise that the new resides within the means of satisfying existing needs. 
The domain of the past, or existing needs, all the way down to the basic need to eat, drink and 
sleep, cannot be thought apart from the means to satisfy such needs. Nor is the domain of the 
present, the production of these means, intelligible in isolation from the content of what they 
satisfy. There is no chronological succession here: one moment (the existence of a need) is 
not subsequently followed by another (the creation of the means to satisfy this need). Rather, 
the domain of the present is the dialectic between the creation of the means to satisfy existing 
needs and the creation of new needs. That is, the present is a dialectic unto itself, and it actively 
creates the past as an existing need. The relationship between the present and the past is thus 
a dialectical relationship between a dialectical present and a non-dialectical past. This is an 
interplay between the present and the past which clearly prioritises the present over the past, 
because the production of the means of life is the production of both new and existing needs. 
Existing needs and the production of the means to satisfy them may codetermine one another, 
but this relationship would be essentially static – it would have no temporality – were it not 
for these means. In Marx, the priority of the historical present – the priority of the actual – is 
indebted to the concept of means. This leads to the second observation. The future of the first 
historical act gives direction to the dialectic of the present and the past. The future by no means 
predetermines this dialectic, but it does guide the present’s ongoing creation and negation of 
the existence of the past, which is to say the ongoing expansion and satisfaction of social needs 
within the present. Yet – quite crucially – the future does not lie in waiting. The domain of the 
future is not the waiting overcoming of the present in the same way that the present actually 
overcomes the past. It is not the speculative formal repetition of an actual dialectic played out 
between the present and the past. To take this stance would be to relegate the future, and with 
it the temporality of the first historical act more generally, to a historicist framework wherein 
the future becomes ‘a moment which has yet to arrive’. Rather, the future is wholly immanent 
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to the present’s transcendence of the past. Better yet: the present’s dialectical transcendence 
of the past is the past’s future (the present is the future of the past). Taken together, these two 
observations give shape to the twofold temporality of the first historical act.61 
The question now is: do the other decisive aspects of the materialist concept of history 
reframe, modify and expand this temporality of the first historical act? Do these aspects add a 
new dimension to this temporal reading of the materialist concept of history? Marx’s concept 
of need is undoubtedly a cornerstone of his transhistorical concept of wealth [Reichtum], such 
that the dialecticisation of need in The German Ideology provides wealth with its overriding 
structure of historical measure. In Marx, following Hegel, to dialecticise is to historicalise: the 
economic is a category of the philosophy of history because the social production of the means 
of life is internally – and dialectically so – differentiated between the creation of the means to 
satisfy existing needs and the creation of new needs. To dialecticise is also to temporalise: if 
‘time’ is the name of the abstract unity of the past, the present and the future, temporalisation 
is the active production of the dynamic relations between these coordinates because practice 
and labour are – from the very outset – dialectical concepts in Marx. However, need does not, 
unto itself, exhaust the philosophical scope of the economic. The creation of the means of life 
is of course the social creation of the means of life, such that the kinds of relations that govern 
this creation also govern the temporal and historical intelligibility of ‘means’ and ‘life’ alike. 
Additionally, despite the fact that the means of life have now been investigated in relation to 
need, it is crucial to expand on the philosophical character of these means, such that they and 
the needs they satisfy can be understood as productive forces [Produktivkräfte]. This must be 
done if, on some level, ‘history’ for Marx is the dialectical correspondence [Entsprechung] of 
the economic subject to itself, if, in other words, it is the ongoing creation of new needs and 
the expansion of productive forces corresponding to this creation. Simply put, we have arrived 
at the essential contradiction between productive forces and the ‘form’, ‘means’ and ‘relations 
of intercourse’ [Verkehrsform, Verkehrsmittel, Verkehrsverhältnisse, respectively], each of 
                                                          
61 Biological reproduction can be made to fit within the framework of this twofold temporality. As 
regards the relationship between biological, social and historical time in Marx, it is worthwhile perhaps 
to rework the famous passage from the Introduction to the ‘B’ (or 1787) edition of the Critique of Pure 
Reason, and to suggest that ‘…although all social and historical time commences with biological time, 
…it does not on that account all arise from biological time’ (cf. ‘…although all our cognition 
commences with experience, …it does not on that account all arise from experience’ Kant, CPR, B 1-
2, 136.) This move fundamentally inverts Kant: it imposes the a posteriori – or social and historical 
time in Marx – on Kant’s a priori, whilst holding on to the necessary and universal character exclusive 
to this a priori. The same manoeuvre is made in the next chapter, in relation to Heidegger’s practical 
philosophy.  
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which prefigure the place of the ‘relations of production’ [Produktionsverhältnisse] in Marx’s 
philosophy of history more generally.62  
This arrival first necessitates a brief digression on the relationship between The German 
Ideology and an ongoing point of contention within Marx and Marxism alike. This is an issue 
which proceeds from the fact that The German Ideology, not Marx’s well-known 1859 preface 
to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (hereafter Contribution), first outlines 
the contradiction between the forces and relations of production at the level of the philosophy 
of history. The German Ideology, on the whole, affords a richer and more complex reading of 
the philosophical contours of ‘the economic’ than the Contribution. But it also functions as a 
foundation for the much maligned ‘base-superstructure’ model announced by the preface to 
the Contribution,63 even as this model does not openly figure in The German Ideology.64 There 
is an ‘economic basis’ in The German Ideology, synonymous with ‘material life itself’, which 
for Marx and Engels is the ‘actual basis of history’ and which might provisionally be defined 
as ‘the totality of the relations of production which correspond to a determinate level of the 
forces of production’. And it is certainly possible to interpret this basis as (implicitly) yielding 
a superstructure [Überbau] within which historical consciousness is dynamically embedded.65 
Yet there are other factors which need to be considered in relation to this model, factors which, 
when engaged, mitigate – and arguably put to rest – charges that Marx’s philosophy of history 
is underpinned by a mechanistic ‘economic determinism’ and vulgar historicism. One of these 
is the manner in which there is already always a political dimension to the economic basis in 
Marx, upsetting any fixed distinction between the ‘economic’ and the ‘political’ as such within 
his corpus. Consider, for instance, Marx’s analysis of the genesis of capitalist ground-rent, in 
                                                          
62 ‘Relations of production’ is not established as a concept in The German Ideology, but Marx and 
Engels already speak of the contradiction between ‘forms of intercourse’ and productive forces as the 
‘origin’ of ‘all collisions in history’. See Marx and Engels, GI, 89. 
63 The relevant passage in the Contribution is: ‘In the social production of their lives, humans inevitably 
enter into definite, necessary relations, which are independent of their will, namely, relations of 
production corresponding to a determinate stage of development of their material forces of production. 
The totality [Gesamtheit] of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, 
the real basis on which there arises a legal and political superstructure and to which there correspond 
definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the general 
process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of humans that determines 
their being, but their social being that determines their consciousness.’ Karl Marx, Zur Kritik der 
Politischen Ökonomie [1859] (hereafter KPÖ), in Marx and Engels, MEW, Band 13 (Berlin: Dietz 
Verlag, 1961), 8-9 (Marx, Contribution, 20-1).  
64 It is important to point out that this model barely emerges after the Contribution. It appears only 
once in the first volume of Capital, in a footnote at that. See Karl Marx, Capital: a Critique of Political 
Economy, Vol. 1: the Process of Production of Capital [1867] (hereafter Capital 1), trans. Ben Fowkes 
(London and New York: Penguin Books, 1976), 175, ft. 35. 
65 Various passages in The German Ideology anticipate the preface to the Contribution, most notably: 
‘Life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life.’ Marx and Engels, GI, 47. 
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which he declares that ‘the specific economic form in which unpaid surplus-labour is pumped 
out of the direct producers determines the relation of domination and bondage, as this grows 
directly out of production itself and in turn reacts back on it [production] in determining it.’66 
This passage is of course specific to a particular mode of production, but it nonetheless directs 
our attention to the viable possibility of reading the base-superstructure model as immanently 
co-constitutive, such that each ‘level’ mutually determines one another. This reading eases the 
philosophical rigidity in proclamations such as ‘life determines consciousness, consciousness 
does not determine life’. As Raymond Williams argues, we have to ‘revalue “determination”’ 
in this model ‘towards the setting of limits and the exertion of pressure, and away from a 
predicted, prefigured and controlled content’, in order to move the superstructure away from 
a unilaterally ‘reflected, reproduced or specifically dependent content.’67 For Gramsci, this is 
the fashion in which ideology already always permeates every facet of the base, including the 
development of ‘organic’ and ‘conjunctural’ movement within the base.68 These interventions 
foster, internal to the philosophy of history, the possibility of a new reading of Marx’s relation 
to Hegel, one grounded in an understanding of life which does much more than simply ‘invert’ 
consciousness.69 This mutual constitution need not, as Althusser warns against, smuggle in an 
idealist dialectic, because it would be consistent with the idea that the economic is – but only 
‘in the last instance’ – the ontological ground of history. Engels’s 1890 letter to Joseph Bloch 
sums this up quite nicely: ‘According to the materialist conception of history, the determining 
moment in history in the last instance is the production and reproduction of actual life. More 
than this neither Marx nor I have ever asserted. Therefore, if somebody twists this into saying 
                                                          
66 Karl Marx, Das Kapital: Kritik der politischen Ökonomie, Dritter Band: Der Gesamtprozeß der 
kapitalistischen Produktion [1894], herausgegeben von Friedrich Engels (hereafter Kapital 3), in Marx 
and Engels, MEW, Band 25 (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1964), 799 (Karl Marx, Capital: a Critique of 
Political Economy, Vol. 3: the Process of Capitalist Production as a Whole (hereafter Capital 3), ed. 
Friedrich Engels, trans. David Fernbach (London and New York: Penguin Books, 1991), 927. 
Emphasis added. See also Louis Althusser, ‘Is it Simple to be a Marxist in Philosophy?’ [1975], Essays 
in Self-Criticism, ed. and trans. Grahame Lock (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1998), 176.  
67 Raymond Williams, ‘Base and Superstructure in Marxist Cultural Theory’, New Left Review I/82 
(November/December 1973), 6. 
68 Antonio Gramsci, ‘Analysis of Situations. Relations of Force’ [1931-1934], in Selections from the 
Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, ed. and trans. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (New 
York: International Publishers, 1999), 180.  
69 An underappreciated contribution to this reading, which in many ways is more sophisticated than 
Marx’s well-known critiques of Hegel, is Herbert Marcuse, Hegel’s Ontology and the Theory of 
Historicity [1932], trans. Seyla Benhabib (Cambridge and London: MIT Press, 1989). In the shadow 
of Marx and Heidegger, this work is a systematic attempt to establish the philosophical basis of history 
within life, qua the ‘motility’ [Bewegtheit] of being, by way of a critical reconstruction of Hegel’s 
Logic, the Early Theological Writings and the Phenomenology. 
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that the economic moment is the only determining one, he transforms that proposition into a 
meaningless, abstract, senseless phrase.’70  
Setting aside this digression, we must now address, albeit at a broad level of abstraction, 
the relationship between the temporality of the first historical act and the dialectic of the forces 
and relations of production. In other words, what is the temporal relation between the dialectic 
of the creation of the means to satisfy existing needs and the creation of new needs, on the one 
hand, and the dialectic of the forces and relations of production, on the other? The answer to 
this question begins with a short account of what productive forces are. Along with needs and 
time71, productive forces fill out Marx’s category of wealth (‘wealth’, for Marx, is a particular 
relation between needs, productive forces and time.72) Accordingly, the scope of a productive 
force is expansive. It takes in, although it is not exhausted by, what David Harvey describes 
as ‘the power to transform and appropriate nature through human labour.’73 Productive forces 
encompass, but are irreducible to, the means of production [Produktionsmittel]: e.g. the tools, 
instruments, technologies and machineries of production (this includes, it is important to add, 
human bodies).74 Socialised matter – both organic and inorganic matter – is a productive force, 
and this register informs, to take the most notable example, Marx’s extensive analyses of the 
relationship between land and production. Conceptually, it is important to indicate that in The 
German Ideology and elsewhere, forces/powers [Kräfte] should be conceived as ontologically 
basic to ‘means’ [Mitteln], although our understanding of the relationship between ‘productive 
forces’ and the broader philosophical literature on forces/powers remains largely in the dark.75 
It would seem, at the very least, that Marx’s ‘productive force’ is indebted to the work of Kant, 
Hegel and particularly Leibniz, whose internalisation of motion and force within matter points 
towards a necessary condition of Marx’s critical reconstruction of materialism more broadly.76 
                                                          
70 Friedrich Engels, letter to Joseph Bloch (in Königsberg) on 21 September 1890, quoted in Althusser, 
‘Is it Simple to be a Marxist in Philosophy?’, 176. Translation modified: see Marx and Engels, MEW, 
Band 37 (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1967), 463. For Althusser, ‘…to talk about the determination by the 
economy in the last instance is to mark oneself off from every mechanistic conception of determinism 
and to adopt a dialectical position.’ Althusser, ‘Is it Simple to be a Marxist in Philosophy?’, 177. 
71 The essential relation between time and wealth is addressed in Chapter 3. As we will later see, ‘the 
whole development of wealth rests on the creation of disposable time.’ Marx, Grundrisse, 398. 
72 Osborne, ‘Marx and the philosophy of time’, 21. 
73 David Harvey, The Limits to Capital [1982] (London and New York: Verso, 1999), 101.) Alex 
Callinicos defines productive forces as ‘the methods of labour and thereby its social productivity.’ Alex 
Callinicos, Making History: Agency, Structure, and Change in Social Theory (Leiden/Boston/Cologne: 
Brill, 2004), 42-4. 
74 ‘Means of production’ also include the objective conditions without which social production cannot 
occur (e.g. office buildings, factories, fields, and so forth). 
75 To my knowledge, there is no work in the Anglophone secondary literature that looks at this relation. 
76 Drawing on an unpublished manuscript by Gareth Stedman Jones, Patrick Riley states (without 
providing any further analysis) that ‘…Leibniz’s notion of “force” and forces (Kräfte) may be the 
remote ancestor of Marx’s “forces of production”.’ Patrick Riley, Leibniz’s Universal Jurisprudence: 
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From the standpoint of classical political economy, Adam Smith and Friedrich List undeniably 
influence Marx’s conception of labour as a productive force. On the whole, the complex and 
multidimensional meaning of a productive force in Marx might be attributed to the fact that, 
in its dialectical relationship with a relation of production, it constitutes a purely social power 
that simultaneously arises from labour and is that through which labour actualises itself. This 
accounts for why, to take another example, Marx and Engels insist that the mode of social co-
operation amongst individuals in the production of their means of life ‘is itself a “productive 
force”.’77 At the same time, the dialectic between the forces and relations of production cannot 
be collapsed, if indeed, as Marx and Engels repeatedly state in The German Ideology, existing 
relations of production become ‘fetters’ to the expansion of productive forces, such that this 
ongoing conflict gives direction to history. What, if any, temporality can be gleaned from this, 
and what relation does this temporality have to the social production of the means of life (the 
temporality of the first historical act)? These questions are, at a transhistorical level, difficult, 
if not impossible, to answer, not simply because the temporality of a relation of production is 
only intelligible at the level of different modes of production (the temporal relation between 
the worker and the capitalist is, of course, not the same as that between the feudal serf and his 
lord), but also because the significance of the expansion of productive forces is not something 
which is unto itself temporally intelligible (unless, that is, one is satisfied, as Marx often seems 
to be, with the historicist framework of linear, progressive time being the implicit framework 
for our understanding of this expansion78). Even if, for Marx, a ‘force’ is a more ontologically 
expansive category than a ‘means’, such that forces are ontologically basic to means, it is the 
creation of the means of life, expressing as it does the temporality inherent in an act, that must 
anchor our (provisional) temporal understanding of history. There is no reason to suggest that 
the dialectic of the forces and relations of production could not be rendered as reinforcing the 
temporality of the dialectic of the present and the past previously analysed, thereby reinforcing 
the relative priority of the historical present over the historical past (the dialectic of the forces 
and relations of production is internal to the historical present), but this is something that can 
only be done at the level of a specific mode of production (this is not our current task79).  
                                                          
Justice as the Charity of the Wise (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996), 272. Marx expresses 
his admiration for Leibniz in a letter to Engels on 10 May 1870. See Marx and Engels, MEW, Band 32 
(Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1974), 504. 
77 Marx and Engels, GI, 50.  
78 Even if one tacitly accepts the historicist model of linear, progressive time, does the materialist 
concept of history not dictate that there is no historical temporality when there is no expansion of 
productive forces, that it is possible that stretches of chronological time can become ‘stagnant’ to the 
extent that they are void of historical time, outside of history itself?  
79 Chapter 4 investigates in more detail the essential correspondence between the creation of new needs 
and the expansion of productive forces.  
38 
 
What about the division of labour and class? This question clearly intersects with the 
dialectic of the forces and relations of production, but it must also be explored in its own right. 
In The German Ideology, there are certainly passages that register the idea that the division of 
labour and the resultant creation of classes is ‘one of the chief forces of history up till now.’80 
Indeed, as previously argued, if need constitutes the ontological basis of the sociality of human 
individuation, then we might follow this up by stating that the division of labour and class are 
the (to date) fundamental historical expressions of this. Ontologically this is true because this 
individuation first manifests itself through the division of labour81, and epistemologically this 
is true because the very thought of this as ‘historical’ – in fact the very thought of ‘history’ as 
opposed to its ‘actual act of genesis’82 – relies on the existence of a ruling class, without which 
‘the division between material and spiritual labour’ cannot appear.83  It is crucial to note here 
that this is a division between material [materiellen] and spiritual (or ‘intellectual’) [geistigen] 
labour, not a division between manual and mental labour. In The German Ideology (or for that 
matter anywhere else), Marx does not speak of ‘a division between manual and mental labour’. 
Material labour – the ‘actual basis’ of history – is not reducible to manual labour [manuelle 
Arbeit], nor is mental labour the same thing as spiritual/intellectual labour, since mental labour 
is inseparable from material labour (even the harshest manual drudgery still involves cognitive 
activity). However, as regards spiritual/intellectual labour, it is precisely the opposite: it must 
be dissociated from material labour, in order for history to be thought. It is thus misleading to 
translate ‘materiellen und geistigen Arbeit’ as ‘manual and mental labour’: to do so closes the 
door on the ongoing constitution of the open relationship between history and materiality. To 
take a contemporary example: the service industries in so-called ‘cognitive capitalism’ would 
not be material labour were this translation to capture the meaning of the division between 
materiellen und geistigen Arbeit. Service labour – which like all labour necessarily has some 
manual dimension – is material labour. Within capitalism, there is no such thing as ‘immaterial 
labour’84 except that which is spiritual labour, and only the bourgeoisie can be comprehended 
                                                          
80 Marx and Engels, GI, 65.  
81 What else but the social division of labour first differentiates one ‘individual’ from another? 
82 ‘The entire movement of history is, therefore, both its actual act of genesis (the birth act of its 
empirical existence) and also for its thinking consciousness the comprehended and known process of 
its becoming.’ Marx, EPM, 135. Chapter 4 will problematise the transhistoricality of this argument.  
83 The ‘division of labour only becomes truly such from the moment when a division between material 
and spiritual labour appears.’ Marx and Engels, DI, 31 (GI, 51). Emphasis added. The German reads 
as follows: ‘Die Teilung der Arbeit wird erst wirklich Teilung von dem Augenblicke an, wo eine Teilung 
der materiellen und geistigen Arbeit eintritt.’  
84 For Negri, ‘we live today in a society increasingly characterised by the hegemony of immaterial 
labour.’ Quoted in Tomba, Marx’s Temporalities, 145, ft. 243. More often than not, assertions such as 
these (thus the concept of ‘immaterial labour’) points to a basic misunderstanding of Marx, whereby 
matter, not sensuous human activity or labour, is the assumed ground of Marx’s concept of materialism. 
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as ‘immaterial labourers’ because they personify the thought (they are not the actual genesis) 
of history. Hence class is of vital importance to the materialist concept of history: it is a central 
condition of its thought. As Balibar puts it, ‘Marx…[extends] the scheme of the division of 
labour to its fullest extent…’, whereby he ‘accord[s] existence to classes on the dual plane of 
the division of labour and consciousness, and therefore also [makes]…the division of society 
into classes a condition or a structure of thought.’85  
We should, however, raise two points of caution here. First, whilst the division of labour 
and class can be understood as ‘chief forces of history’ (to date), they should not be understood 
as ontologically originary forces of history in the same way that labour and need can and must. 
The importance of the division of labour and class is unquestionable, but from the standpoint 
of the basic intelligibility of ‘history’, they are both logically and ontologically ‘down the line’ 
from labour and need.86 Second, we should be quite careful about how the division of labour 
and class are figured transhistorically. Whereas it is possible to consider the division of labour 
as truly transhistorical, from an original sexual division of labour implied by the third moment 
of history to some kind of technical division of labour under the conscious and rational control 
of the producers after capitalism, the same cannot be said of class: the social production of the 
means of life within communism cannot, of course, be conceived of as a ‘class act’.87 We also 
need to be careful about over-ontologising the division of labour and class, which is to say not 
extending their meaning at the level of a specific mode of production (particularly capitalism) 
to history as a whole (for example, the ‘exclusive ownership of the means of production’ is a  
specifically capitalist feature of class formation, whereas something like ‘the differentiation 
and grouping of humans in relation to the surplus product’ might be understood as valid within 
all history to date). However – and this point guides us into Chapter 2 – the division of labour 
and class register a fundamental question that this thesis cannot ignore, but that Marx does not 
provide us with the means of answering. Simply put: how do we comprehend the relationship 
between individual, social and historical temporalities? The division of labour and class may 
be the historical expressions of the sociality of human individuation (‘the individual’ may first 
actualise itself through the division of labour and classes), but this does not explain how an 
individual act temporalises, nor does it explain how the temporalities thereby produced relate 
                                                          
85 Balibar, The Philosophy of Marx, 46, 44.  
86 There is a material basis to history that is structured by human need and the labour that creates the 
means of satisfying this need. It is because of this basis that the division of labour and classes become 
intelligible.  
87 Marx and Engels never develop a conceptual relationship between class and the first historical act in 
The German Ideology, and for good reason: whilst it might be suggested that the first historical act has, 
on some level, been structured by class relations until now, class cannot have a conceptual place within 
this act, even if it is (to date) a condition of thinking this act.  
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to social and historical temporalities. Stated differently, The German Ideology establishes the 
ontological primacy of social and historical being through the categories of labour and need, 
but it does not address the complicated relationship between individual, social and historical 
temporalities that these categories implicitly register. This is a question that a temporal reading 
of the materialist concept of history cannot avoid. It is a question that cuts to the heart of what, 
as previously argued, Kant and Hegel do not provide: the philosophical ground of this reading, 
which is to say an account of why and how the act itself temporalises. This question not only 
compels us to look beyond Marx. It also introduces something without which the concept of 
historical time cannot be thought: historical totalisation.  
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Chapter Two 
Totalisation, Temporalisation and History: Heidegger and Sartre 
 
It remains the case that the totalisation differs from the totality in that the latter is 
totalised while the former totalises itself. In this sense, it is obvious that to totalise 
itself means to temporalise itself.1 
 
The human is a social being inasmuch as it is historically constituted as multiple individuals 
in relation to one another and those very relations themselves.2 History and the human are 
inseparable concepts in Marx, thus the temporal reading of the materialist concept of history 
must also be understood as the temporal reading of the human which creates and is created by 
this history. This understanding is mediated by the transhistorical concept of labour in general. 
As the social production of the means of life, which is a dialectical production of the means 
of life, labour is an ontological domain of temporalisation because it constitutes the movement 
of negation. As in Hegel, the dialectical movement of negation is in Marx the first and most 
evident register of an active difference between the past, the present and the future. But is the 
historical status of negation thereby secured? Is negation thereby the movement of historical 
temporalisation? The German Ideology offers a particular dialectic as a possible foundation 
of historical time: the dialectic of the creation of the means to satisfy existing needs and the 
creation of new needs. And it is through negation that the three temporal coordinates within 
this dialectic first becomes intelligible, such that there is futurity immanent to the present’s 
transcendence of the past. But in what sense is historical temporalisation about more than 
negation? In other words, with what, or rather through what, must negation be thought in order 
to reconstruct the materialist concept of history as a concept of historical time? 
The proposition of this chapter is that a concept of historical time cannot be constructed 
out of the materialist concept of history until dialectical negation is put in relation to historical 
totalisation, which is to say the totalisation of the time of all human lives. Whether it is openly 
acknowledged, left unstated or disavowed, this totalisation is the overarching intelligibility 
                                                          
1 Sartre, CDR 1, 53.  
2 The ‘social’ is not just direct communal relations. As Marx states: ‘Social activity…exist[s] by no 
means only in the form of some directly communal activity…when I am active scientifically…when I 
am engaged in activity which I can seldom perform in direct community with others, then I am social, 
because I am active as a human. Not only is the material of my activity given to me as a social product 
– as is even the language in which the thinker is active – my own existence is social activity, and 
therefore that which I make of myself, I make of myself for society and with the consciousness of 
myself as a social being.’ Marx, OPM, 538 (EPM, 137). 
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and narrative of every post-Enlightenment conception of history from the mid-eighteenth 
century onwards. Within the modern philosophy of history, this is the sense in which the 
human is ‘historical’ because history is the development of the time of the human species as 
a whole. Marx does not thematise this totalisation in relation to the materialist concept of 
history. ‘World history’ and the ‘world-historical’ figure in The German Ideology (primarily 
in relation to alienation and its speculative end in communism), but they are tautologically 
defined by Marx and Engels3, and the extent to which they function as totalising concepts is 
unclear. The world market is depicted as an integral dimension of the production of world 
history ‘for the first time’4, but its relation to the social production of the means of life is not 
established, and it is clearly a phenomenon specific to capitalism.5 As with Marx’s eleventh 
thesis on Feuerbach6, these concepts invoke the ordinary conception of ‘world’, a conception 
which (at least on the surface) is much more about space than it is about time. Therefore, the 
‘ongoing totalisation of the time of the human’7 is a philosophical problem for the materialist 
concept of history, because the relationship between totalisation and negation within this 
concept remains undeveloped. What is this relationship? Namely, how is totalisation a kind 
of temporalisation itself, indissociable from and yet irreducible to the movement of negation? 
These are crucial questions, if only because the consequence of not tying the movement 
of totalisation to temporalisation is the overdetermination of historical time in Marx by the 
other predominant thread of the post-Enlightenment conception of history: the idea that the 
human is subject to change over time. Totalisation is a condition of thinking this conception 
of history, because totalisation is a condition of thinking the objects – the totality of time and 
the totality of history – in, through and across which this conception of change is understood 
to occur. After Koselleck, this is history as ‘the collective singular form of Geschichte, which 
since around 1780 can be conceived as history in and for itself in the absence of an associated 
subject or object.’8 In Marx, this is the idea that social relations and the individuals which 
constitute these relations are subject to change over time, and moreover that the ways in which 
social relations change over time differs from how individuals change over time, and in fact 
determines how individuals change over time. In The German Ideology and elsewhere, Marx 
                                                          
3 ‘The proletariat can…only exist world-historically, just as communism, its activity, can only have a 
“world-historical” existence. World-historical existence of individuals means [the] existence of 
individuals which is directly linked up with world history.’ Marx and Engels, GI, 56. 
4 Ibid. 78. 
5 ‘The tendency to create the world market is directly given in the concept of capital itself.’ Marx, 
Grundrisse, 408. 
6 ‘The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it.’ Marx, 
ToF, 423.  
7 Osborne, ‘Marx and the philosophy of time’, 16. 
8 Koselleck, Future’s Past: on the Semantics of Historical Time, 236. 
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frequently invokes this historicist conception of historical time, because he implicitly treats 
historical time as the medium in which change within and between modes of production 
occurs. As the previous chapter demonstrates, the social production of the means of life bears 
a nonlinear temporal structure, but, this chapter maintains, Marx’s failure to examine this 
production in relation to totalisation unavoidably relegates historical change and historical 
difference within the materialist concept of history to a historicism which might be summed 
up as ‘the change and difference between one specific time and place and another’. However, 
the totalisation of history does not thereby constitute an appeal to the ‘synchronic’ as against 
the ‘diachronic’. And this is not, as Althusser has it, because the synchronic is an instant within 
‘the ideological conception of a continuous-homogenous time’, from which the diachronic 
becomes ‘successive contingent presents in the time continuum.’9 Rather, synchrony and 
diachrony are in origin ahistorical concepts which emerge from structuralist linguistics – qua 
the atemporal succession of semiological systems – and are thus ill-suited to thinking the 
essential relation between totalisation, temporalisation and the materialist concept of history.10 
Many questions arise: in what sense does totalisation register a non-historicist understanding 
of historical change and historical difference? In other words, in what sense does totalisation 
register an understanding of historical time as constituted by its own historicality, which is to 
say by different modes of production themselves? More basically, what is the relationship 
between totalisation and historicalisation?  
In order to address these questions – questions which will be carried over into Chapters 
3 and 4 – it is necessary to systematically investigate the relationship between totalisation and 
temporalisation, and to do so at the level of the phenomenological present which ‘contains the 
totality of the temporal spectrum within itself’ and which ‘alone gives direction to history.’11 
This present is not the Aristotelian instant within the divisible continuity of movement, but 
rather the present in the sense of the Augustinian ‘threefold present’ of memory, attention and 
expectation, the present, that is to say, in the sense of the durational ‘thick present’ of Edmund 
Husserl’s phenomenology of time consciousness, a constitutive present which must both be 
established in its own right and materialised as a historical present12 (the prioritised present of 
                                                          
9 Althusser, ‘The Errors of Classical Economics: an Outline for a Concept of Historical Time’, 96.  
10 See, in particular, Peter Osborne, The Politics of Time: Modernity and Avant-Garde (London: Verso, 
1995), 27-8. On this point, Osborne’s work is indebted to Johannes Fabian, Time and the Other: How 
Anthropology Makes its Object (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 55-6. As we will learn, 
Sartre makes use of the ‘synchronic’ and the ‘diachronic’ throughout both volumes of the Critique, 
unintentionally smuggling in a historicism to his account. 
11 Osborne, The Politics of Time: Modernity and Avant-Garde, 49, 140.  
12 See Harry Harootunian, ‘Remembering the Historical Present’, Critical Inquiry 33 (Spring 2007), 
477. For an analysis of the phenomenological present in Husserl, see Paul Ricœur, Time and Narrative, 
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the first historical act). Whilst the phenomenological present is not reducible to individual 
action, individual action is nonetheless ontologically prioritised within this present because, 
this chapter maintains, individual action is the first standpoint from which totalisation and its 
relation to temporalisation becomes intelligible. Consequently, individual action is the initial 
standpoint from which the existential structure of temporalisation renders the totalisation of 
history unavoidable.13 Herein lies the crucial importance of Heidegger’s Being and Time. His 
phenomenological ontology of Dasein (literally ‘being-there’) comprises the first two sections 
of this chapter because one of the main objectives of this ontology is to secure this priority of 
individual action through Dasein’s relationship to its death. For Heidegger, both the awaiting 
and the anticipation of this existential death are indelibly individual acts which ground the fact 
that ‘temporality temporalises’ as the ontological meaning of ‘care’, which, as we will learn, 
is the ontological meaning of Dasein as a structural whole.14 As we will examine, this being-
towards-death (albeit only in its ‘authentic’ mode) is the ‘hidden basis’ of Dasein’s historical 
being, its ‘historicality’ [Geschichtlichkeit].15  
The first volume of Sartre’s Critique of Dialectical Reason (hereafter Critique) is the 
focus of the final section of this chapter. An existential reading of the relationship between 
the new materialism of praxis in the Theses on Feuerbach and the historical materialism of 
need in The German Ideology, the Critique systematically reconstructs dialectics as the very 
movement of totalisation. For Sartre, individual praxis not only ontologically grounds this 
reconstruction, but so too the practical identity between totalisation and temporalisation, 
because it is individual praxis wherein the conceptual difference between ‘totalisation’ and 
‘totality’ is first revealed. This is the sense in which totalisation is a ceaselessly developing 
activity of synthetic unification16, whereas a totality is the exteriorised product of this activity, 
that which has been cut off from the totalising process of its production (which it nonetheless 
contains sedimented within itself). However – in Heidegger and Sartre alike – this process of 
unification should not be understood as subsequent to an existing state of difference. As with 
the previous chapter (one moment, the existence of a need, is not subsequently followed by 
another, the creation of the means to satisfy that need), there is no chronological succession 
                                                          
Volume 3 [1985], trans. Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1988), 23-44. 
13 Osborne, The Politics of Time: Modernity and Avant-Garde, X. 
14 For Heidegger, care [Sorge] is the totalised manifold of existence, which he formally defines as 
follows: ‘the being of Dasein means ahead-of-itself-being-already-in (the world) as being-alongside 
(entities encountered within-the-world).’ Martin Heidegger, Being and Time [1927] (hereafter BT), 
trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper Collins, 1962), 237. Heidegger 
establishes temporality as the ontological meaning of care in §65 of Being and Time.  
15 Ibid. 438.  
16 Sartre, CDR 1, 46.  
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here. Rather, following Heidegger, to whom Derrida’s concept of différance is also indebted, 
totalisation is the production of difference, a unification whose unity is the process of its 
differentiation. For Sartre, this understanding of unification grounds the practical identity 
between totalisation and temporalisation, such that temporalisation is, as previously stated, 
the production of the very difference between the past, the present and the future.17 The 
relationship between totalisation and temporalisation is thus a relationship of dependence: the 
totalising structure of individual praxis totalises precisely because it produces temporal 
difference. The totalising structure of individual praxis is predicated on temporalisation, just 
as the temporalising structure of individual praxis is predicated on totalisation. For Sartre, this 
dependence grounds the primary (ontological) and secondary (epistemological) intelligibility 
of history. It also, as we will see, enables the construction of a concept of historicalisation. 
Existential temporalisation is the subversive core of a phenomenological ontology of 
human being, because it upends how we (to use a Heideggerian expression) ‘initially and for 
the most part’ understand action [Aktion, Handeln], activity [Aktivität, Tätigkeit] and the act 
[Akt, Tat] themselves. In this sense, existential temporalisation intervenes into existing claims 
made on behalf of the originary character of The German Ideology. It intervenes, to give two 
examples, into Althusser’s assertion that The German Ideology represents an ‘epistemological 
break’ and ‘state of rupture’ in Marx’s work18, as well as Georges Labica’s contention that 
The German Ideology is a groundbreaking ‘construction site’ for a ‘scraping operation’ and 
‘settling of accounts’ with Marx’s predecessors, his contemporaries and himself.19 However, 
against Labica’s outright reduction of all philosophy to ideology, there is a distinct possibility 
that philosophical discourses on temporalisation might in fact enrich the materialist concept 
of history, and that this concept of history might in turn enrich these discourses, such that it 
forces these discourses to reckon with ‘…men and women, not in any fantastic isolation and 
fixation, but in their actual, empirically perceptible process of development under definite 
conditions.’20 The German Ideology may convey a desire, as Althusser puts it, to ‘purely and 
                                                          
17 In a certain sense, the Critique allows us to grasp the difference between totalisation and totality as 
analogous to the difference between temporalisation and time, such that time is the exteriorised product 
of temporalisation, cut off from its own temporalising process, and subject to inertia. This dovetails 
with the doubled meaning of the German Gegenwart as both presence and the present, and points to 
one dimension of Sartre’s indebtedness to Heidegger (who invokes this doubled meaning across his 
corpus). In addition to Sartre, Althusser relies on Heidegger on this point. See Althusser, ‘The Errors 
of Classical Economics: an Outline for a Concept of Historical Time’, 95. 
18 Louis Althusser, For Marx [1965], trans. Ben Brewster (London: Verso, 1996), 33, 36. 
19 Georges Labica, Marxism and the Status of Philosophy [1976], trans. Kate Soper and Martin Ryle 
(Brighton: The Harvester Press, 1980), 165-72. 
20 Marx and Engels, DI, 27 (GI, 47-8).  
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simply abolish’21 philosophy, but this desire not only ‘hardly means that there is no philosophy 
at work in The German Ideology’22, but, we might add, hardly means that there need not be 
more philosophy put to work within The German Ideology. Marx’s emancipatory project need 
not converge with Labica’s militant (but not necessarily radical) grasp of Marx’s materialism 
as ‘situating all philosophy, whether idealist or materialist, in its true place, namely in 
ideology’, as rendering the notion of a Marxist philosophy ‘absurd’.23 The philosophy within 
Marxist philosophy need not be that philosophy (e.g. classical German idealism) in opposition 
to which Althusser, Labica and Marx articulate the ‘science of history’.24 Herbert Marcuse’s 
notion of ‘concrete philosophy’ is a useful example of this. For Marcuse, philosophy is ‘the 
concrete distress of human existence’25 which makes visible, and demands that we overcome, 
our contemporary historical situation. This philosophy, what Marcuse calls ‘philosophising’ 
– philosophy as a concrete mode of human existence – is a far cry from the abstract thought 
from which Althusser, Labica and Marx seek to dissociate themselves, and with which they 
are arguably preoccupied, to the point where they dismiss, to name the most prominent figure, 
the practical and concrete dimensions of Hegel’s thought. To invoke Engels, perhaps it is not 
an ‘exit from philosophy’ which is warranted, but an exit from the exit from philosophy. As 
Balibar points out, this exit is not a simple return to the inside of philosophy unburdened by 
history.26 It is an exit marked by a dialectic between philosophy and Marx’s own foreign land 
(history), a foreign land which is itself a dialectic between philosophy and non-philosophy.  
Yet individual action cannot be the only standpoint from which totalisation and its 
relation to temporalisation is intelligible. What historical totalisation compels us examine – a 
question which is suppressed by Heidegger, underdetermined by Sartre and simply unasked 
by Marx – is the ongoing constitution of complex relationships between individual, social and 
historical temporalities. Take, as one example, Marx’s conception of the ‘social individual’. 
For Marx, this individual is already and entirely determined by society27, such that the social 
                                                          
21 Louis Althusser, ‘The Historical Task of Marxist Philosophy’, in Louis Althusser, The Humanist 
Controversy and Other Writings [1966-7], ed. François Matheron, trans. G.M. Goshgarian (New York 
and London: Verso, 2003), 174. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Labica, Marxism and the Status of Philosophy, 280, 365. 
24 Each in his own way, Althusser, Labica and Marx fail to critically appropriate the place of ‘non-
philosophy’ within Feuerbach’s Preliminary Theses on the Reform of Philosophy [1842], a place which 
qualifies the decisiveness and originality of their respective formulations of a science of history. 
25 Herbert Marcuse, ‘On Concrete Philosophy’ [1929], trans. Matthew Erlin, in Herbert Marcuse, 
Heideggerian Marxism, ed. John Abromeit and Richard Wolin (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 
2005), 36. Marcuse’s ‘concrete distress’ derives from Kierkegaard’s stance that ‘qualitative pressure’ 
must be placed on philosophy in order to exist in the public realm, as only the public realm realises the 
immense concrete difficulties of social and historical existence, of ‘existing-with-one-another’. 
26 Balibar, The Philosophy of Marx, 40, 119.  
27 Marx, Grundrisse, 248. 
47 
 
relation – not the individual – is the basic constituent of society. And yet, he also suggests that 
this individual is ‘the great pillar of production and of wealth.’28 At the level of the materialist 
concept of history, it is unclear how this ‘social individual’ should be read, in no small part 
because Marx’s analyses of social individuality and the social individual are completely tied 
to his critique of political economy (e.g. to capitalism). At best, we can only suggest that the 
materialist concept of history schematises the development of the social individual at the level 
of different modes of production. The point here is that it would be inadequate, and actually 
misleading, to temporally read the ‘social individual’ exclusively from the standpoint of its 
individuality. Yet this standpoint remains the privileged point of departure in the philosophy 
of time. The simple fact is that existing discourses on temporalisation are principally tied to 
the individual as the crux of that which is implicitly temporal. The individual may be a social 
or collective individual, as it is (to varying degrees) in Heidegger and Sartre, but the individual 
is to date the predominant basis of temporalisation within the modern European philosophical 
tradition more generally. As Sartre articulates it (this sentence comes right after the quotation 
that frames this chapter): ‘Indeed, as I have shown elsewhere, the only conceivable temporality 
is that of a totalisation as an individual process.’29 There is no prevailing philosophy of time 
which begins its account of temporalisation from either the standpoint of the sociality or the 
historicality of the act. The philosophical tradition that we have inherited resists the possibility 
of theorising temporalisation from any other basis than that of the individual. The philosophy 
of time needs to think temporalisation from an origin other than individual praxis, as in Sartre, 
and other than the ‘in each case mineness’ of death, as in Heidegger. In order to be properly 
systematic, this philosophy must register the social and the historical as implicitly temporal in 
their own right, from which the complex relationship between individual, social and historical 
temporalities can be investigated in their reciprocal – and asymmetric – determination. The 
individual is this chapter’s necessary point of departure, but we must also insist that a concept 
of historical time can only be constructed out of Marx’s work when and if ‘temporalisation’ 
itself is conceived in direct relation to historicalisation. The meaning and consequences of this 
will remain unknown until the concept of historicalisation is investigated in its own right. The 
final section of this chapter, on Sartre’s Critique, begins this exploration.  
 
 
                                                          
28 Ibid. 705. 
29 Sartre, CDR 1, 53. Emphasis added. The ‘as I have shown elsewhere’ is a self-reference to Jean-Paul 
Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology [1943], trans. Hazel Estella 
Barnes (London and New York: Routledge Classics, 2003), 130-193. 
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2.1 Marx and Heidegger: a Framework for Dialogue 
There is no immediate nor obvious relationship between Heidegger’s existential analytic of 
Dasein and Marx’s conception of the human. Unlike Sartre’s existential reading of individual 
praxis, the very possibility of reading Heidegger and Marx in relation to one another must 
first be established before Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein’s totalising being-towards-death is 
brought into relation with Marx’s philosophy of history. There is no reconfiguration of 
materialism as human practice in Heidegger, nor even an identifiable concept of materialism 
as such. Nonetheless, the project of Being and Time is to explicate human action as implicitly 
temporal, to produce an existential analytic (Dasein) whereby time becomes the horizon for 
understanding human action. It is difficult to overstate the decisiveness, originality and critical 
function of this analytic. It engenders a philosophy of time which has no counterpart in the 
modern European tradition because it is unrivalled in its attempt to generate and sustain a 
framework for grasping, after Kant, the entire field of time [Zeitinbegriff] itself. Heidegger’s 
concept of ‘originary temporality’ is, as William Blattner puts it, ‘a manifold of nonsuccessive 
phenomena’ which aspires to ‘explain ordinary time’30, or what Heidegger generally refers to 
as ‘the vulgar conception of time’. The fact that Being and Time attempts this explanation is 
unprecedented, and it is as consequential to the philosophy of time as are the particular merits 
and limits of the work itself. Every philosophy of time after Heidegger, particularly the anti-
Heideggerian philosophy of time, remains (and not simply in a chronological sense) a post-
Heideggerian philosophy. Heidegger is therefore an unavoidable route, and, this thesis argues, 
an undeniable asset, to the concept of historical time. Hence before we tackle the relationship 
between totalisation and temporalisation, we need to consider the ways in which Heidegger’s 
existential analytic of Dasein dovetails with Marx’s concept of the human. What dimensions 
of Being and Time resonate with Marx’s work more generally?  
Being and Time disrupts any fixed distinction between theory and practice, between a 
‘first philosophy’ (prōtē philosophia [πρώτη φιλοσοφία], which is for Aristotle metaphysics) 
and a practical philosophy, and therefore between thinking and action. In Heidegger, Reiner 
Schürmann argues, ‘…action itself, and not only its theory, loses its foundation or archē,’ and 
by extension, ‘action deprived of archē [is] the condition of the thought which deconstructs 
the archē.’31 The essence of Dasein lies in its ‘to be’ [Zu-sein], but this being (or ‘be-ing’, 
                                                          
30 William D. Blattner, Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2005), 26.  
31 Reiner Schürmann, Heidegger on Being and Acting: From Principles to Anarchy [1982], trans. 
Christine-Marie Gros (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987), 1, 7. Schürmann is undeniably a 
deconstructionist, and thus reads Heidegger’s professed ‘dismantling’ and ‘destruction’ of the history 
of ontology in Derridean terms.  
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from the German seiend, the gerund of the infinitive sein) is not a static ‘presence-at-hand’ 
registered by categories of existentia (ontological ‘whats’), but is rather the movement and 
motion of an entity inclined and orientated towards a ‘there’.32 In Being and Time, Dasein is 
reciprocally figured as a form of kinetic thinking and thinking kinesis, and hence it rejects the 
division between sensibility and conceptuality as authorised by Kant’s transcendental logic, 
in addition to the function of the cogito in Descartes’s philosophy of self-consciousness. 
Exceeding Kant’s critiques, Dasein gives us categories and existentiale, ontological ‘hows’ or 
dynamic states of Dasein’s fluid character which (Heidegger claims) collectively constitute 
the sense or ‘meaning of being’ [Seinssinn] as such. The where of Dasein’s existence is what 
Heidegger names ‘the world’, but this world is not an ontical totality of entities we passively 
find ourselves in, but is rather the ‘wherein’ of Dasein’s act of understanding, an act already 
in the process of making itself and already in the process of exceeding itself.33 Significance 
makes up the structure or ‘worldhood’ of this world and gives this act of understanding its 
phenomenological intelligibility. In Heidegger, ‘understanding’ is not a cognitive act but an 
existential ability-to-be [Seinkönnen]. More precisely, understanding is an existentiale 
constituted by projection upon possibilities, without which there is no world. Dasein cannot 
be without already always being an understanding ability-to-be in a world.  
Heidegger’s notion of world is structured by a complex relationship to the necessity and 
universality of a priori synthetic judgements in Kant. 34 On one level, Heidegger is faithful to 
Kant, even as he expands and recodes the divisions within Kant’s transcendental logic through 
his own framework of ontological difference (the difference, that is to say, between being and 
entity). As Heidegger states: ‘…in the problem of a priori synthetic judgements still another 
type of synthesis is concerned which must bring something forth about the entity not first 
derived from it through experience. This bringing forth of the determination of the being of 
the entity is a precursory act of reference to the entity. This pure ‘reference-to…’ (synthesis) 
first constitutes the direction and the horizon within which the entity is first capable of being 
experienced in the empirical synthesis.’35 And yet, Being and Time makes clear – even if it is 
not explicitly stated by Heidegger – that an internal difference within one of the coordinates 
of ontological difference creates a tension with the function of ontological difference as the 
condition of possibility of a priori synthetic judgements. This is because the existence of a 
                                                          
32 Heidegger, BT, 67.  
33 Ibid. 119.  
34 Most basically, Heidegger suggests that ‘Kant reduces the problem of the possibility of ontology to 
the question: “How are a priori synthetic judgements possible?”’ Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of 
Metaphysics, 18. 
35 Ibid. 20. ‘Entity’ used in lieu of Churchill’s translation of ‘Seiendes’ as ‘essent’. 
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particular entity (more specifically, the understanding ability-to-be of Dasein) is itself the 
condition of the intelligibility of the being of any entity. Dasein is an ‘ontically distinctive’ 
entity because ‘it is ontological.’36 It is an entity whose very being makes being ‘an issue’ for 
it, and this being towards which it comports itself is what Heidegger formally designates as 
‘existence’. Dasein’s existence (which in Heidegger is the ontological meaning of experience) 
is the condition of possibility of a priori synthetic judgements, be they existential (‘precursory 
acts of reference’) or cognitive judgements. Specifically, being-in-the-world is this condition: 
‘…being-in-the-world is a state of Dasein which is necessary a priori.’37 Consequently, 
Heidegger’s concept of world significantly modifies the contours of purity in Kant, such that 
(1) existence, the essential being of Dasein, can be ontologically disclosed as originary only 
if no cognition is, to borrow Kant’s term in the Critique of Pure Reason, first ‘intermixed’; 
and (2) cognition is absolutely dependent on empirical acts and experiences within the world. 
In this regard, Heidegger’s stated desire to enact a transition from ‘pre-ontology’ to 
‘fundamental ontology’ in Being and Time engenders the possibility, to repeat a manoeuvre 
in the previous chapter38, of reconstructing a decisive passage from the introduction to the ‘B’ 
edition of the Critique of Pure Reason in the following manner: ‘…although all our existence 
commences with cognition, …it does not on that account all arise from cognition.’39 As with 
Marx and Engels’s first historical act, Heidegger’s ‘world’ imposes the a posteriori, which is 
to say experience and the empirical, on Kant’s a priori whilst holding on to the necessary and 
universal character exclusive to this a priori. This is, in Marx and Heidegger alike, a distinctly 
temporal exclusivity. In Marx, this is the sense in which the ‘creation of fresh life’ – as one 
domain of the biological – wholly depends on social and historical time for its intelligibility. 
In Heidegger, this is how the temporal character of the ‘earlier’, the ‘in advance’, the ‘prior’, 
the ‘beforehand’, etc. must be read40, along with the temporality of necessity and universality 
more generally: ‘in each case’ through facticity and finitude. The key issue here is that Dasein 
registers a basic tension within ontology itself: the a priori is conceivable only when Dasein 
as an existential analytic preconditions Dasein as a self-understanding (‘existentiell’) entity, 
                                                          
36 Heidegger, BT, 32. 
37 Ibid. 79. 
38 See footnote 62 in Chapter 1. 
39 Once again: ‘But although all our cognition commences with experience, yet it does not on that 
account all arise from experience.’ Kant, CPR, B 1-2, 136. 
40 ‘Can the a priori which in the tradition of ontology is held to be a characteristic of the determination 
of being be explained by asserting that the ‘earlier’ which it implies ‘naturally’ has nothing to do with 
‘time’? Certainly, it has nothing to do with the ‘time’ recognized by the ordinary comprehension of 
time. But is this ‘earlier’ positively determined thereby, and is this annoying temporal character pushed 
aside? Or does it not reappear as a new and more difficult problem?’ Heidegger, Kant and the Problem 
of Metaphysics, 249. 
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and yet only this self-understanding, only Dasein’s ontical affairs, secures being-in-the-world 
as the necessary and universal makeup of the a priori. The importance that Heidegger attaches 
to the world is beyond dispute: ‘…Dasein, insofar as it is, has always submitted itself already 
to a “world” which it encounters, and this submission belongs essentially to its being.’41 
We must now address the question of the relationship between Dasein and individual 
human beings (entities), because this question grounds any attempt to develop a ‘framework 
for dialogue’42 between Dasein and Marx’s conception of the human more generally. This 
framework is, this thesis argues, a vital (and to date unexplored) aspect of what Heidegger in 
his 1949 ‘Letter on Humanism’ calls ‘the historical in being’, that dimension of being within 
which, for Heidegger, a ‘productive dialogue’ between phenomenology and existentialism, on 
the one hand, and Marxism, on the other, ‘first becomes possible.’43 The crux of the matter – 
the condition of this framework – is the possible conjunction (but by no means unity) between 
the individuation of Dasein in Being and Time and the social individuation of the human in 
Marx. The problem of individuation is at the heart of Being and Time: from the outset, Dasein 
is not just nor immediately presented as an individual.44 A pivotal part of the contribution that 
‘being-in-the-world’ makes to the philosophy of the subject is its irreducibility to individual 
human entities. However, this is not to accept the terms of Heidegger’s understanding of this 
contribution, i.e. the notion that being-in-the-world is a new kind of subjectivity because it 
completely evades the ‘common, subjectivistic concept of “subject”.’45 On one level, Dasein 
                                                          
41 Heidegger, BT, 120-21. ‘The world is therefore something “wherein” Dasein as an entity already 
was.’ Ibid. 106. As Macquarrie and Robinson note, Heidegger’s use of angewiesen (‘submitted’) and 
Angewiesenheit (‘submission’) in this passage simultaneously means to assign, to allot, to depend on 
and to be at the mercy of something. Ibid. 121. 
42 See David Schweickart, ‘Heidegger and Marx: A Framework for Dialogue’, in Heidegger: The Man 
and the Thinker, ed. Thomas Sheehan (New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 1996), 
229-43. Whilst individual labour does not figure in his account, Schweickart persuasively analyses how 
Heidegger’s critique of Marxism as a humanist (which for Heidegger = metaphysical) discourse in his 
‘Letter on Humanism’ enriches our understanding of liberatory praxis. 
43 Martin Heidegger, ‘Letter on “Humanism”’ [1949], trans. Frank A. Capuzzi, in Martin Heidegger, 
Pathmarks [1967], ed. William McNeill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 259. For 
Heidegger, since ‘estrangement attains an essential dimension of history’ in Marx, ‘the Marxist view 
of history is superior to that of other historical accounts.’ Ibid. 
44 Consider the following passage: ‘Being and the structure of being lie beyond every entity and every 
possible character which an entity may possess. Being is the transcendens pure and simple. And the 
transcendence of Dasein’s being is distinctive in that it implies the possibility and the necessity of the 
most radical individuation.’ Heidegger, BT, 62.  
45 Martin Heidegger, The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic [1928], trans. Michael Heim 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), 195. See as well Einar Øverenget, Seeing the Self: 
Heidegger on Subjectivity (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998), 103. In the Leibniz 
lectures, Heidegger problematically reads the transcendental subject in Kant, and the a priori which it 
activates, as ‘worldless’, so as to clear space for ‘being-in-the-world…[to] fundamentally transform 
the concept[s] of subjectivity and…the subjective.’ Heidegger, The Metaphysical Foundations of 
Logic, 195.  
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is not a substantial (present-at-hand), thinking ‘I-thing’ [Ichding] outfitted with a body; it is 
not a (conventionally rendered) Cartesian subject. But on another level, it must be this subject. 
It must, on Heidegger’s own terms, be this concept of the individual consistent with the (so to 
speak) common, individualistic concept of the ‘individual’. As we will see, this need not be a 
problem for Being and Time, even if Heidegger creates it as one. Being-in-the-world is not an 
‘originary existentiale’ in isolation from ‘world-historical happening’ [weltgeschichtliches 
Geschehen], but Heidegger precludes the possibility that the ontological structure of this 
happening might (and on his own terms need) structure the Seinsfrage itself (the question of 
the meaning of being in general). The issue here, first of all, is that the ontological structure 
of world-historical happening (in Marx and Heidegger alike) constitutes the existence of the 
isolated and alienated – which is to say the ‘common’ – individual.  
Akin to Wilhelm Dilthey’s ‘life-nexus’, what is pre-given in Being and Time is Dasein’s 
being-in-the-world, not its individualised existence (for its part, the pre-givenness of Husserl’s 
‘lifeworld’ in The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology (1936) 
derives from Heidegger’s ‘world’). Being-in-the-world is ontologically prior to the individual; 
it is only from being-in-the-world that Dasein as an individual entity first becomes possible. 
In Heidegger, to render Dasein as a pre-existing individual is to render it as originally present-
at-hand, a fallacy that reverberates with Lukács’s position in History and Class Consciousness 
(1923) that the ‘individual subject’ is quite simply the product of the generalised reification 
of social relations.46 In fact, much of the scholarship in the American analytical tradition also 
maintains that Dasein cannot be reduced to discrete human entities, that there is, in other 
words, no ‘separate and unique Dasein for each person.’47 In his analysis of the ‘who’ of 
everyday Dasein, Charles Guignon emphasises Heidegger’s claim that Dasein is ‘not the 
egotistical person, not the ontically isolated individual.’48 For Guignon, ‘in the description of 
everyday being-in-the-world, what emerges is a picture of Dasein which is closer to Dilthey’s 
                                                          
46 Highlighting §10 and §83 in Being and Time, where Heidegger explicitly discusses the reification of 
consciousness, Lucien Goldmann provocatively suggests that Being and Time is a direct (and yet 
unacknowledged) response to Lukács’s History and Class Consciousness. Lucien Goldmann, Lukács 
and Heidegger: Towards a New Philosophy [1973], trans. William Q. Boelhower (London and Boston: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977), 27-39. Goldmann’s understanding of Heidegger is suspect, but it is 
certainly possible that Heidegger’s derivation of the ‘present-at-hand’ from the ‘ready-to-hand’ could 
be cross-read with Lukács’s account of reification as yielded by the instrumental rationality of capitalist 
social relations.  
47 John Haugeland, ‘Truth and Finitude: Heidegger’s Transcendental Existentialism’, in Heidegger, 
Authenticity, and Modernity: Essays in Honour of Hubert L. Dreyfus, Vol. 1, ed. Mark A. Wrathall and 
Jeff Malpas (Cambridge and London: MIT Press, 2000), 46. 
48 Martin Heidegger, Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz [1928], in 
Martin Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe, Abteilung 2: Vorlesungen 1923-1944, Band 26 (Frankfurt am 
Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1978), 172.  
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conception of “objective mind” than it is to the Cartesian subject or a monad…there is no 
plural for “Dasein”, and Heidegger seldom speaks of “a Dasein”. “Dasein” is not a “count 
noun” that ranges over particular individuals, but is more like a “mass noun”. It captures the 
idea of a “clearing” of intelligibility which can more properly be understood as a cultural 
totality than as a collection of individuals.’49 Carol White maintains that Dasein is first and 
foremost the entity we all are: it is what we share in common. This is the sense in which the 
individual is, following Marx, the bearer – the personification – of Dasein. The relationship 
between Dasein and the human is ‘graphically ontological’: ‘we are the entity through whom 
what it is “to be”…is revealed, and thus we are the “there”…where Being is disclosed.’50 The 
structuralist overtones here are obvious. White attributes the predominant misreading of the 
individuation of Dasein to translation. She is explicitly critical of Macquarrie and Robinson’s 
continual pluralisation of Heidegger’s collective singular term ‘das Seiende’ (entity or what-
is). Thus, ‘“das Seiende…sind wir je selbst” becomes “we are ourselves the entities” and “das 
Sein des Seienden” becomes “the Being of entities”.’51 For White, the individuation of Dasein 
denotes the demarcation of Dasein from other domains of what-is, such that its being cannot 
be confused with that of other entity. Individuation is the constitution of Dasein’s existential 
self as itself, radically situating the ‘there’ of Dasein. It is only because of this individuation 
that one individual can be differentiated from another. Is it possible to suggest, therefore, that 
Dasein is originarily a social rather than individual entity?  
These are convincing readings of Heidegger, but they must be squared with Heidegger’s 
constitution of Dasein as a social entity, such that an individual Dasein [ein einzelnes Dasein] 
– an entity which definitely figures in Being and Time – encounters what Heidegger calls ‘the 
others’. On the surface, the category of ‘the social’ rarely appears in Being and Time. In its 
place, catalysed by the question of ‘who’ Dasein is in its everydayness, Heidegger presents 
two existentiale as ‘equi-originary’ [gleichursprünglich] with being-in-the-world: ‘being-
                                                          
49 Charles B. Guignon, Heidegger and the Problem of Knowledge (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing 
Company, 1983), 104. 
50 Carol J. White, ‘Dasein, Existence, and Death’, in Heidegger Reexamined, Vol. 1: Dasein, 
Authenticity, and Death, ed. Hubert L. Dreyfus and Mark A. Wrathall (London: Routledge, 2002), 333. 
51 Ibid. 332. Emphasis added. Macquarrie and Robinson frequently interject ‘one’ and ‘one’s’ into their 
translation where ‘one’ [man] and ‘one’s’ [eigenen] do not appear in the German original, effectively 
compelling the English-language reader to comprehend Dasein as only an individual and not also a 
transindividual entity. To name two examples: ‘einen Ausstand an Seinkönnen’ becomes ‘something 
still outstanding in one’s potentiality-for-Being’ (Heidegger, BT, 279) and ‘Endlichkeit der Existenz’ 
becomes ‘finitude of one’s existence’ (ibid. 435). However, it is crucial to note that ‘one’ and ‘one’s’ 
regularly appear in Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein’s sociality. Thus ‘Mitsein ist eine Bestimmtheit des 
je eigenen Daseins’ is accurately rendered as ‘Being-with is in every case a characteristic of one’s own 
Dasein’ (ibid. 157). Emphases added. 
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with’ and ‘Dasein-with’.52 For Heidegger, being-in-the-world is being-with others: ‘the world 
is always the one that I share with others. The world of Dasein is a with-world.’53 The others 
are intraworldly entities. They are confronted in the ‘environmental context of equipment’, 
the ‘for-the-sake-of-which’ structure which grounds the world as a referential totality of 
signifying actions. Put differently, the encounter with the others is fundamentally enabled by 
what Heidegger designates as the ‘ready-to-hand’, an entity whose essential being (‘readiness-
to-hand’) is defined by an ‘assignment’ or ‘involvement’ within-the-world. The ready-to-hand 
is not defined by being a tangible object in space (this is the present-at-hand), but rather by its 
practical relation to the world. This brings us to Heidegger’s formal definition of the others: 
 
By “others” we do not mean all the rest but me – those over against whom the “I” 
stands out. They are rather those from whom, for the most part, one [man] does not 
distinguish oneself – those among whom one is too. This being-there-too…with them 
does not have the ontological character of a being-present-at-hand-along-“with” them 
within a world. This “with” is something of the character of Dasein; the “too” means 
a sameness of being as circumspectively concernful being-in-the-world.54 
 
 
This passage expresses a complex sociality at the core of the being of Dasein. As an 
existential analytic, Dasein represents an incipient ontology of the social as a particular kind 
of ‘transindividual individuation’.55 Specifically, Dasein’s sociality is a twofold individuation: 
following White, it sets Dasein off from other domains of entity (only Dasein, not the ready-
to-hand nor the present-at-hand, is capable of being-with) but only because, and here opposing 
White, this sociality differentiates one individual Dasein from another as ‘for the most part’ 
indistinguishable. Neither the ready-to-hand nor the present-at-hand are capable of being 
social, but, unlike Dasein, they are radically differentiated within-the-world. Herein lies a 
crucial dimension of the world, and to push Heidegger further than what he offers, the ready-
to-hand within-the-world: it conditions Dasein’s by and large undifferentiated sociality with 
                                                          
52 Ibid. 149. §26 of Being and Time, ‘The Dasein-with of Others and Everyday Being-with’, has been 
widely commentated on and is crucial to the work of Jean-Paul Sartre, Emmanuel Levinas, Jean-Luc 
Nancy, Jacques Derrida and Roberto Esposito.  
53 Ibid. 155. As he puts it a bit later: ‘So far as Dasein is at all, it has being-with-one-another as its kind 
of being.’ Ibid. 163. 
54 Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit [1927] (hereafer SZ), in Martin Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe, 
Abteilung 1: Veröffentliche Schriften 1914-1970, Band 2 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 
1977), 158 (BT, 154).  
55 The notion of ‘transindividual individuation’ has recently gained currency in the Anglo-American 
academy, primarily due to a growing reception of Gilbert Simondon and his commentators. See, for 
instance, Muriel Combes, Gilbert Simondon and the Philosophy of the Transindividual [1999], trans. 
Thomas LaMarre (Cambridge and London: MIT Press, 2013). For readings of Marx which draw on 
Simondon, see Luca Basso, Marx and Singularity: from the Early Writings to the Grundrisse [2008], 
trans. Arianna Bove (Leiden/Boston/Cologne: Brill, 2012), as well as Jason Read, ‘The Production of 
Subjectivity: from Transindividuality to the Commons’, New Formations 70 (Winter 2011), 113-31.  
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the others. The world ‘frees’ the others, not as ready-to-hand nor as present-at-hand, but as 
‘like the very Dasein which frees them, in that they are there too, and there with it.’56 For 
Jean-Luc Nancy, this sociality forms ‘the very humble layer of our everyday experience.’57 
The others are the ‘who’ of everyday Dasein, and this is the existential meaning of their being, 
their ‘Dasein-with’. As Heidegger puts it, ‘this Dasein-with of the others is disclosed within-
the-world for a Dasein, and so too for those who are Daseins with us, only because Dasein in 
itself is essentially being-with.’58 Heidegger fills out his characterisation of the others with an 
existentiale (and a thinly disguised fear of the masses) he names the ‘one’: 
 
…Dasein, as everyday being-with-one-another, stands in subjection to others. It itself 
is not; its being has been taken away by the others. Dasein’s everyday possibilities of 
being are for the others to dispose of as they please. These others, moreover, are not 
definite others. On the contrary, any other can represent them. What is decisive is just 
that inconspicuous domination by others which has already been taken over unawares 
from Dasein as being-with. One [man] belongs to the others oneself and enhances their 
power…the “who” is not this one, not that one, not oneself, not some people, and not 
the sum of them all. The “who” is the neuter, the “one” [das Man]…the “one” is an 
existentiale; and as an originary phenomenon, it belongs to Dasein’s positive 
constitution.59 
 
For Heidegger, there is an essential ‘averageness’ which belongs to the ‘one’ and which 
corresponds to a ‘levelling’ of the possibilities of Dasein’s being. Obvious differences with 
Marx notwithstanding (most notably, the individual’s classed existence discloses the others as 
simultaneously definite and indefinite, conspicuously and inconspicuously dominant), there 
are nonetheless aspects of Marx’s analysis of alienated labour in the 1844 Manuscripts which 
resonate with this account of Dasein’s sociality. Three in particular stand out. The first is the 
likeness between (in Marx) the perversion of the human’s ‘genus-being’ into a means of 
                                                          
56 Heidegger, BT, 154.  
57 Jean-Luc Nancy, Being Singular Plural [1996], trans. Robert D. Richardson and Anne E. O’Byrne 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), 8. Being Singular Plural is a determined attempt to rewrite 
Being and Time from the standpoint of Mitsein. For Nancy, ‘it is necessary to refigure fundamental 
ontology (as well as the existential analytic, the history of Being, and the thinking of Ereignis that goes 
along with it) with a thorough resolve that starts from the plural singular of origins, from being-with.’ 
Ibid. 26. The ‘“question of social Being” must, in fact, constitute the ontological question.’ Ibid. 57. 
58 Heidegger, BT, 156. Following this passage, which is quite similar to Marx’s position (see footnote 
2 in this chapter) that the social is not just to be understood as directly communal activity, Heidegger 
states that ‘Being-with is an existential characteristic of Dasein even when factically no other is present-
at-hand or perceived. Even Dasein’s being-alone is being-with in the world.’ Ibid. 156-57. In other 
words, being-with in the world is the a priori condition of the lonely, isolated individual.  
59 Heidegger, SZ, 168, 169, 172 (BT, 164, 167). Confusingly, Macquarrie and Robinson translate das 
Man as ‘the they’ when they ought to translate Man and das Man as ‘one’ and ‘the one’ consistently 
throughout. Das Man will hereafter be rendered as ‘the one’ in Being and Time without recourse to a 
citation in Sein und Zeit. 
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individual existence and (in Heidegger) the disposal of the everyday possibilities of Dasein’s 
being as the others please. The second is a shared emphasis on the distortion of ‘the self’. For 
Marx, this is the alienation of the labour-process itself, understood as the ‘self-activity’ of the 
worker, and which is to be differentiated from something like ‘humans in the entire wealth of 
their being’. For Heidegger, the self of everyday Dasein is the ‘one-self’ [das Man-selbst] (as 
opposed to ‘the one itself’ [das Man selbst]), and this self represents ‘a particular Dasein’ 
dispersed into and distracted by concernful absorption in the world.60 In Being and Time, the 
‘authentic self’ stands in opposition to the one-self. 
The possibility of a philosophical correspondence between Being and Time and Marx’s 
analyses of capitalist alienation is beginning to emerge, and this is all the more evident with 
the third point of resonance. To be clear, this point is only secured by modifying Heidegger 
in the direction of Marx, but it is all the more productive because of this. There is a conjunction 
between Marx’s phenomenology of the alienation of the worker from both the product of his 
labour and from other workers, such that these become objective things divorced from and 
hostile to him, and Heidegger’s account of an everyday absorption in the world which ‘leaps 
over’ the world and relegates it to a pre-ontological thing. Crucially, this conjunction traverses 
the two primary and interdependent articulations of ‘world’ in Being and Time: the ready-to-
hand within the world of circumspective concern [das Umwelt], as well as the world of public 
interaction between one individual Dasein and another, which is to say the ‘with-world’ of 
solicitude [Fürsorge]. In Heidegger, the reification [Verdinglichung, literally ‘thingification’] 
of the world of circumspective concern comes to the fore with what he calls the ‘un-ready-to-
hand’, an entity which is ‘not missing at all and not unusable’,61 but which, and here we must 
realign Heidegger towards Marx, does not ‘stand in the way’ of Dasein’s concern. This is 
because concern – the existential register of the activity which Dasein performs and the things 
which this activity procures – is, at the level of individuals, overtly and covertly forced upon 
Dasein. Against Heidegger, Dasein’s assignment is explicit precisely because this assignment 
has not been disturbed.62 This non-disturbance is a class concern. Within capitalism, it is the 
exclusive belonging – ownership – of the ready-to-hand whose worldly character ‘announces 
itself’ as what might be described as a ‘useful presence-at-hand’ (the ready-to-hand qua the 
un-ready-to-hand). In his reading of the 1844 Manuscripts, Marcuse grasps this subjection to 
the thing as the economic manifestation of an originary lack of Dasein. For Marcuse, Dasein’s 
being always exceeds its existence, rendering its labour a futile attempt to realise its capacity 
                                                          
60 Heidegger, BT, 167.  
61 Ibid. 103.  
62 Ibid. 105.  
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for self-fulfilment. Therefore labour is, as he puts it, inescapably ‘burdensome’: ‘in labour it 
is always first a question of the thing itself and not of the labourer, even when a complete 
separation between labour and the “product of labour” has not yet taken place. In labour the 
human is always taken away from its self-being and toward something else: it is always with 
an other and for an other.’63 It is necessary to read ‘the thing’ in the Marcuse passage as both 
the product of labour and the other worker in Marx, and as the being of both the ready-to-hand 
and ‘the other’ in Heidegger. Herein lies the relevance of Heidegger’s concept of solicitude to 
Marx. Solicitude ‘throws’ the other out of his ‘position’ and dictates that with which he is 
concerned.64 Heidegger acknowledges solicitude to be a relation of dependence, and, in a rare 
moment of political economic insight, a ‘being-with-one-another of those who are hired for 
the same affair…[that] thrives only on mistrust.’65 Whilst he never establishes the connection, 
solicitude (in its indifferent and deficient modes) is the objectification of the other as a tangible 
thing. The ‘one’ may be ‘as little present-at-hand as Dasein itself,’ yet the ‘the being of those 
entities which are there with us gets conceived as presence-at-hand.’66  
Transposing this dialogue between Marx and Heidegger to the philosophy of time now 
requires that Dasein’s structural whole [Ganze] be investigated. At the end of the first division 
of Being and Time, ‘care’ [Sorge] emerges as the totalised manifold of existence which 
simultaneously refigures existence as ‘existentiality’. Care is formally defined as follows:  ‘the 
being of Dasein means ahead-of-itself-being-already-in (the world) as being-alongside 
(entities encountered within-the-world).’67 For Heidegger, existence, facticity and falling are 
the ontological characteristics of Dasein which ‘weave together’ the originary context of care, 
to which disclosedness and truth – and their articulation through discourse and language – 
essentially belong.68 As previously considered, existence is constituted by understanding, an 
                                                          
63 Herbert Marcuse, ‘On the Philosophical Foundations of the Concept of Labour in Economics’, 
[1933] trans. John Abromeit, in Marcuse, Heideggerian Marxism, 130. Douglas Kellner also translates 
this essay in Telos 16 (Summer 1973), 9-37. There is clearly an ontological individualism in this essay.  
64 Heidegger, BT, 158, 161. This is misleadingly characterised as an ‘extreme possibility’ of solicitude, 
but in fact constitutes the phenomenological core of its ‘indifferent’ and ‘deficient’ modes. 
65 Ibid. 159.  
66 Ibid. 166, 168.  
67 Ibid. 237. 
68 If disclosedness (understanding, disposedness, falling) ‘maintains its articulation through discourse’ 
(Heidegger, SZ, 461/BT, 400), and if ‘discourse is existentially equi-originary with disposedness and 
understanding’ (Heidegger, SZ, 213/BT, 203), is it justifiable to suggest that, even if ‘discourse in itself 
is temporal,’ it ‘does not temporalise itself primarily in any definite ecstasis’ (Heidegger, BT, 400)? Is 
Heidegger’s transposition (as we will later consider) of understanding as the future, disposedness as 
beenness, and falling as making present not woven together with an ecstasis (if not a temporality) 
specific to Articulation itself? It never made its way into the final manuscript, but Heidegger’s 
temporalisation of language and speech in the ‘first draft’ of Being and Time addresses this. See Martin 
Heidegger, The Concept of Time (The First Draft of Being and Time) [1924], trans. Ingo Farin 
(London: Continuum, 2011), 63. This text should not be confused with his Marburg Theological 
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ability-to-be which in turn is structured by projection upon possibilities and the interpretation 
(the ‘working out’) of these possibilities. Facticity is the affective determinacy of Dasein. It is 
not the brute ‘factuality’ of something present-at-hand, but rather an actuality marked by a 
‘disposedness’ which discloses Dasein in its essential ‘thrownness’. An existential fact that is 
never settled nor finished, thrownness reveals that Dasein has already always been ‘delivered 
over’ to being-in-the-world, even if, and in fact precisely because, Dasein ‘initially and for the 
most part’ evades this fact. ‘Falling’ fills out Heidegger’s notion of care. If existence is the 
domain of ‘being-ahead’ and facticity that of being-already-in the world, falling is the ‘being-
alongside’ or ‘being-amidst’ entities encountered within-the-world. Falling is constituted by 
idle talk, curiosity and ambiguity. As being-in-the-world, it is also temptation, tranquillity and 
estrangement (falling is the only stated place of estrangement in Being and Time). Reminiscent 
of the ‘fundamental premise of private property’ for Marx, the fact that the human ‘produces 
only in order to have’69, falling is for Heidegger a ‘downward plunge’ whose ‘tranquillised 
supposition’ is that ‘it possesses everything…that everything is in reach.’70 An existentiale 
directly linked to the sociality of the one, falling is, for this reason, the primary point of entry 
into Heidegger’s two existentiell modes of being: authenticity/ownedness [Eigentlichkeit] and 
inauthenticity/unownedness [Uneigentlichkeit], wherein the latter is not (purportedly) a fall 
from the purer and higher state of the former, but an ontologically basic fascination with the 
world and the one, a positive possibility of Dasein’s ‘not-being-its-self’.71  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
lectures of the same year: Martin Heidegger, The Concept of Time [1924], trans. William McNeill 
(Malden/Oxford/Carlton: Blackwell, 1992). 
69 Marx, JM, 274. See also Kostas Axelos, Alienation, Praxis, and Technē in the Thought of Karl Marx 
[1969], trans. Ronald Bruzina (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1976), 123-42. 
70 Heidegger, BT, 223. 
71 Ibid. 220. It is difficult to accept Heidegger’s argument that falling ‘does not express any negative 
evaluation.’ Ibid. As he expresses it: ‘we…misunderstand the ontologico-existential structure of falling 
if we…ascribe to it the sense of a bad and deplorable ontical property of which, perhaps, more advanced 
stages of human culture might be able to rid themselves.’ Ibid. For an attempt to move past this strict 
separation between the ontic and the ontological, to think affinities between inauthenticity in Heidegger 
and alienation in Marx, see Anne F. Pomeroy, ‘Remythologizing Heidegger: Capitalism, Time, and 
Authenticity’, Φιλοσοφία (Philosophia): International Journal of Philosophy 37:2 (2008), 119-38. 
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2.2 Death, Temporality and Historicality: Being and Time 
‘Being-in-the-world’, Heidegger declares at the opening of his analysis of care, ‘is a structure 
which is originarily and constantly whole.’72 Yet the entire chapter devoted to care (chapter 6 
of the first division) never analyses the meaning of the whole or the totality as such. This task 
is left to the opening section of the second division of Being and Time (§45), which reminds 
the reader that existence ‘formally indicates that Dasein is as an understanding ability-to-be’ 
which firstly ‘raise[s] the question of this entity’s ability-to-be-a-whole [Ganzseinkönnen].’73 
As such an ability-to-be, there is thus some sense in which Dasein is necessarily not yet, some 
sense in which it is necessarily still outstanding, to which an ‘end’ belongs. But the issue for 
Heidegger is not the actual realisation of this end, such that Dasein ontically ‘completes’ its 
own ability-to-be-a-whole, but rather the end which defines – which is – this open ability, this 
possibility of being-a-whole. In short, this end of being-in-the-world is death [Tod], and it is 
an end which ‘limits and determines in every case whatever totality is possible for Dasein.’74 
This is, as we will now examine, a distinct existential-ontological conception of death, which 
only exists as a possibility – Dasein’s pure, ‘ownmost’ [eigenst]75 possibility – and hence ‘is 
only in an existentiell being towards death.’76 In other words, the existential structure of this 
existentiell being makes up Dasein’s ability-to-be-a-whole, such that this structure is modally 
divided between an authentic being-towards-death (anticipation) and an inauthentic everyday 
evasion in the face of death (awaiting).  
Heidegger differentiates his conception of death from both ‘perishing’ and ‘demise’ at 
an analogous level to his dissociation of Dasein from both the present-at-hand and the ready-
to-hand. Perishing is the biological end of life: the heartbeat stops. But since perishing is a 
category of the ontology of life which – as Heidegger wants it – is subordinate to the ontology 
of Dasein,77 the end of Dasein from the standpoint of its existence as a living entity is not its 
perish but rather its demise. Strictly speaking, Dasein never perishes, but it certainly demises, 
but only so long as this demise is understood as the end of its life, not its death. The primary 
problem, however, with perishing and demise is that they situate death at the level of being-
                                                          
72 Heidegger, SZ, 240 (BT, 225).  
73 Heidegger, SZ, 307, 310 (BT, 274, 276). 
74 Heidegger, BT, 277. Following Macquarrie and Robinson, Ganze will be translated as ‘whole’, 
whereas Ganzheit will be rendered as ‘totality’. Heidegger rarely uses the technical term Totalität for 
totality. 
75 White prefers to translate eigenst as ‘most proper’ rather than ‘ownmost’, so as to resist the reduction 
of Dasein to individual persons. See White, ‘Dasein, Existence, and Death’, 332. However, she does 
not mitigate the overt individualism of other dimensions of Heidegger’s analysis of death, particularly 
his depiction of the ‘in each case mineness’ of death. 
76 Heidegger, BT, 277. 
77 Ibid. 291. 
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at-an-end [Zu-Ende-sein] rather than being-towards-the-end [Sein zum Ende]. For Heidegger, 
these conceptions of death operate with a conception of end which displaces the fact that the 
end is already always there [da], such that Dasein’s understanding ability-to-be-a-whole is, 
one might say, already always constituted by an understanding inability-to-be-a-whole. 
Comparing the not-yet of Dasein to a piece of ripening fruit, he suggests that ‘…as long as 
any Dasein is, it too is already its “not yet”.’78 Heidegger never uses the word, but there is an 
implicit concept of totalisation being developed here, such that being-towards-death totalises 
precisely because it is not nor can never be a totality (in the ordinary or so-called pre-
ontological sense of the term). This is also the unique way in which Heidegger’s conceptions 
of death and the end dovetail with a particular conception of the limit [Grenze].79 As White 
explains, ‘We are interested in why and how the possibilities are thus limited’80, and ‘death 
delineates and delimits Dasein’s possibilities as an understanding able-to-be.’81 Or as Blattner 
states, ‘it is a limit-situation in which the ability-to-be is stifled.’82 The conception of death 
which is appropriate to the entity that is its possibilities is the fundamental limit of those 
possibilities, but what kind of limit is this? 
There is a complex philosophical appropriation of the conceptual lineage of the limit at 
work here. As with Heidegger’s reconstruction of the purity of a priori synthetic judgements 
through his conception of world, this appropriation begins with Kant, although its relation to 
being-towards-death stems from the (for Heidegger) underdeveloped difference between the 
whole and the sum in Plato and Aristotle.83 There are different but overlapping dimensions to 
                                                          
78 Ibid. 288. ‘…the “lack of totality in Dasein, the constant “ahead-of-itself”, is neither something still 
outstanding in a summative togetherness, nor something which has not yet become accessible. It is a 
“not-yet” which any Dasein, as the entity which it is, has to be.’ Ibid.  
79 As we will examine, this is also the unique manner in which Heidegger ties temporalisation to the 
basic teleological structure of action by way of the concept of finitude [Endlichkeit], that ‘characteristic 
of temporalisation itself’ (ibid. 378). It is the limit – qua the finitude of temporality – which secures 
being-towards-death as the existential ground of temporalisation.  
80 White, ‘Dasein, Existence, and Death’, 338. 
81 Carol J. White, Time and Death: Heidegger’s Analysis of Finitude (Aldershot: Ashgate Press, 2005), 
79. 
82 William Blattner, ‘The Concept of Death in Being and Time’, in Heidegger Reexamined, Vol. 1: 
Dasein, Authenticity, and Death, ed. Hubert L. Dreyfus and Mark A. Wrathall (London: Routledge, 
2002), 325. Blattner stresses the centrality of anxiety [Angst] to Heidegger’s analysis of death, although 
in a very curious fashion. On his reading, anxiety is not a disposedness in line with anticipatory being-
towards-death, as Heidegger argues, but death as such. In other words, Blattner expresses the idea that 
death is actually a possible way to be Dasein (in which Dasein is unable to be). Death, it seems, is akin 
to an anxiety attack. It is a state in which the ability-to-be is stifled. His metaphor for this is as follows: 
‘in the absence of light, the ability-to-see is not non-existent, it is simply stifled.’ Ibid. To Blattner’s 
credit, he carefully reconstructs Heidegger’s nuanced understanding of the end, drawing on Jasper’s 
concept of the limit-situation, in order to evade any sense of the end as ‘stopping’. However, his idea 
that death is a situation that ‘occurs’ when Dasein is beset by anxiety, in which none of its possibilities 
matter to it whatsoever, does little else but flatten the crucial importance of anticipation. 
83 Heidegger, BT, 288, ft. iii (494). 
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this appropriation whose shared origin is arguably the systematic distinction between the limit 
and the barrier [Schranke] within Kant’s critical philosophy. For Kant, ‘limits…always 
presuppose a space that is found outside a certain fixed location, and that encloses that 
location; barriers require nothing of the kind, but are mere negations that affect a magnitude 
insofar as it does not possess absolute completeness.’84 Unlike mathematics and the natural 
sciences, the ‘dialectical endeavours of pure reason’ within metaphysics lead to limits whose 
transgression (qua transcendental ideas) ‘cannot be avoided and yet will never be realised.’85 
In Heidegger, the existential rendition of this comes by way of Kierkegaard’s concept of 
anxiety and Jasper’s conception of the ‘limit-situation’ [Grenzsituation] in his Psychology of 
Worldviews (1919), which Heidegger footnotes.86 Specifically, it is the towards within being-
towards-the-end, such that anxiety ‘amounts to the disclosedness of the fact that Dasein exists 
as thrown Being towards its end’87, which existentially registers the unavoidability and yet 
actual impossibility of death. To put it another way, the anxiety inherent within being-towards-
death corresponds to and yet critically modifies the function of the limit in Kant: corresponds 
to, because the limit (death) which begets this anxiety is certain and yet unrealisable; critically 
modifies, because the transgression of this limit in Heidegger is only ever a being-towards the 
limit, such that anxiety is not generated beyond the phenomenal realm of time and space but 
is rather only ever being-in-the-world itself.88 Against Kant’s transcendental idea, therefore, 
being-towards-death is not illusory or deceptive (at least, that is, in its ‘authentic’ mode).  
This recoding of transgression as anticipation – this reworking of the transgression of 
the limit as what might be called ‘being-towards-the-limit’ – forms the background to the most 
consequential passage within Heidegger’s analysis of death: 
 
The closest closeness of being towards death as a possibility is as far as possible away 
from anything actual. The more undisguisedly this possibility gets understood, the 
more purely does the understanding penetrate it as the possibility of the impossibility 
of any existence at all [überhaupt]. Death, as possibility, gives Dasein nothing to be 
‘actualised’, nothing which Dasein, as actual, could itself be. It is the possibility of the 
impossibility of every way of comporting towards anything, of every way of existing. 
In the anticipation of this possibility it becomes ‘greater and greater’; that is to say, 
                                                          
84 Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics That Will Be Able to Come Forward as 
Science [1783], trans. and ed. Gary Hatfield (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 103-4 
(§57). Translation modified to register Grenzen as ‘limits’ and Schranken as ‘barriers’.  
85 Ibid. 104.  
86 Heidegger, BT, 293, ft. vi (494-95). See also William Blattner, ‘Heidegger’s Debt to Jasper’s Concept 
of the Limit-Situation’, in Heidegger and Jaspers, ed. Alan M. Olson (Philadelphia: Temple University 
Press, 1994), 153-65.  
87 Heidegger, BT, 295. Emphasis in the original.  
88 ‘That in the face of which there is anxiety is being-in-the-world as such.’ Heidegger, SZ, 247 (BT, 
230).  
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the possibility reveals itself to be such that it knows no measure at all, no more or less, 
but signifies the possibility of the measureless impossibility of existence.89 
 
This passage works with a twofold conception of the limit. On the one hand, death is the limit 
of all limits: the limit as such, the collective singular limit which grounds every limit of the 
understanding (the limit of the ability-to-be which ontologically grounds every limit of every 
ability-to-be). As Dasein’s purest and ownmost possibility, this is the meaning of death as the 
absolute limit within the multitude of every limited experience. In this regard, the ‘possibility 
of the impossibility of any existence at all’ is the possibility of complete nonexistence, the 
possibility of the utter lack of existence. On the other hand, there is a radical situatedness at 
the heart of this passage, such that each and every act is existentially structured by a limit 
specific to that act. This limit is not death, but rather the factical domain of being-towards-
death. The limit as such (death) ontologically grounds the specificity of the limit of each and 
every act, but it only does so because there is a specificity – a facticity – to the limit of each 
and every act. Hence the ‘possibility of the impossibility of any existence at all’ also registers 
the simple fact that Dasein cannot be in any particular way (this is equally evident within the 
doubled meaning of the ‘possibility of the impossibility of every way of comporting towards 
anything, of every way of existing.’) Existentially speaking, every act is constituted by a limit 
particular to that act, and, because of this, Dasein cannot be – it is not free to be – any existence 
whatsoever. This dimension of the limit is central to Heidegger’s later analysis of ‘anticipatory 
resoluteness’, wherein the resolution is ‘precisely the disclosive projection and determination 
of what is factically possible at the time’90, and that through which Dasein’s ability-to-be-a-
whole has ‘existentiell authenticity’. As being-towards-death, there is no measure to what 
Dasein cannot be: no measure to both the limit as such (death) which it cannot avoid but which 
it can never actualise, and no measure to the factical limit which structures each and every act. 
The ontological meaning of the possibility of Dasein’s ability-to-be-a-whole takes in both of 
these measureless impossibilities of existence.91 
                                                          
89 Heidegger, SZ, 348. The Macquarrie and Robinson translation of this passage (Heidegger, BT, 306-
7) includes a ‘one’ (‘The closest closeness which one may have in Being towards death as a possibility’) 
and a ‘oneself’ (‘the impossibility of every way of comporting oneself towards anything’) which, as 
previously mentioned (footnote 51), effectively compels the English-language reader to grasp Dasein 
as already and only an individual entity, and as already and only an individual person at that. 
90 Heidegger, BT, 345. This analysis of resoluteness [Entschlossenheit] figures conscience as the ‘call’ 
of care, whereby an appeal is made – from Dasein to Dasein – to ‘summon’ it out of its fall into ‘the 
one’ and towards its ‘ownmost ability-to-be’. Heidegger, SZ, 369 (BT, 322).  
91 At the end of her analysis of Heidegger’s conception of death, White points out that the prefix ‘Un’ 
of Unmöglichkeit (impossibility) denotes both ‘excessive amount’ as well as ‘non/not’. She advances 
the notion that Heidegger might be playing with a doubled meaning of Unmöglichkeit, and that, in the 
anticipation of death, what is ‘measureless’ about the measureless impossibility of existence is both 
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We are now in a position to comment on Heidegger’s culminating definition of death. 
Following his order of presentation, death is, in full: Dasein’s ownmost possibility, which is 
non-relational [unbezügliche], unsurpassable [unüberholbar], certain [gewiß] and indefinite 
[unbestimmt].92 Grounding each of these dimensions is what Heidegger calls the ‘in each case 
mineness’ [Jemeinigkeit] of Dasein’s death which, after John Haugeland, indicates that in 
being-towards-death, it is not Dasein per se which is ‘mine’, but rather Dasein in each 
respective case which is ‘mine’.93 The extent to which a conception of the limit is interwoven 
through each of these dimensions is readily apparent. However, there is an equally apparent 
philosophical problem with this conception of death, a problem which is not beget by the 
concept of the limit as such, but rather by the particular individualising character of the limit 
which underlies being-towards-death. This is the well-documented problem which Dasein’s 
originary sociality (the equi-originary existentiales of being-with and Dasein-with) constitutes 
for being-towards-death. For Levinas, the individualising structure of being-towards-death in 
Heidegger ignores the ethical, non-derivative structure of responsibility for the Other which 
produces ‘a world where I can die as a result of someone and for someone.’94 For Ricœur, the 
‘intimist tendency’ at the core of Heidegger’s analysis of death conceals the full scope of the 
‘horizon of the world…from our sight.’95 It is possible to mitigate these critiques through the 
ambiguities inherent within certain passages. For instance, when Heidegger states that ‘death 
lays claim to it [Dasein] as an individual Dasein’96, it is important to recall that it is unclear 
what the exact contours of this ‘individual’ are, since, as earlier suggested, the individuation 
of Dasein signifies the demarcation of Dasein from other domains of entity, not – at least 
                                                          
the non- and excessive possibility of existence. If Heidegger is in fact invoking Unmöglichkeit in this 
doubled sense, it is possible to suggest that death erases any measure to possibility both within and 
outside the limit, thus grounding the ontological importance of the limit. See White, ‘Dasein, Existence, 
and Death’, 342. 
92 Heidegger, SZ, 349-52 (BT, 307-10).  
93 Haugeland, ‘Truth and Finitude: Heidegger’s Transcendental Existentialism’, 62. As previously 
indicated (see footnote 47), this specification of Jemeinigkeit adds weight to the idea that Dasein is not 
already always a human individual, that there is, in other words, a unique and separate Dasein for each 
individual person. 
94 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity: an Essay on Exteriority [1961], trans. Alphonso Lingis 
(The Hague/Boston/London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1979), 239.  
95 Ricœur, Time and Narrative, Volume 3, 295, ft. 38. Consider Ricœur’s comment in light of the fact 
that the ‘horizon’ (from the Greek horizein) is that which limits, surrounds and encloses. Simon 
Critchley’s insistence on the ‘fundamentally relational character of finitude’ qua the ‘originary 
inauthenticity’ of death is a thought-provoking but ultimately unconvincing reworking of Heidegger, 
because it strips all existentiality away from Heidegger’s explicitly existential conception of death, and 
because the novelty of his ‘originary inauthenticity’ is premised on the notion that authenticity is the 
exclusive domain of the origin in Being and Time, which is simply untrue [ursprüngliche ≠ eigentliche]. 
See Simon Critchley, ‘Originary Inauthenticity – on Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit’, in Simon Critchley 
and Reiner Schürmann, On Heidegger’s Being and Time, ed. Steven Levine (London: Routledge, 
2008), 144. 
96 Heidegger, BT, 308. 
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originarily – the difference of one individual human being from another. In this sense, and on 
the condition that being-with and Dasein-with are in fact originary existentiales, we might 
suggest that death lays claim to Dasein as, to invoke Nietzsche, an ‘individual more-than-
individual’ (wherein the latter individual is an individual human being but the former 
individual is not). However, the stance that ‘death individualises – but only in such a manner 
that…it makes Dasein, as being-with, have an understanding of the ability-to-be of others’97 
undercuts the philosophical potential of the individual and the social alike, because the content 
of this understanding is not the same understanding which first ‘raise[s] the question of this 
entity’s ability-to-be-a-whole’. The latter understanding is in both existential and existentiell 
opposition to the former, given that ‘all being-alongside things of concern and all being-with 
others…fails when the ownmost ability-to-be is at stake.’98 Despite their originary status, 
concern and solicitude have been relegated to second-rate existentiale. From the standpoint of 
being-towards-death, they are not constitutive limits of Dasein’s ability-to-be-a-whole, but 
mere barriers which Dasein can choose to overcome, and in fact must choose to overcome, if 
it is to free itself from the illusions of ‘the one’.  
It is structured by an anti-social individualism, but Heidegger’s analysis of death is not 
thereby irrelevant to the construction of a concept of historical time in Marx. Being-towards-
death is not just the existential-ontological ground of temporalisation but so too the ground of 
the indissociable tie between temporalisation and totalisation. It thus has a direct bearing on 
the construction of a concept of historical time in Marx, but like all philosophical encounters, 
this has its conditions. The entire range of these is vast, but it is evident that Being and Time 
must be critically reconstructed in such a way that the anticipation of death becomes indelibly 
social.99 Being-towards-death must become compatible with Marx’s distinctly social concept 
of the human. What this socialisation of death brings to light, as will soon be examined, is the 
problem of the historicality of the act in Heidegger more generally. With this socialisation 
comes an essential restriction of the Heideggerian project: time cannot give being as such.100 
Rather, time’s ‘gift’ is only Dasein. Or better: time and Dasein give one another. Restricting 
Heidegger in this fashion enables ‘the procedure of separating out the existential analytic of 
                                                          
97 Heidegger, SZ, 351 (BT, 309).  
98 Heidegger, SZ, 349-50 (BT, 308). 
99 Osborne, ‘Marx and the Philosophy of Time’, 20. 
100 ‘Time cannot at all be present-at-hand, it does not at all have any sort of determinate being – rather 
it is the condition of the possibility that it gives something like being (not entities). Time does not have 
the sort of being of some other thing, but rather, time temporalises [Zeit zeitigt].’ Martin Heidegger, 
Logik: Die Frage nach der Wahrheit [1925-6], in Martin Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe, Abteilung 2: 
Vorlesungen 1923-1944, Band 21 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977), 410.  
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Dasein from the question of the meaning of being in general.’101 It also redefines ‘ontological 
difference’ as that between Dasein and other domains of entity, not between being and entity 
as such. And as Heidegger is well aware, ontological difference is not just difference as such, 
but the relations between what is different. Hence to the extent that it is a historical difference, 
ontological difference (a concept, to be sure, Marx never uses) must also denote the difference 
between one mode of production and another, such that each mode of production produces a 
different kind of time because it produces a different kind of Dasein, and produces a different 
kind of Dasein because it produces a different kind of time. This is what a dialogue with Marx 
on the aforementioned ‘historical in being’ might become: not a dialogue whereby temporality 
is an entity,102 but a dialogue whereby temporality only temporalises because – like Dasein – 
it bridges the ontical-ontological divide. In contrast to Heidegger, this is the sense in which 
temporality only temporalises because it has materiality. This is a temporality not simply of 
matter but of the formation of matter through the living time of labour.103 
Yet despite the fact that it is constituted at the level of an anti-social individual, there is 
in Heidegger – not in Marx – a necessary aspect of temporalisation to which we must attend. 
This is the premise in Being and Time that existence holds ontological priority over facticity 
and falling, that ‘possibility as an existentiale is the most originary and ultimately positive 
way in which Dasein is characterised ontologically.’104 That is, we take from Heidegger an 
ontological priority granted to the future [die Zukunft] over the past and the present, which is 
to say his conviction that ‘temporality temporalises itself originarily out of the future.’105 It is 
the future, not as that which is yet to come but as the existential-ontological meaning of the 
understanding ability-to-be, that in the last instance determines ‘beenness’ [Gewesenheit], the 
temporality of facticity, and ‘making present’ [Gegenwart], the temporality of falling. This is 
not to elide the past and the present106 as originary ecstasies [Ekstasen, from the ancient Greek 
ekstasis or ἔκστασις] of temporality. Rather, it is to confront (this comes with its conditions) 
                                                          
101 Osborne, The Politics of Time: Modernity and Avant-Garde, 56. Exposing ‘being as such’ or ‘being 
in general’ [Sein überhaupt] as ‘ahistorical’ is more complex than might be assumed, as it depends on 
creating a concept of the ‘ahistorical’ out of a concept of the ‘historical act’ which both deviates from 
Heidegger and is not synonymous with situating this act in ‘its specific time and place’ (historicism). 
102 Reiterating Heidegger’s position in the Leibniz lectures (footnote 100): ‘Temporality “is” not an 
entity at all. It is not, but it temporalises itself.’ Heidegger, BT, 377. 
103 As cited in the previous chapter: ‘Labour is the living, form-giving fire; it is the transitoriness of 
things, their temporality, as their formation by living time.’ Marx, Grundrisse, 361. 
104 Heidegger, SZ, 191 (BT, 183).  
105 Heidegger, SZ, 438 (BT, 380).  
106 Whilst this thesis utilises the terms ‘the past’ and ‘the present’ in conjunction with facticity/beenness 
and falling/making present, it must be noted that Heidegger relegates ‘the past’ to an entity which is 
no longer present-at-hand, and ‘the present’ to the ‘levelling off’ of the significance of ‘now-time’. The 
future is the only coordinate of time which keeps its everyday name in Being and Time. 
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the materialist concept of history with Heidegger’s definition of temporality as ‘the unity of a 
future which makes present in the process of having been.’107 From this perspective, the future 
of Marx and Engels’s ‘first historical act’ is originary because ‘the character of having been’ 
arises from it, and because as a future in the process of having been, it ‘releases from itself’ 
and ‘awakens’ presence as the present and the present as presence.108 As an ecstasy, the future 
of the first historical act stands outside-of-itself because it is already ahead-of-itself, and this 
excess, this essential surplus, constitutes the basis of its originary power. The future of the 
first historical act totalises the act, such that the difference between the present and the past is 
unified by an understanding – a projective capacity – for the sake of which any act exists.109  
Being-towards-death secures the possibility of Dasein’s ability-to-be-a-whole, but in 
what sense does it secure temporality as the ontological meaning of this possibility? For 
Heidegger, the answer to this question – that through which death and temporality are 
inextricably tied – is the finitude [Endlichkeit] of existence. The ‘end’ within Endlichkeit is 
not ‘an end at which it [Dasein] just stops’ but is, as previously indicated, a ‘characteristic of 
temporalisation itself.’110 Herein lies the crucial (if largely unacknowledged111) importance of 
the telos [τέλος] and teleology to Being and Time. Simply put, the teleological structure of the 
act is the standpoint from which Heidegger’s analyses of death and temporality come together. 
This structure is explicitly not the structure of the ordinary interpretation of totality and 
temporality. For Heidegger, the ‘end’ of being-towards-the-end is the teleological end, not the 
chronological end. The teleological end cannot be conflated with the chronological end. 
Rather, the teleological end is the condition of thinking the chronological end, such that 
originary temporality is the condition of thinking the vulgar conception of time. As Todd Mei 
puts it, ‘the ecstasies of time (past, present, future) characterise the end, or the for-the-sake-
of, as one that is constantly reinvoked by virtue of the temporality that being is. This is the 
reflective burden of finitude which, in apprehending an end, can only realise it through 
constant ontological movement that never finally arrives there.’112 This finitude dictates that 
                                                          
107 Heidegger, BT, 374. Emphasis added. 
108 Ibid. 374, 375, 378. On the doubled meaning of the German Gegenwart, see footnote 17. 
109 Ibid. 385.  
110 Ibid. 378. 
111 Curiously, Heidegger does not openly acknowledge the fact that his rethinking of telos and teleology 
are at the heart of the project which is Being and Time. As we will investigate, this rethinking calls into 
question the relationship between action (the Greek ergon [ἔργον]) and praxis [πρᾶξις] more broadly. 
Take, for instance, his 1924 lectures on Aristotle, in which praxis is the ontological specification of 
action: ‘…we know that the being of human beings is determined in its ἔργον as πρᾶξις. This has telos 
[τέλος] in itself, comes to its end through itself.’ Martin Heidegger, Basic Concepts of Aristotelian 
Philosophy [1924], trans. Robert D. Metcalf and Mark B. Tanzer (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 2009), 123 (§17).  
112 Todd Mei, Heidegger, Work and Being (London: Continuum, 2009), 125. 
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existence, facticity and falling are temporality temporalising itself, and this finitude secures 
temporality as the ‘originary ontological ground’113 of existence. The end is the limit which 
in every case determines Dasein’s ability-to-be. Finitude does not originarily give temporality 
meaning (in capitalism, labour-time does not originarily have value) because Dasein ‘will die 
one day’. Finitude is not originarily the number of years, months, weeks, days, hours, etc. that 
we have left to live, but our existential limit as kinetic entities, a limit which is already always 
there as the origin of all possible projection. For Heidegger, our limited capacity to act in the 
situations we find ourselves in is what first gives temporality meaning, and it is this finitude 
from which the quantifiable time of ‘infinite’ or ‘endless’ time derives.  
In short, this problematisation of teleology is Heidegger’s systematic deconstruction of 
action, activity and the act. Despite the fact that historicality has yet to be examined, we can 
schematise this deconstruction with the following diagram:  
 
Death      Originary Temporality      Anxiety            Existence/Care 
[Tod]  [Ursprüngliche Zeitlichkeit]      [Angst]          [Existenz/Sorge] 
     |            |                    |            | 
     |            |              |            | 
     |            |              |            | 
     |            |              |            | 
Demise      World-Time              Fear                  Ready-to-Hand/ 
[Ableben]    [Weltzeit]                   [Furcht]    Available      
     |            |                                               |      [Zuhanden] 
     |            |              |            | 
     |            |              |            | 
     |            |              |            | 
Perishing          The Vulgar Concept of Time            Alarm/Dread/Terror        Present-at-Hand/ 
[Verenden]   [Der Vulgäre Zeitbegriff]     [Erschrecken/Grauen/Entsetzen]    Occurrent 
                                            [Vorhanden] 
          
      -------------------------- 
              Historicality   
        [Geschichtlichkeit] 
            | 
            | 
            | 
            | 
                          World-Historical Happening 
                   [Weltgeschichtliches Geschehen] 
            | 
            | 
            | 
            | 
          Historicity/History (as a Disciplinary Knowledge) 
                    [Historizität/Historie]114 
                                                          
113 Heidegger, SZ, 311 (BT, 277).  
114 This diagram shows the unequivocal dependence of historicality on temporality in Being and Time. 
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A couple of notes about this diagram. First, it transforms what Heidegger refers to as a 
‘derivative time’ (wherein the priority of the future still holds)115 into a logic of derivation 
which extends across the entirety of Being and Time. This is a tripartite structure of existential 
derivation whose model is the ‘degeneration’ of originary temporality into world-time, and 
world-time into ordinary time116, but as a structure it is not reducible to time. Second, to be 
faithful (for now) to Heidegger, the vertical and hierarchical orientation of derivation in this 
diagram is better imag(in)ed on a horizontal and non-evaluative plane, consistent with the idea 
that time (originary temporality, world-time and ordinary time) is the transcendental horizon 
for ‘any understanding whatsoever’ of being.117 Consequently, authenticity and inauthenticity 
are written across the entire structure. Originary temporality is not the sole domain of authentic 
temporality; namely, originary temporality ≠ authentic temporality. After Blattner, originary 
temporality in Being and Time is ‘modally indifferent’ to authenticity and inauthenticity: 
‘authentic temporality is merely one mode of originary temporality.’118 Hence world-time and 
ordinary time are not necessarily inauthentic. Strictly speaking, it is possible that world-time 
and ordinary time can be taken hold of as Dasein’s ‘own’ in such a way that they become ‘an 
existentiell modification of the “one”’ which ‘frees the other in his freedom for himself.’119 
Conversely, originary temporality repeatedly loses itself in the one and becomes ‘completely 
fascinated by the “world” and by the Dasein-with of others in the “one”.’120 For Heidegger, a 
binding identity between one form of time and one existentiell mode of being, a fixed identity 
between, say, ordinary time and inauthenticity, flattens the essential difference between the 
ontological and the ontic because it immobilises – it absolutises – Dasein’s relationship to its 
own being. But what explains the convergence between one form of time and one existentiell 
mode of being? What mediates their relationship, such that there is, as there is in Heidegger, 
                                                          
115 Heidegger, BT, 378.  
116 William Blattner, ‘Temporality’, in A Companion To Heidegger, ed. Hubert L. Dreyfus and Mark 
A. Wrathall (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), 318. See Heidegger, BT, 383, where degeneration is linked to 
the notion of ‘springing-from’.  
117 ‘Our provisional aim is the interpretation of time as the possible horizon for any understanding 
whatsoever of being.’ Ibid. 19. This is an understanding of time as that which exceeds and transgresses 
(from the Latin transcendere) as well, as previously mentioned, as limits, surrounds and encloses (from 
the Greek horizein). This is Dasein as a ‘transcendental horizon’: ‘Dasein’s selfhood does not imply a 
substantial centre from which the transcending movement is supposed to start, but is, on the contrary, 
founded upon transcendence itself – as the condition of its very possibility.’ Françoise Dastur, ‘The 
Ekstatico-Horizonal Constitution of Temporality’, in Martin Heidegger: Critical Assessments, Vol. 1, 
Philosophy, ed. Christopher Macann (London: Routledge, 1992), 174. Heidegger’s transcendental 
horizon is indebted to the temporalising structure of ‘transcendence in immanence’ in Husserlian 
phenomenology, from which Nancy’s idea of art as ‘transimmanence’ equally departs. See Jean-Luc 
Nancy, The Muses [1994], trans. Peggy Kamuf (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), 34-5. 
118 Blattner, Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism, 99. 
119 Heidegger, BT, 168, 159.  
120 Ibid. 220. 
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an ‘originary and authentic temporality’ and an ‘ordinary and inauthentic time’? How do we 
account for the fact that the temporal relationship between the originary and the authentic, and 
that between the ordinary and the inauthentic, has the capacity to change? These questions, 
which Heidegger does not address, refresh the larger problem of the relationship between the 
ontological and the ontic in Being and Time, a problem only intensified by the fact that Dasein 
is ‘ontically distinctive’ because it is ontological.  
These questions lay the groundwork for an investigation of how the materialist concept 
of history problematises Heidegger’s deconstruction of the act, an investigation whose origin 
converges with the problem of the origin [Ursprung] in Being and Time. Schürmann’s work 
is the crucial point of departure. It demonstrates that the classical relationship between thought 
and action is essentially inverted in Heidegger: the mantle traditionally assumed by thought 
passes over to action. For Schürmann, this inversion does not just reground ontology in action, 
but in so doing renders any distinction between thought and action anarchic because the 
tension at the heart of Heidegger’s practical a priori releases the origin and the originary from 
the restrictions of ‘the philosophical principle’.121 Schürmann traces this release by way of a 
complex genealogy of the origin. First, he examines the causal and teleocratic dimensions of 
the kinetic notion of archē [ἀρχή], internally defined as inception and domination over that to 
which it gives rise, and as the source of the end [telos] which structures both poiêsis (setting 
to work in order to produce a sensible object) and praxis (setting to work as an end unto itself). 
He fails, however, to identify the basic temporal makeup of archē: telos provides the futural 
standpoint from which temporal unification occurs, a unification which is only actual as the 
past in the present. Archē is the past (cause, inception), yet it is a past which is only intelligible 
from within the present action it dominates.122 Second, Schürmann follows the translation of 
the Greek archē into the Latin principium through Duns Scotus’s Treatise on God as a First 
Principle and Leibniz’s Monadology. What is at stake here is how the ‘first from which’ things 
arise does not represent time forgotten – as Schürmann maintains – but time immobilised, an 
ossified time under the command of the past as absolute subject, be it in the figure of the 
princeps which confers an essential order or the law of the principium which grounds logic 
and truth. The philosophical upshot of this is that action – whilst still within time – cannot be 
figured as an implicitly temporalising concept. ‘At the close of that epoch [Latin philosophy]’, 
                                                          
121 Schürmann, Heidegger on Being and Acting, 95-6. According to Schürmann, this is an ontological, 
epistemological and historical release which simultaneously sunders the boundaries between ontology, 
epistemology and history. 
122 This is the temporal logic of archē: ‘In Aristotle, where the origin is understood in the context of 
human making, the elements of inception and of domination in archē balance each other. Production 
is a becoming over which telos reigns, perceived from the start as archē.’ Ibid. 110. 
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Schürmann notes, ‘the principium becomes a law of the mind…a first truth conceived by 
reason and formulated as a premise.’123 For Schürmann, this is the philosophical and historical 
context that Heidegger’s conception of beginning [Beginn], inception [Anfang] and the origin 
dismantles.124 Beginning and inception are categories which cut across Heidegger’s critical 
engagement with the metaphysics of presence. Beginning entails an inchoate movement that 
signals the precondition of thinking, whereas inception recovers the Presocratic idea of being 
seized by and responding to an experience, one which brings forth a dynamic constellation of 
sensation, speech and thought. The Ursprung – the ‘primal leap’125 – is phenomenologically 
simultaneous with and yet ontologically prior to Beginn and Anfang. For Schürmann, this 
priority of the origin comes through two co-constitutive questions: the question of ‘ontology 
originarily’, which is the task of Being and Time, and the question of ‘origin ontologically’, 
from which presencing as event – and with it Heidegger’s notion of Ereignis – emerges.126  
The problem with Schürmann’s scheme is not the questions themselves but the fact that 
Being and Time is not held accountable to the question of the origin ontologically. This should 
not come as a surprise. The origin as such is not thematised in Being and Time. At the start of 
the second division, the ‘originariness’ [Ursprünglichkeit] of an ontological Interpretation (as 
opposed to interpretation as the existential working out of an understanding) is loosely defined 
in relation to the unity of Dasein’s structural whole, but this definition does nothing to mitigate 
– actually it exacerbates – the fact that, strictly speaking, there is no concept of the act in Being 
and Time. Dasein is phenomenologically presented as the ontological basis of temporalisation, 
but nowhere is it ontologised qua action and the act. The lack of an ontological concept of the 
act in Being and Time, a lack which dictates that the phenomenological ontology of Dasein 
implicitly stands in for this concept, is synonymous with the lack of an ontological concept of 
the origin in Being and Time. The consequences of this are diverse. For one thing, it consigns 
the philosophical status of the ‘equi-originary’ [gleichursprünglich] to a descriptive seriality. 
Being and Time is a serial text like Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason: the ‘equi-originaries’ of 
                                                          
123 Ibid. 106. 
124 ‘…the task is crucial if acting – life – is to be disengaged from teleocratic as well as principial 
frameworks; if deconstruction is to set free from beneath archē and principium an origin less 
compromised by command and domination; and if in the final analysis the question of acting comes 
down to complying with that more elusive origin.’ Ibid. 121. 
125 ‘To originate something by a leap, to bring something into being from out of the source of its nature 
in a founding leap – this is what the word origin (German Ursprung, literally, primal leap) means.’ 
Martin Heidegger, ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’ [1935-6], trans. Albert Hofstadter, in Martin 
Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought (New York: HarperCollins, 2001), 75. 
126 For Schürmann, ‘many of the misunderstandings concerning Heidegger are explainable by the 
exclusive attention paid to his effort to raise the ontological question originarily, without noting his 
simultaneous effort to think the origin ontologically.’ Schürmann, Heidegger on Being and Acting, 
128-29. Ereignis is a concept of the later Heidegger, after the so-called ‘turn’ [Kehre].  
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Dasein are successively added on top of one another. Being and Time is not a systematic text, 
such that the equi-originary denotes constitutive relations between different domains of what 
is originary. It is difficult, therefore, to conceive of the originary within ‘originary temporality’ 
as something else than an internal derivation of world-time and vulgar time. Yet this is exactly 
what Heidegger expects of us. Originary temporality is intended to grant us access, as earlier 
indicated, to ‘something like being’. 
But if there is a single aspect of Heidegger’s failure to thematise the origin and the act 
which stands out more than any other, it is the impoverishment of the philosophy of history. 
Proceeding from the standpoint that the analysis of Dasein’s ability-to-be-a-whole has to this 
point been overdetermined by being-towards-death, that the ‘end’ which is Dasein’s beginning 
– its ‘birth’ – has been overlooked, the penultimate chapter of Being and Time introduces the 
existential and existentiell dimensions of the ‘happening’ [Geschehen] and the historicality 
[Geschichtlichkeit] of Dasein. For Heidegger, happening is the movement [Bewegtheit] of 
existence (not the motion [Bewegung] of something present-at-hand) which defines the way 
‘in which Dasein is stretched along and stretches itself along’127 between its birth and its 
death, whereas historicality is the structural name of this happening. Historicality introduces 
nothing new to Dasein’s temporal character. It ‘merely reveals what already lies enveloped in 
the temporalising of temporality’, and is ‘at bottom, just a more concrete working out of 
temporality.’128 The relationship between temporality and historicality essentially follows the 
relationship between understanding and interpretation: historicality is the interpretation of the 
temporality of understanding. Historicality does not influence the three ecstasies of originary 
temporality in any particular way, which is as much to say that history does not shape the 
ontological constitution of time in any particular way. The philosophical scope of historicality 
is accordingly limited to the elaboration of the existentiell possibilities (and solely authentic 
existentiell possibilities at that) of being-towards-death. The extent to which historicality has 
bearing on the existential analytic of Dasein is already established by originary temporality. 
Dasein’s fate is consequently ‘that powerless superior power which puts itself in readiness for 
adversities’129 and its destiny is thus the instantiation of its being-with, the co-happening of 
the community and the people, both of which enable Dasein to hand down factical possibilities 
to itself which have-been-there. This is for Heidegger the meaning of repetition, whereby the 
‘peculiarly privileged position’ of the past (having-been-there) appears in the historical.130 Yet 
                                                          
127 Heidegger, BT, 427.  
128 Ibid. 428, 434.  
129 Ibid. 436.  
130 Ibid. 438.  
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historical repetition does not unseat the priority of the future, since it is only being-towards-
death which enables repetition in the first place.  
Historicality, this thesis maintains, does little else than aggravate the problem that the 
act and the origin are ontologically sidestepped in Being and Time. Historicality offers nothing 
in the way of a response to the unavoidable problem that history constitutes for the ‘one issue 
of radical phenomenology’ (being as time).131 History qua historicality is not an ‘originary 
ontological ground’ in its own right, thus there is no sense in which a concept of the ‘historical 
origin’ might be constructed out of Being and Time. At an existential-ontological level, it is 
temporality, not historicality, which is originary in Being and Time.132 This dovetails with the 
overriding issue that, as Adorno puts it, ‘the structure of historicality…only offers an apparent 
solution to the problem of the reconciliation of nature and history.’133 As referenced in the 
introduction, ‘authentic being-towards-death – that is to say, the finitude of temporality – is 
the hidden basis of Dasein’s historicality.’134 Yet if authentic being-towards-death is non-
relational and in each case mine – if the anticipation of death is unavoidably anti-social – then 
Dasein has no mediated externality to it at all, such that the difference between the individual 
and the historical end – the difference between individual and historical temporalisation – is 
completely flattened. In Marx, the difference between an individual and historical temporality 
is mediated through nature, whereby an individual act (the social production of the means of 
life from the standpoint of the individual) is neither immediately nor immanently historical, 
but only leads to historicality (the historical individual) because it is necessarily mediated 
through nature. This is important, because it demonstrates structurally – historically – that 
historicality cannot be an immanent dimension of individual temporalisation (this despite the 
fact that Heidegger restricts historicality to the working out of individual temporalisation). 
The individual and its historicality must each be mediated by an exteriority, and it is precisely 
the historically changing character of this exteriority – of nature – that comes to the fore with 
Marx’s (underdeveloped) concept of the social individual. The social individual is a normative 
concept in Marx: it is historically produced as what it ought not to be. It is thus indissociable 
from a historical ontology of communism. This is the sense in which, after István Mészáros, 
                                                          
131 Schürmann, Heidegger on Being and Acting, 127. The history which constitutes a problem for being 
as time cannot be ‘the project Heidegger pursues after his Kehre…[which] crystallises in the question, 
how does presencing become history? How does it, as event, condition all that can occur?’ Ibid. The 
retroactive insertion of a historical origin qua Ereignis into Being and Time is not the answer. 
132 Heidegger uses the expressions ‘originary happening’ (435) and ‘originary historicality’ (438) in 
Being and Time, but these are strictly confined to the existentiell level of authentic resoluteness and 
fate.  
133 Theodor Adorno, ‘The Idea of Natural-History’ [1932], trans. Bob Hullot-Kentor, in Telos 60 
(Summer 1984), 115. For the sake of consistency, ‘historicity’ has been replaced by ‘historicality’. 
134 Heidegger, BT, 438.  
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only a ‘truly’ social individual realises the ‘complete personality’ [Gesamtpersönlichkeit] of 
the human: ‘the realisation of “Gesamtpersönlichkeit” necessarily implies the reintegration of 
individuality and sociality in the tangible human reality of the social individual.’135 However, 
it is not just the individual’s alienated powers which are reappropriated in communism, but so 
too something like historicality itself, such that individuals become historical for the first time: 
they relegate the ontological status of all previous history to ‘pre-history’. The social 
individual not only fulfils its own concept in communism; it also becomes an authentically 
historical individual for the first time. The point here is that Heidegger’s concept of authentic 
historicality de-historicalises its own condition of possibility (temporality), whereas Marx’s 
concept of the social individual does not (capitalism). In Schürmann’s terms, historicality does 
not release the origin from the restrictions of ‘the philosophical principle’. Ultimately, what 
Heidegger and Schürmann cannot avoid is Adorno’s accusation that historicality ‘immobilises 
history in the unhistorical realm, heedless of the historical conditions that govern the inner 
composition and constellation of subject and object.’136  
Two points follow from this which bring our dialogue with Heidegger to a close. First, 
his conception of historicality bypasses the philosophical importance of birth [Geburt] as an 
unsurpassable existential-ontological limit of Dasein.137 ‘Being-towards-birth’ (a neologism 
which Heidegger never uses) is not established as a necessary aspect of being-towards-the-
                                                          
135 István Mészáros, Marx’s Theory of Alienation [1970] (London: Merlin Press, 1986), 269. The 
problem with Mészáros’s account is that the social individual as such is conceptually opposed to the 
isolated individual in capitalism. He does not recognise that the isolated individual in capitalism is a 
socially isolated individual, no less a social individual than its (speculative) counterpart determined by 
communism.  
136 Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics [1966], trans. E.B. Ashton (London and New York: 
Continuum, 2004), 129. The incommensurability between the temporality of Dasein [Zeitlichkeit des 
Daseins] in Being and Time and the ‘Temporality of Being’ [Temporalität des Seins] in Heidegger’s 
later work is not unrelated to this. Namely, the analysis of historicality paves the way for attempts to 
think a transition from Zeitlichkeit to Temporalität. Consider John Sallis’s search for ‘another time’: 
‘the move to an analytic of Temporalität would be an advance to a form of time that would be more 
originary than the originary time of Dasein. It would be an advance beyond the time that the existential 
analysis establishes in its identity with Dasein, an advance beyond the time that would be sheltered in 
what was once called the soul, an advance toward another time.’ John Sallis, ‘Another Time’, in 
Appropriating Heidegger, ed. James E. Faulconer and Mark A. Wrathall (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000), 183. The search for what Sallis calls ‘uranic time’ devolves into mysticism: 
‘Could the sheer radiance of the sky, its pure shining, the radiant shining that is the sky, ever be 
mistaken for something at hand in the narrow human world? Then, neither could the time it gives be 
assimilated to Dasein’s temporality. And then, one would need to say that the time given by the sky, 
this uranic time, is, in a way both remote and wondrous, another time.’ Ibid. 189. 
137 Inspired by Hannah Arendt’s account of natality in The Human Condition (1958) and the category 
of vita activa (labour, work, action) which underlies this account, Ricœur suggests that ‘…the silence 
of Being and Time regarding the phenomenon of birth…is surprising. Should not this jubilation be 
opposed to…an obsession of metaphysics with the problem of death…does not the anguished obsession 
with death amount to closing off the reserve of openness characterising the potentiality of being?’ Paul 
Ricœur, Memory, History, Forgetting [2000], trans. Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 2009), 357. 
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limit which, as is the case with being-towards-death, grounds the historicalising possibility of 
Dasein’s ability-to-be-a-whole. Birth is characterised as the other ‘end’ of Dasein’s ability-to-
be-a-whole, but it is quickly subsumed by death.138 The priority of death over birth is secured 
by the immanent relationship between birth and the ‘connectedness’ of Dasein’s life, whereas 
death is (for Heidegger) irreducible to life. Yet despite his frequent use of qualifying quotation 
marks, Heidegger does not develop an existential conception of ‘birth’, ironically foreclosing 
the possibility (to be consistent with the logic of derivation in Being and Time) that birth qua 
biological reproduction – hence the temporality of biological reproduction – might somehow 
figure in the phenomenological ontology of Dasein. From the standpoint of the limit, there is 
no sense in which birth constitutes a ‘pure facticity’ analogous to the pure possibility of death; 
no sense, in other words, in which the past might moderate the originary ontological power of 
the future. 139 In general, it is clear that Heidegger’s neglect of birth is indissociable from the 
problem that the origin represents for his analysis of historicality. Yet the integration of being-
towards-birth need not invalidate his reworking of the teleological structure of the act. There 
is no reason why the act cannot be structured by more than one unsurpassable limit which 
grounds the possibility of Dasein’s ability-to-be-a-whole. If anything, birth adds an additional 
dimension to being-towards, further radicalising Dasein’s situatedness and further solidifying 
the ontological importance of the limit. Despite the fact that birth is an ‘irreducibly past 
possibility’140 which can never be re-actualised, it is also – in both its biological and existential 
registers – an originary component of the historical future. It is an end that conditions the very 
possibility of Dasein’s historical repetition, the very possibility, that is to say, that Dasein can 
ontically and ontologically reproduce itself.  
This leads to a second – and even more ontologically basic – problem with Heidegger’s 
philosophy of history. At the heart of the lack of a sustainable concept of the act and the origin 
in Being and Time is a systematic lack of a concept of need. This lack is all the more glaring 
                                                          
138 In repetition, Dasein’s birth ‘is caught up into its existence in coming back from the possibility of 
death (the possibility which cannot be surpassed)…’ Heidegger, SZ, 516 (BT, 443). Simply put, Dasein 
can ‘catch up’ with its birth – but not its death – in anticipatory resoluteness.  
139 Were it to be developed, the ‘pure facticity’ of birth would need to be theorised in relation to the 
factical domain of being-towards-death, which is to say the particular limit specific to each and every 
act. 
140 Consider the temporality of this passage by Lisa Guenther: ‘I suggest that a rigorous distinction 
must be made between the originating possibility of birth and all the other possibilities granted to me 
at birth, in order to mark the ontological distinction between the unrepeatable, deeply passive, and 
irreducibly past possibility of birth, and the heritage of repeatable possibilities given to me at birth. 
What is at stake in this distinction? On one hand, understood strictly as an ontological limit, birth grants 
me the sheer possibility of existence; on the other hand, and at the same time, birth grants all the 
traditions, practices, languages, and other possibilities that together form a heritage that is received but 
must also be chosen.’ Lisa Guenther, ‘Being-from-others: Reading Heidegger after Cavarero’, Hypatia 
23:1 (January-March 2008), 106. 
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because there is an unacknowledged yet undeniable dependence on a discourse of need which 
cuts across the existential analytic of Dasein. On Heidegger’s own terms, Dasein needs the 
world: its very possibility of existence, its very understanding ability-to-be, is absolutely 
impossible in isolation from being-in-the-world. The a priority of the world is beyond dispute. 
Yet this foundational need is only thematised in passing: we ‘need’ the ready-to-hand when it 
is understood to be missing, when it has become the ‘un-ready-to-hand’; the temporality of 
circumspective concern confers meaning to our ‘everyday needs’.141 There is exactly one 
passage in Being and Time, included in Heidegger’s analysis of the ‘temporal problem of the 
transcendence of the world’, which expresses the ontological centrality of need: ‘Dasein exists 
for the sake of an ability-to-be of itself. In existing, it has been thrown, and as something 
thrown, it has been delivered over to entities which it needs [es bedarf] in order to be able to 
be as it is – namely, for the sake of itself.’142 But what are these entities which Dasein needs? 
What structures the relationship between Dasein and the world as a relationship of need? The 
answer, in short, is the ready-to-hand. The ontological structure of the ready-to-hand grounds 
Dasein as an entity already always in a certain practical relation to a particular world. The 
ready-to-hand defines being-in-the-world as a practical relation, and it is precisely this relation 
which differentiates the ready-to-hand from the present-at-hand.143 As Mark Okrent puts it, 
‘the whole difference between the ready-to-hand and the extant is that to be an extant being 
of a certain type is to be capable of effects that make no reference to potential ends.’144 What 
the ready-to-hand draws attention to is the fact that the existential analytic of Dasein does not 
just rethink the teleological structure of the act through the end of praxis, but that the end of 
the act is defined by an indissociable connection between praxis and poiêsis. Dasein’s being 
is praxis, as Franco Volpi and others have demonstrated145, but it is equally poiêsis (from the 
standpoint, that is, of the production of necessary objects for use, not the objects themselves). 
Heidegger’s philosophy of time implicitly registers this. As Blatter reminds us, there is no 
                                                          
141 Heidegger, BT, 103, 403, 407.  
142 Heidegger, SZ, 482 (BT, 416).  
143 As previously discussed, the ready-to-hand is an entity whose being is constituted by any assignment 
or involvement within-the-world. It is not defined by being a tangible object in space, but rather by its 
practical relation to the world. 
144 Mark Okrent, Heidegger’s Pragmatism: Understanding, Being and the Critique of Metaphysics 
(Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1988), 87. ‘Extant’ is Okrent’s translation of vorhanden, 
viz. the present-at-hand. Despite its general indifference to the philosophical problem of history, the 
American pragmatist reading of Heidegger has gone a long way towards enriching the philosophical 
potential of the ready-to-hand. 
145 Franco Volpi, ‘Being and Time: A “Translation” of the Nicomachean Ethics?’, trans. John Protevi, 
in Reading Heidegger from the Start: Essays in his Earliest Thought, ed. Theodore J. Kisiel and John 
van Buren (Albany: SUNY Press, 1994), 195-212. See, in addition, Theodore Kisiel, The Genesis of 
Heidegger’s Being and Time (Berkeley and London: The University of California Press, 1993), 
chapters 5 & 6. 
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difference between the ‘world-time now-structure’ and the originary present within originary 
temporality: the former is embedded within originary temporality as one of its three ecstasies 
(the ecstatic present of falling).146 Yet Heidegger’s philosophy of history explicitly rejects this. 
As previously alluded to, Heidegger declares that the ‘ontological structure of world-historical 
happening’ (the happening of worldly entities other than Dasein which are historical) must be 
excluded from ‘the ontological enigma of the movement of happening in general.’147 This is 
an exclusion which – not without irony – conditions Schürmann’s insistence that ‘ontology 
originarily’ and the ‘origin ontologically’ are inseparable. It is an exclusion which contradicts 
Heidegger’s claim that historicality is just the ‘concrete working out’ of originary temporality. 
Yet the problem is not contradiction as such, but rather the specific ahistorical – or better, the 
specific de-historicalising – a priority of the world which this contradiction reveals.  
The potential solution to this problem is the systematic reconstruction of the a priority 
of Heidegger’s world. This reconstruction would resituate the ontological structure of world-
historical happening as integral to the ‘ontological enigma’ of the movement of happening in 
general, precisely because historicality is not simply the concrete working out of originary 
temporality. This solution would by no means remove contradiction from the world; rather, it 
would register the fundamental relationship between contradiction and historicalisation more 
generally. It would register a fundamental originariness to historicality irreducible to, because 
equi-originary with, the Ursprünglichkeit of temporality. This world presents the possibility 
of historicising the relationship between temporality and historicality in Being and Time. It 
theoretically enables us to address the previously raised question of the changing relationships 
between temporality and existentiell (authentic and inauthentic) modes of being. Of central 
importance to Marx, this world would therefore allow us to engage Being and Time from the 
standpoint of the ‘economic fact of the present’148, thus rendering the ontological structure of 
capitalist everyday life constitutive of Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein’s everyday use of time, 
or what he refers to as Dasein’s ‘reckoning with time’. For Heidegger, this is the temporality 
of circumspective concern which ‘permits’ the ready-to-hand and the present-at-hand to be 
encountered in time. It is a temporality which guides Dasein’s everyday encounter with others, 
in which making present possesses a ‘peculiar importance’.149 Yet there is nothing in Being 
                                                          
146 Blattner, ‘Temporality’, 321. 
147 Heidegger, SZ, 514 (BT, 441).  
148 Marx, EPM, 107. In her introduction to Marcuse’s Hegel’s Ontology, Seyla Benhabib essentially 
makes the same claim on behalf of Marcuse’s intervention, such that ‘a Heideggerian objection to the 
present work would be that it contains no clear distinction between the “world-historical” dimension, 
the historicity of entities and of our shared world, which unfolds in public space, and the “historicity” 
proper to Dasein.’ Marcuse, Hegel’s Ontology and the Theory of Historicity, xxx. Along with Marcuse, 
this thesis rejects a distinction between the ‘world-historical’ and ‘Dasein’ at the level of historicality.  
149 Heidegger, BT, 459.  
77 
 
and Time which allows us to historicise this importance, nothing which might historicise time-
reckoning as a particular ‘system of time accountancy’150, whereby worldly entities receive 
their basic temporal attribute, their ‘within-time-ness’.151 Ultimately, the essential issue is this: 
Heidegger’s world is not just a de-historicising but a de-historicalising world, but what exactly 
does this mean? What is the existential-ontological meaning of ‘historicalisation’ itself? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
150 Harry Harootunian, ‘Marking time, making histories’, a review of Tomba, Marx’s Temporalities, 
Radical Philosophy 178 (March/April 2013), 40. 
151 Heidegger, BT, 382. For Heidegger, within-time-ness should not be confused with Henri Bergson’s 
analysis of the externalisation of qualitative time into a measurable quantity in space.  
78 
 
2.3 Critique of Dialectical Reason and the Concept of Historicalisation 
Of all the ways in which the materialist concept of history destabilises the phenomenological 
ontology of Dasein in Being and Time, the philosophical (not to mention political) jolt which 
Marx’s concept of need gives to this ontology stands as the most consequential. The historical 
materialism which this concept grounds raises critical social, biological and natural questions 
for this ontology, questions which expose the absence within this ontology of the inseparable 
concepts of the origin and the act. As the previous chapter reveals, The German Ideology does 
not just subsume need under a historical logic, but structures need as the logic of history itself. 
Our grasp of the historicalising power of need begins with the category of the economic – and 
the definition of the first historical act – as the dialectic of the creation of the means to satisfy 
existing needs and the creation of new needs. This grasp also registers need as the ontological 
basis of the sociality of human individuation, from which the division of labour receives its 
historical intelligibility. Yet since Marx and Engels do not provide a temporal reading of their 
materialist concept of history, and since they do not, as the introduction to this chapter states, 
situate their concept of history in relation to the totalisation of the time of all human lives, The 
German Ideology yields what is at best a nascent and descriptive concept of historicalisation. 
That is, it does not provide an account of historicalisation as constituted by relations between 
temporalisation, totalisation and materiality more broadly. Hence it does not offer the means 
by which the historicalising logic of dialectics is secured, such that the dialecticisation of need 
provides the transhistorical category of wealth with its formal structure of historical measure. 
The stakes of this are high, if in fact a concept of historical time is to be constructed out of the 
materialist concept of history. The question is therefore: how would an existential-ontological 
concept of historicalisation enrich Marx’s philosophy of history more generally?  
Sartre’s Critique does not use the word ‘historicalisation’, but unlike Being and Time, 
it enables the construction of a concept of historicalisation in a way which reframes, qualifies 
and extends the materialism of praxis in the Theses on Feuerbach and the materialism of need 
in The German Ideology. It is clear that Heidegger’s ‘historicality’ does not and cannot do the 
same. Yet the importance of Being and Time is not thereby diminished. In his presentation of 
the totalising structure of individual praxis as the ‘original intelligibility’ of history, such that 
totalisation becomes, to employ the classical Marxist expression, the ‘law of dialectics’, Sartre 
does not just consider certain aspects of Being and Time useful for his project to existentially 
rework the materialist concept of history. More fundamentally, he is finding his way to Marx 
through (not just with) Heidegger. The Critique must be read, I argue, as a determined attempt 
to affect a transition from Heidegger’s existential problematic to Marx’s historical materialist 
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problematic, an attempt that is spurred by a gap – an immanent deficit – within Heidegger 
which, as should now be evident, is the decisive lack of a concept of need. For Sartre, Marx 
speculatively fills this gap, but only on the condition that (1) Marx’s concept of human need 
is subjected to the logic of totalisation and temporalisation, as this is the only way in which it 
can be sustained as ‘materialist’; this condition is itself predicated on the condition that (2) 
dialectics constitutes the logic of totalisation and temporalisation. This is the crux of Sartre’s 
methodological approach: Marx and Heidegger are dialectically confronting one another, such 
that – so to speak – Heidegger is being made to totalise and temporalise Marx, and Marx is 
being made to dialecticise and historicalise Heidegger. What secures this as a unique approach 
is the fact that Heidegger is as much a catalyst for this confrontation as is Marx.152 Heidegger 
constitutes a lack, but it is a constitutive lack: he as much as Marx initiates the possibility of 
constructing a properly ‘materialist’ concept of human need, a concept which, as we will see, 
is by no means faithful to that offered by Marx. But – and this is crucial – there is an unequal 
exchange at work here. The Critique is not, as much of the secondary literature characterises 
it, a ‘synthesis’ between existentialism and Marxism. On the contrary, the relationship 
between Heidegger and Marx is for Sartre – it must be – asymmetric: Marxism, after all, is 
‘the unsurpassable philosophy [l’indépassable philosophie] of our time.’153 The fundamental 
relation between Dasein and the ready-to-hand – namely, being-in-the-world – is in the 
Critique systematically replaced and ontologically reconstructed through the relation between 
praxis and the ‘practico-inert’, a relation which takes the name of ‘materiality’. Dialectical 
intelligibility itself emerges from this relation. For Sartre, the dialectic is the necessary 
consequence of individual action under certain material conditions, and therefore, to integrate 
Marx into this, the necessary structure of different ‘regions’ of materiality wherein the social 
production of the means of life occurs.154 How and why this amounts to totalisation and 
temporalisation must now be demonstrated.  
                                                          
152 Pietro Chiodi suggests that ‘…in many important respects the Critique is a straightforward return 
to the Heideggerian position after the attack on it in Being and Nothingness.’ Pietro Chiodi, Sartre and 
Marxism [1965], trans. Kate Soper (Hassocks: The Harvester Press, 1976), 8. 
153 Jean-Paul Sartre, Critique de la raison dialectique, tome 1: Théorie des ensembles pratiques [1960] 
(Paris: Gallimard, 1985), 9. Marcuse’s writings in the late 1920s and early 1930s expresses the same 
position. His essays during this period seek to rewrite Heidegger’s phenomenological ontology within 
the terms of Marx. However, they do not engage Heidegger’s philosophy of time, and thus their implicit 
attempt to fashion a ‘Heideggerian Marxism’ at the level of history and historicality is ultimately a 
failure, relegating their contribution to what is better described as a ‘Marxist Heideggerianism’. These 
essays are collected in Herbert Marcuse, Heideggerian Marxism, ed. John Abromeit and Richard Wolin 
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2005).  
154 This is the manner in which materiality is a historical monism. Critiquing Engels, Sartre contends 
that ‘the monism which starts from the human world and situates man in Nature is the monism of 
materiality. This is the only monism which is realist, and which removes the purely theological 
temptation to contemplate Nature “without alien addition”.’ Sartre, CDR 1, 180-81. 
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Sartre’s account of totalisation in the Critique is indebted to Heidegger’s analysis of 
being-towards-death in Being and Time. In particular, the way in which Dasein’s ability-to-
be-a-whole structures it as an existential analytic directly bears on Sartre’s understanding of 
individual praxis as the ontological basis of totalisation as well as a ‘whole’.155 As previously 
mentioned, totalisation in Heidegger and Sartre alike should be comprehended as an ongoing 
unification whose unity is the very process of its differentiation, not, as Mészáros reads Sartre, 
as a process whereby ‘millions of individual actions’ (this is Sartre’s expression) ‘add up to a 
network of lawlike determinations in the proper sense of historical necessity.’156 The fact that 
the movement of totalisation is necessarily ongoing comprises its ‘fundamental character’.157 
This movement is not only the basis of differentiating totalisation from the scholastic (static) 
notion of the totality.158 It also dictates that totalities are always ‘detotalised totalities’, which 
is to say that their existence hinges on both (1) having been separated from the process of their 
own production (totalisation), and thus (2) a unity – an ‘active power of holding together its 
parts’ – which correlates to an act of the imagination.159 In other words, only totalisation, not 
the totality, is the ontological ground of ‘material unification’, even if, as we will learn, this 
unification is imposed upon human action by ‘material forces gathered together in the passive 
unity of tools or machines’ which themselves ‘perform actions’.160 The relationship between 
totalisation and the totality brings to the forefront Sartre’s ‘progressive-regressive’ method (as 
it is outlined in Search for a Method, the prefatory essay to the Critique), and the movement 
of totalisation-detotalisation-retotalisation that makes up the systematic logic of the Critique. 
Rather than denoting successive moments of the ‘spiral’ of history, totalisation, detotalisation 
and retotalisation are to be understood as nonsuccessive yet qualitatively different movements 
                                                          
155 Sartre differentiates a whole from a totality as follows: ‘…a “whole” is not a totality, but the unity 
of the totalising act insofar as it diversifies itself and embodies itself in totalised diversities.’ Ibid. 48, 
ft. 22. 
156 Mészáros, The Work of Sartre: Search for Freedom and the Challenge of History, 243. Mészáros is 
commenting on historical, not individual, totalisation in Sartre in this passage, but the point remains 
the same: totalisation is not an ‘adding up’ of existing multiplicities. It is rather a double movement 
wherein ‘multiplicity is multiplied to infinity, each part is set against all the others and against the 
whole which is in the process of being formed, while the totalising activity tightens all the bonds, 
making each differentiated element both its immediate expression and its mediation in relation to the 
other elements.’ Sartre, CDR 1, 46. 
157 Chiodi, Sartre and Marxism, 36. 
158 In his foreword to the Critique, as part of his reading of Sartre’s desire to dissociate himself from 
the ‘standpoint of totality’ in Lukács’s History and Class Consciousness, Fredric Jameson sums this 
up: ‘For Sartre…a totality is precisely a static concept, a concept of being rather than of process, and 
one governed by analytic rather than by dialectical reason.’ Fredric Jameson, Foreword to Sartre, CDR 
1, xxi. 
159 Sartre, CDR 1, 45. 
160 Ibid. 184. The ontological status of the act from the standpoint of its performance by the practico-
inert – what Sartre calls ‘passive action’ – must be differentiated from the act as praxis.  
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internal to totalisation as such. In his analysis of ‘enveloping totalisation’ in the second volume 
of the Critique, Thomas R. Flynn summarises this as follows: ‘every totalisation presumes a 
detotalisation of which it is the ongoing negation or retotalisation.’161  
Before the relationship between praxis and the practico-inert takes centre stage in the 
Critique, ‘interiorisation’ and ‘exteriorisation’ emerge as the first registers in which this logic 
of totalisation is to become synonymous with the meaning of dialectics. For Sartre, totalisation 
exteriorises itself through totalities, ‘worked matter’ in which past praxis is embodied, but this 
exteriorisation is already always tied to what he describes as the ‘reinteriorisation’ of totalities. 
This is, in a manner of speaking, the ‘ur-site’ of dialectical intelligibility: when an exteriorised 
totality is reinteriorised through praxis, this reinteriorisation is at once ‘an interior negation of 
interiority.’162 This double movement (the interiorisation of exteriority and the exteriorisation 
of interiority) may represent an ‘antiquated’ framework163, but it lays the groundwork for two 
philosophical cornerstones of the Critique. First, and in line with Marx’s Theses, it situates 
praxis (but also, exceeding Marx, the practico-inert) as ontologically basic to the subject-
object relation, such that ‘interiority’ and ‘exteriority’ become particular dynamisations (but 
also immobilisations) of, respectively, the subject and the object. Second (to return to the 
question which this chapter begins with), the movement of interiorisation and exteriorisation 
establishes the parameters of the relationship between totalisation and negation. Negation is a 
dynamic movement unto itself, but from the standpoint of totalisation it is only intelligible as 
a particular moment of totalisation. That is, negation only produces ‘a temporary totality…on 
the basis of a provisional totalisation.’164 Herein lies Sartre’s ambiguous relationship to Hegel. 
On one level, the Critique is an orthodox reading of the Phenomenology, insofar as it retains 
the primacy of the negation of the negation (which, as we will discover, is Sartre’s definition 
of need). Yet on another, because it grounds dialectics in praxis (rather than consciousness), 
and thus stipulates that totalisation, detotalisation and retotalisation (rather than identity, non-
identity and contradiction) constitute the core of dialectics, the Critique materialises negation 
in a fashion that extends far beyond Hegel. The implications this has for the temporalisation 
                                                          
161 Thomas R. Flynn, Sartre, Foucault, and Historical Reason, Volume 1: Toward an Existentialist 
Theory of History (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1997), 158. As Sartre articulates it: 
‘…totalisation is the way in which detotality is totalised; or again, in which detotalisation is retotalised.’ 
Jean-Paul Sartre, Critique of Dialectical Reason, Volume 2 (Unfinished): The Intelligibility of History 
[1985] (hereafter CDR 2), ed. Arlette Elkaïm-Sartre and trans. Quintin Hoare (London and New York: 
Verso, 1991), 448. The triad ‘territorialisation-deterritorialisation-reterritorialisation’ in the two 
volumes of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s Capitalism and Schizophrenia is a spatialisation of 
totalisation-detotalisation-retotalisation in the Critique, a spatialisation which in large part leads to the 
problems that history constitutes for the Anti-Oedipus (1972) and A Thousand Plateaus (1980). 
162 Sartre, CDR 1, 57.  
163 Chiodi, Sartre and Marxism, 46-7. 
164 Sartre, CDR 1, 60. To which we must add: ‘on the basis of a provisional temporalisation’. 
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of history (as a collective singular, to which Hegel and Sartre are equally wedded)165 must be 
considered, but only after materiality is investigated in its own right. 
The relationship between praxis and the practico-inert cannot be comprehended from 
the perspective of human action and inorganic matter ‘in themselves and as such’. For Sartre, 
action and matter have never been, nor will ever be, exclusive and self-sufficient domains: 
‘within praxis…there is a dialectical movement and a dialectical relation between action as 
the negation of matter…, and matter, as the real, docile support of the developing re-
organisation, as the negation of action.’166 This is the sense in which matter is already always 
worked matter; matter in itself, which is to say worked matter considered from the standpoint 
of its pure exteriority, ‘does not appear anywhere in human experience.’167 Sartre’s conception 
of worked matter is a potential basis from which ‘labour’ in The German Ideology might be 
(retroactively) secured as the meaning of praxis in the Theses, such that worked matter is ‘the 
fundamental motive force of History’ in which ‘the actions of all unite and take on a meaning 
[sens], that is to say, they constitute for all the unity of a common future.’168 Worked matter 
is without question at the heart of the practico-inert, but it by no means exhausts the scope of 
the practico-inert. Invoking (and transgressing the limits of) Marx’s concept of a productive 
force, the practico-inert takes in a radically expansive and differential ensemble of forces: ‘to 
the extent…that these forces are forces of inertia…, they introduce exteriority in the form of 
passive unity as a material bond of interiority.’169 For Flynn, the practico-inert is the 
functional (one might add heretical) heir to ‘being-in-itself’ in Being and Nothingness.170 The 
multiple forms of passivity which it designates actively constitute the practical field, but only 
insofar as these anti-dialectical forces defined by anti-praxis (‘praxis without an author’) and 
                                                          
165 ‘…there is one human history, with one truth and one intelligibility.’ Ibid. 69. The critical departure 
which Sartre’s conception of negation makes from Hegel’s is inseparable from his dialecticisation of 
Heidegger’s anti-dialectical philosophy of difference. Sartre is a notable exception to the predominant 
trajectory of the philosophy of difference within 20th century French philosophy more generally. 
166 Ibid. 159. ‘Matter as the receptacle of passivised practices is indissolubly linked to lived praxis, 
which simultaneously adapts to material conditions and inert significations, and renews their meaning 
[sens], re-constituting them by transcending them, if only to transform them.’ Ibid. 168. Flynn 
emphasises the crucial distinction between signification [signification] and meaning/direction [sens] in 
Sartre’s work: the former ‘refers to a static, conceptual meaning’, whereas the latter ‘denotes the 
ongoing unity of a lived process.’ Flynn, Sartre, Foucault, and Historical Reason, Vol. I, 104. Just as 
history cannot be a totality but it can, it is, a totalisation, so too it cannot be signified but it can, it does, 
have sens. 
167 Sartre, CDR 1, 180.  
168 Ibid. 183. On multiple occasions (90, 124, 136-37, 165, 178, etc.) in which worked matter is the 
implicit or explicit subject, Sartre either implies or explicitly states that labour is the historical meaning 
of praxis.  
169 Ibid. 179. ‘Thus materialised praxis…has the effect of uniting men precisely to the extent that it 
separates them by imposing on everyone a meaningful reality infinitely richer and more contradictory 
than they anticipated individually.’ Ibid. Totalisation and the practico-inert are indissociable.  
170 Flynn, Sartre, Foucault, and Historical Reason, Vol. I, 120.  
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‘counterfinality’ negate the finality of the dialectical praxis-project. ‘This negation, however, 
operates not by destruction or dissolution, but by deviation and inversion’171, a negation whose  
effect ‘is to render material external to the project and opposed to it as necessity to freedom.’172 
Hence, like praxis, the practico-inert is internally structured by multiple, shifting relations 
between action and matter, relations that coalesce in the forces of ‘passive activity’.173 Unlike 
praxis, however, the practico-inert is neither the origin nor ontological ground of totalisation: 
‘the practico-inert can be treated as a process…, but this process, insofar as it is already 
passive action, presupposes the entire praxis…, which it reabsorbs and transforms in the 
object, while still being based on its real, abstract pullulation.’174 As with the dialectic of living 
and dead labour in Marx, the material realisation of praxis is entirely dependent on the field 
of the practico-inert, just as the practico-inert can only be activated through praxis. Yet praxis 
and ‘praxis alone…is, in its dialectical freedom, the real and permanent foundation (in human 
history up to the present) of all the inhuman sentences which men have passed on men through 
worked matter.’175 The humanism of the Critique is thus simultaneously mitigated and fuelled 
by matter: praxis is ontologically accountable to the exteriority of matter, but exteriority itself 
is nothing but the product of praxis, of totalisation as exteriorisation.  
The relation between praxis and the practico-inert can only be confirmed as a material 
relation – in fact as the meaning of ‘materiality’ itself – when and if two fundamental and 
indissociable aspects of this relation are brought to light. The first is that the relation between 
individual praxes is itself dialectical and that this relation is mediated by the practico-inert. In 
other words, the practico-inert determines human activity as inherently social: there is a 
dialectical relation between the dialectical structure of each individual praxis and this relation, 
whereby individual action is ‘transcended and preserved by inertia’, is an ‘original statute of 
reifying sociality.’176 This is the manner in which the practico-inert ‘is simply the activity of 
others insofar as it is sustained and diverted by inorganic inertia.’177 Sartre’s dialectic remains 
ontologically individualistic, but the priority of the individual is mitigated by the fact that his 
                                                          
171 Sartre, CDR 1, 340.  
172 Chiodi, Sartre and Marxism, 49. 
173 Within the field of the practico-inert, ‘matter as passive activity and counterfinality contradicts its 
own idea through its movement.’ Sartre, CDR, 171. Curiously, Flynn restricts ‘passive activity’ to 
serialised individual action rather than situating it across the entire (human and non-human) milieu of 
the practico-inert. See Thomas R. Flynn, Sartre and Marxist Existentialism: The Test Case of Collective 
Responsibility (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1984), 96, 105.  
174 Sartre, CDR 1, 713. For Sartre, a practico-inert process is a systematic form of exploitation (such as 
racism, capitalism or colonialism) which must be differentiated from the ‘three modalities of human 
action’: individual praxis, common, constituted praxis, and praxis-process. Ibid. 789. 
175 Ibid. 333. 
176 Ibid. 319. 
177 Ibid. 556. 
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praxis is already always social as a consequence of his existence within multiple domains of 
materiality, each of which are created – necessarily – by other individuals. The Critique can 
thus be read as the construction of a concept of the social individual that Marx never provides. 
This individual is only intelligible within what Sartre calls ‘the series’: the most basic form of 
the social whereby individuals are united by their separation. This serial unity emerges from 
the ‘formal, universal structure of alterity’178, relations of otherness (viz. alienation) that Sartre 
characterises as ‘the practico-inert object itself insofar as it produces itself in the milieu of 
multiplicity with its own particular exigencies.’179 The praxis that underlies this unity is hence 
‘serial praxis’: ‘the practico-inert structure of…praxis insofar as it is social’180, the existential 
basis of passive activity, and the praxis from which other social forms – namely the group and 
the collective – derive. The relation between the group and the collective is central to Sartre’s 
social ontology: far from being constituted between two discrete social entities, this relation 
is best grasped as a unitary field of social immanence wherein the materiality of the practico-
inert is both resisted and surrendered to. Consider the following passage: 
 
The group is defined by its undertaking and by the constant movement of integration 
which tends to turn it into pure praxis by trying to eliminate all forms of inertia from 
it; the collective is defined by its being, that is to say, insofar as all praxis is constituted 
by its being as mere exis; it is a material, inorganic object in the practico-inert field 
insofar as a discrete multiplicity of active individuals is produced in it under the sign 
of the Other, as a real unity within Being…as a passive synthesis, and to the extent 
that the constituted object is posited as essential and that its inertia penetrates every 
individual praxis as its fundamental determination by passive unity, that is to say, by 
the pre-established and given interpenetration of everyone as Others.181 
 
The primary point to take from this is that groups and collectives constantly negate one another 
because they are dialectically structured – totalised – by one another. The group’s opposition 
to serial praxis is predicated on the collective ‘which engenders and sustains it’182, just as the 
                                                          
178 Ibid. 264. 
179 Ibid. 266.  
180 Ibid. 
181 Ibid. 255. ‘…the collective is not simply the form of being of certain social realities, but…it is also 
the being of sociality itself at the level of the practico-inert field…a collective is in itself a sort of scale 
model of the practico-social field and of any passive activity carried out in it.’ Ibid. 304. Flynn’s work 
is exemplary in its account of how truly expansive a category Sartre understands the practico-inert to 
be. It takes in ‘the social field of collective objects like the newspaper or the Gothic cathedral, …ideas 
and systems like racism and colonialism, and…institutions like the army or the state bureaucracy’, in 
addition to passive unities like language, ideology, classes, and other forms of ‘objective spirit’ (viz. 
culture). See Flynn, Sartre, Foucault, and Historical Reason, Vol. I, 121-23, and Flynn, Sartre and 
Marxist Existentialism, 99-101. This (below) has diverse ramifications for the meaning of ‘collective 
action’ and the ‘collective subject’.  
182 Sartre, CDR 1, 254. 
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collective can never evade the fact that the ossification of the group which it yields inexorably 
leads to new gatherings marked by new bonds of interiority (i.e. fused groups, pledged groups, 
etc.). Groups continually dissolve into the individuating seriality from whence they came, but 
it is precisely this seriality that undercuts Goldmann’s claim183 that Sartre cannot be a Marxist 
because he has no concept of a collective subject. The practico-inert acts, and this means that 
the collective (and the group) subject is everywhere in the Critique.  
The mediation of the practico-inert which grounds the social materialism of the Critique 
would be nothing if it were not situated in relation to Sartre’s unique conception of need. In a 
word, need motors the dialectic of action and matter within praxis; philosophically, it is that 
through which materiality is ontologically basic to matter. Early in the Critique, Sartre outlines 
the broad contours of his understanding of need: 
 
Everything is to be explained through need [le besoin]; need is the first totalising 
relation between the material being, man, and the material ensemble of which he is 
part. This relation is univocal, and of interiority. Indeed, it is through need that the 
first negation of the negation and the first totalisation appear in matter. Need is a 
negation of the negation insofar as it expresses itself as a lack within the organism; 
and need is a positivity insofar as the organic totality tends to preserve itself as such 
through it…; the negation of this negation is achieved through the transcendence of 
the organic towards the inorganic: need is a link of univocal immanence with 
surrounding materiality insofar as the organism tries to sustain itself with it…; as soon 
as need appears, surrounding matter is endowed with a passive unity, in that a 
developing totalisation is reflected in it as a totality: matter revealed as passive totality 
by an organic being seeking its being in it – this is Nature in its initial form.184 
 
Following Marx and Engels, Sartre’s conception of need proceeds from the physiological and 
biological reproduction of human life. The living body is absolutely crucial to the Critique: it 
is an originary condition of totalisation and the first coexistence of praxis and matter – of 
ground and product – in time and space. The body is thus an organic totality that ‘acts on inert 
bodies through the medium of the inert body which it is and which it makes itself.’185 However, 
in sharp contrast with Marx, it is not surplus but scarcity [la rareté] which for Sartre underlies 
this metabolism between humanity and nature. Scarcity, not surplus, fuels history, such that, 
in Marx’s terms, new needs are created and productive forces expand because there is scarcity. 
                                                          
183 See Lucien Goldmann, Marxisme et sciences humaines (Paris: Gallimard, 1970), 330-31, as well as 
Flynn’s response to Goldmann in Sartre and Marxist Existentialism, 173-77. 
184 Sartre, CDR 1, 80-1. This conception of need safeguards dialectical reason from being killed twice 
over ‘to make sure it is dead – the first time by claiming to have discovered it in Nature, and the second 
time by suppressing it within society.’ Ibid. 712. 
185 Ibid. 82. ‘…the matter outside it subjects the living body to an inorganic statute precisely to the 
extent that it is itself transformed into a totality.’ Ibid. 81. 
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If need is the negation of the negation, scarcity is the negation which is negated: the ‘negation 
of man in man by matter.’186 To put it another way, matter and scarcity are indissociable terms 
in Sartre’s conceptual vocabulary: scarcity is matter, and matter scarcity, but only to the extent 
that both exist ‘as a human fact, rather than as the malignity of a cruel Nature.’187 Scarcity is 
the transhistorical condition under which the negation of the negation becomes an affirmation 
– a positivity – but it also dictates that this affirmation (viz. need) is a univocal relation: the 
human must exteriorise itself in matter in order to exist, but matter need not, or rather it cannot, 
reciprocate the same action. Matter cannot exteriorise itself (at least, that is, at the level of 
human history): it is only ever exteriorised and reinteriorised by praxis (this is the meaning of 
passive activity). This is the reason why scarcity produces a ‘permanent framework of a field 
of tension’188, not just within individuals facing the constant threat of elimination but between 
individuals as well. Social relations are thus structured as relations of ‘interiorised scarcity’, 
as relations, in short, of violence and with the Other.189 If scarcity and matter are conceptually 
indissociable in the Critique, so too are violence and need. They articulate two different but 
interdependent dimensions of totalisation as an ongoing and open movement. 
Sartre is often critiqued for this conception of need, primarily because the entire milieu 
of relations between action and matter, praxis and the practico-inert, individuals, collectives, 
groups, etc. that is immanent to this conception stems from a transhistorical identification of 
alienation and objectification, an identification which, Chiodi argues, is mediated by alterity: 
‘alienation is bound to alterity to the extent to which alterity is equivalent to objectification.’190 
As Chiodi reads it, the Critique systematically conflates alienation, objectification and alterity. 
It takes the Hegelian coincidence of objectification and alienation in the Phenomenology, but 
effectively refuses the latter’s possible disappearance precisely because the former is tied to 
an ineliminable – existential – alterity. Effectively refuses, since Chiodi denies Sartre’s claim 
that the group-in-fusion might shoulder the ‘double concrete undertaking’ of ‘removing man 
from the statute of alterity which makes him a product of his product, in order to transform 
him, when molten [à chaud], by appropriate practices, into a product of the group, that is to 
say – as long as the group is freedom – into his own product.’191 For Chiodi, the statute of 
alterity in fact dictates that ‘de-alienation…becomes possible only through the suppression of 
                                                          
186 Ibid. 149. Thus labour ‘has to be defined as praxis aimed at satisfying need in the context of scarcity 
by a particular negation of it.’ Ibid. 136-37. 
187 Ibid. 140, ft. 21. 
188 Ibid. 125. 
189 Ibid. 815. Violence ‘is the constant non-humanity of human conduct as interiorised scarcity; it is, 
in short, what makes people see each other as the Other and as the principle of Evil.’ Ibid. 149. 
190 Chiodi, Sartre and Marxism, 88. 
191 Sartre, CDR 1, 672-73. 
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objectification, which in being a feature of the reciprocal relation of multiplicity, can only be 
suppressed through the suppression of multiplicity itself.’192 Namely, through the suppression 
of totalisation itself, which is the suppression of history itself. ‘What this means, simply, is 
that de-alienation has the temporal dimension of an instant.’193 If, for Sartre, the individual 
‘discovers himself as Other in the world of objectivity’, and if the domination of individuals 
by matter, through individuals’ own praxes as the Other and through the praxes of Others, 
constitutes the ‘permanent possibility of alienation for everyone’, it is difficult to imagine how 
this possibility is not already a permanent necessity, the ‘destiny in exteriority of freedom.’194 
There seems to be no alternative to the fundamental incompatibility between reciprocity and 
objectivity at the heart of the Critique. For Mészáros, the root of this problem stems from the 
fact that the Critique ‘turn[s] the eminently historical and socially transcendable category of 
scarcity into a paralyzing ahistorical and anti-historical absolute, arbitrarily proclaimed to be 
the insuperable permanence and the overall determination and horizon of our real history.’195 
This is unquestionably true. Sartre resists at every turn the viewpoint that the ‘human fact’ of 
scarcity and (as he understands it) the alienation to which it gives rise are specific economic 
manifestations of the division of labour and private property relations within capitalism. This 
resistance – this over-ontologisation of history – extends to Sartre’s conception of ‘exigency’ 
(need from the standpoint of the practico-inert, its imperative) and its subcategory of ‘interest’, 
or ‘being-wholly-outside-oneself-in-a-thing insofar as it conditions praxis as a categorial 
imperative.’196 The notion that both exigency and interest owe their historical intelligibility to 
capitalist private property is something that Sartre continually dismisses. 
Yet the critical literature on the Critique generally does not thematise (in most cases it 
does not acknowledge) the manner in which Sartre’s conception of need forms the backbone 
of his understanding of the relationship between totalisation and temporalisation. Directly put, 
                                                          
192 Chiodi, Sartre and Marxism, 93. 
193 Ibid. 95. 
194 Sartre, CDR 1, 227, 136, 227. Destiny, as Flynn describes it, is ‘a future inscribed in the practico-
inert.’ Flynn, Sartre and Marxist Existentialism, 103. Destiny is ‘an irresistible movement [that] draws 
or impels the ensemble towards a prefigured future which realises itself through it.’ Sartre, CDR 1, 
551. 
195 Mészáros, The Work of Sartre: Search for Freedom and the Challenge of History, 243. Mészáros 
is, bar none, the most forceful critic of Sartre’s conception of scarcity. Again, this is not without irony. 
Mészáros continually faults the Critique for its ‘ahistorical discourses’ and its lack of ‘historical 
specificity’, but he never considers the idea that Sartre provides the very means of rendering concepts 
such as the ‘ahistorical’ and expressions such as ‘historical specificity’ intelligible, which, it seems, 
are for Mészáros self-sufficiently secured by Marx’s concept of ‘mode of production’. This irony is 
exacerbated by the fact that Mészáros accords to nature an impenetrable (ahistorical?) ‘lawfulness’. 
According to Mészáros, there is an ‘absolutely inescapable order of Nature’ whose ‘lawfulness…can 
be dynamically adapted but not violated’, dictating that there is ‘ineliminable natural substratum of 
human existence itself.’ Ibid. 247-49. 
196 Sartre, CDR 1, 197. 
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need secures the ontological dependence between totalisation and temporalisation. It is that 
through which the unification of totalisation must be understood as the active differentiation 
between the past, the present and the future. At the crux of this is Heidegger’s reconstruction 
of the teleological framework of the act. In Sartre, as in Heidegger, individual praxis is given 
meaning by the particular end of a particular project, precisely because every individual praxis 
makes the future present through the end of the act. Yet in the Critique – and this is exactly 
what is missing in Being and Time – need is where the end comes from. It is what governs the 
projection of the end. Need, such as it is defined by the negation of scarcity, thus occupies and 
materially grounds the place of finitude in Being and Time. It is the historical-existential limit 
in relation to which temporality temporalises itself as a kind of ‘being-towards-need’. As with 
Heidegger, the future is prioritised as the standpoint of the temporal unity of the act, which is 
to say that temporal unification is univocal: it originates from the projected future of the act. 
Yet on top of denoting an existential understanding ability-to-be, the future in the Critique is 
also structured by the conscious imagination of the end of the act. The future is simultaneously 
both actual and imaginary in the Critique, which cannot be said of Being and Time. It is open 
because it is a projective capacity for the sake of which any act exists and because it correlates 
to an act of the imagination. This latter sense of the future (the broadly Aristotelian conception 
of the future that guides the third volume of Lukács’s Ontology of Social Being197) is directly 
in line with one of Marx’s classic descriptions of labour in Capital: ‘…what distinguishes the 
worst architect from the best of bees is that the architect builds the cell in his mind before he 
constructs it in wax. At the end [Ende] of every labour process, a result emerges which was 
already present in the imagination of the worker from the start, hence already existed ideally. 
The worker not only realises a change of form of the natural; he also realises his own purpose 
[Zweck] in the natural. And this is a purpose he is conscious of. It determines the mode of his 
activity with the rigidity of a law, and he must subordinate his will to it.’198 This purpose is an 
implicit formulation of the future in Marx, a teleological future immanent to the metabolism 
between humanity and nature. Sartre’s future is distinctive because it combines – and therefore 
exceeds – both Marx and Heidegger’s construction of the teleological future, and because it 
emerges from (absent in Marx and Heidegger alike) a conception of need which itself emerges 
from an account of the relationship between materiality and matter. This, as we will now begin 
                                                          
197 See in particular Georg Lukács, The Ontology of Social Being, Vol. 3, Labour [1971-3], trans. David 
Fernbach (London: Merlin Press, 1978), 1-46.  
198 Karl Marx, Das Kapital: Kritik der politischen Ökonomie, Erster Band: Der Produktionsprozeß des 
Kapitals (hereafter Kapital 1), in Marx and Engels, MEW, Band 23 (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1962), 193 
(Capital 1, 284).  
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to examine, is crucial to our project of thinking historical temporalisation and, consequently, 
the concept of historicalisation.  
 The Critique does not investigate the ontological dependence between totalisation and 
temporalisation to the extent to which it might. There is, for instance, no consideration of how 
the movement of totalisation-detotalisation-retotalisation might correspond to something like 
‘temporalisation-detemporalisation-retemporalisation’, nor does Sartre specify how collective 
and group praxes institute new bonds between totalisation and temporalisation irreducible to 
individual praxis. As the introduction to this chapter argues, if temporalisation is conceivable 
beyond the scope of individual praxis as totalisation, then there is an entire domain within the 
Critique which is missing, a domain which, this thesis contends, must be explored in order to 
both maximise and qualify Sartre’s formulation of history as ‘totalisation without a totaliser’. 
Nonetheless, there are passages in the Critique that must be highlighted, as they represent a 
critical departure from Heidegger as well as the means through which Marx and Engels’s first 
historical act can be read temporally, and done so beyond what the previous chapter provides. 
The first passage is a general exposition of what Sartre calls ‘dialectical time’: 
 
 
Organic functioning, need and praxis are strictly linked in a dialectical manner; 
dialectical time came into being, in fact, with the organism; for the living being can 
survive only by renewing itself. This temporal relation between the future and the past, 
through the present, is none other than the functional relation of the totality to itself; 
the totality is its own future lying beyond a present of reintegrated disintegration. In 
short, a living unity is characterised by the decompression of the temporality of the 
instant; but the new temporality is an elementary synthesis of change and identity, 
since the future governs the present insofar as this future strictly identifies itself with 
the past.199 
 
The second passage reworks Heidegger’s analysis of being-towards-death: 
 
 
Need, as a negation of the negation, is the organism itself, living itself in the future, 
through present disorders, as its own possibility and, consequently, as the possibility 
of its own impossibility; and praxis, in the first instance, is nothing but the relation of 
the organism, as exterior and future end, to the present organism as a totality under 
threat; it is function exteriorised.200 
 
                                                          
199 Sartre, CDR 1, 82.  
200 Ibid. 83.  
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The third passage is an account of the temporality of exigency: 
 
Inertia comes to him from the fact that previous work has constituted in the machine 
a future which cannot be transcended in the form of exigency…and from the fact that 
this untranscendable future is actualised in all its urgency by present circumstances 
(the capitalist process as a whole and the conjuncture in the unity of historical 
totalisation). Thus the inertia of praxis, as a new characteristic of it, removes none of 
its previous characteristics: praxis remains a transcendence of material being towards 
a future reorganisation of the field. But passivising annulment modifies it from the 
future towards the past within the petrified framework of exigency: this is because the 
future to be realised is already fabricated as mechanical inertia in the way in which 
past being is transcended. And indeed it can always be said that any material 
circumstance which has to be transcended, even the configuration of the land in the 
course of a walk, imposes a certain content on the future towards which it is 
transcended. It restricts certain possibilities and provides a certain instrumentality 
which will characterise the final result. However, it does not produce that future; the 
future comes to material circumstances through men, and if material circumstances 
are preserved in it as significations, it is not because it is homogeneous with them (and 
passive like them), but on the contrary because human praxis has given it a human 
future by projecting it (as transcended and preserved) into this future. On the contrary, 
precisely because they have been worked and assembled by men, who have made them 
anti-human, the machine and the combination of exigencies contain the movement of 
transcendence in themselves and, in connection with this inert movement, the future 
of the ensemble is the mechanico-practical meaning of this totality insofar as it 
functions (that is to say, insofar as an exterior force enables it to realise itself as a 
pseudo-organic function). Thus the reason why past being cannot be transcended is 
that it is itself the inscription in being of a praxis which produces, beyond any 
particular human praxis, its own meaning as transcendent being. So the human praxis 
which lives in symbiosis with this inert practice and which is controlled by it as 
exigency constitutes itself as a mechanical means (in exteriority) of introducing 
mechanics amongst its characteristics as a human undertaking. It remains entirely what 
it is (if one takes it abstractly as a pure, isolated praxis) but its own future as 
transcendence of its past being is transcended by this very past-being insofar as it is 
already signified by the future.201 
 
These passages exemplify the unique fashion in which Sartre dialecticises Heidegger’s  
anti-dialectical philosophy of time. If there is a single dimension that cuts across each passage, 
it is the way in which, as the first passage expresses it, the ‘future strictly identifies itself with 
the past’. This is not a conflation of the future and the past within an absolutised present. The 
difference between the future and the past has not been flattened, but rather dialecticised, and 
dialecticised, crucially, under the immense weight and pressure of the practico-inert. The basic 
teleological structure of the act prevails (the future still governs the act through its end), but 
need and exigency, the functional relations of, respectively, organic and inorganic totalities to 
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themselves, are only actual within the dialectic between praxis and the practico-inert202, or 
what might be described as the dialectic between the totalising present and the totalised past. 
Both praxis and the practico-inert ‘contain the movement of transcendence in themselves’, 
but each encompasses a different kind of movement corresponding to a different kind of 
transcendence. Praxis is a dialectical movement between the present and the past wherein the 
present is prioritised as the totalising transcendence of the past towards the future. As the 
totalising present, praxis is the dialectical negation of the past as a totality, which is to say that 
the materiality of the present is the dialectical negation of the past as matter. To the extent that 
it is embodied as matter – i.e. to the extent that it is totalised as a totality – the past is fated to 
inertia (the totality cannot undo its separation from the process of its own production). But the 
past is equally fated to movement, because the totalising present cannot totalise without re-
interiorising matter (there is no praxis without poiêsis). In contrast to praxis, the practico-inert 
prioritises the totalised past as an anti-dialectical force that incessantly saps the present of its 
ability to transcend the past, such that the future becomes untranscendable insofar as it already 
signifies and already identifies itself with the past. As the milieu of recurrence and historical 
repetition, the practico-inert constitutes the standpoint from which passivity is ‘the whole as 
the presence of the future’, and worked matter is ‘the solidified threat of the future.’203 This 
‘theft of the end’204 at the hands of anti-praxis and counterfinality deforms temporalisation 
into the production of passive temporalities (‘the ingenuity of the organiser’ within Taylorism 
‘consists in replacing temporalisation by passive temporality.’205) In short, the practico-inert 
temporalises, but only because, to invoke Marx, it represents the perversion [Verrücktheit] of 
human praxis as temporalisation. 
It is clear that the dialectic of praxis and the practico-inert has the potential to amplify 
the temporal reading of the first historical act in the previous chapter. Generally speaking, the 
Critique adds significant depth to the past and the future of this act, qualifying but not undoing 
the priority that this act accords to the present. As the previous chapter suggests, the past can 
be identified with the domain of existing needs within the dialectic of the creation of the means 
to satisfy existing needs and the creation of new needs. From a Sartrean perspective, however, 
                                                          
202 It is crucial to remind ourselves that the dialectic between praxis and the practico-inert is not simply 
another name for the dialectic between action and matter, but is rather a complex dialectic between a 
dialectical and anti-dialectical configuration between action and matter.  
203 Ibid. 86, 184.  
204 Chiodi, Sartre and Marxism, 53.  
205 Sartre, CDR 1, 559. This dovetails with how ‘a group…incorporates lived temporality with the 
passive temporality of the practico-inert, so as to accomplish, through actions that are multiple and the 
same, a common result.’ See Joseph S. Catalano,  A Commentary on Jean-Paul Sartre’s Critique of 
Dialectical Reason, Volume 1, Theory of Practical Ensembles (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1986), 200.  
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this past takes on a constitutive function which exceeds its mere creation and negation by the 
present. The past is no longer non-dialectical but rather anti-dialectical: it internally opposes 
the negation of the negation within the present as a particular negation of the negation itself 
(exigency is the movement of ‘past-present-past’ that is internal to the movement of need as 
‘present-past-present’). Hence the social production of the means of life is (for Sartre) already 
controlled by the practico-inert (alienation and class are already internal to the first historical 
act). As for the future of the first historical act, Sartre as well as Heidegger obviously provides 
us with the framework with which the future is to be grasped as immanent to the present: the 
teleological structure of the act. Chapter One claims that the future does not lie in waiting: it 
is not the waiting repetition of an actual dialectic played out between the present and the past. 
Yet it does not identify telos as the reason why this is the case, such that it is only the end of 
the act which unifies the time of the act. Telos – not negation – provides the standpoint from 
which the practical dependence between totalisation and temporalisation is secured. Thus the 
question emerges: does the unifying power that Heidegger and Sartre grant to the future, and 
does the prefabricating power that Sartre attaches to the past, undercut the ontological priority 
of the present within the first historical act? The answer, in a word, is no. The future and the 
past are constitutive features of this act, but only because they are immanent to the present. 
Sartre does not thematise this point, and would likely reject it. The Critique is guided by the 
idea that the future and the past completely determine, and thus overdetermine, the present,206 
but nowhere is this idea measured against the idea that temporalisation as such is only actual 
within the present. This is not, after Heidegger, an appeal to the identity between the present 
and presence (the phenomenological appearance of matter). More basically, this is the notion, 
unconsidered by Sartre, that the present is the ontological meaning of movement itself, in both 
its active and inert registers. In this sense, totalising praxis and passive activity are inseparable 
movements of the present.207 Far from fitting into the framework of synchrony/diachrony, this 
present correlates to the phenomenological present outlined in the introduction to this chapter: 
properly materialised, it is the condition of thinking the past and the future in relation to one 
another. If this present is an ‘unbridgeable “pernicious chasm”’ that lies ‘between the subject 
                                                          
206 See in particular Sartre, CDR 1, 709. The present is – by far – the least theorised of the three temporal 
modes in the Critique, largely because the historicist framework of synchrony/diachrony predetermines 
its meaning. This leads Flynn to problematically accept that temporalisation = ‘diachronic totalisation’ 
(which in turn is = historical totalisation). See Flynn, Sartre, Foucault, and Historical Reason, Vol. I, 
111. 
207 After Hegel, Heidegger and Marcuse, it is important to establish the difference and relation between 
the movement/motility [Bewegtheit] of existence/life and the motion [Bewegung] of a tangible object 
in space (see footnote 127 in this chapter and footnote 69 in Chapter 1). This difference does not feature 
in Marx but, this thesis argues, it might be productively integrated into his work (especially the various 
drafts of Capital). 
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and the object’208, and ‘between’ the past and the future, it is only because – qua the movement 
of becoming – it is ontologically basic to them.  
This underdetermination of the present notwithstanding, the Critique equips us with the 
means of constructing a concept of historicalisation that promises to enrich Marx’s philosophy 
of history. In order for this concept to work, it must register the singularity of the historical 
(as opposed to the individual and the social) act, as well as articulate a general set of relations 
within and between totalisation, temporalisation and materiality, relations that each and every 
historical act ‘incarnates’.209 There are a number of ways to approach historicalisation through 
Sartre, but undoubtedly the most productive is through the concept of ‘enveloping totalisation’ 
and its correlative ‘praxis-process’ in Sartre’s second Critique. Enveloping totalisation does 
not represent a departure, but rather an intensive and extensive expansion – a ‘compression’ 
and ‘decompression’ – of totalisation in his first Critique. As Flynn puts it, ‘what [enveloping 
totalisation] adds to ‘totalisation’ tout court from volume 1 is a greater intensity and a broader 
scope. It is more comprehensive than isolated organic praxis in both senses of the term: it is 
more inclusive of the mediating relationships that render abstract organic praxis concrete and, 
correspondingly, it yields greater understanding of the praxis in question…it is a unifying 
notion (historicising praxis-process), not an atemporal concept, that subsumes our praxes as 
parts of a dynamic whole.’210 Commenting on Sartre’s position that ‘every singular totalisation 
is enveloping as a totalisation as well as enveloped as a singularity’211, Flynn goes on to state 
that ‘the singularity of the totalisation comes from its unique locus as the nodal point and 
matrix of an indefinite multiplicity of relationships’, and ‘its enveloping character arises from 
the linkage it constitutes (both in knowledge and in being) to the entirety of these relations.’212 
There are two noteworthy conclusions to take away from this. First, the primacy of individual 
and social (collective, group) praxis has been supplanted by that of ‘praxis-process’, which, 
irreducible to its individual and social actors, is the ontological basis not of totalisation sans 
                                                          
208 Georg Lukács, ‘Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat’ [1923], in History and Class 
Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics [1923], trans. Rodney Livingstone (Cambridge and 
London: MIT Press, 1972), 204. The expression ‘pernicious chasm’ comes from Ernst Bloch.  
209 ‘Incarnation’ does not feature as a central category in Sartre’s first Critique. It mainly designates 
individuation within the group, particularly its ‘summit’ (e.g. the sovereign). Incarnation is, however, 
crucial to the dialectical logic of his second Critique. As an ‘internal and local temporalisation’ of ‘a 
certain moment of the ongoing totalisation’, it encompasses every level of enveloping totalisation. It 
is, ‘at all levels, the retotalisation of the enveloping totalisation by every event, every praxis and every 
particular exis.’ Sartre, CDR 2, 77, 256. The conceptual homology between Sartre’s ‘incarnation’ and 
Hegel’s ‘concrete universal’ is clear. 
210 Flynn, Sartre, Foucault, and Historical Reason, Vol. I, 157. 
211 Sartre, CDR 2, 49. 
212 Flynn, Sartre, Foucault, and Historical Reason, Vol. I, 157. As Flynn points out, this aspect of 
enveloping totalisation is for Sartre the ‘law of immanence’ which constitutes ‘the synthetic interiority 
of the historical field.’ Sartre, CDR 2, 384. 
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phrase, but of singular totalisations. The upshot of this is that there is no such thing as concrete 
praxis ‘as such’. There are only concrete praxes, each of which temporalise because they are 
orientated towards an end and because, as praxis-processes, they forge ‘passive syntheses’ 
that ‘reintroduce multiplicity’ into all modalities of human action.213 Temporalisation has now 
become ‘the movement of enveloping temporalisation’214, which is to say temporalisation ‘by 
every event, every praxis and every particular exis.’ 
This leads to the second conclusion. Enveloping totalisation fundamentally unsettles the 
culminating formulation of history as ‘totalisation without a totaliser’ in the first Critique. We 
must consider how Sartre defines this formulation: 
 
 
History is intelligible if the different practices which can be found and located at a 
given moment of historical temporalisation finally appear as partially totalising and as 
connected and merged in their very oppositions and diversities by an intelligible 
totalisation from which there is no appeal. It is by seeking the conditions for the 
intelligibility of historical vestiges and results that we shall, for the first time, reach 
the problem of totalisation without a totaliser and of the very foundations of this 
totalisation, that is to say, of its motive-forces and of its non-circular direction.215 
 
 
The point here is straightforward. The end of individual and social praxis is one thing, but is 
there such a thing as ‘the end of history’, and if so, what mediates the relationship between 
these ends? What gives history its unity? ‘How’, as Sartre asks early in his first Critique, ‘can 
there be a historical future?’216 ‘Totalisation without a totaliser’ is a placeholder of a response 
to these questions. The essence of this formulation is that totalisation at the level of individual 
and social praxis (totalisations which ‘have’ totalisers) is not – it cannot be – the totalisation 
that totalises history. That is, if history is in some way the totalisation of the time of the human, 
then it might be understood as the totalisation of all individual and social totalisations, and as 
the temporalisation of all individual and social temporalisations, yet this totalisation and this 
temporalisation are not – they cannot be – the same totalisation and temporalisation immanent 
to individual and social praxes. The difference between individual and historical totalisation 
is particularly important to Sartre. We know totalisation from the standpoint of the individual, 
but the intelligibility of historical totalisation, that totalisation ‘from which there is no appeal’, 
is obscure. It is akin to Hegel’s ‘cunning of reason’, and to the invisible hand of Adam Smith’s 
market, each of which work behind the backs of individuals. 
                                                          
213 Ibid. 335. Recall that Sartre identifies ‘three modalities of human action’ in the first volume of the 
Critique: individual praxis, common (constituted) praxis, and praxis-process. 
214 Ibid.  
215 Sartre, CDR 1, 817.  
216 Ibid. 79.  
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 Sartre leaves unaddressed – he does not ask – what kind of relationship exists between 
‘totalisation without a totaliser’ and enveloping totalisation. For Flynn, enveloping totalisation 
is ‘in its most comprehensive form’ a ‘version’ of totalisation without a totaliser, such that the 
former constitutes the diachronic (or progressive) meaning-direction [sens] of the synchronic 
(or regressive) latter.217 Consequently, ‘“totalisation without a totaliser” does not refer to some 
“hyperorganism” or some transcendent reality, which Sartre would reject on principle. Rather, 
it denotes that set of objective relations or possibilities that are put in motion and sustained, 
even in their deviating and counterproductive functions, by individual and group or collective 
activity.’218 Put in motion and sustained, he should add, by singular (enveloping) totalisations, 
by praxis-processes. This is an interesting – and faithful – reading of the relationship between 
Sartre’s two Critiques. It takes Sartre at his word on the last page of the first Critique that ‘we 
have not yet considered the diachronic depth of practical temporalisation’219, implicitly stating 
that ‘enveloping temporalisation’ fulfils this need. However, Sartre and Flynn do not realise 
that the framework of synchrony/diachrony (the framework that grounds the implied (Sartre) 
and reconstructed (Flynn) relationship between totalisation without a totaliser and enveloping 
totalisation) threatens to undercut the dynamic – the dialectical – relationship between what 
Sartre identifies as ‘the formal structures of history’ (volume 1) and ‘real history’ (volume 2). 
This dovetails with what Mészáros calls the ‘unfinishability of [Sartre’s] theory of historical 
totalisation.’220 Whilst Mészáros singles out the ‘existential-ontological foundation’ of the 
Critique, and the ‘incorrigible’ lack of social and historical mediation it yields, as the reason 
for this unfinishability221, the blame is better placed on Sartre’s attempt to yoke the philosophy 
of history ‘to the double synchronic and diachronic movement by which History constantly 
totalises itself.’222 It is exceedingly difficult to transcend the atemporal origins of synchrony 
and diachrony within structuralist linguistics, origins, as the introduction to this chapter warns, 
which indelibly steer us towards historicism. ‘Diachronic totalisation’ therefore becomes the 
meaning of historical temporalisation. Even if we grasp ‘the double synchronic and diachronic 
movement’ as doubly dialectical, such that it correlates to the movement within and between 
the formal structures and the ‘concrete and absolute reality of History’223, we are still left with 
the problem of how to understand historical change and difference through Sartre’s unique 
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218 Ibid. 177.   
219 Sartre, CDR 1, 818.   
220 Mészáros, The Work of Sartre: Search for Freedom and the Challenge of History, 242. 
221 Ibid. 243. 
222 Sartre, CDR 1, 818.  
223 Sartre, CDR 2, 335. ‘The concrete and absolute reality of History can be only in the singularity of 
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dialectical-teleological conception of time. In Heideggerian terms, how are historical change 
and difference irreducible to the ‘ordinary’ (chronological) conception of time? 
This yields a more fundamental problem. The concept of historicalisation must register 
the singularity of the historical event224, but do so in such a way that historical time does not 
become relegated to a passive medium through which this singularity is realised (Benjamin’s 
‘homogenous, empty time’). Yet the only way to avoid this relegation is to likewise conceive 
historicalisation at the level of history as a collective singular, consistent with the idea that the 
problem of history is ‘how to universalise the singular without suppressing its specificity.’225 
That is, the concept of historicalisation must equally register relations between totalisation, 
temporalisation and materiality – need-based relations of dependence – specific to history as 
a whole. This returns us to the argument that enveloping totalisation unsettles the formulation 
of history as ‘totalisation without a totaliser’. The reason why enveloping totalisation is useful 
is not because it provides a model for the concept of historicalisation, but because, in holding 
historical temporalisation ontologically accountable to ‘the real’, which is to say to the entire 
field of historical time, it casts considerable doubt on the idea that history is not in some sense 
constituted by a totaliser. This is not a ‘mysterious totaliser’226 which forces ‘the dialectic to 
become a divine law again, a metaphysical fate’227, but is better understood as the condition 
of thinking what Sartre calls ‘our History’ (viz. human history). This is the premise of the rest 
of this thesis: there is an identifiable totaliser that totalises, and thus temporalises, history. It 
has not existed throughout history, but this lack of transhistorical validity takes nothing away 
from the fact that it is (to date) the only historically totalising stand. 
                                                          
224 The existential notion of ‘historialisation’ in Sartre’s War Diaries (1939-40) and his Notebooks for 
an Ethics (1947-48) is the philosophical precursor of the singularity of the historical event in his second 
Critique. This is the sense in which the lives of, to use Sartrean examples, Flaubert and Stalin incarnate 
their respective ‘epochs’. 
225 Mészáros, The Work of Sartre: Search for Freedom and the Challenge of History, 242. According 
to Mészáros, this is both the definitive problem of history and an ‘insurmountable problem’ for Sartre.  
226 Ibid. 241.  
227 Sartre, CDR 1, 36. It is the unconditional absence – not the presence – of a totaliser within historical 
totalisation which consigns the dialectic to metaphysics. 
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Chapter Three 
Whither Labour? 
 
…we should not say that one man’s hour is worth another man’s hour, but rather that 
one man during an hour is worth as much as another man during an hour. Time is 
everything, man is nothing; he is at the most the embodiment of time. Quality no 
longer matters. Quantity alone decides everything: hour for hour, day for day…1 
 
This thesis has, up to this point, been predominantly framed at a transhistorical level. Chapter 
1 introduced a transhistorical materialist concept of history: a concept of history that, for Marx 
and Engels, registers all of human history. The heart of Chapter 1 is a temporal reading of the 
first historical act – the social production of the means of life – that is a ‘fundamental condition 
of all history, which today, as thousands of years ago, must daily and hourly be fulfilled merely 
in order to sustain human life.’2 Specifically, this chapter looked at Marx and Engels’s internal 
specification of this act – the creation of the means of satisfying existing needs and the creation 
of new needs – as two different dimensions of one and the same historical act. It then argued 
that the basic temporal structure of this act is a dialectic between the present and the past, one 
immanently guided by a teleological future. What Chapter 1 established is that, for Marx and 
Engels, labour and need are the two categories upon which the materialist concept of history 
depends, and thus labour and need are the two forces without which the temporality of history 
cannot be thought. Chapter 2 gave us the means by which to ontologically ground the temporal 
reading offered by Chapter 1. Heidegger’s Dasein provides an account of how the act as such 
temporalises, but fails to establish need as the end of the act, whereas Sartre explicitly reworks 
the relation between Dasein and its world as a material relation between individual praxis and 
the ‘practico-inert’, thus situating need not only at the heart of temporalisation, but at the heart 
of the unity between totalisation and temporalisation. The conclusion of Sartre’s first Critique 
is the formulation of history as ‘totalisation without a totaliser’ (a formulation, we should note, 
which is remarkably similar to Althusser’s ‘process without a subject’). For Sartre, history can 
thus be conceived as the ongoing totalisation and temporalisation of all individual totalisations 
and temporalisations, but historical totalisation and temporalisation does not – it cannot – have 
a totaliser. Any attempt to identify such a totaliser is to relegate dialectics to metaphysics. 
                                                          
1 Karl Marx, Das Elend der Philosophie [Misère de la Philosophie] [1847], in Marx and Engels, MEW, 
Band 4 (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1977), 85 (for an English edition of this passage: Karl Marx, The Poverty 
of Philosophy (New York: International Publishers, 1963), 53-4). 
2 Marx and Engels, GI, 48. 
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 The underlying concern of this chapter – in fact the rest of this thesis – is the fate of the 
materialist concept of history, and hence the fate of Heidegger and Sartre’s contribution to our 
temporal understanding of this concept, in the wake of Marx’s critique of political economy 
from the late 1850s onwards, which is to say from the Grundrisse onwards. In what ways does 
this critique problematise the transhistoricality of the materialist concept of history? In what 
ways does it force us to rethink ‘transhistoricality’ in Marx more generally? If labour and need 
are the two essential categories at the heart of the materialist concept of history, in what sense 
does this critique modify our understanding of these categories, our understanding, that is, of 
how labour and need temporalise and historicalise? This chapter concentrates on the category 
of labour, whereas the following chapter will, in light of what is demonstrated in this chapter, 
thematise the category of need. So what becomes of Marx’s category of labour in the wake of 
his critique of political economy? How does this critique transform the category of ‘labour in 
general’, the transhistorical category which, one might state, registers the ontological basis of 
the totalisation and temporalisation of history? We must address these questions because, and 
contrary to some readings of Marx, ‘human labour in general’ [menschliche Arbeit überhaupt] 
does not fall out of his critique of political economy. In actual fact, labour in general is at the 
forefront of this critique, albeit in ways which radically alter the scope and critical function of 
this category in both the 1844 Manuscripts as well as The German Ideology. This is because, 
this chapter argues, Marx’s critique of political economy introduces a concept without which 
labour in general cannot be thought, a concept which is the historically specific (to capitalism) 
condition of thinking this category. In short, this concept is Marx’s concept of ‘abstract human 
labour’ [abstrakt menschliche Arbeit], a concept that is a cornerstone of his concept of capital 
and that is the central focus of this chapter. To suggest that abstract labour is the condition of 
conceiving ‘labour in general’ does not mean that capital is ‘a necessary feature of the human 
labour-process as such, irrespective of the historical forms it has assumed’3, but it does mean 
that we cannot conceptualise this process, nor the historical forms it assumes, in isolation from 
the totalising and temporalising power of capital.  
 As controversial as it may be to declare this, this chapter proceeds from the premise that  
Capital readily demonstrates that abstract labour is the condition of thinking labour in general. 
‘Labour in general’ is an epistemological consequence of the commodity exchange relation in 
capitalism, an exchange relation that both constitutes and is constituted by the ‘value-forming 
substance’: abstract labour. Hence when Marx asserts that ‘the equality and equivalence of all 
                                                          
3 Marx, Capital 1, 981. When capital is comprehended as a necessary feature of labour as such, ‘it is 
consequently something permanent, determined by the nature of human labour itself.’ Ibid. This is, in 
short, the defining error of classical political economy, an error in which ‘capital comes to be thought 
of as a thing...[that] plays…a role appropriate to it as a thing in the process of production.’ Ibid. 982.  
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kinds of labour because and insofar as they are human labour in general’ is predicated on ‘the 
dominant social relation…[being]…the relation between men as possessors of commodities’4, 
this does not mean that, consequent to the establishment of a generalised system of commodity 
exchange (capitalism), abstract labour emerges as the ‘historically specific’ form of an already 
existing – transhistorical – labour in general, but rather that something like ‘labour in general’ 
becomes, for the first time in history, intelligible because capitalism creates a particular kind 
of labour – abstract labour – as its own condition. This thesis argues that there is no basis other 
than abstract labour, and therefore no mode of production other than capitalism, which enables 
us to think ‘labour’ transhistorically, which enables passages like: 
 
 
The labour-process…is purposeful activity aimed at the production of use-values. It is 
an appropriation of what exists in nature for the requirements of human beings. It is 
the universal condition for the metabolism [Stoffwechsel] between the human being 
and nature, the eternal, natural condition of human existence, and it is thus independent 
of every form of that existence, or rather it is common to all forms of society in which 
human beings live.5 
 
 
The crux of the issue here is the category of ‘concrete labour’. The premise of this chapter is 
that capital demolishes the thought of something like a ‘transhistorical labour in general’ – a 
‘concrete labour as such’ – except – and this is the essential point – as a general category that 
receives its intelligibility from concrete labours as particular instances of abstract labour. Put 
differently, the only actuality to the category of ‘labour in general’ is abstract labour: insofar 
as ‘labour in general’ is actual in general, it is as abstract labour. Within capitalism, ‘labour in 
general’ is not actual as concrete labour. It is actual as concrete labours (plural, the multiplicity 
of them), which is why abstract labour constitutes its condition of intelligibility. The dialectic, 
we will argue, between concrete labour (the Multiple) and abstract labour (the One), a dialectic 
that is specific to capitalism, cannot be compromised. The potential ‘controversy’ arises from 
the fact that Marx himself, in Capital and elsewhere, offers us passages (such as the one above) 
that clearly depict ‘labour’ in transhistorical terms. Passages like these are, this thesis argues,  
very problematic, because they do not acknowledge what Capital demonstrates: capital is their 
condition of possibility. As we will learn, this extends to other concepts in Marx’s critique of 
political economy as well, namely ‘concrete labour’, ‘use-value’ and ‘labour-power’. In some 
regards, therefore, this chapter is in conflict with Marx. 
                                                          
4 Ibid. 152.  
5 Marx, Kapital 1, 198 (Capital 1, 290). 
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 Yet the purpose of this chapter is not simply, or even primarily, to demonstrate that the 
concept of abstract labour is the condition of thinking labour in general.6 It overriding purpose 
is in fact to systematically examine, consequent to the fact that abstract labour makes ‘labour 
in general’ intelligible, the complex and rich concept that is ‘abstract labour’ itself, at the heart 
of which is a complex and rich – if underdeveloped – account of temporalisation. Indeed, the 
temporal – temporalising – dialectic between abstract and concrete labour is arguably Marx’s 
greatest contribution to the philosophy of time, a contribution that is still far from being fully 
realised. To anticipate the next chapter, the reason why such attention is being paid to abstract 
labour is that if it is the condition of thinking labour in general, then it must also be an essential 
(but not the only) condition of thinking the materialist concept of history.7 This chapter is thus 
the necessary first step towards establishing what the previous chapter speculatively proposed 
and what the next chapter seeks to demonstrate: against Sartre, there is a totaliser that totalises 
and temporalises history. It is capital. Thus whilst history does not feature prominently in this 
chapter, this does not mean that abstract labour is in any sense ‘outside’ of history, or that the 
exchange relation which simultaneously constitutes and expresses abstract labour is somehow 
‘outside’ of historical time. Quite the opposite. Abstract labour and the commodity exchange 
relation are squarely within history and historical time, precisely because they are constitutive 
of history and historical time. They – and this claim can only be fully appreciated after Chapter 
4 and the Conclusion – are a historical-ontological ground of the production of historical time. 
In opposition to the standpoint of much of the literature in so-called ‘Systematic Dialectics’, 
therefore, the capitalist exchange relation is not just a historical but a historicalising relation, 
such that historical time is – logically and actually – immanent to the systematic development 
of the value-form.8 A crucial dimension of coming to this realisation – and this the concern of 
the second section of this chapter, after the totalising and temporalising power of abstract 
labour has been outlined – is the systematic investigation of Marx’s concepts of ‘necessary’ 
                                                          
6 The question is also: if abstract labour is the condition of thinking labour in general, is it the condition 
of thinking Sartre’s ‘praxis’? Heidegger’s ‘Dasein’? The historical condition that makes, we might go 
so far as to say, the existential-phenomenological subject possible?   
7 Chapter 4 concentrates exclusively on the materialist concept of history, but it raises the question of 
whether capital is the condition of thinking the modern, post-Enlightenment conception of history more 
generally.  
8 ‘Systematic Dialectics’ does not grasp capital as the condition of thinking history, and hence does not 
think the systematic properly. Statements such as the following (which is representative of Systematic 
Dialectics) are thus misguided: ‘the exchanges outlined in the first chapter of Capital are not historical 
but logical.’ Stavros Tombazos, Time in Marx: The Categories of Time in Marx’s Capital (Chicago: 
Haymarket Books, 2014), 62. This standpoint is common, and extends beyond Systematic Dialectics. 
In his Kantian rereading of commodity exchange as the a priori synthetic matrix of the social, Sohn-
Rethel states that ‘the exchange abstraction excludes everything that makes up history, human and even 
natural history’, and that through the exchange relation ‘time becomes unhistorical time.’ Sohn-Rethel, 
Intellectual and Manual Labour: a Critique of Epistemology, 48-9, 56. 
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and ‘surplus-labour’. These two concepts must be examined not only because their difference 
and relation are the very reason why abstract labour exists, but because – and this is the task 
of Chapter 4 – the production of their difference and relation comprises, in Sartre’s words, the 
‘primary intelligibility’ of history. 
 An overriding consequence of this chapter – one that the rest of this thesis reinforces – 
can be grasped by the following proposition: there is no place for a ‘transhistorical ontology’ 
in Marx, only a historical ontology. Categories such as labour and need are only ontologically 
valid at the level of the difference between one mode of production and another, such that the 
capitalist human is a fundamentally different kind of subject than the feudal human (the social 
individual in capitalism is a fundamentally different kind of subject than the social individual 
in other modes of production9). Yet this does not mean that we cannot think transhistorically. 
For our purposes, the specifically capitalist existence of abstract labour is exactly what allows 
us to think ‘labour’, ‘need’ and ‘history’ transhistorically. In short (assuming one holds to the 
ontological priority of a mode of production), the ‘transhistorical’ should be understood as an 
epistemological category in Marx, whereas the ‘historical’ is an ontological category. Hence 
whilst this chapter – in fact the rest of this thesis – destabilises the transhistorical basis of the 
claims made in the first two chapters, it does not render these claims meaningless. Rather, it 
shows that the capitalist mode of production is the historical condition of thinking what, up to 
this point, has been presented at a transhistorical level. The spirit of this chapter is thus not to 
shut down the possibility of ‘the transhistorical Marx’, but to historicise him. This is important 
because the concept of historical time must register the possibility of social and historical time 
after capitalism. We need the transhistorical Marx, precisely because it is impossible to think 
communism without him. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
9 This point registers the essential limit of Carol C. Gould’s Marx’s Social Ontology: Individuality and 
Community in Marx’s Theory of Social Reality (Cambridge and London: MIT Press, 1978). Drawing 
on the passages on the ‘social individual’ in the Grundrisse, Gould attempts to create a transhistorically 
valid social ontology as the basis from which to think the historical development of social individuality. 
There is something sociological in the bad sense about a methodology such as this: Gould’s manoeuvre 
effectively de-historicises the social in order to historicise the historical. Marx’s conception of a ‘social 
individual’ is intelligible because of capitalism (as is the category of ‘society’).  
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3.1 Abstract and Concrete Labour 
We do not need to go further than the first chapter of the first volume of Capital to have a 
sense of how ‘labour in general’ owes its intelligibility to capital. A direct consequence of the 
systematic development of the value-form in this chapter is the realisation that the capitalist 
exchange relation does not just express but in fact constitutes the category of labour in general. 
The following passage encapsulates this nicely: 
 
Men and women do not…bring the products of their labour into relation with each 
other as values because they see these objects as the thinglike shells [sachliche Hüllen] 
of homogeneous human labour. It is the opposite. By equating their different products 
to each other in exchange as values, they equate their different kinds of labour as the 
same human labour. They do not know this, but they do this.10 
 
 
Marx repeatedly emphasises this point throughout the first chapter of Capital: ‘It is only the 
expression of equivalence between different sorts of commodities which brings to view the 
specific character of value-creating labour, by actually reducing the different kinds of labour 
embedded in the different kinds of commodity to their common quality of being human labour 
in general.’11 In other words, the act of exchange determines the kind of labour that determines 
the value of what is being exchanged. The value-form, and the act of exchange that is implied 
by this form, are originary conditions of Marx’s labour theory of value. Value [Wert], which 
might be described as ‘exchangeability in definite proportions’12, is the self-mediating ground 
of the social. It is determined, as we will examine, by ‘socially necessary labour-time’, but it 
is nothing if it is not also understood as an exchange-determined ground. Capitalist production 
is already always production for exchange, and thus the exchange relation must ‘be grasped 
as simultaneously constitutive of value and serving as its expression.’13  
Any discussion of the relationship between capital and the category of labour in general 
must, however, attend to one particular exchange, one consistent with the exchange relation 
as doubly constitutive and expressive of value, but one that, given the content of what is being 
exchanged, stands as both the presupposition and result of the production-process of capital. 
                                                          
10 Marx, Kapital 1, 88 (Capital 1, 166-67). The ‘products of labour’ which men and women bring into 
relation with each other should also, crucially, be understood as these very same men and women. 
11 Marx, Capital 1, 142. Emphasis added. 
12 See Tony Smith, ‘Hegel, Marx and the Comprehension of Capitalism’, in Marx’s Capital and 
Hegel’s Logic: A Reexamination, ed. Fred Moseley and Tony Smith (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2014), 
29.  
13 Christopher J. Arthur, The New Dialectic and Marx’s Capital (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2004), 96. 
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This is the act of the sale and purchase of labour-capacity [Arbeitsvermögen] or labour-power 
[Arbeitskraft], or what Marx also calls ‘the exchange of variable capital for labour-power.’14 
Marx details this exchange in Chapter 6 (of the English edition) of the first volume of Capital, 
emphasising the two conditions necessary for the possessor of money to encounter the owner 
of labour-power on the market. These are the two senses in which the potential labourer must 
be ‘free’: (1) free from the possession of the means of production (hence free from the means 
of satisfying his own needs), and (2) free – in the juridical sense of the term – to sell his sole 
possession (but only for a fixed amount of time, such that he ‘manages both to alienate his 
labour-power and to avoid renouncing his rights of ownership over it.’15) As we will learn in 
Chapter 4, ‘so-called originary accumulation’ [die sogenannte ursprüngliche Akkumulation] 
is itself the condition of these conditions. It should also be noted here that unlike the permanent 
presence and various metamorphoses of the category of labour in Marx’s work, the concept 
of labour-power does not appear until the late 1850s (the Grundrisse), and does not feature 
until the mid-1860s (it is everywhere in Marx’s 1849 pamphlet Wage-Labour and Capital, 
but only because of Engels’s editorial hand in 1891).  
For our present purposes, however, we must navigate a potential ambiguity at the heart 
of Marx’s account of labour-power. On the one hand, he characterises it as ‘the entire field 
[Inbegriff] of those physical and intellectual capabilities existing in the corporeal form 
[Leiblichkeit], the living personality of a human being, capabilities which he sets in motion 
whenever he produces a use-value of any kind.’16 To the extent that it ‘exists only as a capacity 
of the living individual’17, labour-power might seem to function as a transhistorical – indeed 
a naturalistic transhistorical – concept in Marx. This reading might be likened to what Moishe 
Postone calls ‘traditional Marxism’, such that labour-power becomes the normative repository 
of labour as the ‘transhistorical essence of social life.’18 Accordingly, labour-power would 
come into alignment with Marx’s depiction of the labour-process as ‘the universal condition 
for the metabolism between the human and nature, the eternal, natural condition of human 
existence…independent of every form of that existence.’19 This reading also intersects with a 
                                                          
14 ‘Variable capital’ has a variable meaning throughout the various drafts of Capital, but in the context 
of the exchange relation it designates the wage-form (this is its predominant meaning in ‘Results of the 
Immediate Production-Process’, written before the publication of Capital in 1867). However, it also 
designates the act of labour itself, insofar as this act is only actual as ‘one of the modes of existence’ of 
capital. Ibid. 988.  
15 Ibid. 271. In this sense, the worker’s mode of freedom and his mode of subjection are the same thing.  
16 Marx, Kapital 1, 181 (Capital 1, 270). 
17 Marx, Capital 1, 274. 
18 Postone, Time, Labor, and Social Domination, 61. 
19 Marx, Kapital 1, 198 (Capital 1, 290). This passage is nearly identical to passages in Marx, Capital 
1, 133, and Marx, Contribution, 36. 
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number of recent Italian formulations of the concept of ‘biopolitics’ (this is paradoxical insofar 
as the relevant authors explicitly dissociate themselves from ‘traditional Marxism’). For Paolo 
Virno, the capitalist purchases the life and the body of the worker because ‘this life, this body, 
are what contains the faculty, the potential, the dynamis’20, but for Virno this potentiality is 
irreducible to its commodification, because life is ontologically basic to capital. Michael Hardt 
and Antonio Negri agree: ‘Labour-power has always exceeded its relation to capital in terms 
of its potential, in the sense that people have the capacity to do much more and produce much 
more than what they do at work.’21 The actualisation of ‘biopolitical labour-power’ – which 
is for Hardt and Negri the contemporary capacity of human beings to live and to love – thus 
leads to a ‘creativity’ which expresses the common and points beyond capital.22 
A far more definitive case can, however, be made that labour-power is only intelligible 
from the standpoint of its commodification. Like every other commodity, labour-power has a 
value and a use-value [Gebrauchswert]. Like every other commodity, its value is determined 
by the social labour-time necessary for its production, time that is, in this case, objectified as 
‘a certain sum of the means of life’23 essential to the preservation [Erhaltung] of the individual 
worker. Unlike every other commodity, therefore, the labour-time requisite for the production 
of labour-power is at once the labour-time necessary for its reproduction – both socially and 
biologically – presenting the determination of its value with ‘a historical and moral element’24 
which simply cannot be attributed to any other commodity. In this respect, labour-power is a  
‘peculiar commodity’ [eigentümliche Ware], since its owner’s mortality directly bears on the 
determination of its value.25 However, this peculiarity must be extended to the use-value of 
labour-power as well. First – and we will consider this later – because human mortality also 
directly bears on the determination of this use-value. The second reason, which is inseparable 
from the first, is that labour-power, considered from the standpoint of its use-value, is the sole 
provider of the use- and exchange-value [Tauschwert] of every commodity.26 This peculiarity 
                                                          
20 Paolo Virno, A Grammar of the Multitude, trans. Isabella Bertoletti, James Cascaito, and Andrea 
Casson (Los Angeles and New York: Semiotext(e), 2004), 82-3. 
21 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Commonwealth (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009), 
151.  
22 Ibid. 315.  
23 Marx, Kapital 1, 185 (Capital 1, 274). 
24 Marx, Capital 1, 275. By this Marx primarily means the strength and organisation of the working-
class. Class struggle features in the analysis of the production-process the next chapter. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Like value, ‘exchange-value’ is a purely relational category. It is nothing but the form of appearance, 
the manifestation, of value as a purely social objectivity, which is to say that ‘not an atom of matter 
enters into’ it. Ibid. 138. Insofar as exchange-value expresses the quantitative ratio in which one 
commodity is exchanged for another, money is its necessary and exclusive representative. The question 
here is whether labour-power is the sole provider of every use- and exchange-value. See Marx, Capital 
1, 131, and footnote 28, below. 
105 
 
corresponds to the doubled character of labour specific to capitalism: namely, ‘concrete useful 
labour’ [konkrete nützlicher Arbeit], or the social individual form of labour that produces use-
values, and ‘abstract human labour’ [abstrakt menschliche Arbeit], or the purely social form 
of labour that produces exchange-values. These two social forms of labour do not refer to two 
separate or distinguishable acts, but rather ‘to two aspects of the same labour in commodity-
determined society.’27 To the extent that it is defined by the production of use-value, whose 
status as an economic category specific to capitalism remains ambiguous28, a certain degree 
of historical indeterminacy might seem to follow concrete labour. But when this ‘expenditure 
of human labour-power in a particular form and with a definite aim’29 is considered – quite 
necessarily – in its dialectical relation to abstract labour, ‘labour as the expenditure of labour-
power, whatever the “useful” mode in which it is expended’30, what quickly becomes evident 
is that labour-power is only intelligible from the standpoint of its commodification. Abstract 
labour – and Marx is unambiguous on this point – is not a transhistorically valid category. Its 
power, qua ‘living labour’, to produce exchange-value establishes it as the ‘life-blood of 
capitalism’31 and capitalism alone. As Peter Osborne formulates it, ‘this power…is thus not 
“fundamentally” but rather historically ontological: it is the historico-ontological product of 
the process of production of capital as a whole.’32 To reinforce this point from another angle, 
the idea of a dialectic between a transhistorical (‘concrete’) and historical (‘abstract’) concept 
of labour – which is to say a dialectic between a social form of labour common to all modes 
of production and one specific to a particular mode of production – is nonsensical. ‘Concrete 
labour’ is historically specific to capitalism.33 In short, ‘use’, ‘exchange’ and ‘labour’ can be 
                                                          
27 Postone, Time, Labor, and Social Domination, 144. For Marx, therefore, ‘…the commodity does not 
contain two different sorts of labour; the same labour, however, is determined as different and as 
opposed to itself.’ Quoted in ibid. 
28 The ambiguity within Marx’s account of use-value is far more pervasive than that within his account 
of labour-power. In the Grundrisse, the 1861-63 Manuscripts, and the Marginal Notes on Wagner, use-
value is characterised as a decidedly economic and historical category, whereas a number of passages 
in the first volume of Capital and the Contribution would seem to suggest that it is a category ‘outside 
the sphere of investigation of political economy.’ Marx, Contribution, 28. Marx should be critiqued on 
this front. Use-value, this thesis maintains, is only intelligible as an economic and historical category 
specific to capitalism. Use-value, which Marx too often conflates with ‘utility’ [Nutzen], is internal to 
value, even as it is produced as exterior to it. That is, use-value stands opposed to exchange-value, but 
only within the value-form. This will be further developed in our analysis of the dialectic of concrete 
and abstract labour-time. 
29 Marx, Capital 1, 137. Emphasis added. 
30 Karl Marx, Randglossen zu Adolph Wagner’s Lehrbuch der politischen Ökonomie [1879-80], in 
Marx and Engels, MEW, Band 19 (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1987), 370.  
31 Marx, Capital 1, 1007. 
32 Osborne, ‘Marx and the philosophy of time’, 19. 
33 Werner Bonefeld is mistaken in his position that figuring concrete labour ‘as a specifically capitalist 
form of labour’ amounts to an ‘absurd notion.’ Werner Bonefeld, ‘Abstract labour: Against its nature 
and on its time’, Capital & Class 34:2 (2010), 270. Categorically, in its meaning as the dialectical 
other of abstract labour, ‘concrete labour’ is a specifically capitalist form of labour. 
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understood as transhistorical categories, but ‘use-value’ and ‘exchange-value’, and ‘concrete 
labour’ and ‘abstract labour’, cannot. Likewise, the capacity to use ‘brains, muscles, nerves, 
hands, etc.’ is not something which is specific to capitalism, but labour-power is. In Wolfgang 
Haug’s terms, the purchase of labour-power is set in motion by a ‘use-value promise’34 which 
cannot be reduced to the potentiality of life itself (in this sense, the concept of abstract labour 
completely destabilises Virno’s, and Hardt and Negri’s, concept of ‘biopolitics’). 
In a letter to Engels written after the publication of Capital, Marx identifies his analysis 
of ‘the doubled character of labour, according to whether it is expressed in use-value or in 
exchange-value’, as one of the two ‘best points of my book.’35 ‘All understanding of the facts 
depends on this’36, he claims (to which we might add: ‘so too our understanding of historical 
totalisation and temporalisation’). Like the concept of labour-power, the concepts of concrete 
and abstract labour do not extend across Marx’s corpus. In the Grundrisse, ‘labour as such’ 
[Arbeit schlechthin] and ‘labour sans phrase’ appear as proto-formulations of abstract labour, 
but they are not concepts of abstract labour, because they are not structured dialectically in 
relation to concrete labour. It is only after the Contribution (from 1859) wherein concrete and 
abstract labour feature as concepts essential to Marx’s critique of political economy (this is 
interesting insofar as ‘labour-power’ does not feature until the mid-1860s). Therefore, despite 
the fact that ‘labour-time’ [Arbeitszeit] does feature in the Grundrisse, we cannot state that it 
functions as a concept in Marx until after the Contribution (there are several passages in the 
Grundrisse with which to construct ‘concrete labour-time’ and ‘abstract labour-time’ alike as 
concepts, but only on the condition that they are retroactively read through the dialectic of 
concrete and abstract labour). This dovetails with the standpoint (of this thesis) that Marx must 
be read in such a way that ‘concrete labour’ and ‘concrete labour-time’, and ‘abstract labour’ 
and ‘abstract labour-time’, each become two different expressions of one and the same thing. 
Thus, for instance, abstract labour is already always abstract labour-time: a particular form of 
homogenous, quantifiable and divisible time which constitutes the measure and substance of 
value. In both its concrete and abstract manifestations, the ‘time’ of labour-time is inseparable 
from the ‘labour’. However it is grasped (even if it never leaves the domain of the ‘ordinary’ 
conception of time), it is not something which can be tacked on to, and severed from, ‘labour’. 
                                                          
34 Wolfgang Fritz Haug, ‘Commodity aesthetics revisited: Exchange relations as the source of 
antagonistic aesthetization’, Radical Philosophy 135 (January/February 2006), 19. Labour-power is a 
problem for Haug, insofar as its use-value promise – the ‘aspects offered by the commodity’ – cannot 
be reduced to ‘the Archimedean ellipse of commodity aesthetics.’ Ibid. 19-20.  
35 Letter to Engels on 24 August 1867, Marx and Engels, MEW, Band 31 (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1965), 
326. According to Marx, the other best point of the first volume of Capital is his ‘treatment of surplus-
value independently of its particular forms as profit, interest, ground-rent, etc.’ Ibid.  
36 Ibid. 
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In this regard, the hyphen within ‘labour-time’ is crucial, because it registers the ontological 
unity of the concept of Arbeitszeit: ‘labour-time is a part of the time of the labourer; that is, it 
is part of the life-time of the labourer.’37 This can be specified further, because if, consequent 
to the commodification of labour-power, living labour (and thus the labourer who personifies 
this labour) is internal to the value-form, then labour-time is only actual as a part of the time 
of capital, as a part of the life-time of capital. 
The contours of abstract labour and abstract labour-time must nevertheless be outlined 
before those of concrete labour and concrete labour-time. There is (and on this point we cannot 
waver) a dialectic of abstract and concrete labour, but this is a dialectic wherein abstract labour 
has, to say the least, the upper hand. Generally speaking, three things should be kept in mind. 
First, abstract labour is the predominant, although not self-sufficient, successor to the category 
of labour in general: the totalising and temporalising power of labour in general must first and 
foremost be reworked through the category of abstract labour. Second, Marx’s analysis of 
abstract labour is far more temporally informed than that of his analysis of concrete labour: 
the temporality of the latter is either described with vague reference to a ‘qualitative’ labour-
time, or, much more common, as already reduced to abstract labour-time, in the sense that ‘the 
worker is nothing more…than personified labour-time.’38 Indeed, unless it is stated or implied 
otherwise, ‘labour-time’ is to be understood as abstract labour-time. Third, and this directly 
follows from the previous two points, abstract labour determines concrete labour to a degree 
and extent that is simply unmatched by concrete labour itself. Just as use-value is internal to 
value, so too is use-value producing labour internal to value-producing labour, even as the 
latter produces the former as its dialectical opposite. Whereas ‘concrete labour has to take the 
form of its opposite, undifferentiated human labour, to count as socially necessary labour’39, 
abstract labour does not, not because it is not dialectically dependent on concrete labour, but 
because it is socially necessary labour.  
Two common misconceptions about abstract labour can now be addressed. First, whilst 
this social form of labour constitutes the equalisation of qualitatively distinct concrete labours, 
it does not constitute the ongoing homogenisation of these labours. Abstract labour, as Werner 
Bonefeld articulates it in his critique of Massimo De Angelis, ‘is not concrete labour, however 
homogenised, monotonous, repetitive, senseless and boring it might be.’40 Chris Arthur makes 
the same point to introduce his critique of Harry Braverman’s Labour and Monopoly Capital: 
                                                          
37 Osborne, ‘Marx and the philosophy of time’, 19. 
38 Marx, Capital 1, 352-53.  
39 Bonefeld, ‘Abstract labour: Against its nature and on its time’, 266. 
40 Ibid. 260. Nor is ‘concrete labour’ abstract labour, despite the fact that the former is internal to the 
latter, and only actual because of the latter. 
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‘the simplification of [concrete] labour refers to an impoverishment of its quality. But even 
the simplest motion still has some quality, it can never be abstraction as such.’41 Simply put, 
the ‘content’ of abstract labour cannot be conflated with Taylorism or the assembly line.  
A second and far more widespread misconception about abstract labour requires a more 
detailed examination. The passages on the physiological dimension of this labour in the first 
chapters of the Contribution and Capital – abstract labour as the ‘productive expenditure of 
human brains, muscles, nerves, hands, etc.’42 – continue to cause something of a rift within 
the secondary literature. I.I. Rubin’s Essays on Marx’s Theory of Value (1923) (or, to be exact, 
the rediscovery of this work in the early 1970s) is at the origin of this. Rubin argues that: 
 
 
One of two things is possible: if abstract labour is an expenditure of human energy in 
physiological form, then value has a reified-material character. Or value is a social 
phenomenon, and then abstract labour must also be understood as a social 
phenomenon connected with a determined social form of production. It is not possible 
to reconcile a physiological concept of abstract labour with the historical character of 
the value which it creates.43 
 
An ‘irreconcilable’ divide between the physiological and social dimensions of Marx’s concept 
of abstract labour is often framed as a transhistorical-historical divide, and in this sense might 
be understood as parallel to, if not constitutive of, the ambiguities inherent within his accounts 
of labour-power and use-value. This has prompted several commentators to make a choice on 
Marx’s behalf, thereby clearing the way for a critical (that is, consistent) reconstruction of this 
concept. Following Rubin, Bonefeld rejects any place for physiology within abstract labour: 
the ‘asocial physiological terms’ in which it is defined are incompatible with its existence as 
‘a specific temporal form of capitalist labour.’44 On the other hand, and against Rubin, Axel 
Kicillof and Guido Starosta maintain that the physiological definition is the ‘only meaningful 
definition of abstract labour, which, as much as its concrete aspect, is a purely material form, 
bearing no social or historical specificity.’45 Postone takes a (seemingly) more nuanced stance: 
                                                          
41 Arthur, The New Dialectic and Marx’s Capital, 44. 
42 Marx, Capital 1, 134. See also Marx, Contribution, 30-1. 
43 Isaak Illich Rubin, Essays on Marx’s Theory of Value [1923, 3rd edition 1928], trans. Miloš 
Samardžija and Fredy Perlman (Detroit: Black and Red, 1972), 135.  
44 Bonefeld, ‘Abstract labour: Against its nature and on its time’, 258. 
45 Axel Kicillof and Guido Starosta, ‘On Materiality and Social Form: a Political Critique of Rubin’s 
Value-Form Theory’, Historical Materialism 15:3 (2007), 34. Kicillof and Starosta expand on this by 
stating that ‘when performed privately and independently, and once congealed in the natural materiality 
of the product of labour, that purely material form acquires the form of the value of the commodity, 
i.e. a purely social form that embodies “not an atom of matter”.’ Ibid. 34-5. The problems with this 
reading are too many to detail here, but Kicillof and Starosta are unique insofar as they effectively state 
that abstract labour is not just a transhistorical generalisation of concrete labour which is transformed 
109 
 
we must ‘move beyond the physiological definition of abstract human labour’ and yet, at the 
same time, uncover why Marx presents the value-forming substance as physiological; that is, 
as ‘transhistorical, natural, and thus historically empty.’46 The answer, for Postone, is Marx’s 
analysis of commodity fetishism: the expenditure of brains, muscles, etc. is the necessary form 
of appearance [Erscheinung] of abstract labour as a general social mediation, and is thus ‘the 
fundamental core of the fetish of capitalism.’47 Yet there is a fundamental flaw to this position, 
the identification of which sheds light on a problem shared by each of these commentators. 
‘The discovery of abstract labour-time leads ineluctably to that of commodity fetishism’48, as 
Daniel Bensaïd is right to declare, but this is not because physiological labour amounts to the 
form of appearance of abstract labour, but because, from the standpoint of capital, the human 
body is completely reducible to abstract labour, to purely social brains, muscles, nerves, hands 
etc., the expenditure of which satisfies purely social needs.49 This is what Marx calls ‘simple 
average labour’, and this labour is precisely what is both expressed and veiled by the value-
form (namely money). The ‘labour’ that capital (and political economy) would like us to think 
creates value, that labour which is transhistorical and natural, etc., is not the atomised form of 
physiological labour which Marx presents, but the labour of qualitatively distinct and unified 
human beings and bodies, labour which ‘has value itself’ and which ‘appears as paid labour.’50 
In short, the physiological dimension of Marx’s concept of abstract labour does not vitiate its 
historical specificity or purely social character, but registers it. As Alfred Schmidt reminds us, 
in Marx, ‘history itself projects into the physiological structure of the human being,’51 and one 
(but by no means the only) aspect of this, specific to capitalism, is the reduction of the human 
body to the same ‘phantom-like objectivity’52 which exemplifies value. 
                                                          
into a purely social form of labour specific to capitalism, but both of these forms of labour at the same 
time. 
46 Postone, Time, Labor, and Social Domination, 145. This passage reflects the fact that, for Postone, 
the ‘ontological’ and the ‘transhistorical’ are synonymous. In other words, he systematically dissociates 
ontology and history, and thus refuses the possibility of a historical ontology. 
47 Ibid. 170. For Postone, the physiological definition of abstract labour is accordingly central to Marx’s 
immanent critique, because it is a ‘part of an analysis of capitalism in its own terms, that is, as the forms 
present themselves.’ Ibid. 
48 Daniel Bensaïd, Marx for Our Times: Adventures and Misadventures of a Critique [1995], trans. 
Gregory Elliott (London: Verso, 2002), 118. 
49 To put this another way: from the standpoint of capital, the use-value of labour-power, a usefulness 
which ‘is conditioned by the properties of the bodies of commodities’, is purely social brains, muscles, 
nerves, hands, etc. Marx, Kapital 1, 50 (Capital 1, 126). I owe this reference and translation to C.E. 
McMenamin. 
50 Marx, Capital 1, 677, 680.  
51 Alfred Schmidt, The Concept of Nature in Marx [1962], trans. Ben Fowkes (London and Brooklyn: 
Verso, 2014), 84. 
52 Marx, Capital 1, 128. 
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Abstract labour temporalises – it is already always abstract labour-time – because it is  
the meaning of ‘social labour’ within capitalism. There is a fundamental social dimension to 
concrete labour: the ‘social individual’ within capitalism is the bearer of concrete labour as a 
distinct social form (one, that is to say, characterised by a private and isolating existence). Yet 
abstract labour represents the originary social character of commodity producing society: ‘the 
general or abstract character of labour is…its social character, because it is the character of 
the equality of the labours incorporated in the different products of labour. This determinate 
form of social labour distinguishes commodity production from other modes of production.’53 
Thus any conception of ‘social time’ specific to capitalism must proceed from abstract labour. 
As Tomba articulates it, ‘the time of abstract labour, positing itself as that which regulates the 
relations of exchange, constitutes a new form of the transcendental, conditioning the a priori 
structures of experience.’54 In Foucault’s positivist terms, this is a historical a priori that, to 
rewrite a passage in The Archaeology of Knowledge, is an ongoing ‘a condition of reality for 
acts…an a priori not of truths that might never be done, or really given to experience; but the 
a priori of a history that is given, since it is that of things actually done.’55 Postone’s persistent 
emphasis on abstract labour as a ‘general social mediation’ and a ‘socially total mediation’ is 
thus warranted: abstract labour is not just what is common to the entire multiplicity of concrete 
labours; ‘rather, it is the social function of [abstract] labour which makes it general.’56 It is the 
substance and measure of value by virtue of the fact that it is a purely socialising time, a time 
that renders exchangeable all individual temporalisations (in Marx’s terms, it makes possible 
the reduction of every form of ‘complex labour’ to ‘simple average labour’). This time ‘has 
no reality apart from its exchangeability’57, as Guy Debord asserts, but it is important to stress 
                                                          
53 Karl Marx, quoted in Massimiliano Tomba, ‘Historical Temporalities of Capital: An Anti-Historicist 
Perspective’, Historical Materialism 17 (2009), 48. 
54 Tomba, Marx’s Temporalities, 108.  
55 ‘…what I mean by the term is an a priori that is…a condition of reality for statements…an a priori 
not of truths that might never be said, or really given to experience; but the a priori of a history that is 
given, since it is that of things actually said.’ Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge and the 
Discourse on Language [1969], trans. A.M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Pantheon Books, 1972), 127. 
This a priori is the successor to the ‘positive unconscious of knowledge’ in The Order of Things: a 
distinctly historical unconscious underlying scientific discourses. See Michel Foucault, The Order of 
Things: an Archaeology of the Human Sciences [1966] (New York and London: Routledge Classics, 
2002), xi-xii. 
56 Postone, Time, Labor, and Social Domination, 151. As Althusser says of Sartre, so too can we say 
of Postone: he is ‘the philosopher of mediations par excellence.’ See Louis Althusser, ‘Marxism is not 
a Historicism’, in Althusser and Balibar, Reading Capital, 136. Consider Postone’s culminating 
definition of value: ‘Value is, then, a category of mediation: it is at once a historically determinate, 
self-distributing form of wealth and an objectified, self-mediating form of social relations.’ Postone, 
Time, Labor and Social Domination, 154. 
57 Guy Debord, Society of the Spectacle [1967], trans. Ken Knabb (London: Rebel Press, 1992), 87. I 
owe this reference to Bonefeld, ‘Abstract labour: Against its nature and on its time’, 262. 
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that abstract labour-time is not originarily a quantity but a social relation, a regulatory force 
that ‘can only be quantified through the effect of a difference that manifests itself in it.’58 It is 
equally important to stress that abstract labour-time is not the same thing as clock-time. The 
former ontologically depends on the latter – its homogeneity, quantifiability and divisibility 
is predicated on the clock – but it is not equivalent to it.59 The clock historically precedes, and 
will continue to exist after, abstract labour (this point dovetails with Heidegger’s position that 
the clock ‘is factically necessary’60, which is to say that it is not necessarily ‘inauthentic’). But  
this is not the most important point. Abstract labour controls the clock – most immediately by 
its measure of concrete labour – yet its own measure is not the clock but money (in capitalism, 
the clock is subservient to money as a temporal form: it does not register the ‘natural’ time of 
sunlight but the ‘natural’ law of valorisation).61 Money, in both its function as a commodity 
and as capital – as the ‘materialisation of universal labour-time’62 and as value made formally 
independent63 – constitutes the real measure of abstract labour.  
The temporalising time of abstract labour is at once its totalising power. ‘Social labour’, 
‘total labour-power’, ‘universal social labour’, etc. – expressions which recur throughout the 
Contribution and Capital and which must be grasped as synonymous with abstract labour – 
are totalising concepts in the full Sartrean sense of the term. Their unity is the process of their 
differentiation, a dialectical fact which is most basically expressed by Marx’s characterisation 
of concrete labour as a ‘mere organ’ of abstract labour: ‘labour, thus measured by time, does 
not seem, indeed, to be the labour of different persons, but on the contrary the different 
working individuals seem to be mere organs of this labour.’64 To put this another way, the 
individual act of labour totalises and temporalises – it has unity – because it is totalised and 
                                                          
58 Tombazos, Time in Marx, 4. 
59 Postone’s historical sketch of ‘abstract time’ comes dangerously close to conflating abstract labour-
time with clock-time. See Postone, Time, Labor, and Social Domination, 200-16. 
60 Heidegger, BT, 466. Recall that ‘world-time’ and ‘ordinary time’ are not necessarily inauthentic, 
that, for Heidegger, ‘originary temporality’ is not the sole domain of ‘authentic temporality’. 
61 As Tomba says: ‘The clock measures the labour-time concretely performed in production, while the 
time of abstract labour objectivised in the same commodity as socially-necessary labour – thus, as 
exchange-value – has a social measure, given by money. The first temporality is measured by the 
capitalist or by his overseers with the stopwatch in his right hand and the Principles of Scientific 
Management in the left; the second temporality is, instead, regulated on the global markets.’ Tomba, 
Marx’s Temporalities, 103.  
62 Marx, Contribution, 49. 
63 The essential function of money-capital is to overcome its own limit, the contradiction between its 
own quality (the ‘quintessence of all use-values’ (Marx, Grundrisse, 270), viz. infinite general wealth) 
and the necessity of its quantification (it is only ever a definite amount of money). This dialectic of 
infinitude and finitude is the historical-ontological basis of (modern) clock-time. 
64 Marx, Contribution, 30. Or: ‘the abstractly general counts not as a property of the concrete, sensibly 
real, but on the contrary the sensibly concrete counts as the mere form of appearance or definite form 
of realisation of the abstractly general.’ Karl Marx, quoted in Arthur, The New Dialectic and Marx’s 
Capital, 46.  
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temporalised by abstract labour. In capitalist society, abstract labour is thus the condition of 
both the individuation of the act of labour and the historical intelligibility of the division of 
labour.65 The averageness of ‘simple average labour’ is critical here, because it quantifies the 
totalising core of abstract labour: it secures the identity between abstract labour and ‘socially 
necessary labour-time.’ Simple average labour thus lies at the basis of what Tombazos, in his 
analysis of the third volume of Capital, identifies as the culminating contradiction of socially 
necessary labour-time: that between the social labour required to produce a commodity (the 
aliquot time of total labour-power allotted to the production of a particular use-value), and the 
social need for that commodity (the aliquot time of total social need offered as an equivalent 
for this use-value).66 At this level, value can be defined as the ‘link or the interaction between 
these two times’67, even if this connection, as Marx emphasises, is only ever fortuitous.68 The 
basic point, however, still remains: abstract labour is only intelligible from the standpoint of 
totalisation. It only temporalises from this standpoint, because only totalisation registers the 
dialectical relation between abstract and concrete labour. 
The unavoidable question must now be asked: what exactly is ‘concrete labour-time’? 
That is, does it have a ‘measure’ which is not – at least not immediately – reducible to abstract 
labour-time? This is a difficult question to address, given Marx’s conviction that: 
 
 
If the mere quantity of labour functions as a measure of value regardless of quality, it 
presupposes that simple labour has become the pivot of industry. It presupposes that 
labour has been equalised by the subordination of men and women to the machine or 
by the extreme division of labour; that men and women are effaced by their labour; 
that the pendulum of the clock has become as accurate a measure of the relative 
activity of two workers as it is of the speed of two locomotives. Therefore, we should 
not say that one man’s hour is worth another man’s hour, but rather that one man 
during an hour is worth as much as another man during an hour. Time is everything, 
man is nothing; he is at the most the embodiment of time [die Verkörperung der Zeit]. 
Quality no longer matters. Quantity alone decides everything: hour for hour, day for 
day…69 
 
 
This well-known passage from The Poverty of Philosophy (the last part of which frames 
this chapter) was composed over a decade before the dialectic of abstract and concrete labour 
becomes a feature of Marx’s writings, but it nonetheless typifies his temporal understanding 
                                                          
65 As Tombazos puts it, ‘abstract labour introduces a division within itself that is usually called the 
“division of labour”.’ Tombazos, Time in Marx, 29. 
66 See ibid. 26-7, 36, 53. See also Marx, Capital 3, 288. 
67 Tombazos, Time in Marx, 26-7. 
68 Marx, Capital 3, 288. 
69 Marx, Das Elend der Philosophie [Misère de la Philosophie], 85 (The Poverty of Philosophy, 53-4). 
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of this dialectic, and should therefore be read from the standpoint of this dialectic. It expresses 
a relation between abstract and concrete labour so asymmetric that ‘the opposition at stake is 
not one between two forms of time…but one between time per se (figured as quantitative) and 
the human (figured as qualitative).’70 Marx does not always de-temporalise the human (which 
in this passage can be read as ‘concrete labour’) in such radical terms. For instance, there are 
passages (primarily in the Grundrisse) in which human labour (the ‘living, form-giving fire’71) 
is not only not opposed to time, but in which its time – its time within capitalism – possesses 
a qualitative dimension:  
 
 
Labour-time itself exists as such only subjectively, only in the form of activity. In so 
far as it is exchangeable (itself a commodity) as such, it is defined and differentiated 
not only quantitatively but also qualitatively, and is by no means general, self-
equivalent labour-time; rather, labour-time as subject corresponds as little to the 
general labour-time which determines exchange-values as the particular commodities 
and products correspond to it as object.72 
 
 
Yet unlike the labour-time in this passage (which should be read as concrete labour-time), the 
vast majority of Marx’s critique of political economy depicts concrete labour as a time already 
outside of and opposed to itself, as a time which concrete labour is compelled to embody. The 
secondary literature on abstract labour – one that is still governed by the position that abstract 
labour is extrinsic, rather than internal, to historical time – registers this. The issue here is not 
this fidelity to Marx, but the lack of a concept of concrete labour-time within this literature, a 
concept accountable to abstract labour as a distinct form of social time specific to capitalism. 
There are statements to the effect that concrete labour ‘has a concrete temporality’73, that its 
time ‘has a particular content…that is experienced subjectively’74, but there has been (to date) 
no systematic attempt to conceptualise concrete labour as a social form of time simultaneously 
internal and external to abstract labour. There are numerous possible explanations for this, but 
one in particular stands out: this literature remains internal to Marx’s philosophy of time (such 
that it exists).75 In other words, this literature (Bensaïd, Bonefeld, Postone, Tomba, Tombazos, 
etc.) does not adequately confront the fact that Marx offers us a concept of abstract labour but 
                                                          
70 Osborne, ‘Marx and the philosophy of time’, 18. 
71 Marx, Grundrisse, 361. 
72 Ibid. 171. 
73 Bonefeld, ‘Abstract labour: Against its nature and on its time’, 267. 
74 Tombazos, Time in Marx, 18. 
75 More often than not, a condition of this interiority is a certain exteriority – indifference – towards 
Marx’s philosophy of history.  
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not of concrete labour. It thus maximises, yet stays within the limits of, the concept of abstract 
labour, such that this concept constitutes a historical ontology of ‘ordinary time’ which, to be 
sure, Heidegger and Sartre do not offer, but which also must account for the idea that the time 
of concrete labour – a time which abstract labour produces and upon which it depends – is not 
immediately reducible to abstract labour. 
To his credit, Postone has gone the furthest in an attempt to temporalise concrete labour 
in ways which avoid this immediate reduction. At the heart of his reinterpretation of abstract 
labour as a general social mediation is a dialectic between ‘concrete time’ (time as a ‘function 
of events, occurrences or actions’, hence time as a ‘dependent variable’) and ‘abstract time’ 
(‘uniform, continuous, homogeneous, “empty” time’, hence time as an ‘independent variable’, 
an ‘independent framework within which motion, events, and action occur.’76) Abstract time, 
he goes on to say, ‘is divisible into equal, constant, nonqualitative units.’77 The specifically 
capitalist iteration of this is the changing dynamic between the productivity of labour (concrete 
time) and the consequent redetermination of the constant social labour hour (abstract time).78 
This ‘ongoing directional movement of time’79, which Postone likens to a ‘treadmill pattern’, 
has an intrinsic historical dimension: it ‘can be grasped as a dialectic of abstract and historical 
time’80 immanent to the value-form. In short, ‘historical time’ in capitalist society is ‘concrete 
time’.81 There are multiple problems with this reading of Marx, but they all proceed from the 
fact that severing ‘labour’ from abstract and concrete labour-time dehistoricises, it absolutises, 
the historically specific character of labour in capitalism that Postone insists on (ad nauseam). 
Abstract labour qua ‘abstract time’ does not temporalise history, or even temporalise as such: 
it is rather the readymade backdrop against which temporalisation – qua ‘concrete time’ – is 
measured (this explains why, for Postone, abstract time is already ‘abstract domination’.)82 As 
Bonefeld summarises it from a different perspective, ‘Postone presupposes what needs to be 
explained.’83 As for ‘concrete time’, its exclusive identity as the historical time of capitalism 
                                                          
76 Postone, Time, Labor, and Social Domination, 202.  
77 Ibid. Once again, Postone’s concept of abstract time conflates abstract labour-time with clock-time. 
The progress made by his dialectic of concrete and abstract time is immediately undone by his de-
dialectisation of abstract labour-time, such that this time is not understood as a dialectical relation 
between two different manifestations of clock-time, but as clock-time itself. 
78 Ibid. 292-93. 
79 Ibid. 293. 
80 Ibid. 295. 
81 ‘Historical time in capitalism…can be considered as a form of concrete time that is socially 
constituted and expresses an ongoing qualitative transformation of work and production, of social life 
more generally, and of forms of consciousness, values, and needs. Unlike the “flow” of abstract time, 
this movement of time is not equable, but changes and can even accelerate.’ Ibid. 294. 
82 See, for instance, ibid. 191. Hence abstract labour qua ‘abstract time’ de-temporalises history. 
83 See Werner Bonefeld, ‘On Postone’s Courageous but Unsuccessful Attempt to Banish the Class 
Antagonism from the Critique of Political Economy’, Historical Materialism 12:3 (2004), 104. 
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renders abstract labour a form of unhistorical time.84 It thereby renders the difference between 
the historical time of capitalism and other modes of production indistinguishable: the defining 
aspect of capitalist historical time is not the dialectic of abstract and concrete labour, but the 
productivity of concrete labour within itself. In sum, a ‘dialectic of abstract and historical time’ 
has no historicity, nor can it be understood as immanent to the value-form. It is unintentional, 
but the social totality which features in Time, Labor, and Social Domination turns its back on 
the dialectical – the historicalising – relationship between abstract and concrete labour-time.85 
Simply put, it does not register this relationship historically. 
If Postone’s attempt to ‘temporalise’ concrete labour is a failed attempt, it nevertheless 
reminds us that concrete labour-time is only intelligible in its dialectical relation with abstract 
labour-time. This much is evident: there is no such thing as concrete labour as such: ‘concrete 
labour’ is only ever particular concrete labours, a social form of labour which in its concretion 
is necessarily multiple. Nor can we state that concrete labour produces value (this is as much 
to say that concrete labour is not immediately reducible to abstract labour). The production of 
value is the sole purview of abstract labour. In Marx, therefore, it is impossible to conceive of 
concrete labour at a level of generality equal to that of abstract labour. Yet this does not mean 
that concrete labour cannot be examined as a form of temporalisation itself, that there is not, 
we might say, a temporalising structure common to each and every instance of concrete labour. 
A crucial problem that the concept of concrete labour produces is how to negotiate its explicit 
empirical basis (one which restricts most analyses of concrete labour to a time that must ‘occur 
within “homogenous time”…is compelled to occur within the time of its abstract measure’86) 
with its implicit existential basis (one shared by each and every social individual), while at the 
same time maintaining its historical basis (one secured by its relation to abstract labour). Put 
differently, the empirical temporality of shipbuilding is not the same as that of writing a thesis, 
but it is still possible to assign a shared existential basis to each, the generality of which is not 
the same as that represented by abstract labour (but is no less historically specific to capitalism 
because of this). However, we must insist on this point: if this basis is a ‘measure’ of concrete 
                                                          
84 This puts Postone squarely in line with Sohn-Rethel: see footnote 8 in this chapter.  
85 Postone maintains that Sartre’s Critique ‘presuppose[s] the concepts of “moment” and “totality” 
ontologically.’ Postone, Time, Labor and Social Domination, 152, ft. 86. He goes on to argue that, as 
against Sartre and Althusser alike, his work ‘treats the relation of moment and totality as historically 
constituted, a function of the peculiar properties of the social forms analysed by Marx with his 
categories of value, abstract labor, commodity, and capital.’ Ibid. Assuming that ‘ontologically’ means 
‘ahistorically’ here, we can state that Postone’s concepts of ‘abstract time’ and ‘concrete time’, as well 
as the relation he establishes between them, can be subjected to the same critique. 
86 Bonefeld, ‘Abstract labour: Against its nature and on its time’, 267-68. Most analyses of concrete 
labour-time are in this sense Kantian: they accord to the schematism of the categories, in particular the 
schemas of magnitude and substance. See Kant, CPR, A143-44/B182-84, 274-75. 
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labour, it is only because it is internal to – it is an existential condition of – the social measure 
constituted by abstract labour and expressed by money. 
As the bearers of concrete labour, individuals temporalise by virtue of the fact that they 
are social individuals. Consequently, if the existential basis of temporalisation is to have any 
meaning at all in Marx, it must itself be based in the sociality of human individuation specific 
to capitalism. Consider the following passage by Osborne: 
 
If one agrees with something like the early Heidegger’s argument that the anticipation 
of death is the existential basis of temporalisation…(modified to register the social 
basis of this anticipation in relations with others, and hence the sociality of human 
individuation), then it is a short step to inferring that human finitude, in the sense of 
the existential register of mortality, is the ontological basis of the “value” of time and, 
thereby, the ontological ground of labour-time’s functioning as a universal measure of 
value. And this, despite the fact that any such “measurement”, in itself, involves the 
social instantiation of a degraded, “ordinary” or merely chronological conception of 
time (negating the existential temporalisation upon which it depends). At its limit, time 
is valuable because it (that is, “your” time) runs out.87 
 
This passage can be read from various different (highly interrelated) standpoints: the exchange 
relation, the division of labour, the dialectic of abstract and concrete labour, and so forth. Yet 
one standpoint particularly draws our attention, not just because it takes in each of these other 
standpoints, but because it does so as the capitalist origin from which the materialist concept 
of history must be restructured. This origin is the commodification of labour-power: it sets off 
a dual and asymmetric form of historical totalisation and temporalisation. 
The sale of labour-power must be viewed from ‘the standpoint of the simple circulation 
of commodities’88, because this sale constitutes an initial act of the circuit C–M–C: the simple 
transformation of one commodity into another, wherein money is nothing but the disappearing 
means with which to complete the circuit. As Tombazos reminds us, the economic subject of 
this circuit – selling in order to buy – is the individual human being89, not because this circuit 
is instigated by individual will, but because it ensures that individual need does not exceed the 
need to conserve and reproduce oneself (which this circuit satisfies). The peculiar importance 
of the ‘peculiar commodity’ labour-power is in this sense doubled: its sale not only represents 
the exclusive entryway into the labour-process, but dictates that the only relationship between 
the circuit C–M–C and the satisfaction of need is the purchase of ‘a certain sum of the means 
                                                          
87 Osborne, ‘Marx and the philosophy of time’, 20. 
88 Marx, Capital 1, 209.  
89 Tombazos, Time in Marx, 61. 
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of life’ (in the restricted sense of Leben as ‘subsistence’). For our purposes, this importance is 
manifested in the manner in which concrete labour – the labour yielded by labour-power from 
the standpoint of its sale – temporalises history. Insofar as it can be treated as a specification 
of individual praxis in Sartre’s terms, concrete labour constitutes, to quote from Chapter 2, ‘a 
dialectical movement between the present and the past wherein the present is prioritised as the 
totalising transcendence of the past towards the future.’ Moreover, the existential basis of this 
temporalisation is, following Heidegger, the individual worker’s finitude (on the condition, to 
return to Chapter 2 again, that finitude is understood as a being-towards a factical limit which 
structures – temporalises – each and every act). Therefore, and to tie this back to Chapter 1, 
concrete labour might be conceived as a ‘first historical act’: it produces the ‘dialectical time’ 
(to use Sartre’s expression) that epitomises the creation of the means to satisfy existing needs 
and the creation of new needs.90 
Yet even from the limited standpoint of the labour-process, this description of historical 
temporalisation is obviously inadequate. The use-values produced by concrete labour are only 
means of life – they only satisfy existing needs and create new needs for their producers – by 
virtue of the fact that they do not belong to these producers, that, in other words, they authorise 
the payment of the wage which is then exchanged for other means of life. Thanks to the wage-
form, the means of life are only actual as objects of exchange, as commodities, and hence their 
production has already been determined by abstract labour (the diverse metamorphoses of this 
at the level of historical totalisation and temporalisation will be developed in the next chapter). 
However, before we comment on this, we must address the character of this ‘already’. This is 
not a straightforward thing to do, if in fact:  
 
 
Social labour-time exists in…commodities in a latent state…and becomes evident 
only in the course of their exchange. The point of departure is not the labour of 
individuals considered as social labour, but on the contrary the particular kinds of 
labour of private individuals, i.e. labour which proves that it is universal social labour 
only by the sublation of its original character in the exchange process. Universal social 
labour is consequently not a readymade presupposition but an emerging result. Thus 
a new difficulty arises: on the one hand, commodities must enter the exchange process 
as objectified universal labour-time, on the other hand, the labour-time of individuals 
becomes objectified universal labour-time only as a result of the exchange process.91 
 
                                                          
90 In this regard, concrete labour represents a concrete form of ‘labour in general’, which is to say that 
it temporalises and historicalises as a kind of ‘labour in particular’.  
91 Marx, KPÖ, 31-2 (Contribution, 45). 
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As Arthur notes, Marx’s solution to the contradiction at the end of this passage is money, yet 
‘although money certainly posits the labour it represents, and hence by reflection the labour 
represented by all commodities, as abstract universal labour, the abstraction is still not posited 
prior to exchange.’92 After Rubin, Arthur concludes that this contradiction is better addressed 
within the production-process itself, such that generalised commodity production – production 
that is already always production for exchange – is predicated on ‘living labour [being] treated 
as abstract prior to exchange precisely because it is treated as abstract in exchange.’93 This is 
not to say that – within the production-process itself – concrete labour-time is actually realised 
as abstract labour-time (only the act of exchange achieves this), but it does mean that – within 
this process – concrete labour-time is already internal to abstract labour-time. This internality 
is what is often described as the ‘imposition’ and ‘policing’ of abstract labour-time; its agents 
are the foreman and the clock. It is along these lines that Bonefeld, drawing on the work of 
Riccardo Bellofiore, characterises abstract labour as a real abstraction that ‘projects the “ghost 
of value”…back into production, where the ghost turns into a vampire that sucks living labour 
dry, reducing it to “time’s carcase”.’94 The exchange relation is the sole guarantor of socially 
necessary labour-time, but, ‘if anything, the constitution of labour as abstract in the capital 
relation is more fundamental than its constitution as abstract in exchange’95, because only the 
labour-process makes possible the transformation of the ‘ontological basis of the “value” of 
time’ into socially necessary labour-time. 
If, consequent to the commodification of labour-power, concrete labour is internal to 
abstract labour, then human need (the temporalising and historicalising ground of the act, that 
from which the teleological end, hence the unity, of this act derives) is internal to capital. In 
Chapter 4 of the first volume of Capital – ‘The General Formula for Capital’ – Marx asserts 
that ‘the simple circulation of commodities…is a means to a final goal which lies outside 
circulation, namely the appropriation of use-values, the satisfaction of needs’, whereas ‘the 
circulation of money as capital is an end in itself, for the valorisation of value takes place only 
within this constantly renewed movement.’96 There are two, and two fundamentally opposed, 
conceptions of need – and with them teleologies – at work here, and establishing the difference 
and relation between them is one of the primary tasks of the following chapter. But what must 
                                                          
92 Arthur, The New Dialectic and Marx’s Capital, 46. 
93 Ibid. ‘In effect, abstract labour as a form-determination of the living labour of the wage worker, and 
abstract labour as the dead labour objectified in a commodity, are the same thing, in the one case looked 
at as activity, in the other as its result.’ Ibid. 
94 Bonefeld, ‘Abstract labour: Against its nature and on its time’, 266. The expression ‘time’s carcase’ 
is a translation of ‘die Verkörperung der Zeit’, from the passage in The Poverty of Philosophy cited 
earlier (see footnotes 1 and 69 in this chapter). ‘The embodiment of time’ is a more literal translation. 
95 Arthur, The New Dialectic and Marx’s Capital, 45.  
96 Marx, Capital 1, 253.  
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be emphasised now is that whereas the satisfaction of individual needs lies outside of simple 
circulation, the creation of the means to satisfy these needs lies squarely inside the circulation 
of money as capital. Unlike the simple circulation of commodities, the circulation of money 
as capital not only presupposes but posits the means of satisfying individual needs.97 Again, 
we are faced with the peculiar importance of the commodification of labour-power. It not only 
dictates that the acts within a particular instance of the circuit C–M–C (i.e., the sale of labour-
power, the concrete act of labour, and the exchange of the wage for the means of life) are only 
actual within the circuit M–C–M’ (the definitive circuit of capital: buying in order to sell), but 
that, insofar as it leads to the satisfaction of individual needs, every act within every instance 
of C–M–C is only actual within M–C–M’. In sum, the materiality of C–M–C is predicated on 
M–C–M’, and thus the totalising and temporalising capacity of concrete labour as a historical 
act is based in the totalising and temporalising power of abstract labour, or the labour yielded 
by labour-power from the standpoint of its purchase. In Sartre’s terms, abstract labour totalises 
and temporalises not because it is driven by human need, but because it internally transforms 
– it perverts – this need into exigency. Hence for the worker (to return to two previously cited 
passages in the Critique), ‘the future governs the present insofar as this future strictly identifies 
itself with the past’98, and ‘the future to be realised is already fabricated as mechanical inertia 
in the way in which past being is transcended.’99 As a ‘living organism’, capital’s self-renewal 
is expressed by this temporality of exigency, a temporality that quantifies human need. If, as 
the previous chapter argues, human need grounds ‘death’ as the existential limit in relation to 
which ‘temporality temporalises itself’, such that the act temporalises itself as a kind of ‘being-
towards-need’, then exigency constitutes the capitalist restructuration of this, whereby the 
‘ontological basis of the “value” of time’ is reduced to the number of years, months, days, etc. 
that the individual worker has left to live.100 This despite the fact – in fact precisely because – 
capital ‘is indifferent to his or her reproduction other than as part of a certain social aggregate 
of labour-power.’101 This has significant ramifications for the materialist concept of history. 
Capital, as the next chapter establishes, is the subject of history (this is synonymous with the 
                                                          
97 As Tombazos shows, Marx’s understanding of the difference between simple circulation and the 
circulation of money-capital is indebted to the transition from chemism to teleology in Hegel’s Logic. 
See Tombazos, Time in Marx, 75-9. Unlike the chemical process (simple circulation), the teleological 
process (capital) not only presupposes but posits the moments of its self-renewal.  
98 Sartre, CDR 1, 82.  
99 Ibid. 235.  
100 Marx’s concept of capital could well be understood as a dialectic of mortality (in both its existential 
and chronological registers) and immortality, inasmuch as ‘the immortality which money strove to 
achieve by setting itself negatively against circulation, by withdrawing from it, is achieved by capital, 
which preserves itself precisely by abandoning itself to circulation’, and ‘value is capital only as self-
immortalising and self-multiplying value.’ Marx, Grundrisse, 261, 639. 
101 Osborne, ‘Marx and the philosophy of time’, 20. 
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fact that it is the economic subject of M–C–M’), but it is this subject because its needs deprive 
human beings of their capacity to totalise and temporalise history (on their own terms). This 
is the reason why, as Chapter 4 also argues, Capital is the condition of thinking the materialist 
concept of history in The German Ideology, but only because it destabilises this concept: the 
condition of thinking the first historical act is, as we will see, its de-historicalisation. It cannot 
and never will realise its ultimate end (infinite wealth), but until it is gone, capital will never 
cease attempting to ensure that human need, and thus ‘material life itself’, does not exceed the 
‘reproduction of the physical existence of…individuals.’102 
There is no doubt that the category of labour in general is irrevocably altered by Marx’s 
critique of political economy. In the aftermath of the Contribution and Capital, the totalising, 
temporalising and historicalising power of labour must be rethought through the concept of 
abstract labour, unto itself and in its dynamic relationship with concrete labour.103 Yet abstract 
labour is nothing – it has no practical materiality – if it is not joined with the other ‘best point’ 
of the first volume of Capital: the concept of surplus-value [Mehrwert]. More than any other 
concept, surplus-value – the investigation of which guides the rest of this chapter – illuminates 
the complex (and politically vexing) directions history takes within capitalism. Insofar as ‘the 
only utility [Nützlichkeit] whatsoever which an object can have for capital can be to preserve 
or increase it’104, surplus-value determines the fact that living labour ‘confronts capital not as 
a use-value, but as the use-value pure and simple…the use-value of capital itself.’105 From the 
dialectic of abstract and concrete labour two new concepts appear (which, again, are identical): 
surplus-labour [Surplusarbeit] and surplus-labour-time [Surplusarbeitszeit]106. Just like the 
surplus-value it produces, surplus-labour is by no means a straightforward concept (as is often 
                                                          
102 Marx and Engels, DI, 21 (GI, 42). 
103 Consider this passage by Tombazos : ‘In the usual way of reading Capital, the commodity divides 
itself into abstract and concrete labour, in value and use-value, without being able to be value if it is 
not also use-value, and vice versa. This is correct but insufficient. Abstract labour divides itself, within 
itself, into abstract labour (universality) and abstract/concrete labour (universality/particularity)…It 
seems to us more correct to say that the commodity is divided into value and value/use-value in order 
to highlight the non-independent (and neutral) character of use-values under capitalism. Thus, abstract 
labour appears in two forms: as a simple unity with itself (value, universality) and as a “composed” 
unity (value/use-value, abstract/concrete labour, particularity).’ Tombazos, Time in Marx, 29-30. The 
problem with this passage is not that all use-values are dependent on value, but that they are all neutral 
(the use-value of labour-power is by no means ‘neutral’). 
104 Marx, Grundrisse, 270. 
105 Ibid. 295, 297. Like most passages in the Grundrisse, this passage must be read from the retroactive 
standpoint of the dialectic of abstract and concrete labour. See, in addition, Arthur, The New Dialectic 
and Marx’s Capital, 42. 
106 Unlike ‘concrete labour’, ‘abstract labour’ and ‘necessary labour’, ‘surplus-labour’ will be written 
with a hyphen in order to reflect the unity of the original German. The same holds for ‘surplus-labour-
time’ (as against ‘necessary labour-time’ [notwendige Arbeitszeit]). In the Grundrisse, Marx often uses 
the term ‘surplus-time’ [Surpluszeit] synonymously with surplus-labour-time.  
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assumed). It registers a contradiction at the heart of ‘socially necessary labour-time’ (one more 
basic than the contradiction between the social labour necessary to produce a commodity and 
the social need for that commodity). Surplus-labour thus registers a contradiction at the heart 
of abstract labour/value, and for this reason the relation between necessary and surplus-labour 
must be examined in its own right, before – and this is the task of Chapter 4 – it can be grasped 
as constitutive of a distinct historical dynamic.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
122 
 
3.2 Necessary and Surplus-Labour 
The concepts of surplus-labour and surplus-value add a new dimension to the complex lineage  
of, and relationship between, concepts within Marx’s critique of political economy. Unlike 
the concepts of labour-power, abstract labour and concrete labour, surplus-labour and surplus-
value feature prominently from the start of this critique (on the assumption that the Grundrisse 
constitutes this start). In the Grundrisse, the exposition of surplus-labour and surplus-value is 
far more developed than that of labour-power, even as it already registers the extent to which 
surplus-labour, surplus-value and labour-power are conceptually inseparable. Of even greater 
consequence, however, is the fact that this exposition is not mediated by a dialectic of abstract 
and concrete labour. The lack of a concept of abstract labour in the Grundrisse is particularly 
important. If, as Osborne maintains, ‘the concepts of abstract labour and labour-power are 
indissociable’, such that ‘ontologically, both are actual only as ideal objectivities’107, the same 
must be said of the concept of surplus-labour (i.e. surplus-labour must be added to this list of 
indissociable concepts). Surplus-labour is not identical to abstract labour. It is, rather, abstract 
labour from the standpoint of the difference between the value of labour-power and every 
other commodity. Once more, the logic of retroactivity emerges here, insofar as surplus-labour 
and surplus-value function as developed concepts in the Grundrisse, but only on the condition 
that they are refigured through abstract labour and its dialectical relation with concrete labour. 
This is important, because the Grundrisse – not the 1861-63 Manuscripts nor Capital, each of 
which dedicate significant attention to surplus-labour and surplus-value108 – arguably contains 
the most philosophically constructive passages on surplus-labour and surplus-value, primarily 
because they critically appropriate the difference and relation between the barrier [Schranke] 
and the limit [Grenze] in Hegel’s Logic.109 Hence we might say – not without irony – that the 
Grundrisse offers some of the most philosophically constructive passages on abstract labour 
as well. The point here (one which extends across Marx’s critique of political economy, if not 
his entire corpus) is that the logic of retroactivity is at once a logic of mutual constitution. In 
other words, it is fair to state that the Grundrisse offers as much to Capital as Capital does to 
the Grundrisse.  
Surplus-value constitutes ‘the hidden time of the commodity’, as Tombazos depicts it, 
because it emerges from the difference between the labour-time necessary for the production 
of a commodity and the labour-time necessary for the reproduction of the labour-power whose 
                                                          
107 Osborne, ‘Marx and the philosophy of time’, 19. 
108 Surplus-labour and surplus-value do not feature in the Contribution, which is essentially a draft of 
the first three chapters of the first volume of Capital. 
109 See, in particular, Marx, Grundrisse, 415-16 and 420-23. 
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use produces this commodity.110 This difference is a purely quantitative difference, in terms 
of both substance and measure. There are not two different kinds of socially necessary labour-
time at work here: the labour-time necessary for the reproduction of labour-power is the same 
type of labour-time necessary for the production of all commodities (labour-power is the same 
as every other commodity in that it can only be reproduced through every other commodity). 
Nevertheless – and this is crucial – this difference sets into motion a single ‘necessary labour’ 
(and with it a singular concept of need) internally opposed to itself, such that necessary labour 
divides itself, within itself, into the labour-time necessary to reproduce labour-power and that 
necessary to produce every other commodity.111 Surplus-value thus not only sets labour-power 
against every other commodity (labour-power is not ‘peculiar’ because it has no ‘hidden time’, 
but because its ‘hidden time’ is the absence of this time112), but sets abstract labour and value 
against themselves more generally. A contradiction – in fact a dialectic – is thereby produced 
between labour-power and every other commodity, including the labour necessary to produce 
each (this despite the fact that each derive from the same kind of labour-time). Surplus-value 
does this for a very simple reason: its existence, which is to say the existence of capital, hinges 
on creating an excess out of a relationship of equivalence. And as Capital makes clear, there 
is precisely one commodity which has the capacity to yield an excess from the inviolable ‘law 
of commodity exchange’. Labour-power, and labour-power alone, yields the surplus-labour 
that yields surplus-value, and it is for this reason commodified. This is the context from which 
the practical relationship between abstract and surplus-labour must be understood. Surplus-
labour depends on abstract labour for its temporal intelligibility, but abstract labour-time only 
exists because ‘necessary labour’ simultaneously contains and does not contain surplus-labour 
within itself. The homogeneity, quantifiability and divisibility of abstract labour-time – a time, 
we must recall, which is originarily not a quantity but a social relation – is not fundamentally 
based on any difference which manifests itself in it, but on the difference between the labour-
time necessary to produce labour-power and every other commodity. Abstract labour-time is 
‘socially necessary labour-time’, but only on the condition the latter is grasped as both separate 
and opposed to surplus-labour, and as containing surplus-labour within itself. 
The fact that surplus-labour is (at least ideally) contained within every commodity other 
than the one which yields it expands the dialectical scope of abstract labour. On the one hand, 
Marx’s basic formulations of the labour theory of value – the use-value of labour-power is ‘a 
                                                          
110 Tombazos, Time in Marx, 85.  
111 I am using Tombazos’s language here. See ibid. 29 (and footnote 103 in this chapter). 
112 This corresponds to the basic sense in which labour-power is a ‘peculiar commodity’ because the 
mortality of its owner directly bears on the determination of its value. 
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source not only of value, but of more value than it has itself’113, or, ‘surplus-value…is only 
the relation of living labour to that objectified in the worker’114 – owe their intelligibility to 
abstract labour-time. Surplus-value does not make sense absent the concept of abstract labour. 
The essence of surplus-labour-time is the ‘theft of labour-time’, but not just because countless 
hours are stolen from workers. Surplus-labour-time is equally a qualitative theft, grounded by 
the sense in which abstract labour is firstly a purely relational – a purely social – form of time. 
Abstract labour has a quality, but in Hegel’s terms, the dialectic of concrete and abstract labour 
that produces labour-time as the measure of value cannot be directly mapped onto the dialectic 
of quality and quantity in the Logic. That is, quality + quantity  measure cannot be rewritten 
as ‘concrete labour + abstract labour  measure’. The dialectic of quality and quantity is in 
Marx already internal to abstract labour. Consequent to the commodification of labour-power, 
the quality of use-value producing labour is quantified precisely because it is already internal 
to the quality of exchange-value producing labour, or pure exchangeability115. 
However, and on the other hand, the purely relational quality of abstract labour must be 
grasped as immanent to, in fact as emerging from, the doubled relation between necessary and 
surplus-labour. We have already postulated this, and the bulk of Chapter 4 will redevelop this 
from the standpoint of the production of historical time. But what needs to be stressed here is 
that if, at its core, abstract labour originates from the doubled relation between necessary and 
surplus-labour, it also conceals this relation. The homogeneity, quantifiability and divisibility 
of abstract labour-time both expresses and disguises the doubled relation between necessary 
and surplus-labour; or, this expression and disguise exist within and at the same time. Hence 
the dual importance of money as the ‘materialisation of general labour-time’. The sale of every 
product of labour except labour-power ideally expresses (profit) and veils (price) the surplus-
labour, the surplus-value, within these products. This realisation is retroactive and corresponds 
to the sense in which surplus-labour is internal to socially necessary labour. The sale of labour-
power is more complex, but can be characterised in similar terms. It sets into motion both the 
                                                          
113 Marx, Capital 1, 301. 
114 Marx, Grundrisse, 337. For Marx, ‘it is not at all contradictory, or, rather, the in-every-way mutually 
contradictory statements that labour is absolute poverty as object, on one side, and is, on the other side, 
the general possibility of wealth as subject and as activity, are reciprocally determined and follow from 
the essence of labour, such as it is presupposed by capital as its contradiction and as its contradictory 
being, and such as it, in turn, presupposes capital.’ Ibid. 296. 
115 This point is indebted to the fifth chapter of Arthur’s The New Dialectic and Marx’s Capital. See 
Arthur, The New Dialectic and Marx’s Capital, 90, 109. In addition to this, see Christopher J. Arthur, 
‘Marx, Hegel and the Value-Form’, in Marx’s Capital and Hegel’s Logic: A Reexamination, 269-91. 
Tombazos is correct to point out that abstract labour is indifferent to the productivity of concrete labour, 
that it can thus only be ‘more or less extensive and intensive’, but it does not follow that abstract labour 
is a purely quantitative category, that, as he puts it, ‘the “quality” of abstract labour is precisely that it 
has no “quality”.’ Tombazos, Time in Marx, 112. 
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expression (rate of profit) and the concealment (price of labour, the wage116) of the extraction 
of surplus-labour, thus latent surplus-value, from individual workers. This extraction is both 
prospective and retroactive117, and corresponds to the sense in which surplus-labour is defined 
against socially necessary labour. In Hegelian mode, the basic point here is that the ‘essential 
relation’ abstract labour does not only just exist, but is both manifestation [Erscheinung] and 
semblance [Schein], because it is itself based in the doubled relation between necessary and 
surplus-labour. Abstract labour-time simultaneously realises the fact that, within capitalism, 
‘surplus-labour and necessary labour are mingled together’118, as well as the fact that surplus-
labour is nothing other than ‘forced labour’.119 
The dialectic that confronts us is thus not the ‘dialectic of necessary and surplus-labour’ 
(there is no such thing), but rather, within capitalism, the dialectic within necessary labour as 
such. This dialectic differs from that between abstract and concrete labour in two crucial ways. 
First, as previously stated, this dialectic comes out of two different manifestations of one and 
the same kind of labour and time. Second, and more importantly, the structure of this dialectic 
is essentially different. Whereas concrete labour is produced by abstract labour as both internal 
and external to abstract labour (this is the manner in which living labour is external to capital 
because it is internal to the production-process), surplus-labour produces itself as both internal 
and external to necessary labour. In other words, if a defining feature of capitalism is that 
surplus determines necessity, then this is so because surplus-labour simultaneously determines 
itself as internal (from the standpoint of the production of all commodities but labour-power) 
and external (from the standpoint of the production of labour-power) to necessary labour. Thus 
the objective conditions of the production-process which make possible the transformation of 
value into surplus-value not only appear, but are posited, as the result of surplus-value itself.120 
Consequently, ‘the particular forms which value…must adopt in order to realise itself anew, 
                                                          
116 ‘Wage-labour always consists of paid and unpaid labour’ (Marx, Grundrisse, 574), and at the same 
time, ‘in wage-labour…even surplus-labour, or unpaid labour, appears as paid.’ (Marx, Capital 1, 680). 
117 In other words, the commodification of labour-power chronologically precedes the labour-process, 
but the exchange of labour-power for the wage is only actual (the worker is only paid) after this process. 
118 Ibid. 346. Marx’s statement that ‘capital did not invent surplus-labour’ (Ibid. 344) is misleading. It 
is true that within the corvée system ‘the necessary labour which the Wallachian peasant performs for 
his own maintenance is distinctly marked off from his surplus-labour on behalf of the boyar’ (Ibid. 
346), but this surplus-labour is not just the unhidden predecessor of surplus-labour within capitalism, 
as Marx’s analysis of the working-day [der Arbeitstag] suggests. The various forms of feudal surplus-
labour are fundamentally different from the kind of ‘surplus-labour’ which characterises capitalism. If 
anything, and just like the relation between abstract labour and labour in general, surplus-labour within 
capitalism is the condition of thinking ‘surplus-labour’ transhistorically. 
119 Marx, Grundrisse, 324. 
120 ‘…the values he [the capitalist] gave in that exchange [the wage for living labour capacity] were 
not values which he originally put into circulation out of his own funds; they were, rather, objectified 
alien labour which he appropriated without giving any equivalent whatsoever, and which he now re-
exchanges for alien living labour.’ Ibid. 457. 
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i.e. to posit itself as capital…are…only particular forms of surplus-labour itself.’121 This is 
the framework through which the following passage must be read: 
 
…capital forces the workers beyond necessary labour to surplus-labour. Only in this 
way does it realise itself, and create surplus-value. But on the other hand, it posits 
necessary labour only to the extent and insofar as it is surplus-labour and the latter is 
realisable as surplus-value. It posits surplus-labour, then, as the condition of the 
necessary, and surplus-value as the limit [Grenze] of objectified labour, of value as 
such. As soon as it cannot posit value, it does not posit necessary labour; and, given 
its foundation, it cannot be otherwise. It therefore restricts labour and the creation of 
value – by an artificial check, as the English express it – and it does so on the same 
grounds as and to the same extent that it posits surplus-labour and surplus-value. By 
its nature, therefore, it posits a barrier [Schranke] to labour and value-creation, in 
contradiction to its tendency to expand them boundlessly. And inasmuch as it both 
posits a barrier specific to itself, and on the other side equally drives over and beyond 
every barrier, it is the living contradiction.122 
 
The direct context of this passage is the contradiction – and the illusion that arises from 
this contradiction – between the individual and collective worker (or between the individual 
worker and his class), a contradiction which is itself generated by the contradiction between 
the individual and collective capitalist (or between the individual capitalist and his class). This 
passage expresses the simple fact that, apart from his workers, the individual capitalist relates 
to the working class not as workers, but as consumers: as possessors of exchange-value in the 
form of money (not wages). Hence the drive to simultaneously restrict and expand what Marx 
describes as the worker’s ‘exchangeability’ [Tauschfähigkeit] – the capacity, that is to say, of 
labour-capacity to consume.123 This is the meaning of capital as the ‘living contradiction’. But 
what predominantly interests us here is the appearance of the concepts of ‘limit’ and ‘barrier’. 
In the Grundrisse, and elsewhere, Marx does not systematically develop a relation, or even a 
difference, between the limit and the barrier. Thus the importance of this passage: it casts light 
on what this difference and relation might look like. Yet there is also – this thesis maintains – 
a more fundamental relation between the limit and barrier in Marx which must be uncovered, 
both because it grounds other expressions of this relation (such as the one articulated above), 
                                                          
121 Ibid. 451. 
122 Ibid. 421. 
123 ‘Capital, then, posits necessary labour-time as the barrier to the exchange-value of living labour-
capacity; surplus-labour-time as the barrier to necessary labour-time; and surplus-value as the barrier 
to surplus-labour-time; while at the same time it drives over and beyond all these barriers, to the extent 
that it posits labour-capacity opposite itself as something simply engaged in exchange, as money, and 
surplus-labour-time as the only barrier, because creator [Schöpferin], of surplus-value.’ Karl Marx, 
Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie, in Marx and Engels, MEW, Band 42 (Berlin: Dietz 
Verlag, 1983), 337 (Grundrisse, 422-23). 
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and because it confronts Hegel’s concepts of limit and barrier, namely as they are outlined in 
the second chapter of the ‘Doctrine of Being’ in the Logic: ‘Determinate Being’ [Das Dasein]. 
For Hegel, ‘through the limit something is what it is, and in the limit it has its quality’124, such 
that the limit is ‘the mediation through which something and other each as well is, as is not.’125 
In other words, the limit of something determines the fact that its ‘beyond’ is simultaneously 
internal and external to it. This something is, for this reason, finite: ‘nonbeing constitutes [its] 
nature and being’, and hence ‘the truth of this being is [its] end.’126 Yet this something is also, 
for this very same reason, possibly infinite: its concept registers the possibility that its negation 
– its finitude – can itself be negated. In this sense, its self-posited limit is equally a barrier: a 
limit that ‘ought’ [Sollen] to be transcended.127 
The doubled relation between necessary and surplus-labour fundamentally disrupts, and 
in so doing reworks, this philosophy of the limit. It is therefore impossible to map this doubled 
relation as a doubled relation between the ‘something’ and ‘other’ in Hegel’s Logic. From the 
standpoint of all commodities but labour-power, it is true that the labour necessary to produce 
labour-power stands as the limit of surplus-labour, insofar as the latter is finite because of the 
former, and strives to transcend the former. And it is also true that surplus-labour realises this 
transcendence, if only ever as a ‘bad infinity’ [Schlecht-Unendliche]: an infinity entangled, to 
use Hegel’s words, in an ‘alternating determination’128 with the labour necessary to produce 
labour-power. Therefore, the possibility of the infinite expansion of capital exists, but only as 
‘infinite expansion within limits’129. Or, ‘the movement of capital is…limitless’130, but only 
insofar as the formal circuit M–C–M’ contains material production (‘…P…’) within it.131 
However, these assertions represent the reach of any kind of ‘homology’ between Hegel and 
Marx’s concept of the limit. From the standpoint of every commodity but labour-power, it is 
                                                          
124 Hegel, The Science of Logic, 126. 
125 Ibid. 127. 
126 Ibid. 129.  
127 ‘Something’s own limit thus posited by it as a negative which is at the same time essential, is not 
merely limit as such, but barrier. But what is posited as negated is not barrier alone; the negation is 
two-edged, since what is posited by it as negated is the limit, and this is in general what is common to 
both something and other, and is also a determinateness of the in-itself of the determination as such. 
This in-itself, therefore, as the negative relation to its limit (which is also distinguished from it), to itself 
as barrier, is the ought.’ Ibid 132. This translation has been altered to render Schranke as ‘barrier’ rather 
than ‘limitation’.  
128 Ibid. 138. 
129 Peter Osborne, ‘A sudden topicality: Marx, Nietzsche and the politics of crisis’, Radical Philosophy 
160 (March/April 2010), 21. 
130 Marx, Capital 1, 253. 
131 Chris Arthur describes ‘…P…’ as the ‘“black box”…that lies at the heart of capital, and which it 
must manage materially, and not just formally.’ Christopher J. Arthur, ‘The Problem of Use-Value for 
a Dialectic of Capital’, in New Dialectics and Political Economy, ed. Robert Albritton and John 
Simoulidis (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 137.  
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not enough to declare that surplus-labour has quality because its limit is the labour necessary 
to produce labour-power. And this is not because surplus-labour posits this necessary labour 
as its limit in spite of itself (this is consistent with the Logic). The basic issue, rather, is that 
this necessary labour is unfree to posit its own limit. From the standpoint of every commodity, 
surplus-labour is not the self-posited, but the imposed, limit of the labour necessary to produce 
labour-power. Thus it is not only necessary labour as such, but the capitalist limit itself, which 
exists as a ‘living contradiction’. For the production of every commodity except labour-power, 
the barrier is a limit which the labour necessary to reproduce labour-power not just ought but 
must transcend, and transcend, furthermore, as the labour necessary to produce every other 
commodity. For the reproduction of labour-power, two points can be made. First, the barrier 
is a limit that necessary labour not just ought not but must not transcend, simply because this 
non-transcendence is the condition of the creation of surplus-labour. This barrier may ‘always 
in principle be overcome’132, but given the regulatory power of the wage-form and the labour 
market, is in practice rarely overcome, and when it is, only ever momentarily. Second, this 
suggests that the limit of the labour necessary to reproduce labour-power is effectively a limit 
without barriers: an entirely unsurpassable limit. From the standpoint of the reproduction of 
labour-power, there is nothing but absolute separation between necessary and surplus-labour: 
‘for the worker, the capitalist mode of production is alienation as unsurpassable ontological 
condition…the point at which the circulation of capital makes its dialectical turn for its return 
trip laden with surplus-value is the point of the expropriation of labour-power, which for the 
worker is a point of absolute and pure loss: no supersession or sublation here, merely a really 
bad infinity that is therefore not dialectical at all.’133 In this regard, and to return to the previous 
chapter, we might suggest that capital temporalises through two different, but interdependent, 
forms of ‘being-towards-the-limit’, wherein surplus-labour is, necessarily and simultaneously, 
the surpassable and unsurpassable limit. Therefore, we might state that from the standpoint of 
temporalisation, Marx is in equal parts Hegelian and Heideggerian.  
This is the context in which Marx’s analysis of ‘free’, or ‘disposable’, time – both within 
and without capitalism – must be situated. Marx consistently equates this time – particularly 
‘disposable time’ – with wealth itself: ‘the whole development of wealth rests on the creation 
of disposable time’134, and more decisively: ‘wealth is disposable time and nothing more.’135 
                                                          
132 Osborne, ‘A sudden topicality: Marx, Nietzsche and the politics of crisis’, 21. 
133 Haver, ‘For a Communist Ontology’, 117. 
134 Marx, Grundrisse, 398. 
135 This formulation of wealth first appears in the Grundrisse (ibid. 397), and is elaborated on in Karl 
Marx, Theories of Surplus-Value, Part 3 [1861-63], trans. Jack Cohen (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 
1972), 255-57. This formulation is not Marx’s: it comes from an anonymous 1821 London pamphlet 
entitled The Source and Remedy of the National Difficulties. 
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Thus together with the concepts of need and productive force, the concept of free/disposable 
time must be understood as constitutive of Marx’s transhistorical concept of wealth. And yet, 
free/disposable time – which is, amongst other things, the ‘time for education, for intellectual 
development, for the fulfilment of social functions, for social intercourse, for the free play of 
the vital forces of [the] body and…mind’136 – is only intelligible as a concept when it is placed 
in relation with the concept of labour-time. In capitalist society, therefore, free/disposable time 
is only intelligible in relation with the doubled relation between necessary and surplus-labour; 
that is, the doubled relation between necessary and surplus-labour-time. The necessary labour-
time which contains surplus-time within itself – the necessary labour-time to produce every 
commodity but labour-power – is the basis of the free time of the capitalist: ‘the free time of 
the non-working parts of society is based on the surplus-labour, or overwork, the surplus-
labour-time, of the working part.’137 This free time might be characterised as the ‘time of the 
superstructure’: the time for ‘the performance of activities which are not directly productive’ 
(e.g. statecraft, war), as well as the time ‘for the development of human abilities and social 
potentialities…which have no directly practical purpose’ (e.g. art, science).138 Surplus-labour-
time is the ‘base’ of this time of the superstructure – it is the base of ‘ideological time’ – but 
only insofar, to return to the first chapter, and as the upcoming passage reinforces, as there is 
a co-constitutive, not unilateral, relation between these two times. Additionally, the necessary 
labour-time which surplus-time excludes itself from – the labour-time necessary to reproduce 
labour-power – constitutes the basis of the free time of the worker. It is not that the individual 
worker does not have free time – the physiological limits of the working-day, and the ensuing 
struggle to reduce its length, renders this impossible – but rather that his labour-time posits 
his free time as ‘existing in and through the opposition to surplus-labour-time.’139 Yet whilst 
this free time is opposed to surplus-labour-time, it is also – and only – ‘free’ by virtue of the 
fact that it is productive for capital. Consider the following passage: 
 
The saving of labour-time [is] equal to the increase of free time, i.e. time for the full 
development of the individual, which in turn reacts back upon the productive power 
of labour as itself the greatest productive power. From the standpoint of the direct 
                                                          
136 Marx, Capital 1, 375. 
137 Karl Marx, Economic Manuscripts of 1861-63, in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels Collected Works 
(MECW) Volume 30, Marx: 1861-1863, trans. Ben Fowkes (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1988), 
191. 
138 Ibid. 190. 
139 Marx, Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie, 604 (Grundrisse, 708). The use of the 
masculine personal pronoun ‘his’ here is deliberate: it registers the fact that free time ‘existing in and 
through the opposition to surplus-labour-time’ must itself negotiate the fact that labour-power is 
reproduced through the absolute unfreedom of domestic labour-time. Simply put, Marx is indifferent 
to the fact that, within capitalism, domestic labour-time measures nothing, neither value nor wealth.  
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production-process, it can be regarded as the production of fixed capital, this fixed 
capital being man himself...Free time – which is both idle time and time for higher 
activity – has naturally transformed its possessor into a different subject, and he then 
enters into the direct production-process as this different subject. This process is then 
both discipline, as regards the human being in the process of becoming; and, at the 
same time, practice [Ausübung], experimental science, materially creative and 
objectifying science, as regards the human being who has become, in whose head 
exists, the accumulated knowledge of society.140 
 
This is a striking passage, one that underscores the extent to which the free time of the 
worker is structured by capital. It exemplifies the other side of the relation between surplus-
labour-time and this free time: if, on the one hand, this free-time is opposed to surplus-labour-
time, such that the latter represents what ought to be the former, the theft of the former, on the 
other hand, this free time is equally creative of surplus-labour-time, such that the latter is also, 
and contradictorily, predicated on the increase of the former. This passage needs to be doubly 
situated. The first context, one that will receive more attention later, is the difference between 
the production of circulating and fixed capital. Whereas the former involves the production of 
use-values which satisfy immediate needs, the latter is defined by the production of the means 
of this production, production ‘not towards value as an immediate object, but rather towards 
value creation’, which is to say the production of the ‘value-producing power of capital.’141 A 
defining dimension of capitalism is the tendential orientation towards the production of fixed, 
rather than circulating, capital.142 Stemming from this, the second context is quite simply the 
fact that the ongoing development of the capacity to produce is directly connected to ongoing 
development of the ‘capability to consume’143 [Fähigkeit des Genusses, which equally means 
the capability to enjoy], a capability which is itself ‘the development of an individual potential, 
a force of production.’144 These contexts ground the manner in which, ‘from the standpoint of 
the direct production-process, [the increase of free time] can be regarded as the production of 
fixed capital, this fixed capital being man himself.’ The increase of free time not only enriches 
the capability of the worker to transform into ‘the watchman and regulator of the production-
process itself’, such that this process becomes ‘the appropriation of [the worker’s] own general 
productive power, his understanding of nature and his mastery over it by virtue of his presence 
as a social body.’145 This increase is as much the enrichment of the worker as a consumer, the 
                                                          
140 Marx, Grundrisse, 711-12. Emphasis added. Marx wrote the expression ‘being man himself’ in 
English. See Marx, Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie, 607. 
141 Marx, Grundrisse, 710.  
142 ‘…it is in the production of fixed capital that capital posits itself as end-in-itself and appears active 
as capital, to a higher power than it does in the production of circulating capital.’ Ibid. 
143 Ibid. 711. 
144 Ibid. 
145 Ibid. 705. 
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‘human being who has become, in whose head exists, the accumulated knowledge of society’; 
this is the ‘full development of the individual’ which in turn fuels the general productive power 
of labour. The free time of the worker may ‘naturally [transform] its possessor into a different 
subject’, but the naturalness of this transformation, and the difference of this subject, are still 
structured by, because they are internal to, capital. Osborne’s critique of this passage is thus 
misplaced. Far from expressing ‘utterly untenable, nineteenth-century assumptions’, such that 
it cannot account for how ‘there is nothing “natural”, and little that is “free”, about current 
processes of the transformation of the individual into a “different subject” during disposable 
time’146, this passage in fact anticipates the extent to which these processes (consumption and 
the culture industry) are ‘unnatural’ as well as unfree. 
Yet the full importance of this passage only comes to light when it is read in conjunction 
with, and against, the following passage in Theories of Surplus-Value: 
 
Labour-time, even if exchange-value is sublated, always remains the creative 
substance of wealth and the measure of the cost of its production. But free time, 
disposable time, is wealth itself, partly for the enjoyment of the product, and partly for 
free activity which – unlike labour – is not dominated by the pressure of an extraneous 
purpose which must be fulfilled, and the fulfilment of which is regarded as a natural 
necessity or a social duty, according to one’s will. It is self-evident that if labour-time 
is restricted to a normal amount [Maß] and, moreover, labour is no longer performed 
for someone else, but for oneself, and, together with the sublation of the social 
contradictions between master and men, etc., it acquires a quite different, a free 
character, it becomes real social labour, and finally the basis of disposable time – the 
labour-time of men who also have disposable time, must be of a much higher quality 
than that of working animals [Arbeitstiers].147 
 
The relation between labour-time and free/disposable time is as essential to the comprehension 
of communism as it is to capitalism. If there is a ‘communist ontology’ in Marx, if he provides 
us with an outline of a ‘communist mode of production’, then this relation – which should be 
understood as the relation between freedom and necessity more broadly – constitutes the basis 
of the ‘ontological difference’148 between communism and capitalism. There is still a dialectic 
of freedom and necessity in communism. The difference, however, between this dialectic and 
                                                          
146 Osborne, ‘Marx and the philosophy of time’, 21. Crucially, Osborne’s citation of this passage omits 
the sentence stating that the increase of free time ‘can be regarded as the production of fixed capital, 
this fixed capital being man himself.’ See ibid. 20.  
147 Karl Marx, Theorien über den Mehrwert, in Marx and Engels, MEW, Band 26, Dritter Teil (Berlin: 
Dietz Verlag, 1968), 253 (Theories of Surplus-Value, Part 3, 257). 
148 Recall that the Heideggerian notion of ‘ontological difference’ (the difference between being and 
entity) must in Marx be based in the difference between one mode of production and another. 
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its capitalist counterpart is that, in communism, it is freedom – not necessity – that constitutes 
the measure of wealth. In communism, ‘the measure of wealth is…not any longer, in any way, 
labour-time, but rather disposable time.’149 As the passage above puts it, labour-time ‘always 
remains the creative substance of wealth and the measure of the cost of its production’, but if 
exchange-value – and with it abstract labour – is actually sublated, then this time is no longer 
the measure of wealth itself, simply because wealth no longer assumes the form of value. The 
dialectic of freedom and necessity in communism is a non-antagonistic dialectic – in Maoist 
terms, it expresses a ‘non-antagonistic contradiction’ – insofar as ‘the realm of freedom really 
begins only where labour determined by necessity and external expediency ends’, as well as 
the fact that ‘the true realm of freedom, the development of human powers as an end in itself… 
can only flourish with [the] realm of necessity as its basis.’150 In this way, the conflict between 
labour-time and free/disposable time disappears, not because their difference disappears, but 
because surplus-labour-time disappears. Communism sublates the ‘socially necessary labour-
time’ of capitalism because it abolishes the surplus-labour within this time. This is the manner 
in which communism is the consciously collective, thus rational, recognition of the qualitative 
identity between the labour-time necessary to reproduce labour-capacity and the labour-time 
necessary to produce every other product, whereas capitalism represents the structural refusal 
to recognise this identity (despite the fact that it depends on it). At the same time, this sublation 
not only preserves but enhances the productive power of ‘socially necessary labour-time’, but 
only insofar as it yields an entirely different quality of social labour-time, and thus an entirely 
different quality of product, than capitalism. In short, communism allows no place for surplus-
time within labour. ‘Free activity’ becomes the exclusive domain of this time, such that labour 
– ‘life’s first need’ – is the basis, but not the measure, of wealth.151  
Yet the ontological difference between communism and capitalism – the fact that each 
produces a fundamentally different kind of time since each produces a fundamentally different 
                                                          
149 Marx, Grundrisse, 708. Antonio Negri’s position that ‘Communism is the negation of all measure, 
the affirmation of the most exasperated plurality – creativity’ is thus completely at odds with Marx’s 
position. Antonio Negri, Marx Beyond Marx: Lessons on the Grundrisse [1979], trans. Harry Cleaver, 
Michael Ryan and Maurizio Viano, ed. Jim Fleming (New York: Autonomedia, 1991), 33. 
150 Marx, Capital 3, 958-59. 
151 ‘…when the narrow-minded bourgeois form is stripped away, what is wealth other than the 
universality of individual needs, capacities, pleasures, productive forces, etc., created through universal 
interchange? The full development of human mastery over the forces of nature, those of so-called 
“nature” as well as his own nature? The absolute working out of his creative potentialities, with no 
presupposition other than the previous historical development, that makes this totality of development, 
i.e. the development of all human powers as such, the end in itself, not as measured on a predetermined 
scale? Where he does not reproduce himself in one specificity, but produces his totality? Strives not to 
remain something he has become, but is in the absolute movement of becoming?’ Marx, Grundrisse 
der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie, 395-96 (Grundrisse, 488). This wealth comprises a fundamentally 
different kind of historical time. 
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kind of human, and vice versa – is only intelligible when it is framed as a historical difference. 
And the kind of history and historical time that communism produces is itself only intelligible 
from the standpoint of the kind of history and historical time that it sublates. For this reason, 
the relation between necessary and surplus-labour, which more than any other relation within 
capitalism structures the social production of the means of life, must now be configured as a 
distinct kind of historical relation. Specifically, how does the production of this relation relate 
to the materialist concept of history? How does it restructure the historicalising power of need? 
In short, what is the relation between valorisation and the production of historical time? These 
questions point to the focus of the next chapter: the production-process of capital, the process 
which sets the relation between necessary and surplus-labour into motion as historical time. 
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Chapter Four 
Capital: the Condition of Thinking History 
 
Historical Materialism…means the self-knowledge of capitalist society.1  
 
As previously argued, the difference between the circuits C–M–C and M–C–M’ should be 
understood as expressing two different conceptions of need. Whereas the first circuit leads to 
the satisfaction of human needs – most importantly the satisfaction of the need of the worker 
to reproduce his own existence – the second circuit correlates to capital’s need to self-expand: 
the ‘constantly renewed movement’ that is ‘an end in itself.’2 Furthermore, the kind of ‘need’ 
underlying the circuit M–C–M’ constitutes the perversion [Verrücktheit] of human need, such 
that, in Sartrean terms, the self-expansion of value transforms human need into exigency – the 
individual is compelled to sell his labour-power in order to live, precisely because capital must 
expand.3 In this respect, if concrete labour is internal to abstract labour – if the former totalises 
and temporalises, but only insofar as it is internal to the totalising and temporalising power of 
the latter – this is because only exchange-value, not use-value, satisfies capital’s need for self-
expansion.4 In other words, it is only from the standpoint of the need of capital, measured by 
exchange-value, that the scope of the internality of concrete labour to abstract labour reveals 
itself. The individual sells his labour-power because he needs to live, but this need is not the 
totalising and temporalising basis of his ensuing labour. The need that governs the teleological 
end of this labour is not the worker’s need to consume the means of life, but rather the creation 
of use-values predestined for exchange. In capitalism, the worker does not posit the end of his 
act – capital does – and thus his need to consume the means of life arises quite separately from 
the actual production of these means. The only thing that actually connects the production and 
consumption of the means of human life is the wage.  
Consequently, despite the fact that concrete and abstract labour totalise and temporalise 
differently (this is important: there is no dialectic between them if this is not acknowledged), 
                                                          
1 Georg Lukács, ‘The Changing Function of Historical Materialism’ [1919], in History and Class 
Consciousness, 229. ‘Thus historical materialism is, in the first instance, a theory of bourgeois society 
and its economic structure’. Ibid. 
2 Marx, Capital 1, 253. 
3 For Sartre, this represents the sense in which the practico-inert temporalises: exigency – or need from 
the standpoint of the practico-inert – constitutes the systematised perversion, the systematic co-option, 
of the temporalising basis of human praxis. 
4 However, only use-value – e.g. the use-value of labour-power – produces that which satisfies capital’s 
need for self-expansion. Only the use-value of labour-power produces surplus-value. 
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the historical-ontological ground of each – the ground which determines that, within each, 
totalisation is temporalisation, and temporalisation totalisation – is the same. This ground is, 
quite simply, capital’s need to self-expand.5 Yet if this is the case, new questions emerge: what 
is the relationship between capital’s need to self-expand and history? More precisely, what is 
the relationship between this need and the materialist concept of history? How does this need 
relate to this concept as a modern, philosophical concept of history? Capital’s relentless drive 
to expand pervades the whole of Marx’s critique of political economy, but what would it mean 
to reconstruct Marx’s exposition of this drive as a historicalising concept of need? A concept 
of need which registers the creation of history itself, such that capital’s need historicalises qua 
needs? These questions point to the fact that the expansive ontological scope of the concepts 
of necessity [Notwendigkeit] and need [Bedürfnis], as first introduced in the 1844 Manuscripts 
and enriched by The German Ideology, is not realised by Marx in the various drafts of Capital. 
In other words, from the Grundrisse onwards, Marx does not, this chapter argues, adequately 
sustain the ‘materialist outlook’ [materialistischer Anschauung], an outlook which, according 
to The German Ideology, determines not only that necessities and needs must be subjected to 
a historical logic, but must be understood as constituting that very logic itself. In The German 
Ideology, this outlook is undeniably grounded in human necessities and human needs, but this 
does not mean that it does not thereby extend to capital’s necessities and capital’s needs. Not 
at all. If, within capitalism, human needs are internal to, if they are satisfied because of, capital, 
what this means is that capital does more than make itself relevant to the materialist outlook. 
It regrounds this outlook. This must be systematically investigated, such that a general set of 
ontological relations between need, capital and history reveals itself, and reveals itself beyond 
the predominant framework through which Marx presents these relations, which is to say the 
ordinary understanding of history. Marx teaches us that social needs evolve and expand, and 
that capitalism is a historically specific formation of socially necessary labour and social need, 
one which alienates human necessities and human needs. This is of course true, but it presumes 
rather than explains the relationship between the self-expansion of capital and the materialist 
concept of history more generally. 
We must address this relationship because, and as we have already established, abstract 
labour is the condition of thinking the category of ‘labour in general’, the category upon which 
the intelligibility of the materialist concept of history depends. But – and this cuts to the heart 
                                                          
5 This is not to say that capital’s need to self-expand is not itself ontologically grounded by the human’s 
need to socially produce the means of its life, that there is not, in other words, a mutually constitutive 
– a reciprocal – ontological ground between capital’s need and human needs. The point, rather, is that 
the historical-ontological ground of the expansion of human needs within capitalism, that which gives 
this expansion its historical intelligibility, is capital’s need to self-expand.  
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of the matter – it is one thing to demonstrate that ‘labour in general’ hinges on abstract labour, 
and quite another thing to put this into motion as history. If capital is in essence ‘movement’, 
‘motion’, and ‘unity-in-process’6, it must hereafter be grasped as a historicalising movement, 
motion, and unity-in-process. And if, furthermore, self-valorising value – i.e. capital – is the 
‘comprehensive subject’ [übergreifendes Subjekt] of its own processes, ‘in which it alternately 
assumes and loses the form of money and the form of commodities, but preserves and expands 
itself through all these changes’7, then the comprehensiveness of this subject (the manner in 
which this subject is the unification – the totalising and temporalising movement – of its own 
processes, and thus the unity of the acts within these processes) must become its historicalising 
power. As should now be clear, by ‘historicalise’ we do not mean ‘historicise’ – understanding 
capital as a ‘historically specific’ subject (at least what is normally meant by this expression), 
nor do we mean situating this subject in its ‘specific time and place’, in, for example, 1860s 
England (this is historicism); rather, we mean the way in which, as the comprehensive subject, 
as the unity of the acts within the processes that it is, capital historicalises, and it does so in 
such a manner that it constitutes the condition of thinking Marx’s modern post-Enlightenment 
concept of history.8 This historicalisation is the condition of thinking ‘historicisation’, and, 
therefore, capitalism’s historical specificity. Capital (and here we mean ‘capital in general’, 
or ‘universality’9) totalises and temporalises in such a manner that these movements become 
                                                          
6 Marx, Grundrisse, 620. 
7 Marx, Capital 1, 255. I am indebted to Peter Osborne for the translation of ‘übergreifendes Subjekt’ 
as ‘comprehensive subject’, as opposed to Ben Fowkes’s ‘dominant subject’ (übergreifendes literally 
means ‘overarching’ or ‘all-grasping’). Fowkes’s translation lends itself too easily to the notion that 
the human subject is ‘externally dominated’ by the subject that is value (this is Postone’s ‘abstract 
domination’), when in fact the point is that human subjectivation is internal to value (in capitalism, the 
human is (predominantly) a subject because there is value). Living labour is internal to the value-form; 
labour-power is used. And the human consumer is predominantly a subject because there is circulation: 
‘as the subject predominant [übergreifend] over the different phases of this movement, as value 
sustaining and multiplying itself in it, as the subject of these metamorphoses proceeding in a circular 
course – as a spiral, as an expanding circle – capital is circulating capital.’ Marx, Grundrisse, 620. 
Martin Nicolaus’s translation of übergreifend as ‘predominant’ lacks the overarching connotations of 
‘comprehensive’, but it is preferable to Fowkes’s ‘dominant’.  
8 The focus of this chapter is the relationship between capital and Marx’s particular post-Enlightenment 
concept of history, but the ultimate question which Marx poses for the philosophy of history is whether 
capital constitutes the condition of thinking every post-Enlightenment concept of history (from roughly 
the mid-eighteenth century onwards). In other words, does capital constitute the very possibility of the 
category of history, as conceived by the likes of Kant, Hegel, Condorcet, Comte, Dilthey, Heidegger, 
Collingwood, Sartre and Fukuyama? Constitute the very possibility of ‘the collective singular form of 
Geschichte, which since around 1780 can be conceived as history in and for itself in the absence of an 
associated subject or object’? Koselleck, Future’s Past: on the Semantics of Historical Time, 236. Marx 
does not feature in Koselleck, hence the latter never asks whether capital is the subject of ‘history…in 
the absence of an associated subject or object’. 
9 As Roberto Fineschi says, in Marx, ‘“capital in general” [Kapital im Allgemeinen] and “universality” 
[Allgemeinheit] mean the same thing.’ Roberto Fineschi, ‘On Hegel’s Methodological Legacy in 
Marx’, in Marx’s Capital and Hegel’s Logic: A Reexamination, 140, ft. 2. Whilst these categories only 
appear in Marx’s work until the end of 1862, Fineschi demonstrates that ‘capital in general’ actually 
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historicalising movements: they become constitutive of the movement of historical totalisation 
and historical temporalisation. Thus, against Sartre, this chapter argues that there is a totaliser 
– it is capital – that totalises and temporalises history.10 Broadly speaking, this is what is meant 
by the statement that ‘capital is the subject of history’. Ontologically, this is not to assert (and 
here we must draw on the historicist understanding of historical time) that capital has been the 
subject of all hitherto existing (human) history, and will be the subject of all (human) history 
to come. This is absurd. Ontologically, capital has only been, and will only be, the subject of 
history for as long as capitalism has existed and continues to exist (even if, strictly speaking, 
it is impossible to know not only when – or if – capitalism will end, but also when it ‘began’11). 
Epistemologically, however, this does not invalidate the fact that, without capital, there is no 
history in and for itself: no ‘history of all hitherto existing society’ nor no ‘all history to come’. 
‘History as such’, ‘history itself’, exists because of capital. 
What is the upshot of this? If, on some level, we are to hold on to the materialist concept 
of history, wherein ‘history’ can be understood as something like ‘the social production of the 
means of human life’, a production that satisfies existing human needs and creates new human 
needs, then we must recognise and work through the fact that capital is the subject that makes 
this understanding possible. Methodologically, this requires that we extend the logic of history 
to capital itself. This requires that capital – whose existing and new needs might be formulated 
as ‘reproduction on an expanded scale, i.e. accumulation’12 – be conceived from the standpoint 
                                                          
‘[becomes] more consistent thanks to some modifications’ after 1862. Ibid. 144, 142. ‘Total social 
capital’ [gesellschaftlichen Gesamtkapital] is, as we will later learn, the decisive modification. Hegel 
is the clear interlocutor here, insofar as the three moments of the Concept in the Logic (universality, 
particularity and singularity) correspond to capital in general, many competing capitals and interest-
bearing capital in Capital. The details of this reading of the Hegel/Marx confrontation are not important 
here, but what needs to be stressed is that ‘capital in general’ does not turn its back on particularity and 
singularity, but is dialectically dependent on them. Hence the ‘historicalisation’ being discussed here 
is not indifferent to different particular histories, nor is it indifferent to the singularity of the historical 
event, but is rather dialectically dependent on them. As previously cited, this dovetails with the problem 
of history as ‘how to universalise the singular without suppressing its specificity.’ Mészáros, The Work 
of Sartre: Search for Freedom and the Challenge of History, 242.  
10 Disclosing capital as this totaliser does not invalidate, but actually registers, Hegel’s ‘cunning of 
reason’, as well as the ‘invisible hand’ of Smith’s market. This is the structuralist dimension of capital’s 
subjectness: it is the ‘hidden’ or ‘empty’ subject of history.  
11 Take the question of the ‘origins of capitalism’. Insofar as capitalism is a mode of production, and a 
mode of production is a totalising abstraction of multiple, actually existing societies, the desire to locate 
the origins of capitalism in a particular time, place and phenomenon (in, for instance, 16th century 
English agrarian relations, which is the ‘Brenner Thesis’) is fundamentally misguided. In other words, 
capitalism is capitalism by virtue of the fact that, as a system of social relations and forces irreducible 
to linear causation and time, its origins belong to no one place, time or phenomenon. This fact guides 
Marx’s analysis of ‘originary accumulation’, and it is, to varying degrees, lost on the leading thinkers 
of the origins of capitalism (e.g. Fernand Braudel, Maurice Dobb, Paul Sweezy, Robert Brenner, Perry 
Anderson, Immanuel Wallerstein and Ellen Meiksins Wood). 
12 Marx, Capital 1, 763. 
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of producing the means of its own life. These means are irreducible to the human’s means of 
life – the commodities necessary for the reproduction of the owner of labour-power. Capital’s 
means of life are not these and other commodities, but rather the processes by which the ‘inner 
substance’ of commodities – ‘socially necessary labour-time’ – produces and circulates itself. 
More specifically, the processes by which this labour-time expands itself – valorises itself – 
constitutes capital’s means of life. It is not difficult to grasp, therefore, that capital presents us 
with a very different kind of ‘life’ than that of the human being. Yet whilst there is a consistent 
appeal to life in Marx’s critique of political economy – there is a consistent use of life-related 
terms – there is no (or at least no explicit) theoretical discourse on the ‘life of capital’ in this 
critique (indeed, the same can be said of ‘the life of the worker’, ‘living labour’, and so forth, 
insofar as ‘life’ here only functions ontologically around the concepts with which it is joined). 
What, then, is the ‘life of capital’? In what sense is this life a historical – a historicalising – 
life? To answer these questions, this chapter maintains, we must systematically investigate the 
different dimensions of capital’s need to self-expand, and thereby create a life that expresses 
these dimensions.13 This is, in the end, how to fill out capital as the subject of history. This is 
how social – as opposed to individual – life occupies the standpoint (in capitalism) from which 
‘historical totalisation’ and ‘historical temporalisation’ can be understood. Hence this is how 
Marx’s distinct challenge to the Heideggerian and Sartrean projects can ultimately be secured. 
As opposed to Heidegger, capital, not Dasein, is ‘the originary happening’ [das ursprüngliche 
Geschehen] that makes the ‘science of history’ possible (this itself stems from the fact that the 
individual’s being-towards-death is predominantly actual within what can be called capital’s 
‘being-towards-life’14). Contra Sartre, individual praxis is not the totalising and temporalising 
core of historical dialectics; the life of capital – ‘universal social labour’ – is. 
This chapter focuses on the production-process of capital, and treats the self-expansion 
at the heart of this process as the practical basis upon which the materialist concept of history 
depends.15 In Sartrean language, this self-expansion constitutes the ‘primary intelligibility’ of 
history: it gives history its autonomy and – as heretical as it may be to state this – its ‘motive 
                                                          
13 The production-process of capital (Capital Vol. 1) correlates to what can be called capital’s ‘deathly 
life’, whereas the circulation-process of capital and its metamorphoses (Capital Vol. 2) – treated in the 
conclusion to this thesis – might be understood as the ‘life-circuit’ or ‘life-process’ of capital. 
14 To expand on the previous footnote, the ‘life’ in this formulation must be doubly understood, as both 
the life of capital which, ‘vampire-like, lives only by sucking living labour, and lives the more, the 
more labour it sucks’ (Marx, Capital 1, 342), and as the life of capital in which the production-process 
is just one of the moments within each of capital’s multiple life-circuits. This formulation does not 
detract from the fact that, following Osborne, human finitude is the ‘ontological basis of the “value” 
of time’. It simply gives this fact its historical purchase. It expresses that, in capitalism, human finitude 
is only this basis in relation to the historicalising life of ‘self-immortalising and self-multiplying value.’ 
Marx, Grundrisse, 639. 
15 The circulation-process of capital is examined in the conclusion to this thesis.  
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force’.16 Marx and Engels are correct to argue – and this chapter should be read as reinforcing 
this argument – that in the bourgeois conception of history – the culminating ‘conception of 
history up to the present’ – the ‘actual basis of history has either been totally neglected or else 
considered as a minor matter quite irrelevant to the course of history.’17 Yet what they do not 
recognise in The German Ideology, and what Marx does not demonstrate, or even suggest, in 
the various drafts of Capital, is that the ‘need’ without which history cannot be comprehended 
is not, that is, not originarily, human need, but rather capital’s need to self-expand. Ultimately, 
it is the two ‘great sections’18 of the movement of capital – the production- and circulation-
processes – which, taken together, render ‘the process of expansion of human needs and the 
productive forces corresponding to them’19 intelligible as history, but, this chapter argues, the 
production-process of capital takes precedence, because this process directly determines that, 
in capitalism, the human is not only not the subject of the expansion of its own needs, but that 
this displacement is the very reason why there is such a thing as ‘human history’. As we will 
see, the production-process is the ontological basis of some of the most basic, and seemingly 
self-evident, assumptions that Marx’s, if not every post-Enlightenment, conception of history 
tacitly accepts: human history not only exists ‘in itself and as such’20, but its progression never 
stops. Hence the speculative proposition which guides this chapter is this: valorisation is the 
production of historical time. The production-process of capital valorises value, and it does 
so in such a way that, to rework the Lukács quotation that frames this chapter, historical time 
becomes its self-knowledge.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
16 The point here is not that the assertion that class struggle is the ‘motive force of history’ is necessarily 
misplaced, but that it must negotiate the fact that in addition to being the condition of thinking history, 
capital is the condition of thinking the category of ‘class’.  
17 Marx and Engels, DI, 39 (GI, 59). Heidegger’s philosophy of history is the paradigmatic example of 
this. 
18 Marx, Grundrisse, 620. 
19 Osborne, How to Read Marx, 41. 
20 As Ricœur stresses in his reading of Koselleck, this goes hand-in-hand with the idea that ‘history is 
the history of humanity, and in this worldwide sense, the world history of peoples. Humanity becomes 
both the total object and the unique subject of history, at the same time as history becomes a collective 
singular.’ Ricœur, Memory, History, Forgetting, 300. The irony here is that history first becomes the 
‘history of humanity’ precisely because capital, not humanity, is the subject of this history.  
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4.1 The Production-Process of Capital 
There is a passage in the Grundrisse that is worth citing at the outset, because it constitutes a 
rare instance in which Marx addresses, that is, directly addresses21, the relationship between 
surplus-labour and history. It is thus worth citing in full: 
 
 
 
The great historical quality of capital is to create…surplus-labour, superfluous labour 
from the standpoint of mere use-value, mere subsistence; and its historical 
determination is fulfilled as soon as, on the one side, there has been such a 
development of needs that surplus-labour above and beyond necessity [Notwendige] 
has itself become a universal need [Bedürfnis] arising out of individual needs 
themselves – and, on the other side, when the severe discipline of capital, acting on 
succeeding generations [Geschlechter], has developed general industriousness as the 
universal property of the new generation – and, finally, when the development of the 
productive powers of labour, which capital incessantly whips onward with its 
unlimited mania for wealth, as the sole conditions in which this mania can be realised, 
have flourished to the stage where the possession and preservation of universal wealth 
require a lesser labour-time of society as a whole, and where the labouring society 
relates scientifically to the process of its progressive reproduction, its reproduction in 
a constantly greater abundance; hence where labour in which a human being does what 
things could do has ceased. Therefore, capital and labour relate to each other here like 
money and commodity; the former is the universal form of wealth, the latter merely 
the substance destined for immediate consumption. Capital’s ceaseless striving 
towards the universal form of wealth drives labour beyond the limits of its ‘natural 
neediness’ [Naturbedürftigkeit], and thus creates the material elements for the 
development of the rich individuality, which is as all-sided in its production as in its 
consumption, and whose labour also therefore appears no longer as labour, but as the 
full development of activity itself, in which natural necessity in its immediate form 
has disappeared; because a historically created need has taken the place of a natural 
need. This is why capital is productive; i.e. an essential relation for the development 
of the social productive forces.22 
 
 
 
This passage is not just cited for what it actually tells us, but also for what it potentially tells 
us, for what, that is to say, it can be made to tell us. If ‘the great historical quality of capital is 
to create…surplus-labour’, such that ‘surplus-labour…has itself become a universal need’, 
what would it mean to read this creation as the creation of the means of understanding history 
itself? This is the essential task of this chapter: to simultaneously ground ourselves in Marx’s 
analysis of the production-process of capital, and to push this analysis beyond its immediate 
and intended scope. 
                                                          
21 See also Marx, Economic Manuscripts of 1861-63, 199.  
22 Marx, Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie, 244 (Grundrisse, 325).  
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When we speak of the ‘production-process of capital’, we must, after Marx, internally 
differentiate this process between the ‘labour-process’ [Arbeitsprozeß] and the ‘valorisation-
process’ [Verwertungsprozeß]. The relationship between these two processes has, from one 
standpoint, already been established: it directly corresponds to the relationship between the 
concrete labour which produces use-values (the labour-process) and the abstract labour which 
produces exchange-values (the valorisation-process). Marx often depicts the relation between 
the labour- and valorisation-process within the terms of the concrete/abstract labour relation: 
‘The production-process is the immediate unity of the labour-process and valorisation-process, 
just as its immediate result, the commodity, is the immediate unity of use-value and exchange-
value.’23 Hence, as with concrete and abstract labour, we are not looking at two different acts 
here: the labour- and valorisation-process register one and the same purposive act, albeit from 
dialectically opposed standpoints. And as with abstract and concrete labour, the unity of the 
labour- and valorisation-process is hierarchically structured: ‘…the labour-process itself is 
nothing else than the means of the valorisation-process, just as the use-value of the product is 
nothing but a repository of its exchange value’24; additionally, ‘in capitalist production the 
labour-process is only the means, the end is supplied by the valorisation-process.’25 Therefore 
just as concrete labour and use-value exist as the internalised, dialectical opposites of abstract 
labour and value, so too is the existence of the labour-process within capitalism26 predicated 
on the valorisation-process: the former only exists because it is internalised by the latter as its 
dialectical opposite. This is the sense in which ‘the labour-process is as it were incorporated 
in it [the valorisation-process], subsumed under it.’27 Yet what Marx’s analysis of the relation 
between the labour- and valorisation-process gives us, which the presentation of the relation 
between concrete and abstract labour in Chapter 3 does not, is a direct account of why these 
relations exist. The relation between concrete and abstract labour presumes precisely what the 
relation between the labour- and valorisation-process explains: the production of the relation 
between necessary and surplus-labour. It is this production, and this production alone, that 
                                                          
23 See Karl Marx, Resultate des unmittelbaren Produktionsprozesses (Frankfurt: Archiv sozialistischer 
Literatur 17, Neue Kritik, 1968), 21 (Marx, Capital 1, 991). The Results of the Immediate Production-
Process – and not the 1861-63 Manuscripts or the first volume of Capital (proper) – contains the most 
direct account of the relation between the labour- and valorisation-process.  
24 Marx, Resultate des unmittelbaren Produktionsprozesses, 21 (Marx, Capital 1, 990). 
25 Marx, Capital 1, 1001-2. 
26 We should remind ourselves that, as with concrete labour and use-value, Marx presents us, quite 
problematically, with a transhistorical labour-process per se. He does not recognise that, conceptually 
speaking, the ‘labour-process’, just like ‘concrete labour’ and ‘use-value’, depends on capitalism for 
its intelligibility. The transhistorical descriptions of the labour-process do not just appear in Chapter 7 
(of the English edition) of the first volume of Capital: see, for instance, Marx, Economic Manuscripts 
of 1861-63, 56-9, in addition to Marx, Contribution, 36. 
27 Marx, Economic Manuscripts of 1861-63, 67. 
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gives abstract labour its raison d’être, its immanent movement without which we cannot grasp 
capital as the condition of thinking history. Thus if Chapter 3 makes the epistemological claim 
that necessary and surplus-labour hinge on abstract labour for their intelligibility, this chapter 
makes the ontological claim that abstract labour only exists – and hence the difference between 
concrete and abstract labour only exists – because of the necessary/surplus-labour relation. 
Quite simply, the only reason why abstract labour exists is because ‘the production of surplus-
value, i.e. the objectification of unpaid labour’28 exists. We can now summarise the historical-
ontological importance of the relationship between the labour- and valorisation-process: this 
relationship gives the concrete/abstract labour relation its movement because it establishes the 
necessary/surplus-labour relation as the engine of this movement. This is the reason why the 
relationship between the labour- and valorisation-process is the predominant framework of 
the first volume of Capital, as well as substantial portions of the 1861-63 Manuscripts and the 
Grundrisse. This relationship underscores the fact that, for Marx, every relation is at bottom 
a processual relation: a relation is only a relation because it is a material process between its 
relatum. Capital, in other words, directly reinforces a basic lesson of the Theses on Feuerbach: 
the relation, logically and ontologically, grounds the relatum (not the other way around). We 
must firstly prioritise the relation between the labour- and valorisation-process, such that the 
difference between these processes can come to light. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
28 Marx, Capital 1, 991. 
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4.1.1    Subsumption 
The concept which Marx uses to capture the relation between the labour- and valorisation-
process, a concept without which, this thesis argues, history cannot be thought, is subsumption 
[Subsumtion]. In short, subsumption is the concept which structures Marx’s understanding of 
the production-process of capital. For this reason, we must briefly consider its philosophical 
development leading up to Marx. The modern usage of ‘subsumption’ is associated with Kant, 
who was the first to establish the sense in which subsumption refers to the processes through 
which the universal and the particular enter in relation with one another, or more precisely the 
sense in which the particular is brought under the universal, and thereby transformed in some 
manner. In Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, subsumption is the essential process underlying 
the faculty of judgement [Urteilskraft]. For Kant, it captures the relation between the manifold 
and the categories of the understanding, between the sensible and the logical: ‘to the use of a 
concept there…belongs a function of the power of judgement, whereby an object is subsumed 
under it.’29 To return to Chapter 1, subsumption is a central feature of Kant’s analysis of the 
schematism of the pure concepts of the understanding.30 The Critique of Pure Reason directly 
assigns a temporalising logic to subsumption: the question of ‘the application of the category 
to appearances’31 must be addressed through the numerous schematics of time. Subsumption 
introduces the ‘third thing’ – the multiple time-determinations, culminating in the entire scope 
or ‘field of time’ [Zeitinbegriff] – that secures the possibility of a relation between categories 
and appearances. (The interesting thing at play here is not that the schematism of the categories 
provides a multidimensional framework for temporalising the relation between abstract and 
concrete labour, but the sense in which Marx reproduces Kant in his position that time is the 
‘third thing’ that allows two commodities, and thus we might say abstract and concrete labour, 
to have a relation in the first place). Subsumption does not figure as extensively in Hegel as it 
does in Kant, but the former is consistent in his critique of the latter’s use of this concept. For 
Hegel, the essential problem with Kantian subsumption is that it does not register the fact that 
the universal is universal by virtue of the fact that it has a determinate content. In other words, 
Kantian subsumption is, for Hegel, a ‘one-sided’ or ‘bad’ abstraction: it strips away what is 
particular about the particular, and thereby prevents the universal from manifesting itself as a 
singularity or concrete universal. Kantian subsumption does not tell us what is essential about 
                                                          
29 Kant, CPR, A248/B304, 359. 
30 The opening line of the schematism of the categories reads: ‘In all subsumptions of an object under 
a concept the representations of the former must be homogeneous with the latter, i.e., the concept must 
contain that which is represented in the object that is to be subsumed under it, for that is just is what is 
meant by the expression “an object is contained under a concept”.’ Ibid. A137/B176, 271. 
31 Ibid. A138/B177, 272. 
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the object, since it lacks the concrete fullness without which abstractive power is productive. 
For Hegel, the manifold is not external to the concept, but is rather the concept incarnate. Thus 
if one takes the standpoint of the ‘self-subsistence of both subject and predicate’ (which Kant 
does, because his transcendental subject – the Gemüt – is a human subject), then ‘subsumption 
is only the application of the universal to a particular or an individual, which is placed under 
the universal in accordance with a vague idea that it is of inferior quality.’32 Hegel’s problem 
is not subsumption as such – the very rationality, the dialectical movement, of the syllogism 
depends on relations of subsumption – but the failure to recognise that subsumption is nothing 
if it is not also thought in relation to inherence [Inhärenz]. That is, subsumption registers the 
fact that the universal and particular inhere in one another, albeit in different ways.33  
Commenting on Marx’s claim in the Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy 
of Right that Hegel does not ask whether his use of the category of subsumption is ‘the rational, 
the adequate mode of subsumption’34, the Endnotes Collective suggests that: 
 
 
The irony here is that it is just such a usage of this category that Marx himself goes on 
to develop. From the 1861-63 draft of Capital onwards, subsumption, for Marx, is the 
subsumption of the particularities of the labour-process under the abstract universality 
of the valorisation-process of capital. The abstract category, it seems, really does find 
itself a body. Marx’s critique of German idealist philosophy is thus paralleled in his 
critique of capital. However, now the error is not on the part of the speculative 
philosopher, for it resides, rather, in capitalist social relations themselves. The abstract 
universal – value – whose existence is posited by the exchange abstraction, acquires 
                                                          
32 Hegel, The Science of Logic, 629.  
33 The Endnotes Collective gives good commentary on the place of subsumption in Hegel’s Philosophy 
of Right, although they overstate the manner in which this place marks a tension in Hegel’s work more 
broadly. It is true that, in the Philosophy of Right, Hegel in effect recreates the Kantian framework: he 
reproduces the sense in which the manifold is external to the pure categories of the understanding and 
thus subsumed under – subjected to – these categories. Here the universality of the sovereign’s decision 
is not configured as inhering in, and thus constituted by, the particularities of civil society. This decision 
does not manifest itself as a concrete universal, but is rather a decision which imposes itself upon civil 
society, such that the executive power – namely the judiciary and the police – have an ‘immediate 
bearing on the particular concerns of civil society and they make the universal interest authoritative 
over its particular aims.’ G.W.F. Hegel, Philosophy of Right [1821], trans. T.M. Knox (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1981), 189 (§287). Therefore, the ‘particular interests which are common to everyone 
fall within civil society and lie outside the absolutely universal interest of the state proper.’ Ibid. 189 
(§288). See http://endnotes.org.uk/en/endnotes-the-history-of-subsumption (accessed 27 April 2015).  
34 In full: ‘The sole philosophical statement Hegel makes about the executive is that he “subsumes” the 
individual and the particular under the general, etc. Hegel contents himself with this. On the one hand, 
the category of “subsumption” of the particular, etc. This has to be actualised. Then he takes any one 
of the empirical forms of existence of the Prussian or modern state (just as it is), anything which 
actualises this category among others, even though this category does not express its specific character. 
Applied mathematics is also subsumption, etc. Hegel does not ask “Is this the rational, the adequate 
mode of subsumption?” He only takes the one category, and contents himself with finding a 
corresponding existent for it. Hegel gives a political body to his logic: he does not give the logic of the 
body politic.’ See Karl Marx, Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, in MECW 
Volume 3, Marx and Engels: 1843-1844 (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1975), 48.  
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a real existence vis-à-vis particular concrete labours, which are subsumed under it. 
The real existence of abstractions, which acquire the ability to subsume the concrete 
world of production under them – and posit themselves as the truth of this world – is 
for Marx nothing other than a perverted, enchanted, ontologically inverted reality. The 
absurdity and violence which Hegel perceives in a relation of subsumption applies not 
only to Hegel’s system itself, but also to the actual social relations of capitalist 
society.35 
 
 
 
The merit of this reading is that it recognises the sense in which Hegel’s system reproduces, 
and is in fact predicated on, capitalist social relations. However, there are two problems with 
this reading, the identification of which cuts to the heart of Marx’s distinct use of the category 
of subsumption. First, Hegel did not understand subsumption to be absurd and violent; rather, 
this was the critique he levelled at Kant’s specific use of the category of subsumption in his 
1831 Berlin lectures on logic, not subsumption per se.36 In the Logic, as the previous paragraph 
shows, the doubled relation of subsumption and inherence is central to Hegel’s formulation of 
the syllogism in the Doctrine of the Concept. It is true that the Philosophy of Right is in tension 
with Hegel’s critique of Kantian subsumption, as it reproduces Kant’s use of the category of 
subsumption, but this is not representative of Hegel’s system more broadly.  
This leads to the second, more basic, problem. Like much of the secondary literature on 
subsumption more generally, the Endnotes Collective does not consider the complex dialectic 
between the labour- and valorisation-process, the understanding of which is essential not only 
to Marx’s understanding of subsumption, but, as we will see, the very intelligibility of history. 
The character of this dialectic has, once again, already been introduced – it corresponds to the 
dialectic between concrete and abstract labour. This dialectic is the processual manifestation 
of the fact that abstract labour produces, within itself, concrete labour as its dialectical exterior 
(this is one register of the larger sense in which, consequent to the commodification of labour-
power, living labour is external to capital within the production-process). But what must now 
be highlighted is that this dialectic is the dynamic transposition of the dialectic of abstract and 
concrete labour via the category of subsumption. We must thus insist on the following point 
(one that much of the secondary literature fails to thematise, and in some cases acknowledge): 
subsumption is an indelibly dialectical category in Marx, the exposition of which grounds our 
exposition of the production-process of capital. Marx does not explicitly highlight this point, 
but it is only from the standpoint of the essentially dialectical character of subsumption that 
                                                          
35 See http://endnotes.org.uk/en/endnotes-the-history-of-subsumption (accessed 27 April 2015).  
36 See G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on Logic [1831], trans. Clark Butler (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 2008), 12-13 (§22), which the Endnotes Collective mistakenly cites as representative of Hegel’s 
view on subsumption as such. 
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Marx’s indebtedness to Kant and Hegel, as well as his critical departure from them, can be 
realised. On one level, the valorisation-process subsumes the labour-process in much the same 
way that subsumption functions in the Critique of Pure Reason: the labour-process is brought 
under the valorisation-process in such a way that the labour-process – as a sensible object of 
appearance – is transformed into an object of capital’s self-knowledge, thus authorising the 
universality and necessity of the valorisation-process. Despite Hegel’s protestations that such 
a grasping of subsumption ‘alters what is immediate…strip[s] away what is sensory, and lift[s] 
out the universal’37, this is precisely the point: capital is wholly indifferent to the particularities 
of the labour-process. This indifference marks the self-expansion of capital via the production 
of exchange-values: capital is predicated on the erasure of the concrete, sensual particularities 
of the labour-process. On another level, however, this erasure is at once the creation of these 
particularities. This is the deeply Hegelian dimension of Marx’s concept of subsumption: the 
dialectical manner though which the subsumption of the labour-process under the valorisation-
process is the logical and ontological creation of the particularities of the labour-process, such 
that, after the Logic, the universality of the concept – here the valorisation-process – inheres 
within these particularities. This is the syllogistic structure of capital from the standpoint of 
subsumption. Marx’s concept of subsumption thus represents a unique confrontation between 
Kant and Hegel’s conceptions of subsumption. Yet despite the fact that the Kantian aspect of 
Marx’s concept of subsumption is the most immediate and explicit dimension in Capital, it is 
ultimately the dialectical dimension – a dimension which proceeds from Hegel but critically 
restructures him at the same time – which grounds the uniqueness of this concept.  
Three points follow from this. First, Marx’s concept of subsumption confirms the sense 
in which the relation ontologically precedes the relatum: it is not as if one pre-existing thing 
(the valorisation-process) subsumes another (the labour-process). Rather, following the basic 
logic of totalisation and temporalisation, ‘subsumption’ denotes the active production of the 
relation between the valorisation-process and labour-process, and thereby the intelligibility of 
the difference between these processes. Second, this concept specifies the sense in which the 
labour-process is internal to the valorisation-process, and for this reason subsumption replaces 
the logic of ‘internalisation’ which, up to this point, has structured our comprehension of the 
relationship between concrete and abstract labour, and the relation between human needs and 
the needs of capital. However, and this should now be clear, subsumption is not simply another 
word for ‘internalisation’, but is rather a dialectic of interiorisation and exteriorisation. If, after 
Sartre, an exteriorised totality is reinteriorised through praxis, such that this reinteriorisation 
                                                          
37 Ibid. 12 (§22). 
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is at once ‘an interior negation of interiority’38, then we might transpose this to Marx and state 
that the interiorisation of the labour-process into the valorisation-process is at once the interior 
negation of the interiority of the valorisation-process. The erasure of the particularities of the 
labour-process is dialectically fastened to the expanding creation of these particularities. The 
difference, however, between Sartre and Marx is that, consequent to the commodification of 
labour-power, this dialectic must be understood as the self-creation of the valorisation-process 
itself (the valorisation-process externalises the labour-process within itself). This leads to the 
third and final point, one that signals the greatest critical departure from Hegel. Subsumption 
is, after Peter Osborne, what we might call an ‘actual abstraction’. As Osborne suggests, ‘once 
we divest ourselves of Hegel’s notion of an achieved absolute’ (as a side note: this is precisely 
the problem with Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, the reason why Hegel’s otherwise consistent 
commitment to the dialectical character of subsumption is lost in this work), then ‘analytically 
“good” abstraction, “concrete fullness of abstraction”, or the unity of the categorial forms of 
a systematic dialectic, may now correspond to practically “bad” abstraction: paradigmatically, 
in Marx’s analysis, domination by the abstractions of the value-form.’39 In other words, once 
we recognise subsumption for what it is – a necessarily ongoing and open process – then the 
analytically ‘good’ dimension of subsumption – the manner in which the concrete fullness of 
the valorisation-process is constitutive of the particularities of the labour-process – may now 
correspond to the practically ‘bad’ dimension of subsumption – the erasure, consequent to the 
commodification of labour-power, of the particularities of the labour-process. However, as 
Osborne points out, ‘this kind of practically “bad” abstraction has a different logical form to 
the “one-sided” bad abstractions of the understanding, from which the discourse of good and 
bad abstractions derives.’40 In other words, the subsumption of the labour-process under the 
valorisation-process (here in the sense that the latter ‘erases’ the concrete particularities of the 
former) is a ‘bad’ erasure immanent to a ‘good’ creation.  
This is the philosophical context in which the two forms of subsumption that constitute 
capitalism – formal subsumption and real subsumption – must be situated. For Marx, formal 
subsumption is ‘formal’ because it denotes the way in which capital ‘takes hold’ of the labour-
process without actually transforming the content of this process, whereas real subsumption 
is ‘real’ because capital actually transforms this process – it actually, and incessantly, recreates 
this process in order to increase the productivity of labour. Marx primarily makes use of formal 
subsumption in order to highlight how existing labour-processes are brought under the capital 
                                                          
38 Sartre, CDR 1, 57.  
39 Peter Osborne, ‘The reproach of abstraction’, Radical Philosophy 127 (September/October 2004), 
27. 
40 Ibid. 
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relation41, how, for instance, guild-labourers become wage-labourers without actually having 
the content of their labour-process transformed. Real subsumption, on the other hand, yields 
what Marx describes as the ‘specifically capitalist mode of production’. As is well-known, the 
production of surplus-value – the production of the difference and relation between necessary 
and surplus-labour – motors both formal and real subsumption alike: the valorisation-process 
subsumes the labour-process because capital needs to self-expand (to produce surplus-value). 
Accordingly, Marx directly ties the two different forms of subsumption to two different forms 
of the production of surplus-value, the analysis of which constitutes half of the first volume 
of Capital. Formal subsumption corresponds to the production of ‘absolute surplus-value’: the 
absolute extension of the working-day past the labour-time necessary to reproduce the owner 
of labour-power, whereas real subsumption corresponds to the production of ‘relative-surplus 
value’: the reduction of the labour-time necessary to reproduce the owner of labour-power and 
therefore the ‘corresponding alteration in the respective lengths of the two components of the 
working-day.’42 Thus absolute surplus-value is ‘absolute’ as it involves the absolute extension 
of the time beyond that necessary to reproduce the worker, whereas relative surplus-value is 
‘relative’ because the increase of surplus-labour-time is relative to the reduction of necessary 
labour-time, such that the working-day may stay at the same length, or even decrease. In short, 
formal subsumption, and the absolute surplus-value correlating to it, is an extensive process, 
whereas real subsumption, and the relative surplus-value that correlates to it, is an intensive 
process. However, as with the labour- and valorisation-process, it is not the difference between 
formal/real subsumption, and thus absolute/relative surplus-value, that ultimately concerns us, 
but rather the relations between them, because it is these relations which constitute, one might 
say, the ‘inner substance’ of the dialectic of the labour- and valorisation-process. Subsumption 
is, for Marx, a dialectical category: it registers how the valorisation-process both internalises 
and externalises – within itself – the labour-process, but this does not mean that the relations 
between formal and real subsumption are dialectical relations. Unto themselves, formal and 
real subsumption can be understood as dialectical processes, insofar as each express different 
forms of the relation between the labour- and valorisation-process, but there is, in Marx, no 
such thing as ‘the dialectic of formal and real subsumption’ (nor is there a ‘dialectic of absolute 
and relative surplus-value’). However, this takes nothing away from the need to uncover the 
                                                          
41 Marx, Capital 1, 1020-21. 
42 Ibid. 432. Whereas Marx rarely directly uses the term ‘subsumption’ in the first volume of Capital 
proper, the Results of the Immediate Production-Process renders the relationship between formal and 
real subsumption, and absolute and relative surplus-value, quite explicit: ‘If the production of absolute 
surplus-value was the material expression [materieller Ausdruck] of the formal subsumption of labour 
under capital, then the production of relative surplus-value may be viewed as its real subsumption.’ 
Ibid. 1025. 
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relations between formal and real subsumption, as well as those between absolute and relative 
surplus-value, because they constitute the internal engine of the production-process of capital 
more generally.  
One dimension of Marx’s writings from the 1861-63 Manuscripts onwards is the sense 
in which formal subsumption, and hence absolute surplus-value, ‘precede’ real subsumption 
and relative surplus-value.43 In this way, formal subsumption is the ‘premise and precondition 
of…real subsumption.’44 On one level, this characterisation is not surprising: it proceeds from 
Marx’s examination of the working-day, such that ‘the constant tendency of capital’ to extend 
the length of the working-day to its ‘utmost physically possible limit’45, and the subsequent 
struggle by workers to reduce the length of this day, can be comprehended as fuelling dynamic 
transformations of the labour-process itself, transformations that directly raise the productivity 
of labour and thereby lower the time necessary to the produce workers’ means of life. In this 
manner, formal subsumption might be understood as the premise and precondition of the three 
definitive developments within real subsumption: cooperation, the division of labour, and the 
use of machinery. The absolute limits of absolute surplus-value give rise to the quality of real 
subsumption, the ‘specifically capitalist mode of production’. According to Marx, it is only in 
real subsumption wherein: 
 
 
 
The social productive forces of labour, or the productive forces of directly social, 
socialised (i.e. collective) labour come into being through cooperation, the division of 
labour within the workshop, the use of machinery, and in general the transformation 
of production by the conscious use of the sciences, of mechanics, chemistry, etc. for 
specific ends, technology, etc. and similarly, through the enormous increase of scale 
corresponding to such developments (for it is only socialised labour that is capable of 
applying the general products of human development, such as mathematics, to the 
immediate production-process; and, conversely, progress in these sciences 
presupposes a certain level of material production). This entire development of the 
productive forces of socialised labour (in contrast to the more or less isolated labour 
of individuals), and together with it the use of science (the general product of social 
development), in the immediate process of production, takes the form of the 
productive power of capital.46 
 
 
                                                          
43 See, in particular, ibid. 1025. 
44 Ibid. 1026. 
45 Karl Marx, Value, Price and Profit [1865], as cited in Tomba, Marx’s Temporalities, 134.  
46 Marx, Capital 1, 1024. ‘With the real subsumption of labour under capital a complete (and constantly 
repeated) revolution takes place in the mode of production, in the productivity of the workers and in 
the relations between workers and capitalists.’ Ibid. 1035. The expression ‘a complete and constantly 
repeated revolution’ is Marx’s self-reference to The Communist Manifesto.  
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As this passage shows, real, not formal, subsumption is the realisation of ‘social labour’ 
within capitalism. This social labour is spurred by the competition between individual capitals: 
organisational and technological innovation is driven by the desire of individual capitalists to 
sell – if only momentarily – commodities at an ‘individual value’ below that of their existing 
social value (innovation, particularly new machinery, is unevenly introduced within the same 
industry and across different industries). In the end, however, the idea that formal subsumption 
‘precedes’ its real counterpart, that the former is simply the ‘premise and precondition’ of the 
latter, is not a convincing framework with which to understand their relationship. In fact, it is 
misleading. This is not just because ‘from one standpoint the distinction between absolute and 
relative surplus-value appears to be illusory.’47 More fundamentally, this is because, logically 
as well as materially, the relationship between formal and real subsumption must be grasped 
as a mutually constitutive relationship, an interplay, or continual crossing-over, from one form 
to another, or what Tomba calls the ‘reciprocal co-penetration between absolute surplus-value 
and relative surplus-value.’48 Real subsumption is both the logical and material premise and 
precondition of formal subsumption (as much as the reverse). The introduction of machinery 
in one branch of industry not only ‘prolong[s] the labour-time of those workers who continue 
to work with the old, imperfect means of production,’49 it is also ‘the most powerful means of 
lengthening the working day beyond all natural limits in those industries first directly seized 
on by it.’50 There is simply no ‘replacement’ of formal subsumption by real subsumption: the 
valorisation-process subsumes the labour-process because it relies, from the start, on the co-
existence and interplay between formal and real subsumption. Real subsumption ‘is logically 
implicit in the concept of capital’51, and for this reason cannot be comprehended as something 
which chronologically succeeds formal subsumption. This does not excuse us from granting 
a certain priority to real subsumption/relative surplus-value over formal subsumption/absolute 
surplus-value. The former constitute the ‘specifically capitalist mode of production’: they are 
what allows capitalist production to ‘[establish] itself as a mode of production sui generis and 
[bring] into being a new mode of material production’52 (it is, as we will see, real subsumption 
                                                          
47 Ibid. 646. For Marx, ‘relative surplus-value is absolute, because it requires the absolute prolongation 
of the working day beyond the labour-time necessary to the existence of the worker himself. Absolute 
surplus-value is relative, because it requires a development of the productivity of labour which will 
allow the necessary labour-time to be restricted to a portion of the working day.’ Ibid.  
48 Tomba, Marx’s Temporalities, 155. As Tomba states, it is because of this reciprocal co-penetration 
that ‘the distinction between the North and South of the world, between First, Second and Third World, 
…between centre, semi-periphery and periphery, and the concomitant typology of advanced or 
backward capitalisms, loses any meaning.’ Ibid. 155-56.  
49 Marx, Economic Manuscripts of 1861-63, 327-28. 
50 Marx, Capital 1, 526. 
51 Arthur, The New Dialectic and Marx’s Capital, 76. 
52 Marx, Capital 1, 1035. 
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which ultimately is at the base of the possibility of establishing capital as constitutive of a new 
mode of history sui generis). Real subsumption – not formal subsumption – is the reason why, 
as the passage quoted above illustrates, the capitalist social productive forces of labour come 
into being and expand. Real subsumption – not formal subsumption – is the reason why ‘the 
socially productive power of labour develops as a free gift to capital…and appears as a power 
which capital possesses by its nature – a productive power inherent in capital.’53 And yet, only 
the ongoing interplay between these two forms of subsumption gives rise to the self-expansion 
of capital; only this interplay, as we will now begin to examine in more detail, registers capital 
as a totalising, temporalising and thus historicalising dialectic. Taken together, formal and real 
subsumption constitute the material processes through which capital’s need to self-expand is 
actualised. These processes are crucial to our understanding of history and historical time. Yet 
in order to secure how capital, qua subsumption, relates to history, we must first consider how 
it does not. That is, we must first consider how subsumption is often situated in a historically 
totalising and temporalising framework that does little else but presume, and thereby obscure, 
how capital, time and history structure one another.  
Over the last thirty to forty years, a common reading of the relationship between history 
and subsumption has arisen, which for all its internal variations holds two basic assumptions.54 
First, ‘subsumption’ in Marx can be understood as a category of historical periodisation, such 
that successive periods of history (no matter how they are demarcated) directly correspond to 
successive phases of formal and real subsumption. The precise meaning of formal as opposed 
to real subsumption in these accounts varies, but the conviction that formal subsumption both 
logically and historically precedes real subsumption is firm.55 Theses readings are exclusively 
limited to the history of Western Europe. Second, the contemporary (the early 1970s onwards) 
phase of real subsumption can be taken as what Jacques Camatte calls the ‘total subsumption 
of labour under capital.’56 This is the manner in which real subsumption has, one might state, 
‘completed’ the subsumption of labour under capital. There are two passages57 that exemplify 
these two assumptions, particularly that of ‘total subsumption’. The first comes from Fredric 
                                                          
53 Ibid. 381. 
54 Despite its shortcomings, the Endnotes Collective provides a useful and critical introduction to this 
reading. See http://endnotes.org.uk/en/endnotes-the-history-of-subsumption (accessed 27 April 2015). 
The primary focus of this article is the French group Théorie Communiste. 
55 See e.g. Étienne Balibar, ‘Elements for a Theory of Transition’, in Althusser and Balibar, Reading 
Capital, 302-3, wherein formal subsumption ‘begins with the form of outwork on behalf of a merchant 
capitalist and ends with the industrial revolution.’ For Balibar, formal subsumption thus coincides with 
Marx’s analysis of manufacture, and possesses the structure and form of a transition wherein there is a 
distinct non-correspondence – a dislocation – between the forces and relations of production.  
56 Jacques Camatte, Capital and Community [1976], trans. David Brown (London: Unpopular Books, 
1988), 45. I am indebted to the Endnotes Collective for this reference. 
57 I am indebted to Andrés Sáenz de Sicilia for both of these references. 
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Jameson’s recent rereading of the first volume of Capital, and illustrates the way in which he 
uses the category of subsumption to substantiate his theory that the first volume of Capital is 
essentially about unemployment:  
 
 
This particular Marxian “law” – “in proportion as capital accumulates, the situation of 
the worker, be his payment high or low, must grow worse” (Capital 1, 799) – was the 
object of much mockery during the affluent post-war 1950s and 1960s. It is today no 
longer a joking matter. Along with Marx’s intimations of globalisation, these analyses 
seem to renew the actuality today of Capital on a world scale. In another sense they 
designate a stage of “subsumption” in which the extra-economic or social no longer 
lies outside capital and economics but has been absorbed into it: so that being 
unemployed or without economic function is no longer to be expelled from capital but 
to remain within it. Where everything has been subsumed under capitalism, there is 
no longer anything outside it; and the unemployed – or here the destitute, the paupers 
– are as it were employed by capital to be unemployed; they fulfil an economic 
function by way of their very non-functioning (even if they are not paid to do so).58 
 
 
The second passage comes from Antonio Negri’s 1981 essay ‘The Constitution of Time’, and, 
echoing Camatte, encapsulates what Negri later calls ‘the phase of the total subsumption of 
society.’59 
 
[with real subsumption] use-value cannot appear except under the guise of exchange-
value. There is no longer an external vantage point upon which use-value can 
depend…Real subsumption means the complete realisation of the law of value...social 
labour covers all the time of life, and invests all of its regions...the entire time of life 
has become the time of production.60 
 
These passages can be critiqued on a number of different fronts. The opposition which 
Jameson establishes between the ‘economic’ and the ‘social’, such that we can ‘designate a 
stage of “subsumption” in which the extra-economic or social no longer lies outside capital 
and economics but has been absorbed into it’, is to miss the essential point that, for Marx, the 
economic is a category of the social, that, as Chapter 1 illustrates, the ‘economic’ is, after The 
German Ideology, synonymous with the social production of the means of life, and thus the 
                                                          
58 Frederic Jameson, Representing Capital: a Commentary on Volume One (London and New York: 
Verso, 2011), 71.  
59 Antonio Negri, ‘Twenty Theses on Marx: Interpretation of the Class Situation Today’, in Marxism 
Beyond Marxism, ed. Saree Makdisi, Cesare Casarino and Rebecca E. Karl (New York: Routledge, 
1996), 159. 
60 Antonio Negri, ‘The Constitution of Time’ [1981], in Time for Revolution, trans. Matteo Mandarini 
(London and New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013), 25-9.  
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historical meaning of the human as an essentially social being.61 We must also draw attention 
to Jameson’s conflation of ‘capital’ and ‘capitalism’, leading to statements such as ‘everything 
has been subsumed under capitalism’ (capital is the comprehensive, the predominant, subject 
of capitalism, not its exclusive subject). Negri’s argument that ‘there is no longer an external 
vantage point upon which use-value can depend’ is also, as the previous chapter demonstrates, 
to miss the historical specificity of the category of use-value. Disregarding for the moment the 
question of whether it is even possible to speak of a ‘historical phase’ of formal as opposed to 
real subsumption, the idea that there was once, within capitalism, a moment wherein use-value 
had such an ‘external’ vantage point is to forget the fact that, within capitalism, use-value has 
always only appeared ‘under the guise of exchange-value’, that use-value only stands opposed 
to exchange-value within the value-form. But what needs to be stressed here, a point that these 
critiques orbit around but do not directly confront, is the manner in which Camatte, Jameson 
and, most of all, Negri do not just presume what needs to be explained, but do so even as they 
invoke the very category which allows us to explain what needs to be explained. To be more 
direct: they reveal, albeit unintentionally and unconsciously, that there is an ontologically and 
epistemologically basic relationship between the subsumption of labour under capital and the 
production of historical time, and, furthermore, that the category of totalisation is what first 
allows us to uncover this relationship. Put differently, their primary problem is not their desire 
(something that Marx would certainly not endorse) to extend the scope of subsumption beyond 
the production-process of capital – to ‘everything’ (Jameson), or to ‘the entire time of life’ 
(Negri) – a desire which does little less but conflate the basic difference between capital and 
capitalism, or more specifically the difference between the production-process of capital and 
social reproduction more generally.62 Nor is the primary problem their desire to create distinct, 
chronological historical stages corresponding to formal and then real subsumption, a desire 
that dismisses the constant interplay within capitalism, from its start, between these two forms 
of subsumption. These are significant problems that threaten to jettison the very intelligibility 
                                                          
61 This is important because it points to the sense in which Jameson’s category of ‘postmodernity’ (that 
Representing Capital certainly holds on to) can be understood as an essentially ahistorical, if not anti-
historical, category. If ‘postmodernity’ is ‘our’ current historical conjuncture wherein real subsumption 
subsumes ‘everything’, the irony here is that Jameson’s philosophy of history aligns with Marx’s – the 
economic and the social become intertwined  – precisely at the moment that Jameson evacuates history 
from Marx (who provides, one might say, a ‘pre-postmodern’ account of capitalism). 
62 What these accounts – particularly Negri’s – do is eradicate the ineradicable, the unsurpassable, limit 
to capital: the commodification of labour-power. The consequences of this are immense, and leave us 
with a Marx that is barely recognisable. When, as Negri says, ‘social labour covers all the time of life’, 
it is not just the difference between labour-power and living labour which disappears, but the very 
difference between the production- and circulation-process of capital. ‘Social life’ as such becomes 
synonymous with ‘labour-time’, such that the raison d’être of capitalism is not valorisation, but the 
tautological desire for command for command’s sake. 
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of Marx’s work, but, in the end, they point towards an even more fundamental problem: the 
failure to recognise that the intelligibility of history hinges on what conception of ‘totalisation’ 
guides it. Simply put, the totalisation that guides Camatte’s ‘total subsumption of labour under 
capital’, as well as Negri’s ‘total subsumption of society’, is the vulgar meaning of totalisation: 
a totalising process whose unidirectional advance contains, within itself, the possibility of its 
own ‘completion’ (and wherein real subsumption becomes, whether Negri intends this or not, 
synonymous with the (chronological) ‘end’ of history).63 To this understanding of totalisation 
corresponds the vulgar meaning of temporalisation, whose historical register is well-known: 
the linear and irreversible understanding of time whose custodian is of course chronology. Yet 
the problem is not, strictly speaking, chronology as such, but rather the fact that this model of 
historical time only expresses what must be explained: historical time is ‘historical’ by virtue 
of the fact that it appears as a self-expanding time, or, in other words, that historical time is 
historical time because it expands of its own accord. The ordinary understanding of historical 
time registers this, but it does so in a way that the origins of self-expansion are disguised (this 
is why it is the dominant model of historical time). In merely reproducing the ordinary concept 
of historical time, Camatte, Jameson and Negri cannot explain what their accounts implicitly 
rely on: ‘history’ as, in and for itself, the perpetual movement of self-expansion. This despite 
the fact, and ironically, that it is precisely Marx’s analysis of the subsumption of labour under 
capital which allows us to account for this. It is not a closed and completed totality that makes 
this possible, but rather a totalisation which is by definition open and incomplete, whose unity, 
as should now be evident, is the very process of its differentiation. In short, it is the ongoing 
dialectic between the labour- and valorisation-process, as previously characterised – the very 
dialectic that Camatte, Jameson and Negri neglect – that constitutes the condition of thinking 
the self-expansion of historical time. Subsumption is a historical category, not because it is a 
periodising – or even a historicising – category, but because it is historicalising category: it is 
a category which registers the very constitution of history itself. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
63 If Negri’s concept of totalisation correlates to the ordinary concept of totality – totalisation extending 
into every facet of the ‘social’ and ‘life’ – this is because, for him, ‘valorisation is a continuous and 
totalitarian process, it knows neither limit nor repose.’ Negri, Marx Beyond Marx, 76. Jettisoning the 
commodification of labour-power as the defining limit of valorisation, is, in short, to confuse, and thus 
conflate, totalisation and totalitarianism.  
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4.1.2    Automation 
We are now in a position to establish how the production-process of capital gives rise to the 
materialist concept of history, to establish, that is to say, the fundamental relation between the 
production of surplus-value and Marx’s modern, post-Enlightenment conception of history. If 
the expansion of human needs is the essence of this concept, and if the expansion of capital is 
the historical-ontological ground of understanding the expansion of human needs as ‘history’, 
then the subsumption of the labour-process by the valorisation-process is not only the material 
expression of capital’s need to self-expand, but the relation that makes the category of history 
possible. If, in what follows, the valorisation-process is prioritised over the labour-process and 
real subsumption is prioritised over formal subsumption – both of which we must do – this is 
not because the valorisation-process is in any way ‘independent’ of the labour-process, or that 
real subsumption somehow ‘replaces’ formal subsumption, but because Marx singles out the 
valorisation-process and real subsumption as the truly ‘capitalist’ features of the production-
process of capital. To secure capital as the condition of thinking history is to stress the defining 
features of the valorisation-process and real subsumption. Two features in particular stand out, 
the investigation of which guides the next two sections. The first of these is automation.  
The discourse of automation is shot through Marx’s critique of political economy from 
the Grundrisse onwards. Broadly speaking, the real subsumption of the labour-process by the 
valorisation-process is grounded by the transformation of objectified labour, or more precisely 
the transformation of the means of production, into capital itself: ‘Within the framework of 
capitalist production this ability of objectified labour to transform itself into capital, i.e. to 
transform the means of production into the means of controlling and exploiting living labour, 
appears as something utterly appropriate to them…as inseparable from them and hence as a 
quality attributable to them as things, as use-values, as means of production.’64 In this regard, 
the means of production become – as a quality unto themselves – defined by movement (as 
opposed to being static objects put into motion by an external force), and thus human beings 
are no longer the subjects whose labour animates objects in order to satisfy human needs. Real 
subsumption inverts this relation: ‘…at the level of material production, of the life-process in 
the realm of the social – for that is what the production-process is – we find the same situation 
that we find in religion at the ideological level, namely the inversion of subject into object and 
vice versa.’65 Real subsumption and its most developed material expression – machinery – is 
that wherein the ‘motion and the activity of the instrument of labour asserts its independence 
                                                          
64 Marx, Capital 1, 988-89. 
65 Marx, Resultate des unmittelbaren Produktionsprozesses, 20 (Marx, Capital 1, 990).  
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vis-a-vis the worker’, such that ‘the instrument of labour now becomes an industrial form of 
perpetual motion.’66 With this inversion of subject and object, this automatisation of the means 
of production themselves, comes a radical restructuring of the relationship between material 
production and ‘life’. The labour-process in capitalism can still – because it must – be grasped 
as yielding the means of human life, but only insofar as this process, and with it human need, 
serves the needs of the valorisation-process. In other words, if the dialectic of the labour- and 
valorisation-process constitutes the manifold expansion and diversification of human needs, 
this is because human needs are inessential to this dialectic: ‘the production in enormous mass 
quantities which is posited with machinery destroys every connection of the product with the 
direct need of the producer, and hence with direct use-value; it is already posited in the form 
of the product’s production and in the relations in which it is produced that it is produced only 
as a conveyor of value, and its use-value only as condition to that end.’67 From the standpoint 
of the production-process of capital, human life is thus superfluous. It exists in an exterior and 
purely negative relation to the life of capital, since ‘the worker consumes his provisions during 
pauses in the labour-process, whereas the machine consumes what is essential to it while it is 
still functioning.’68 The life of capital, ‘the life-process of the social’, is its self-produced need 
to be already always in motion. 
In the Results of the Immediate Production-Process, there is a compelling passage that 
describes the relationship between automation and the production-process in temporal terms. 
Remarking on the difference between the labour already contained in the means of production 
and the labour which is added to the production-process, Marx writes:  
 
The two kinds of labour are distinguished only by the fact that the one is already 
objectified in use-values while the other is in the process of being so objectified. The 
one is in the past, the other in the present; the one dead, the other living; the one 
objectified in the past, the other objectifying itself in the present. To the extent that 
past labour replaces living labour, it itself becomes a process, valorises itself; it 
becomes a fluens that creates a fluxion. This absorption into itself of additional living 
labour is its process of self-valorisation, its authentic transformation into capital, into 
value generating itself, its transformation from a constant amount of value into a 
variable value in a state of process.69 
                                                          
66 Ibid. 526. 
67 Marx, Grundrisse, 694. 
68 Marx, Capital 1, 984. 
69 Ibid. 994. If a fluens is a ‘flowing’, then a fluxion is, after Isaac Newton, this flowing as a continuous 
function. This passage must be read in conjunction with the following passage from the Grundrisse: 
‘The communal substance of all commodities, i.e. their substance not as material stuff, as physical 
character, but their communal substance as commodities and hence exchange-values, is this, that they 
are objectified labour. The only thing distinct from objectified labour is non-objectified labour, labour 
which is still objectifying itself, labour as subjectivity. Or, objectified labour, i.e. labour which is 
present in space, can also be opposed, as past labour, to labour which is present in time. If it is to be 
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What must be emphasised here is the fact that the quality of labour already contained in the 
means of production, and that being added to the production-process, is, as Marx articulates 
it, identical.70 Each represent different quantities of this labour, but both involve the same kind 
of ‘general social labour’: abstract labour. Thus consequent to the commodification of labour-
power, the objectivity of each, whether it has already been constituted or is still in the process 
of constituting itself, is structured by the purely social objectivity of the value-form. This is 
the objectivity being expressed here: the ‘ghost-like’ objectivity not just of value, but of value 
in an automatic state of process, neither of which are something like ‘the course sensuousness 
of matter’. Thus consequent to the commodification of labour-power, the objectivity of the 
present and the past, or, more precisely, the objectivity of the dialectic of the present and the 
past within the production-process of capital, is structured by the purely social objectivity of 
the value-form. This presents us with a crucial development on what has been a basic concern 
of this thesis: the temporality of the ongoing first historical act, the temporality that provides 
us with a possible basis of historical time. Insofar as there is a relationship between the social 
production of the means of human life and the production-process of capital, this, as should 
now be clear, is a relationship that is entirely mediated by the value-form: if capital constitutes 
a radically historicalising power, if its production constitutes the incessant production of new 
human needs, such that capital systematises human needs in ways unmatched (to date) by any 
other historical subject, then this is so because these new needs appear within the social form 
of value. But the ontological power that gives the temporality of the first historical act within 
capitalism its movement has now been potentially identified: the replacement of living labour 
by dead labour: the tendential replacement of living labour by the machine. This is, to be sure, 
a dialectical replacement: the replacement of the worker by the machine in one industry is the 
active creation – the active expansion – of living labour in other, new industries. Thus the past 
is not ‘replacing’ the present, but rather past labour is, within the present, within the dialectic 
of the present and the past, replacing present labour, and, in so doing, constituting the manifold 
expansion of the historical present. The constitutive power of the past is therefore not Sartre’s 
practical-inert, but rather the automation of dead labour. Sartre’s determination of the present 
by the past within the present (the practico-inert) cannot account for the immanent movement 
                                                          
present in time, alive, then it can be present only as the living subject, in which it exists as capacity, as 
possibility; hence as worker.’ Marx, Grundrisse, 272. The crucial thing to keep in mind in this passage, 
as well as its counterpart in the Results of the Immediate Production-Process, is that, consequent to the 
commodification of labour-power, ‘living labour’, ‘non-objectified labour’ as well as ‘labour which is 
present in time’ (all of which mean the same thing), is labour subsumed by the valorisation-process. In 
other words, the worker may be a human being opposed to capital, but this ‘living subject’ is only a 
subject by virtue of being within the production-process.  
70 Marx, Capital 1, 994. 
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of this process (this also accounts for his recourse to the synchrony/diachrony model), whereas 
Marx’s determination of the present by the past within the present does: it gives us the reason 
(real subsumption spearheaded by machinery) why the production-process sets into motion a 
kind of historical time. The future – the historical future – is here animated as well: the telos 
underwritten by the production-process of capital is what gives the historical future its place 
within the ongoing, self-expanding, dialectic of the present and the past.  
This brings us to Marx’s so-called ‘Fragment on Machines’. It is worthwhile to cite and 
comment on a long passage within this section of the Grundrisse, not only because it captures 
the essential place of automation within real subsumption, but also because commentators on 
Marx – particularly Negri – have read this and similar passages in ways that threaten to jettison 
their historical intelligibility. Marx writes the following: 
 
 
 
…once adopted into the production-process of capital, the means of labour passes 
through different metamorphoses, whose culmination is the machine, or rather, an 
automatic system of machinery (system of machinery: the automatic one is merely its 
most complete, most adequate form, and alone transforms machinery into a system), 
set in motion by an automaton, a moving power that moves itself; this automaton 
consisting of numerous mechanical and intellectual organs, so that the workers 
themselves are cast merely as its conscious linkages. In the machine, and even more 
in machinery as an automatic system, the use-value, i.e. the material quality of the 
means of labour, is transformed into an existence adequate to fixed capital and to 
capital as such; and the form in which it was adopted into the production-process of 
capital, the direct means of labour, is sublated by a form posited by capital itself and 
corresponding to it. In no way does the machine appear as the individual worker’s 
means of labour. Its distinguishing characteristic is not in the least, as with the means 
of labour, to transmit the worker's activity to the object; this activity, rather, is posited 
in such a way that it merely transmits the machine’s work, the machine’s action, on to 
the raw material – supervises it and guards against interruptions. Not as with the 
instrument, which the worker animates and makes into his organ with his skill and 
strength, and whose handling therefore depends on his virtuosity. Rather, it is the 
machine which possesses skill and strength in place of the worker, is itself the virtuoso, 
with a soul of its own in the mechanical laws acting through it; and it consumes coal, 
oil etc. (matières instrumentales), just as the worker consumes food, to keep up its 
perpetual motion. The worker's activity, reduced to a mere abstraction of activity, is 
determined and regulated on all sides by the movement of the machinery, and not the 
opposite. The science which compels the inanimate limbs of the machinery, by their 
construction, to act purposefully, as an automaton, does not exist in the worker’s 
consciousness, but rather acts upon him through the machine as an alien power, as the 
power of the machine itself. The appropriation of living labour by objectified labour 
– of the power or activity which creates value by value existing for-itself – which lies 
in the concept of capital, is posited, in production resting on machinery, as the 
character of the production-process itself, including its material elements and its 
material motion. The production-process has ceased to be a labour-process in the sense 
of a process dominated by labour as its governing unity. Labour appears, rather, 
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merely as a conscious organ, scattered among the individual living workers at 
numerous points of the mechanical system; subsumed under the total-process 
[Gesamtprozeß] of the machinery itself, as itself only a link of the system, whose unity 
exists not in the living workers, but rather in the living (active) machinery, which 
confronts his individual, insignificant doings as a mighty organism…71 
 
This passage reconfirms much of what has already been established in relation to the 
dialectic of the labour- and valorisation-process: (1) there is a totalising relation between these 
processes (the valorisation-process in this passage can be comprehended as based on a ‘system 
of machinery’), such that the labour-process is a mere ‘organ’ of the machine (this reproduces 
the relation between concrete and abstract labour as depicted in the previous chapter); (2) the 
machine – not the worker – is what ‘animates’ the production-process of capital; and thus (3) 
what gives ‘life’ to the production-process is capital’s need to be in perpetual motion, not the 
human being (which needs to rest). But what must now be raised and commented on here is 
the possibility that this passage registers a basic shift – if not a structural realignment – within 
the fabric of capitalism itself. More precisely, this is the possibility that the automatic system 
of machinery displaces what had up to the introduction of this system defined capitalism as a 
mode of production. More than anyone else, Negri most forcefully expresses this position. His 
direct commentary on this passage, first presented in his seminars in the spring of 1978 at the 
École Normale Supérieure, conforms to his reading of real subsumption in ‘The Constitution 
of Time’: the system of machinery does not just reduce the labour-process to ‘a simple element 
of the process of valorisation’72, but extends the production-process into society as such. Thus 
for Negri, ‘real subsumption of labour can’t but be (in the same moment) real subsumption of 
society. Of society, in other words of the productive social forces, especially of science…the 
moment arrives when the whole system is displaced and advances.’73 We have previously 
                                                          
71 Marx, Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie, 592-93 (Grundrisse, 692-93). There is a 
counterpart to this passage, in the 1861-63 Manuscripts, which captures the automation within the other 
aspects of real subsumption: cooperation and the division of labour. In this passage, Marx stresses the 
manner in which the worker becomes the ‘exclusive life-process’ of one of the multiple ‘monosyllabic’ 
processes involved in the production of a commodity, such that ‘the overall production-process of a 
single commodity appears now as a combined operation, a complex of many operations, all of which 
complement each other independently, and can be carried out simultaneously alongside each other.’ 
Indeed, it is for Marx simultaneity [Gleichzeitigkeit] that is the defining temporal feature of cooperation 
and the division of labour. With real subsumption, the multiple processes that yield a commodity no 
longer ‘follow each other in chronological sequence’, but are simultaneously undertaken, such that ‘the 
complementarity of the different processes is here transferred from the future to the present, whereby 
a commodity which is begun at one side is finished at the other.’ Marx, Economic Manuscripts of 1861-
63, 277-78. 
72 Negri, Marx Beyond Marx, 142. 
73 Ibid. Therefore ‘the subsumption of society has become the production of that same society. The 
displacement is total…at this stage, the capitalist appropriation of society is total.’ Ibid. 142-43. 
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outlined the problems with the notion of ‘the total subsumption of society’ and do not need to 
restate them again. However, we have yet to consider what, for Negri, is the overall practical 
consequence of this subsumption: the displacement of the ‘law of value’ itself, such that real 
subsumption constitutes the abolition of labour-time as the measure of value. As Negri asserts, 
provocatively, in ‘The Constitution of Time’: ‘in the displacement produced by the realisation 
of subsumption, the unitary paradigm of time-as-measure of value is smashed. Subsumption 
generates a completely enveloping temporal Umwelt that dissolves the possibility of 
measure.’74 Simply put, this is the fundamental axis around which Negri’s reading of Marx in 
this period unfolds (which, to date, Negri has not abandoned75). We might summarise it in this 
way76: up to the ‘stage’ of real subsumption, the capacity of time to measure value was based 
on the externality of use-value to exchange-value. This is because (1) the reduction of all kinds 
of labour to ‘simple average labour’, and the time corresponding to this reduction (e.g. socially 
necessary labour-time, the time of exchange-value, the time of measure) was, as Marx puts it, 
‘established by a social process that goes on behind the backs of the producers’77; and thus (2) 
‘time-as-measure’ was determined by the domain external to production: the domain of use-
value. In this sense, use-value was the external catalyst that made the time of exchange-value 
possible: ‘the measure of exchange-value is determined from outside…by temporal quantities 
founded on use-value.’78 However, with the advent of real, or ‘total’, subsumption, use-value 
is completely (i.e. non-dialectically) internalised and redefined by exchange-value, rendering 
different labours irreducible to ‘simple average labour’, and hence the time of measure a ‘pure 
and simple tautology’79, a time that, without an external standpoint from which it is measured, 
becomes its own measure. ‘Social labour’ is thus no longer intelligible in relation to the ‘social 
labour-time’ Marx presents us with, but becomes a form of labour wherein ‘the totality of life’ 
and ‘the totality of time from which this life is woven’ are indistinguishable.80 Time can no 
                                                          
74 Negri, ‘The Constitution of Time’, 42.  
75 The displacement of the labour theory of value is at the heart of Hardt and Negri’s well-known, and 
much maligned, ‘trilogy’: Empire (2000), Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire (2004), 
and Commonwealth (2009).  
76 This is simply a summary of the first section of the first chapter of ‘The Constitution of Time’, which 
Negri entitles ‘Time-as-measure and productive time’, but the fact is that this section grounds Negri’s 
broader critique of the labour theory of value. See Negri, ‘The Constitution of Time’, 23-9. 
77 Marx, Capital 1, 135. 
78 Negri, ‘The Constitution of Time’, 24. 
79 Ibid. 27. If ‘time-as-measure’ remains, it is only ‘in the flow between labour and time. A continuous 
time. A tautological time.’ Ibid. 
80 Ibid. 29. Negri’s work in this period paved the way for analyses of what has become variously known 
as ‘immaterial labour’, ‘cognitive capitalism’ and ‘affective labour’. See, for instance, Paolo Virno, 
‘General Intellect’, Historical Materialism 15:3 (2007), 3-8, as well as Carlo Vercellone, ‘From Formal 
Subsumption to General Intellect: Elements for a Marxist Reading of the Thesis of Cognitive 
Capitalism’, Historical Materialism 15:1 (2007), 13-36, which argues that Marx’s use of the expression 
‘general intellect’ marks a new historical stage of development ‘after’ formal and real subsumption. 
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longer be presented as measure, but ‘must rather be presented as the global phenomenological 
fabric, as base, substance and flow of production in its entirety.’81 The production-process of 
capital is now synonymous with the production of society as a whole, whereby the exploitation 
that the value-form previously expressed becomes ‘pure and simple command.’82  
This account of real subsumption and the end of labour-time as measure is, at least on 
Marx’s own terms, utterly confused. The notion that use-value constitutes a domain ‘external’ 
to production, and thereby the ‘external origin of the measure of time’83, points to the defining 
limit of Negri’s work: the complete lack of an analysis of commodification, specifically the 
complete lack of an analysis of the commodification of labour-power.84 This lack has the fatal 
effect of removing the dialectic of concrete and abstract labour, and hence the dialectic of the 
labour- and valorisation-process, from his analysis. And this dovetails with his attempt to yoke 
real subsumption to a stagist ‘before’/‘after’ framework. Taken to its logical conclusion, this 
reading of real subsumption has the peculiar quality of removing the dialectic of the labour- 
and valorisation-process from its purview, whilst at the same time announcing that, with the 
advent of real subsumption, this dialectic has come to its rational end, having been reduced to 
a non-dialectical tautology. This brings us back to the earlier cited passage from the ‘Fragment 
on Machines’. The reason why such attention is being paid to Negri’s reading of subsumption, 
why his critique of the labour theory of value has been detailed to the extent that is has, is that 
this reading and critique possess another peculiar quality: they effectively, and one might state 
self-consciously, express the idea that the automation at the heart of the production-process of 
capital is synonymous with the automatic expansion of capital. That is to say, Negri effectively 
                                                          
81 Negri, ‘The Constitution of Time’, 29. 
82 As Negri puts it the 1978 lectures: ‘…when the theory of value cannot measure itself by a quantity 
of labour-time or by an individual dimension of labour, when a first displacement leads it to confront 
social time and the collective dimension of labour, at this moment the impossibility of measuring 
exploitation modifies the form of exploitation. The emptiness that appears in the theory of value, the 
evacuation of any element of measure which is not a generic reference to social industriousness, the 
liberation of social industriousness and its constitution in collective individuality, does not suppress 
the law of value but reduces it to a mere formality. Of course, formality does not mean a lack of 
efficacy. Formality does not mean a lack of meaning. The form of the law of value is, on the contrary, 
efficient and full of meaning, but efficacy and meaning are given to it only by its irrationality, by the 
end of the progressive and rationalising function of exploitation. The form is the empty, miserable base 
of exploitation. The form of value is pure and simple command, the pure and simple form of politics – 
of the “essential inessentiality”, as the young Marx would say in Hegelian terms. We are here at the 
culminating point of a process in which the power relations – rationally established – regulated and 
included within the development of capital – are reversed. Where the relation of rationality inverts 
itself. The inversion is total.’ Negri, Marx Beyond Marx, 147-48. 
83 Negri, ‘The Constitution of Time’, 27. 
84 The ‘use-value of labour-power’ features in the translator’s – Matteo Mandarini’s – introduction to 
‘The Constitution of Time’, but it is nowhere to be found in Negri’s work itself. See Negri, Time for 
Revolution, 11. Mandarini reproduces Negri’s basic misunderstanding of labour-power when he claims 
that ‘the labour theory of value demanded that labour-power existed, in some sense, outside capital 
(outside its disciplinary regime) and needed to be drawn in.’ Ibid. 
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claims that, because of real subsumption, the production-process of capital is in-itself and as 
such automatic. Capital expands of its own accord: the production and reproduction of capital 
is wholly self-sufficient.85 In Negri’s world, this does not remove antagonism and exploitation 
from the picture (indeed, it intensifies them86), but it does dictate that they no longer bear any 
rational relation to the commodification of labour-power. On Negri’s terms, the function of 
this commodification is pure irrationality; its function is – at best – an ‘empty, miserable base 
of exploitation.’87 (If Negri removes the dialectic of the labour- and valorisation-process from 
his analysis in order to announce its rational end (chronologically), and thus its irrational end 
(teleologically), this is because he has already made this move with the commodification of 
labour-power). And yet what Negri’s account obscures is that, for Marx, the commodification 
of labour-power not only makes real subsumption, and thus automation within the production-
process, possible, but dictates that real subsumption remains bound to the production-process 
(it does not extend to ‘society’ writ large). What this account obscures is that, for Marx, after 
Hegel, automation is an appearance [Erscheinung], the necessary appearance of an ‘essential 
relation’ between necessary and surplus-labour (an essential relation underwritten by the real 
subsumption of labour under capital and the production of relative surplus-value). As such an 
appearance (as opposed to a mere illusion [Schein]), automation simultaneously (1) expresses 
the fact that, consequent to the commodification of labour-power and the real subsumption of 
labour, there is an inversion of subject and object, that machinery does displace the human as 
the subject of the production-process, thereby re-transforming this process into an ‘automatic 
system’; but it equally (2) conceals the fact that ‘surplus-value does not arise from the labour-
power that has been replaced by the machinery, but from the labour-power actually employed 
in working with the machinery.’88 In other words, automation is real, the machine is perpetual 
motion (so long as it is turned on and functioning properly), and, at the same time, automation 
is an illusion, because it generates the (false) appearance that the production of surplus-value 
is itself automatic, as if this production were not dependent on the commodification, and hence 
use, of labour-power. In opposition to Negri, the essential point here is that real subsumption 
constitutes the incessant entrenchment of labour-time’s function as the measure of value, not 
its displacement, and that this is directly tied to real subsumption transforming capital into an 
                                                          
85 In Negri’s words: ‘This transcendental of the society of real subsumption is the transformation of 
Prometheus into Narcissus, the ideal of the complete self-sufficiency of the schema of production and 
of automatic functioning. Ecstasy.’ Negri, ‘The Constitution of Time’, 48. 
86 For Negri, ‘the first result produced by the logic of separation is to displace the relationship necessary 
labour/surplus labour to…the level of the capacity of capital to subsume society, and to transform the 
relation between two complete, opposed subjectivities that are hostile to the point of destroying each 
other reciprocally.’ Negri, Marx Beyond Marx, 145. 
87 Ibid. 148. 
88 Marx, Capital 1, 530. ‘Machinery…creates no new value.’ Ibid. 509. 
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‘automatic subject’89 [ein automatisches Subjekt] (a necessary dimension of capital’s function 
as the ‘comprehensive subject’ of capitalism). Thus inasmuch as Marx, drawing on Goethe’s 
Faust, suggests that capital acts ‘as if consumed by love’90, that the valorisation-process is an 
‘animated monster’ that works ‘as if its body were by love possessed’91, we must never lose 
sight of the fact that automation only exists because of the commodification of labour-power. 
Automation is an actual appearance of this commodification, an animation whose self-motion 
appears because real subsumption is its animator.  
This is important, because it provides us with a new framework whereby capital can be 
presented as the condition of thinking the materialist concept of history. Specifically, Marx’s 
critical appropriation of the Doctrine of Essence in Hegel’s Logic – his critical appropriation 
of the essence/appearance [Wesen/Erscheinung] relation in Hegel – allows us to formulate the 
following (speculative) proposition: ‘history’ can be thought of as something which, in itself 
and as such, is ‘in motion’, ‘moves on’, ‘expands’, etc., precisely because capital’s production 
of the ‘essential relation’ between necessary and surplus-labour – the production of surplus-
value – appears as automatic. Or, to put this another way, the expansion of human needs, and 
the expansion of productive forces corresponding to the expansion of human needs, can only 
be thought of as ‘history’ because (1) the expansion of human needs is subsumed by capital’s 
need to self-expand, and (2) capital’s self-expansion appears as automatic. This is the context 
in which Marx’s work intersects in interesting ways with Koselleck’s, such that the former 
potentially provides the latter with the material basis necessary to sustain the historiographic-
semantic findings of Koselleck’s Future’s Past. More precisely, this is the possibility that real 
subsumption and the production of relative surplus-value constitute the historical-ontological 
ground of the emergence, in the mid-18th century, of ‘Neuzeit’ – the distinctly modern or ‘new 
time’ that registers, as David Cunningham expresses it, summarising Koselleck, an ‘“epochal 
threshold” [in which] history itself, in the collective singular, comes to be first perceived as 
“in motion” – a perception that Koselleck locates in a divergence between the “space of 
experience” and the “horizon of expectation”.’92 The suggestion here is thus this: what else is 
Neuzeit but the historical time fostered by the production of relative surplus-value? What else 
is Neuzeit but the self-expanding time of capital, a time that is perceived as ‘in motion’ because 
the production of surplus-value appears as self-expanding? This is what an encounter between 
Marx and Koselleck might yield. Our working proposition that the intelligibility of ‘history’ 
                                                          
89 Ibid. 255. 
90 Ibid. 1007. 
91 Ibid. 302 (see also Marx, Grundrisse, 704). 
92 David Cunningham, ‘A Marxist heresy? Accelerationism and its discontents’, Radical Philosophy 
191 (May/June 2015), 29.  
164 
 
relies on the automatic character of the production-process of capital might also function as a 
corrective to the predominant standpoint of ‘Systematic Dialectics’ which, as Chapter 3 points 
out, systematically excludes history and historical time from the domain of Marx’s systematic 
dialectic. Specifically, it might contribute to the sense in which, as some of the scholarship in 
this field has already argued93, Marx’s appropriation of Hegel’s Essence-Logic marks the most 
consequential homology between Capital and the Logic. This critical appropriation, this thesis 
maintains, allows us to grasp the fundamental historical intelligibility of passages such as the 
following, which, like the previous passage, is contained within the ‘Fragment on Machines’ 
in the Grundrisse: 
 
In machinery, objectified labour itself appears not only in the form of the product or 
of the product employed as means of labour, but in the form of the force of production 
itself…the accumulation of knowledge and of skill, of the general productive forces 
of the social brain [des gesellschaftlichen Gehirns], is thus absorbed into capital, as 
opposed to labour, and hence appears as an attribute of capital, and more specifically 
of fixed capital, insofar as it enters into the production-process as a means of 
production proper…in machinery, knowledge appears as alien, external to him; and 
living labour [as] subsumed under self-activating objectified labour. The worker 
appears as superfluous to the extent that his action is not determined by the needs of 
capital [die Bedürfnisse des Kapitals].94  
 
 
Like its earlier cited counterpart, this passage allows us to grasp the essential relation between 
the self-expansion of capital and the materialist concept of history, epitomised by the assertion 
that ‘self-activating objectified labour’ appears as ‘the force of production itself’. Yet of equal 
importance here, and what we will examine now, is something that, in addition to automation 
(although indissociable from it), constitutes another dimension of the valorisation-process and 
real subsumption, thus something that, along with automation, secures capital as the condition 
of thinking history. This feature is alienation.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
93 See, in particular, Tony Smith, ‘Hegel, Marx and the Comprehension of Capitalism’, and Riccardo 
Bellofiore, ‘Lost in Translation: Once Again on the Marx–Hegel Connection’, both of which appear in 
Marx’s Capital and Hegel’s Logic: A Reexamination, ed. Fred Moseley and Tony Smith. 
94 Marx, Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie, 594-95 (Grundrisse, 694-95). The ‘social 
brain’ in this passage dovetails with the physiological dimension of Marx’s concept of abstract labour 
highlighted in the previous chapter.  
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4.1.3    Alienation 
The alienation [Entäußerung] and estrangement [Entfremdung]95 of human life is of course a 
defining feature of Marx’s entire oeuvre. In Marx’s earlier writings, it is the 1844 Manuscripts, 
not The German Ideology, that makes up the primary locus of Marx’s analysis of the alienation 
of human labour and thus the explicit locus of Marx’s appropriation of the philosophical status 
of alienation in Hegel. In the 1844 Manuscripts, Marx transforms the self-externalisation and 
objectification of consciousness in the Phenomenology of Spirit into an existential and moral 
critique of the law of political economy, the law of ‘national economy’ [Nationalökonomie], 
a law that dictates – above all – that the means of production, and thus the means of life, are 
private property. This is the context of Marx’s renowned, fourfold specification of alienation 
as: (1) the alienation of the worker from the product of his labour (‘the object which labour 
produces – its product – stands opposed to it as an alien being, as a power independent of the 
producer’96); (2) the alienation of the labour-process itself, which is to say the ‘self-activity of 
the worker’ (‘production itself must be active alienation, the alienation of activity, the activity 
of alienation’97); (3) after Feuerbach, the alienation of the worker as a human being and thus 
as a genus-being [Gattungswesen] (‘estranged labour…turns humanity’s genus-being…into a 
being alien to it, into a means of individual existence’98); and (4) the alienation of one worker 
from another, one individual human being from another (‘an immediate consequence of men 
and women’s estrangement from the product of their labour, their life activity, their generic-
being, is the estrangement of men and women from other men and women’99).  
Alienation does not feature in the first chapter of this thesis, and for a very basic reason: 
unlike the concepts of labour, need and productive force, and a certain conception of class and 
the division of labour, alienation is not something that Marx presents in transhistorical terms. 
In short, alienation and estrangement exist for Marx because they are capitalist alienation and 
capitalist estrangement. This is apparent in the 1844 Manuscripts (which is essentially Marx’s 
‘Hegelianisation’ of Engels’s 1843 Outlines of a Critique of Political Economy), wherein the 
analysis of alienation is explicitly presented from the standpoint of capitalist private property, 
                                                          
95 Marx’s use of the terms Entäußerung and Entfremdung reflects Hegel’s complex philosophical 
response to the English word ‘alienation’. Strictly speaking, Entäußerung means ‘externalisation’, and 
hence does not capture the entire scope of ‘alienation’ in English [from the Latin alius (other, another) 
and alienus (alien, foreign, and belonging to someone else)]. Hence despite the fact that Entäußerung 
is commonly translated as ‘alienation’, one should keep in mind that this translation relies on the ‘alien’ 
[fremd] within Entfremdung for its intelligibility.  
96 Marx, OPM, 511 (EPM, 108). 
97 Marx, EPM, 110. 
98 Marx, OPM, 517 (EPM, 114). 
99 Marx, EPM, 114. 
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which is to say the standpoint of the ‘economic fact of the present.’100 For our purposes, we 
must consider the alienation generated by the production-process of capital, or more precisely 
the alienation created by the subsumption of the labour-process under the valorisation-process. 
This alienation is vital, because like the automation with which it is intertwined, it constitutes 
an essential standpoint of the intelligibility of history. In other words, the notion, as previously 
proposed, that the form of appearance of the production of relative surplus-value (automation) 
makes possible the idea that ‘history’ is something which, in itself and as such, is in motion, 
moves on and expands, must be supplemented by the idea that alienation, as the manifestation 
of the fact that surplus-value is produced by and with private property, constitutes an additional 
standpoint without which ‘history’ cannot be thought. This is the notion that ‘history’ not only 
stands outside of and opposed to human beings – that it is indifferent to them – but also, and 
as a consequence, that history is a force that independently determines and governs them. To 
express this notion through Marx’s words, consider this description of the valorisation-process 
in the Grundrisse:  
 
the combination of…labour appears just as subservient to and led by an alien will and 
an alien intelligence – having its animating unity elsewhere – as its material unity 
appears subordinate to the objective unity of…machinery, of fixed capital, which, as 
animated monster, objectifies the scientific idea, and is in fact the coordinator, does 
not in any way relate to the individual worker as his instrument; but rather he himself 
exists as an animated individual punctuation mark; as its living isolated accessory...101 
 
 
in conjunction with this passage in The German Ideology, in which the ‘social power’ being 
characterised here could very well be understood as history itself: 
 
 
The social power, i.e. the multiplied productive force, that arises with the cooperation 
of different individuals as it is determined by the division of labour, appears to these 
individuals, since their cooperation is not voluntary but has come about naturally, not 
as their own united power, but as an alien force existing outside them, of the origin 
and goal of which they are ignorant, which they thus cannot control, which on the 
contrary passes through a peculiar series of phases and stages independent of the will 
and the action of men and women, nay even being the prime governor of these.102 
 
                                                          
100 Ibid. 107. 
101 Marx, Grundrisse, 470. 
102 Marx and Engels, DI, 34 (GI, 54). 
167 
 
Take note of Marx and Engels’s deliberate use of a fetishised conception of nature in the latter 
passage; this conception is essential to the idea that Marx’s analysis of the production-process 
of capital allows the basic relationship between alienation and history to come to light. If, after 
The German Ideology, the human is a natural-historical being and nature is a human-historical 
means of life, what Marx’s analysis of the valorisation-process and real subsumption reveals 
is not that the capitalist division of labour and private property (The German Ideology depicts 
these as ‘identical expressions’103) render nature and history as ‘unnatural’ and ‘unhistorical’, 
such that alienation has ‘taken away’ the previously rich totality of human powers and needs, 
that alienation has fractured what in human beings was previously whole. Rather, the situation 
is more complex than this. On the one hand, the division of labour and private property which 
constitute, and are constituted by, real subsumption register the sense in which human powers 
and needs are separated off from human beings, inasmuch as these powers and needs are not 
possessed and actualised by individuals. In this regard:  
 
 
The division of labour is the economic expression of the social character of labour 
within…estrangement. Or, since labour is only an expression of human activity within 
alienation, of the living of life as the estrangement of life, the division of labour…is 
therefore nothing else but the estranged, alienated positioning of human activity as a 
real activity of the genus or as the activity of men and women as genus-beings.104 
 
This passage should be retroactively read from the standpoint of Marx’s examination of real 
subsumption from the early 1860s onwards, since this is the only way in which the specifically 
capitalist division of labour can be understood as constitutive of a conception of ‘history’ (and 
‘nature’) as a productive force in its own right – independent and divorced from individuals – 
wherein, as previously cited, ‘knowledge appears as alien, external’ to workers. Thus ‘history’ 
exists because the expansion of human needs is predominantly not actualised within, and thus 
not possessed by, the majority of human beings. However, and on the other hand, this grasp 
of alienation needs to be reconciled with the sense in which, albeit through alienated property 
relations, human powers and needs are actively developed by capital within human beings, in 
that these powers and needs are possessed and actualised by individuals: 
 
                                                          
103 Marx and Engels, GI, 53. They state: ‘in the one the same thing is affirmed with reference to activity 
as is affirmed in the other with reference to the product of the activity.’ Ibid. 
104 Marx, OPM, 557 (EPM, 159). 
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…[capital] creates the material elements for the development of the rich individuality, 
which is as all-sided in its production as in its consumption, and whose labour also 
therefore appears no longer as labour, but as the full development of activity itself, in 
which natural necessity in its immediate form has disappeared; because a historically 
created need has taken the place of a natural need. This is why capital is productive; 
i.e. an essential relation for the development of the social productive forces.105 
 
There is a distinct tension in Marx – from the Grundrisse onwards – between two discourses: 
alienation both is and is not the separation and dispossession of the human from the expansion 
of its needs. Yet this tension is precisely that through which we must comprehend the relation 
between alienation and the materialist concept of history. These discourses are dialectically 
bound to one another: if there was no development of these needs and powers by capital there 
would be no possibility of their active reappropriation (no possibility, that is, of communism). 
This tension – dialectic – cuts to the heart of the meaning of the ‘social individual’ in Marx 
(which, as Chapter 2 argues, Mészáros does not grasp): the notion of history as the ‘expansion 
of productive forces’ is predicated on the existence of a mode of production in which, ‘on the 
one hand, we have a totality of productive forces, which have…taken on a material form and 
are for the individuals no longer the forces of the individuals but of private property, and hence 
of the individuals only insofar as they are owners of private property themselves’106 (that is, 
only insofar as labour-power is commodified); and in which, on the other hand, the productive 
powers of social individuals are being actively developed by capital in the production-process 
(indeed in capitalist society more generally). This tension and dialectic are complicated further 
by Capital, such that the deeply structuralist dimension of human beings as the ‘bearers’ and 
‘personifications’ of alienated social relations simultaneously registers the distance of human 
beings from the structures that they personify, to the point where they are overdetermined by 
these structures, and yet – at the same time – these human beings are these structures. In other 
words, ‘the capitalist’ may just be the personification of capital, but he is no less an individual 
because of this, just as ‘the worker’ may be the personification of ‘variable capital’, but he is 
likewise no less an individual because of this.  
We are now at the point where the constitutive place of class and class struggle107 must 
be reassessed in relation to Marx’s philosophical concept of history. Chapter 1 briefly raises 
                                                          
105 Marx, Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie, 244 (Grundrisse, 325).  
106 Marx and Engels, GI, 92. 
107 These two terms should be understood synonymously. In Marx, ‘class’ is not a static category which 
is subsequently put into motion through struggle. ‘Class’ is already always class struggle, which is to 
say that, so long as classes exist, they only ever exist through struggle. To rearticulate the relationship 
between needs and the means of their satisfaction in Chapter 1, there is no chronological succession 
here: one moment (the existence of a class) is not subsequently followed by another (the struggle of 
this class).  
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the question of whether category of ‘class’ can, on some level, be grasped in transhistorical 
terms, and suggests that whereas something like ‘the differentiation and grouping of humans 
in relation to the surplus product’ might be understood as transhistorically valid (that is, in all 
human history up to the present), classes and the struggles they constitute cannot, in the last 
instance, and as much as some Marxists would reject this, be comprehended as ontologically 
originary in the same way that labour and need can and must. Class and the division of labour 
are ontologically ‘down the line’ from labour and need, such that class and class struggle can 
only be logically comprehended as a ‘motive force’ or ‘engine’ of history after needs and the 
labours which satisfy these needs have been established as the basic intelligibility of history.108 
However, once capital is established as the condition of thinking history (once abstract labour 
becomes the condition of thinking ‘labour in general’ and once capital’s need to self-expand 
becomes the condition of thinking the expansion of human needs), class takes on a constitutive 
function that previously – at a transhistorical level – was impossible for us to justify. This is 
because the formation of classes specific to capitalism – the formation of classes not just from 
the ownership of the means of producing life, but from the exclusive ownership of these means 
by one class as against another – is a material basis without which alienation and estrangement, 
and hence ‘history’, would not exist. The non-ownership of all facets of the labour-process 
(the activity, means and products of labour) by the producers is, in other words, a direct 
condition of thinking history. The specifically capitalist aspect of this is crucial. If, as The 
German Ideology contends, there is (to date) no consciousness in isolation from the originary 
division between spiritual and material labour, which is to say in isolation from the existence 
of a ruling class, Marx’s analysis of the subsumption of the labour-process by the valorisation-
process implicitly reworks this, and reveals that there is (to date) no historical consciousness, 
no consciousness of history in itself and as such, in isolation from the division of labour and 
consequent creation of classes within capitalism. Hence when Balibar states, as earlier cited, 
that ‘Marx…[extends] the scheme of the division of labour to its fullest extent…’ whereby he 
‘accord[s] existence to classes on the dual plane of the division of labour and consciousness, 
and therefore also [makes]…the division of society into classes a condition or a structure of 
thought’109, we must specify this and declare that only the capitalist division of society into 
classes gives the thought of ‘history’ its possibility. If for Marx and Engels class ‘achieves an 
                                                          
108 The essential point here is that if, famously, ‘the history of all hitherto existing society is the history 
of class struggles’, this proclamation can only be sustained after the needs of capital, or more precisely, 
after the real subsumption of the labour-process under capital, has been established as the condition of 
thinking ‘the history of all hitherto existing society’. See Marx and Engels, Manifesto of the Communist 
Party, 34. The historical importance of class struggle is not thereby diminished: it is simply given its 
ontological and epistemological basis. 
109 Balibar, The Philosophy of Marx, 46, 44.  
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independent existence over against…individuals,’ and if these individuals ‘become subsumed 
under it [class],’110 this must be understood as an essential condition of history, in both thought 
and actual existence. Yet this condition is only valid from the standpoint of the subsumption 
of the labour-process (individuals) under the valorisation-process (‘class’, a category whose 
intelligibility relies on abstract labour).111  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
110 Marx and Engels, GI, 82. 
111 Like ‘labour in general’, the category of ‘class’ is the creation of abstract labour and the valorisation-
process, for how else is the surplus product yielded by ‘surplus-labour’, in capitalism or any other mode 
of production, imaginable in isolation from abstract labour and the valorisation-process? This dovetails 
with, even as it is not the immediate context of, Marx and Engels’s assertion in The German Ideology 
that ‘the emergence of the class…is itself a product of the bourgeoisie.’ Ibid. 84. This does not mean 
that the separation of the means of production from the producers is not a condition of abstract labour 
and the valorisation-process, but it does mean that the latter are the condition of thinking the former as 
constitutive of ‘classes’.  
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4.1.4    So-called Originary Accumulation 
Automation and alienation form the two axes around which the production-process of capital 
can be established as the condition of thinking the materialist concept of history. Nevertheless, 
this chapter would be incomplete without an examination of so-called originary accumulation 
[die sogenannte ursprüngliche Akkumulation]112, the final part of the first volume of Capital. 
Marx’s concept of originary accumulation is a direct, critical response to the place of ‘previous 
accumulation’ in political economy – above all Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations113 – but it is 
also, and more fundamentally, a confrontation with the seemingly circular logic that structures 
the production-process of capital; namely: ‘the accumulation of capital presupposes surplus-
value; surplus-value presupposes capitalist production; capitalist production presupposes the 
availability of considerable masses of capital and labour-power in the hands of commodity 
producers’114, which is to say the accumulation of capital. At the basis of this presuppositional 
circle – that which enables this apparently seamless circularity to exist and which, and as we 
will see, is erased from it – is the originary accumulation of capital. In mocking opposition to 
the ‘insipid childishness’115 of the morality tale which political economy tells itself – e.g. that 
capitalism sprung from the difference between, on the one hand, the ‘frugal elite’ and, on the 
other, the ‘lazy rascals’ who squandered their money in ‘riotous living’– Marx presents his 
readers with a systematic account of originary accumulation, one which registers the fact that, 
                                                          
112 ‘Primitive accumulation’ is of course the predominant English language translation of ursprüngliche 
Akkumulation. In contrast to this, this thesis argues that ‘originary’ is a better rendition of ursprüngliche 
than ‘primitive’, first and foremost because ‘primitive accumulation’ conjures up, as Osborne suggests, 
‘a nineteenth-century anthropological imagery, which would consign the process to a past time; or at 
least, identifies its methods with those of pre-history.’ How to Read Marx, 104-5. As Osborne notes, 
‘primitive accumulation’ obscures the contribution that Marx’s ursprüngliche Akkumulation makes to 
the concept of the origin – the Ursprung – in the German philosophical tradition more generally. Ibid. 
105. Thus originary accumulation might be grasped as constitutive of a kind of ‘originary temporality’, 
in ways that converge with and radically depart from Heidegger’s use of the term. Finally, ‘originary’ 
is preferable to ‘original’, because the former registers the ongoing constitutive function of originary 
accumulation, and hence the sense in which, as we will see, capital cannot exist without it.  
113 Without doubt, Michael Perelman’s The Invention of Capitalism: Classical Political Economy and 
the Secret History of Primitive Accumulation (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000) is the preeminent 
investigation of political economy’s simultaneous support and dismissal of originary accumulation. 
The ‘so-called’ within ‘so-called originary accumulation’ registers Marx’s direct response to political 
economy, but it also, this thesis suggests, can be extended to the permanence of originary accumulation 
within capitalism. 
114 Marx, Capital 1, 873.  
115 Ibid. After Jason Read, this tale is ‘the idealized memory of an individual capitalist’s accumulation.’ 
Jason Read, ‘Primitive Accumulation: the Aleatory Foundation of Capitalism’, Rethinking Marxism 
14:2 (Summer 2002), 27. As Read points out, this is the context of Balibar’s comment that ‘the analysis 
of primitive accumulation thus brings us into the presence of the radical absence of memory which 
characterises history (memory being only the reflection of history in certain pre-determined sites – 
ideology or even law – and as such, anything but a faithful reflection).’ Balibar, ‘Elements for a Theory 
of Transition’, 283. 
172 
 
‘in actual history, …conquest, enslavement, robbery, murder, in short, violence [Gewalt], play 
the greatest part.’116 He summarises this accumulation in the following terms:  
 
The process, therefore, that creates the capital-relation can be nothing other than the 
process that separates the worker from the ownership of the conditions of his own 
labour; it is a process that operates two transformations, whereby the social means of 
life and production are turned into capital, and the immediate producers are turned into 
wage-labourers. So-called originary accumulation, therefore, is nothing else than the 
historical process of separating the producer from the means of production. It appears 
as “originary” [Er erscheint als „ursprünglich“] because it constitutes the pre-history 
[Vorgeschichte] of capital, and of the mode of production corresponding to capital.117 
 
 
Marx’s concept of originary accumulation brings to centre stage, as some commentators have 
convincingly argued118, a – if not the – essential logic underlying the accumulation of capital: 
the logic of separation [Scheidung]. This separation (between the producer and the conditions 
of production, thus between the wage-labourer and the capitalist) constitutes, as Marx puts it 
across his work, ‘the actual formation-process of capital [den eigentlichen Bildungsprozeß des 
Kapitals]’119 and ‘the concept of capital.’120  
 The conventional – although increasingly less so – reading of originary accumulation 
understands this concept within the terms of historical periodisation, which is to say that this 
accumulation is read as a chronologically distinct span of historical time that, centuries ago, 
gave rise to capitalism. Quite similar to the conception of formal subsumption as historically 
‘preceding’ real subsumption, originary accumulation is, on this reading, not just a category 
of historical periodisation but a category of historical transition: it encompasses (15th – 18th 
century England being the archetype) the period of transition from feudalism to capitalism, 
and therefore more or less ‘ends’ after capitalism established itself on the world stage.121 This 
                                                          
116 Marx, Kapital 1, 742 (Capital 1, 874).  
117 Marx, Kapital 1, 742 (Capital 1, 874-75). ‘This historical act is the historical genesis of capital, the 
historical process of separation which transforms the conditions of labour into capital and labour into 
wage-labour. This provides the basis for capitalist production.’ Marx, Theories of Surplus-Value, Part 
3, 315. 
118 See, in particular, Massimo De Angelis, ‘Marx and primitive accumulation: The continuous 
character of capital’s “enclosures”’, The Commoner, Volume 2 (September 2001), 
http://www.commoner.org.uk/02deangelis.pdf (accessed 21 May 2015), and Werner Bonefeld, ‘The 
Permanence of Primitive Accumulation: Commodity Fetishism and Social Constitution’, The 
Commoner, Volume 2 (September 2001), http://www.commoner.org.uk/02bonefeld.pdf (accessed 21 
May 2015).  
119 Marx, Theorien über den Mehrwert, Dritter Teil, 414 (Theories of Surplus-Value, Part 3, 422). 
120 Marx, Capital 3, 354. See also Marx, Theories of Surplus-Value, Part 3, 311. 
121 This is, at least at the level of the ‘diachronic analysis’, the framework of Balibar’s ‘Elements for a 
Theory of Transition’. 
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reading consequently highlights the empirical histories that Marx provides in the final chapters 
of the first volume of Capital: particularly the expropriation of the agricultural peasantry from 
the land they cultivated and collectively owned (and the acts of Parliament which sanctioned 
this expropriation), the manifold development of the state and the mechanisms through which 
it wields power122, and, outside the confines of the European nation-state, the global reach of 
colonial accumulation and imperialist war.123 As De Angelis shows, Lenin’s The Development 
of Capitalism in Russia (1899) arguably inaugurates this reading as the predominant reading 
of originary accumulation, which is subsequently appropriated in different manners by Rosa 
Luxemburg’s The Accumulation of Capital (1913) and the infamous ‘Dobb-Sweezy debates’ 
on the transition from feudalism to capitalism.124 These readings are not at all surprising, nor 
are they necessarily without merit, insofar as they are faithful to Marx’s position that originary 
accumulation ‘precedes capitalist accumulation’, that it ‘is not the result of the capitalist mode 
of production but its point of departure.’125  
 Yet there is undeniably something – something quite significant – which is lost by this 
reading of originary accumulation. What is lost (and this is increasingly a point of emphasis, 
if not consensus, in the secondary literature) are the various dimensions of the continuous, in 
fact the permanent, character of originary accumulation within capitalism, such that originary 
accumulation is a necessarily ongoing feature of the capitalist mode of production. And this 
is not – or at least not primarily – an empirical point, which is to say a point about the ongoing 
introduction and expansion of capital into parts of the world (China being the contemporary 
exemplar) previously outside, if only ever relatively, the reach of capital. Although important, 
this point merely reproduces the conception that ‘originary accumulation’ is a chronologically 
                                                          
122 Marx’s analysis of the credit-system, the modern system of taxation, and the political economic 
function of debt is notable: ‘the national debt, i.e. the alienation [Veräußerung] of the state – whether 
that state is despotic, constitutional or republican – marked the capitalist era with its stamp. The only 
part of the so-called national wealth that actually enters into the collective possession of a modern 
nation is – the national debt.’ Marx, Capital 1, 919. If there is a ‘subject’ of originary accumulation, it 
is the state, not capital. To my knowledge, there is to date no work that looks at the capital-state relation 
from the standpoint of the relation between capitalist and originary accumulation.  
123 ‘The discovery of gold and silver in America, the extermination, enslavement and entombment in 
mines of the indigenous population of that continent, the beginnings of the conquest and plunder of 
India, and the conversion of Africa into a preserve for the commercial hunting of blackskins, are all 
things which signify the dawn of capitalist production. These idyllic processes are the chief moments 
of originary accumulation.’ Marx, Kapital 1, 779 (Capital 1, 915). 
124 De Angelis, ‘Marx and primitive accumulation: The continuous character of capital’s “enclosures”’, 
2-4. The standard conception of originary accumulation still exercises a fair amount of influence. For 
instance, in his recent review of Oskar Negt and Alexander Kluge’s Geschichte und Eigensinn (1981) 
(translated in 2014 as ‘History and Obstinacy’), Stewart Martin questions Negt and Kluge’s declaration 
that ‘primitive accumulation not only stands at the beginning of modern human development, but also 
permanently renews itself in every moment.’ See Stewart Martin, ‘Political economy of life: Negt and 
Kluge’s History and Obstinacy’, Radical Philosophy 190 (March/April 2015), 33. 
125 Marx, Capital 1, 873. 
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distinct span of historical time, and thus a ‘one-off act’ (no matter when, where, nor how long 
this act lasts, and despite the fact that it contains innumerable singular acts within itself). The 
point, rather, is one which must be understood at the level of ‘capital in general’ or ‘universal 
capital’ (which, to be sure, dialectically manifests itself through singular capitals): this is the 
sense in which originary accumulation stands in an ontologically, and thus logically, necessary 
relationship to capitalist accumulation (‘proper’126), such that originary accumulation marks 
an essential and constantly reproduced foundation of the systematic dialectic (and thus, as we 
will soon consider, the historical dialectic) expressed by Marx’s concept of ‘capital’. The crux 
of the issue here, as earlier alluded to, is the separation (between the producer and the means 
of production, and between the wage-labourer and the capitalist) without which there can be 
no commodification of labour-power, and thus no production-process of capital. There are a 
number of passages across Marx’s work that reveal the sense in which capitalist accumulation 
ontologically and logically relies on originary accumulation.127 In the third volume of Capital, 
as part and parcel of his analysis of the centralisation of capital, whereby big capital ‘swallows 
up’ – it ‘decapitalises’ – small capital, Marx contends that ‘this is simply the separation of the 
conditions of labour from the producers raised to a higher power.’128 In the third volume of 
the Theories of Surplus-Value (the 1861-63 Manuscripts), he depicts capitalist accumulation 
– the ‘accumulation of capital on the basis of capital itself’ – as ‘[reproducing] the separation 
and the independent existence of objective wealth [gegenständlichen Reichtums] as against 
labour on an ever expanding scale’, such that capitalist accumulation ‘merely presents as a 
                                                          
126 The difference between originary accumulation and capitalist accumulation (the latter is frequently 
labelled as ‘mature accumulation’ or ‘accumulation proper’) must be maintained, so as not to conflate 
these concepts in Marx, who on a number of occasions explicitly differentiates them: ‘It is indeed this 
separation between the conditions of labour, on the one hand, and the producers, on the other, that 
forms the concept of capital, as this arises with originary accumulation…subsequently appearing as a 
constant process in the accumulation and concentration of capital, before it is finally expressed…as the 
centralisation of capitals already existing in few hands, and the decapitalisation of many.’ See Marx, 
Kapital 3, 256 (Capital 3, 354-55). Commenting on this passage, De Angelis suggests that ‘while 
sharing the same principle – separation – the two concepts point at two different conditions of 
existence. [Originary accumulation] implies the ex novo production of the separation, while [capitalist 
accumulation] implies the reproduction – on a greater scale – of the same separation.’ Massimo De 
Angelis, ‘Marx and primitive accumulation: The continuous character of capital’s “enclosures”’, 8. 
Thus even as, strictly speaking, ‘originary accumulation’ is the originary accumulation of capital, such 
that it is, at a certain level, misleading to suggest that it is not a kind of ‘capitalist’ accumulation 
(particularly since capitalist accumulation (proper) creates the conditions, as we will see, whereby 
originary accumulation is constantly reproduced), it is necessary, on another level, to differentiate these 
two accumulations. Only one – capitalist accumulation – actually creates surplus-value, whereas the 
other is the condition of possibility for this. Likewise, capital is the subject of capitalist accumulation, 
whereas it is not the subject of (its) originary accumulation (the state is).  
127 I am indebted to De Angelis for the passages cited here, specifically section 3.2 of his ‘Marx and 
primitive accumulation: The continuous character of capital’s “enclosures”’: ‘Separation and the secret 
of (primitive) accumulation’.  
128 Marx, Kapital 3, 256 (Capital 3, 354). 
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continuous process what in originary accumulation appears as a distinct historical process.’129 
And finally, in the Grundrisse, he suggests that ‘once this separation is given, the production-
process can only produce it anew, reproduce it, and reproduce it on an expanded scale.’130 
These passages trigger De Angelis’s statement that ‘the difference between accumulation and 
primitive accumulation, not being a substantive one, is a difference in the conditions and forms 
in which this separation is implemented.’131 This argument has its limits – unlike originary 
accumulation, the substance of capitalist accumulation is far more complex, determined by a 
series of relations and dynamics irreducible to the separation of the means of production from 
the producers – but it is, nevertheless, a provocative way of framing the relationship between 
originary and capitalist accumulation. On one (albeit a restricted) level, we might assert that 
the only difference between these two accumulations is the social conditions and forms under 
which separation is enforced (be it a gun, for instance, or a handshake). 
 Originary and capitalist accumulation cannot be conflated with one another,132 but this 
should not distract our attention from the extent to which these are densely interwoven, and 
therefore indissociable, social processes. Bonefeld’s work argues this point consistently and 
persuasively.133 It underscores originary accumulation as a ‘permanently’ and ‘constantly’ 
reproduced accumulation which is, variously, ‘the condition and presupposition of capital’s 
existence’, ‘the foundation of…capitalist social relations and thus the social constitution 
through which the exploitation of labour subsists’, and ‘the presupposition of capital and the 
result of its reproduction.’134 ‘In short’, Bonefeld argues, ‘primitive accumulation is the social 
constitution of capitalist social relations.’135 There are two dimensions of his work which must 
be highlighted here, because they directly bear, as we will shortly consider, on the relationship 
between originary accumulation and the production of historical time. The first is Bonefeld’s 
use of Hegel’s concept of sublation [Aufhebung], the way in which he makes use of the three 
                                                          
129 Marx, Theorien über den Mehrwert, Dritter Teil, 309, 268 (Theories of Surplus-Value, Part 3, 315, 
272). 
130 Marx, Grundrisse, 462. 
131 De Angelis, ‘Marx and primitive accumulation: The continuous character of capital’s “enclosures”’, 
6. 
132 See footnote 126.  
133 With ‘The Permanence of Primitive Accumulation: Commodity Fetishism and Social Constitution’, 
see also Werner Bonefeld, ‘History and Social Constitution: Primitive Accumulation is not Primitive’, 
The Commoner, Debate 1 (March 2002), http://www.commoner.org.uk/debbonefeld01.pdf (accessed 
23 May 2015), Werner Bonefeld, ‘Class Struggle and the Permanence of Primitive Accumulation’, 
Common Sense 8 (November 1988), 54-66, and Werner Bonefeld, Critical Theory and the Critique of 
Political Economy: On Subversion and Negative Reason (London and New York: Bloomsbury 
Academic, 2014), specifically Chapter 4: ‘Capital and Labour: Primitive Accumulation and the Force 
of Value’. 
134 Bonefeld, ‘The Permanence of Primitive Accumulation: Commodity Fetishism and Social 
Constitution’, 1-2.  
135 Ibid. 2. 
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meanings sublation registers and which stand in contradiction to one another – (1) to raise/lift 
up, (2) to destroy/abolish, and (3) to preserve/maintain – so as to grasp the constitutive relation 
between originary and capitalist accumulation. Echoing Marx’s statement in the Grundrisse 
that ‘once developed historically, capital itself creates the conditions of its existence (not as 
conditions for its arising, but as results of its being)’136, Bonefeld maintains that the principle 
‘of primitive accumulation, i.e. separation, is aufgehoben in the social constitution of capitalist 
accumulation, and figures now no longer as its historical becoming but as the result of 
accumulation, a result that capital has to pose continuously to reproduce itself.’137 Therefore, 
the second dimension is that originary accumulation is constitutive of the commodity-form as 
the dominant social form within capitalism, and hence constitutive of the ‘fetish character’ of 
the commodity. It is in this context that Bonefeld writes:  
 
Primitive accumulation is the centrifugal point around which resolves the specific 
capitalist mode of existence of labour-power, the determination of human purposeful 
activity in the form of a labouring commodity. While the capitalist production and 
exchange relations subsist through the commodity-form, primitive accumulation is the 
secret history of the determination of human purposeful practice in the form of a wage-
labour commodity. The commodity-form subsists through this determination, 
presupposes it and, through its form, denies it in the name of abstract equality and 
freedom.138 
 
There is an indissociable relationship between ‘the secret’ [das Geheimnis] of the commodity-
form and that of originary accumulation. Originary accumulation is the historical-ontological 
condition of the fetish character of exchange-determined social relations, such that ‘the social 
relations between…private labours appear as what they are, i.e. not as direct social relations 
between persons at work, but as thing-like relations between persons and social relations 
between things.’139 That is to say, originary accumulation is the condition of the condition (the 
commodification of labour-power) without which relations between persons cannot appear as 
                                                          
136 Marx, Grundrisse, 459. 
137 Bonefeld, ‘History and Social Constitution: Primitive Accumulation is not Primitive’, 6. Thus ‘the 
notion that the essence of primitive accumulation is suspended [aufgehoben] in accumulation proper 
means that the principle of primitive accumulation, that is separation, is raised to a new level, rendering 
primitive accumulation as a specific epoch historically redundant. At the same time, its essential 
character is maintained as the constitutive presupposition of capital: separation.’ Ibid. 4. However, as 
we will consider shortly, the relationship between originary accumulation and the ‘historical becoming’ 
of the accumulation of capital cannot be restricted to the historical past (in its chronological register), 
because, as the constitutive basis of capital, originary accumulation is the ongoing constitutive basis of 
history as the ongoing self-expansion of time. 
138 Bonefeld, ‘The Permanence of Primitive Accumulation: Commodity Fetishism and Social 
Constitution’, 5. 
139 Marx, Kapital 1, 87 (Capital 1, 166). 
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relations between things. If this accumulation ‘is suspended in the commodity-form as its 
“subterranean” condition, constitutive presupposition, and historical basis’140, this is because 
it makes ‘social labour’ in capitalism possible. 
 Bonefeld’s work brings into relief a defining problem of the relation between originary 
and capitalist accumulation: namely, does the ‘permanence’ of originary accumulation refer 
to the principle of separation it first enacts, or – on top of this – originary accumulation itself? 
That is, consequent to the sublation of originary within capitalist accumulation, is it just the 
separation of labour from its means that is incessantly reproduced by capital, as capital’s own 
presupposition and result, or is originary accumulation itself also therefore reproduced? Is it 
possible to grasp originary accumulation – not just the separation it first engenders – as not 
simply the historical premise but the historical result of capitalist accumulation? In short, is 
originary accumulation itself an ongoing process?141 To answer this question affirmatively is 
to come into unavoidable conflict with Marx himself, who on multiple occasions – in Capital 
and elsewhere – makes assertions to the effect that originary accumulation ‘is not the result of 
the capitalist mode of production but its point of departure’142, that this accumulation ‘is the 
historical basis, instead of the historical result, of specifically capitalist production.’143 Marx 
should be critiqued here. Originary accumulation is not just continuous because the separation 
to which it gives rise ‘subsequently appear[s] as a constant process in the accumulation and 
concentration of capital’144, but also because, consequent to capitalist accumulation ‘proper’, 
human beings continue to be separated from the means of production in ways that cannot be 
secured by capitalist accumulation alone. At the crux of this issue is the difference and relation 
between a ‘capitalist’ and ‘non-capitalist’ labour-process. What is important to realise is that 
there is no linear progression here, no movement towards the ‘complete subsumption’ of what 
is ‘non-capitalist’ by what is ‘capitalist’. Rather, the vast majority – at least today – of ‘non-
capitalist’ labour-processes are in fact capitalist labour-processes that have been re-designated 
by capital as ‘non-capitalist’. In this way, the ongoing totalisation of capital is not just ongoing 
because the subsumption of countless labour-processes under the valorisation-process is in 
                                                          
140 Bonefeld, ‘The Permanence of Primitive Accumulation: Commodity Fetishism and Social 
Constitution’, 6. 
141 As Bonefeld conveys it: ‘primitive accumulation is a constantly reproduced accumulation, be it in 
terms of the renewed separation of new populations from the means of production and subsistence, or 
in terms of the reproduction of the wage relation in the “established” relations of capital’, such that, 
and as previously cited, originary accumulation ‘is the presupposition of capital and the result of its 
reproduction.’ Ibid. 1-2, emphasis added. Both Bonefeld and De Angelis point towards Samir Amin’s 
Accumulation on a World Scale: a Critique of the Theory of Underdevelopment (1974) as a pioneering 
work that explicitly presents originary accumulation itself as necessarily ongoing. 
142 Marx, Capital 1, 873. 
143 Ibid. 775. 
144 Marx, Capital 3, 355. 
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fact the manifold differentiation and expansion of labour-processes themselves, but equally 
because the totalisation of capital designates existing labour-processes as either ‘insufficiently 
capitalist’ or as outright ‘non-capitalist’: ‘antiquated’ labour-processes (this process dovetails 
with the dialectical production of the ‘new’ qua the active creation of the ‘old’, as outlined in 
relation to the ongoing first historical act in Chapter 1). Herein lies the importance of originary 
accumulation. The designation of what is an ‘insufficiently’ or ‘non-capitalist’ labour-process 
is of course dialectically subject to what is ‘sufficiently’ capitalist, and hence subject to being 
re-created – subsumed – as a new labour-process. What makes this re-creation possible is the 
re-separation of the means of production from the producers, a process which is in no way 
predominantly characterised by coercion and violence, but which is never absent the latent 
possibility (everywhere) and overt actuality (somewhere) of originary accumulation. To deny 
this is to effectively deny capital’s ongoing need for a state (only the state ensures and insures 
capital as the subject of capitalism), in addition to its ongoing recourse to war.145 In this regard, 
the real subsumption of labour – or the ‘specifically capitalist mode of production’ – not only 
results, as previously shown, in the expansion of the formal subsumption of labour, but in the 
originary accumulation of capital itself. If real subsumption constitutes a ‘constantly repeated 
revolution’ in the production-process, then originary accumulation is both a presupposition 
and result of this. To put this another way, originary accumulation is simultaneously the cause 
and effect of the actuality that ‘separation’ is not a one-off act but is in capitalism ephemeral, 
precisely because what constitutes the ‘means’ and ‘conditions’ of production – and thus the 
production-process of capital more generally – is constantly being revolutionised. In other 
words, if ‘once developed historically, capital itself creates the conditions of its existence (not 
as conditions for its arising, but as results of its being)’146, then originary accumulation must 
be understood as one of the conditions that is the result of capital’s being.147 
                                                          
145 The implicit temporal orientation of those analyses that stress the ‘continuous character’ of originary 
accumulation is – for the most part – the past, which is to say that originary accumulation is (within 
capitalism) predominantly theorised as a reactionary process. This is the underlying assumption behind 
David Harvey’s rereading of originary accumulation as ‘accumulation by dispossession’, such that the 
‘new imperialism’ is fundamentally a response to the economic crises of the 1970s. See David Harvey, 
The New Imperialism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). De Angelis argues that ‘the temporal 
dimension [of originary accumulation] includes in principle both the period of the establishment of a 
capitalist mode of production and the preservation and expansion of the capitalist mode of production 
any time the producers set themselves as an obstacle to the reproduction of their separation to the 
means of production.’ De Angelis, ‘Marx and primitive accumulation: The continuous character of 
capital’s “enclosures”’, 13. Originary accumulation thereby becomes a deliberate response or strategy, 
ex post facto, to existing forms of class struggle. This is not incorrect, but it obscures the sense in which 
originary accumulation is also and systematically structured by the future, such that it represents a form 
of speculation – a gamble, a hedge – on capital’s need to self-expand. 
146 Marx, Grundrisse, 459. 
147 ‘Thus, primitive accumulation becomes not only a cause of the capitalist mode of production but its 
effect.’ Read, ‘Primitive Accumulation: the Aleatory Foundation of Capitalism’, 37. 
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This is crucial, because it is only when originary accumulation is understood as both the 
presupposition and result of capitalist accumulation that the systematic relationship between 
originary accumulation and the production of history and historical time emerges. Generally 
speaking, we might state that if originary accumulation is the condition of the condition of the 
production-process of capital, then it is thereby the condition of the condition of thinking the 
materialist concept of history. Put differently, originary accumulation might be considered as 
a kind of ‘originary temporality’ – an originary temporality of separation, and, as we will soon 
consider, of violence – which makes the historical time of capital possible, but which, at the 
same time, the historical time of capital makes possible. The claim, therefore, is that originary 
accumulation is simultaneously the presupposition and result, the premise and consequence, 
the cause and effect, etc., of both capital’s formal and real subsumption of labour, and hence 
the two features at the heart of the production-process of capital (automation and alienation) 
without which history cannot be thought. Originary accumulation is thus inseparable from the 
speculative proposition which guides this chapter: valorisation is the production of historical 
time. This is what, at the level of the philosophical concept of history, secures the systematic 
character of originary accumulation, which is to say its fundamental relation to the systematic-
historical dialectic that is capital. The co-constitutive relation between originary accumulation 
and alienation is straightforward and requires little demonstration: the separation that defines 
the former is both the condition and result of the various forms of separation which render the 
production-process of capital the production of alienation. For Marx, the ‘objective conditions 
of living labour appear as separated, independent [verselbständigte] values opposite living 
labour capacity as subjective being, which therefore appears to them only as a value of another 
kind’148, whereby ‘the objective conditions of living labour capacity are presupposed as having 
an existence independent of it, as the objectivity of a subject distinct from living labour 
capacity and standing independently over against it.’149 However, the relationship between 
originary accumulation and automation requires a slightly more substantial explanation. On 
the one hand, the relationship between originary accumulation and the real subsumption of 
labour is easily grasped, such that the separation underpinning and reproduced by cooperation, 
the division of labour and, most consequentially, the use of machinery within the production-
process, is both enabled by originary accumulation and brings about the renewal of originary 
accumulation. In this regard, originary accumulation is inseparable from the manner in which, 
as previously analysed, the systematic use of machines – the so-called ‘automatic system of 
machinery’ – constitutes the conception of ‘history’ as the self-expansion of time. On the other 
                                                          
148 Marx, Grundrisse, 461. 
149 Ibid. 462. 
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hand, this must be supplemented – or intertwined – with the fetish character of the commodity, 
specifically the fact that the real subsumption of labour both conditions and is conditioned by 
the commodity-form (in this sense, Marx’s systematic exposition of the value-form in the first 
few chapters of the first volume of Capital presumes the entirety – originary accumulation 
included – of the exposition that follows). In other words, if, following Bonefeld, originary 
accumulation is the constitutive basis of the fetish character of the commodity, then it is also 
the ontological basis of the essential link between automation and fetishism at the level of the 
philosophical concept of history. If automation gives us the idea of history as something that, 
in itself and as such, is in motion, moves on, and expands, this is indissociable from the fetish 
character of the commodity-form as both the premise150 and result of the production-process 
of capital. The originary separation between the producers and the means of production not 
only enables a ‘life-process of the social’ whereby the radical expansion of human needs can 
only appear within the value-form, but also, and because of this, whereby the social relations 
between humans that grounds the expansion of their needs appears, within the objects which 
satisfy these needs, as the ‘objective characteristics of the products of labour themselves, as 
the socio-natural properties of these things.’151 The expansion of human needs appears as the 
socio-natural property of commodities themselves, and this must be tied to the notion that self-
expansion – the self-expansion of time – is the essential property of history itself. Even more 
succinctly: ‘history’ is a fetish (but it is no less real because of this). Hence the fetish character 
of the commodity confirms what was previously postulated: capital’s historicalising power is 
at once its de-historicalising power, which is to say, first, that the modern concept of ‘history’ 
is only possible because of this de-historicalisation, and, second, that originary accumulation 
is what first gives capital this power (which is then systematically reproduced by capital itself). 
This is the necessary context of the basic relationship between originary accumulation and the 
bourgeois erasure of history, and therefore the context, as earlier cited, of Balibar’s claim that 
originary accumulation ‘brings us into the presence of the radical absence of memory which 
characterises history.’152 The ‘insipid childishness’ of the ‘nursery tale’ that political economy 
tells itself unconsciously presumes the commodity-form and its secret.  
 A final note about violence [Gewalt]. Violence is of course pivotal to Marx’s analysis 
of originary accumulation and what should be understood as its ‘comprehensive subject’: the 
modern, bourgeois state. In short, for Marx, the violence of originary accumulation ‘is itself 
                                                          
150 ‘I call this the fetishism which attaches itself to the products of labour as soon as they are produced 
as commodities, and is therefore inseparable from the production of commodities.’ Marx, Capital 1, 
165. 
151 Ibid. 164-65. 
152 Balibar, ‘Elements for a Theory of Transition’, 283. 
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an economic power [ökonomische Potenz].’153 However, for our purposes, capital’s peculiar 
de-historicalising power – that is, the dialectic of historicalisation and de-historicalisation to 
which capital gives rise – must be understood through its essential ontological relation to the 
systematic violence which is originary accumulation. This returns us to the logic with which 
Marx’s – and this section’s – analysis of originary accumulation begins: again, the seemingly 
seamless, and self-expanding, circle whereby the accumulation of capital presupposes surplus-
value, surplus-value presupposes capitalist production, and capitalist production presupposes 
the accumulation of capital. We have, after Marx, now broken this circle, exposed the basis – 
the originary accumulation – upon which this circle depends and (here diverting from Marx) 
reproduces. What must now be considered is, first, the essential place of violence within this 
circle and thus, second, the essential place of violence in relation to the production of historical 
time. What the violence of originary accumulation first (and to this day154) enables is the fact 
that capital proceeds as if [als ob] labour-power can always be commodified, which is to say 
that capital not only proceeds as if labour-power is a readymade commodity, but moreover as 
if it directly produces labour-power as its own commodity (this is its utter indifference to the 
production of the means of human life). This is because the violence of originary accumulation 
is not just the presupposition of the circularity of capital, but its hidden, its secret, or, better, 
its expelled, presupposition: violence is the presupposition of capitalist accumulation precisely 
because it is immediately effaced by capital as its constitutive presupposition. As Jason Read 
expresses it: ‘poised as it were at the point of transformation, the moment of violence almost 
disappears in its execution…the violence of primitive accumulation is immediately justified 
within and by the new order that it constitutes.’155 The violence of originary accumulation is, 
in other words, immediately foreclosed by the production-process of capital, a foreclosure that 
                                                          
153 Marx, Capital 1, 916. 
154 ‘To this day’, but, and once again, in no way predominantly overtly today. The violence of originary 
accumulation is indeed aufgehoben within capitalist accumulation, but this takes nothing away from 
the ongoing necessity of originary to capitalist accumulation.  
155 Read, ‘Primitive Accumulation: the Aleatory Foundation of Capitalism’, 37. Read formulates this 
in conjunction with the following passage in Deleuze and Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus: ‘Hence the 
very particular character of State violence: it is very difficult to pinpoint this violence because it always 
presents itself as preaccomplished. It is not even adequate to say that the violence rests with the mode 
of production. Marx made the observation in the case of capitalism: there is a violence that necessarily 
operates through the State, precedes the capitalist mode of production, constitutes the “primitive 
accumulation”, and makes possible the capitalist mode of production itself. From a standpoint within 
the capitalist mode of production, it is very difficult to say who is the thief and who is the victim, or 
even where the violence resides. That is because the worker is born entirely naked and the capitalist 
objectively “clothed”, an independent owner. That which gave the worker and the capitalist this form 
eludes us because it operated in other modes of production. It is a violence that posits itself as 
preaccomplished, even though it is reactivated every day.’ See Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A 
Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia [1980], trans. and foreword by Brian Massumi 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003), 447. 
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secures and is secured by the fetishism of the commodity-form. As Read shows, this leads to 
a transformation of violence itself – ‘the emergence of a new type of violence’ – one that not 
only registers the fact that ‘the sporadic and excessive feudal forms of violence pass into the 
universality of law’156 (into the universality, in Marx’s words, ‘of state-power [Staatsmacht], 
the concentrated and organised violence of society’157), but also into ‘the quotidian relations 
that are the effects and cause of the law’158, which is to say the everyday life of the production-
process of capital.159  
 We might conclude, therefore, by suggesting that the modern, philosophical concepts 
of history and historical time are inherently violent concepts, insofar as originary accumulation 
is woven into the very fabric of valorisation and hence the production of historical time. The 
seemingly indifferent, if not benign, character of historical time as the self-expansion of time, 
as the background, in Marx’s terms, in which change within and between modes of production 
occurs, is in fact predicated on a systematic violence – specific to capitalism – that is not only 
‘immediately justified within and by the new order that it constitutes’, but is actively recreated 
by this order. The temporal intelligibility of the ongoing creation of new needs – the temporal 
intelligibility of the ongoing first historical act – is in fact predicated on a peculiar temporality 
of violence that not only ‘always presents itself as preaccomplished’160, but does so precisely 
because it is reproduced by a mode of production that presents itself as preaccomplished, that 
presents itself as the self-sufficient condition of its own being. 
                                                          
156 Read, ‘Primitive Accumulation: the Aleatory Foundation of Capitalism’, 38. 
157 Marx, Kapital 1, 779 (Capital 1, 915). 
158 Read, ‘Primitive Accumulation: the Aleatory Foundation of Capitalism’, 38. 
159 Therefore, ‘capitalist accumulation is nothing other than primitive accumulation continued onto the 
shop floor, thus nothing other than a continuation of the modification of violence begun with “bloody 
legislation” and the enclosure acts.’ Ibid.  
160 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, 447. 
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Conclusion 
The Historical Time of Capital and the Time of History 
 
Time is the measure of life itself.1  
 
The production-process of capital is given priority in this thesis because it is the first and most 
immediate ground from which ‘the social production of the means of life’ becomes intelligible 
as history. Yet inasmuch as it is a necessary point of departure, the production-process – and 
with it the first volume of Capital – does not secure capital as the condition of thinking history, 
and therefore does not exhaust the scope of the relation between capital and historical time. 
Ultimately, it is only when the immediate production-process is examined in conjunction with 
the circulation-process of capital, that the basis of the materialist concept of history, and thus 
the possibility of developing a concept of historical time out of this concept of history, is truly 
disclosed. The significance of the circulation-process is not registered by so-called ‘simple 
circulation’ (the circulation of money and commodities in the narrow sense of the term), but 
rather by the circulation of money and commodities as capital. It is this circulation, or what 
Marx frequently calls ‘the circulation-process proper’ [den eigentlichen Zirkulationsprozeß], 
which, on the one hand, and along with the ‘actual’ production-process, constitutes one of ‘the 
two great sections’2 of the movement of capital, such that we can identify, and differentiate, a 
‘circulation-time’ from a ‘production-time’.3 On the other hand, and this is a basic concern of 
the second volume of Capital, ‘circulation’ must equally be understood as a broader and more 
comprehensive [übergreifendes] category, one that, at a higher level of abstraction, actually 
contains, as a necessary moment within itself, the immediate production-process of capital. 
                                                          
1 Marx, Economic Manuscripts of 1861-63, 52.  
2 Marx states: ‘the total production-process [Gesamtproduktionsprozeß] of capital includes both the 
circulation-process proper and the actual production-process. These form the two great sections of its 
movement, which appears as the totality of these two processes. On one side, labour-time, and on the 
other, circulation-time. And the whole of the movement appears as unity of labour-time and circulation-
time, as unity of production and circulation. This unity itself is motion, process. Capital appears as this 
unity-in-process of production and circulation, a unity which can be regarded both as the totality of the 
production-process, as well as the specific completion of one turnover of the capital, one movement 
returning into itself.’ Marx, Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie, 520 (Grundrisse, 620). 
The ‘proper’ in the expression ‘the circulation-process proper’ and the ‘actual’ in the expression ‘the 
actual production-process’ are two different translations of the same German word: eigentlichen. 
3 Therefore, ‘circulation-time and production-time are mutually exclusive. During its circulation-time, 
capital does not function as productive capital, and...produces neither commodities nor surplus-value.’ 
See Karl Marx, Capital: a Critique of Political Economy, Vol. 2: the Process of Circulation of Capital 
[1885] (hereafter Capital 2), trans. David Fernbach (London and New York: Penguin Books, 1978), 
203. See also Marx, Grundrisse, 658, where circulation-time is figured as ‘not-production-time’ as well 
as ‘not-value-positing-time’. 
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From this standpoint, the ‘circulation-process’ is not the dialectical opposite of the production-
process – this is not the circulation-process proper – but is rather a category that expresses the 
unity of the production- and circulation-processes proper. This is what Marx calls the ‘overall-
process’ [Gesamtverlaufs] or ‘total-circuit’ [Gesamtkreislauf] of capital, which later becomes 
the ‘overall’ or ‘total’ (as opposed to the immediate) production-process of capital in the third 
volume of Capital.4 The subject of this process is not simply ‘capital’, but more precisely what 
Marx calls ‘total social capital’ [gesellschaftlichen Gesamtkapital], a concept which must be 
understood as the successor of ‘capital in general’ [Kapital im Allgemeinen], but which, at the 
same time, does not invalidate the concept of ‘capital in general’.5 It is total social capital and 
its metamorphoses – its three cycles or circuits [Kreislauf] – which concerns us now, because 
this allows us to bring this thesis to a close.  
What must be emphasised is that the opening chapters of the second volume of Capital, 
in particular Chapter 4 – ‘The Three Figures of the Circuit’ – equal the systematicity of the 
systematic development of the value-form in the first chapters of the first volume of Capital. 
Moreover, these chapters in Volume Two offer what their counterpart in Volume One cannot: 
a systematic presentation of the various forms of capital itself, or, in other words, a systematic 
presentation of capital subsequent to the establishment of capital as self-expanding value.6 
They present – for the first time – a framework wherein capital might be systematised as the 
condition of thinking history and historical time. In sharp contrast to Marx’s analysis of the 
production-process in the first volume of Capital (above all his depiction of the overt violence 
of originary accumulation), these opening chapters of the second volume of Capital present 
‘capital’ at a much higher level of abstraction: the struggle to reduce the length of the working-
day does not, for instance, figure (at least explicitly) in these pages.7 This does not, however, 
diminish their speculative contribution to our comprehension of history and historical time. In 
                                                          
4 Hence insofar as there is some kind of ‘logic’ (apart from Engels’s editorial hand) that structures the 
three volumes of Capital, it is not the dialectic ‘Volume 1 + Volume 2 = Volume 3’, as is occasionally 
assumed, but rather a logic wherein the immediate production-process (Volume 1) is subsumed by the 
circulation-process, broadly construed (Volume 2), which is thereafter actualised by the total-process 
of capitalist production (Volume 3). This is the sense in which the aim of Volume 3 is to ‘discover and 
present the concrete forms which grow out of the process of capital's movement considered as a whole.’ 
Marx, Capital 3, 117. That is, Volume 3 actualises – via categories such as ‘profit’ and ‘price’ – what 
Volume 2 has already established, albeit at a high level of abstraction. 
5 See Chapter 4, footnote 9. From the second volume of Capital on, the categories of ‘abstract labour’ 
and ‘value’ can be understood from the standpoint of ‘total social capital’. 
6 This thesis accordingly shares Tombazos’s enthusiasm for the opening chapters of the second volume 
of Capital, particularly Chapter 4. See Tombazos, Time in Marx, 2, 4, 124. 
7 Marx is well aware of this when, for instance, he states that ‘capital, as self-valorising value, does not 
just comprise class relations, a definite social character that depends on the existence of labour as wage-
labour. It is a movement, a circulatory-process through different stages, which itself in turn includes 
three different forms of the circulatory-process. Hence it can only be grasped as a movement, and not 
as a static thing.’ Marx, Capital 2, 185. 
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the three circuits of ‘total social capital’ – the circuits of money capital, productive capital and 
commodity capital, each of which include the moment of production within themselves – we 
have a rich and multifaceted exposition of what was raised in the introduction to Chapter 4, 
but which the body of that chapter only presents from the limited standpoint of the immediate 
production-process: the life through which capital satisfies its need to self-expand. The three 
circuits of total social capital form different but interrelated ‘life-processes’ – ‘life-circuits’ – 
of capital, and thus represent a crucial, if not the most important, means with which to enrich 
the (underdeveloped) discourse of life in Marx’s critique of political economy more broadly.8 
Tombazos’s Time in Marx stands apart in its analysis of this largely unexplored dimension of 
Marx’s work.9 Drawing upon the figures of the syllogism in Hegel’s Logic (not to mention 
Marx’s direct acknowledgement of his indebtedness to this syllogism), Tombazos shows the 
extent to which the different positions and relations between money (M), the commodity (C) 
and production (P) represent a critical appropriation of Hegel that nonetheless corresponds to 
the different positions and relations between universality (U), particularity (P) and singularity 
(S) within the syllogism. This is, as Tombazos says, ‘the syllogistic structure of capital’10, and, 
after the Logic, it directly correlates to the sense in which, as the ‘Idea’, capital is a processual 
‘living being’ – a teleological ‘living organism’ – which divides itself, within itself, into three 
processes11: (1) the ‘living individual’, or ‘shape’ (the circuit of productive capital); (2) the 
‘life-process’, or ‘assimilation’ (the circuit of commodity capital); and (3) the ‘genus-process’ 
(the circuit of money capital). The details of this homology between Marx and Hegel (which 
most of the work in so-called ‘Systematic Dialectics’ after Tombazos does not address) cannot 
                                                          
8 The following two passages in the Grundrisse are also quite instructive: first, ‘Capital…exists as the 
subject of circulation; circulation is posited as its own life’s course. But whilst capital thus, as the whole 
of circulation, is circulating capital, is the process of going from one phase into the other, it is at the 
same time, within each phase, posited in a specific aspect, restricted to a particular form, which is the 
negation of itself as the subject of the whole movement. Therefore, capital in each of its particular 
phases is the negation of itself as the subject of all the various metamorphoses’; and, second, ‘Insofar 
as capital in every moment of the process is itself the possibility of going over into its other, next phase, 
and is thus the possibility of the whole process, which expresses capital’s act of life, to that extent each 
of the moments appears potentially as capital – hence commodity capital, money capital – along with 
the value positing itself in the production-process as capital.’ Marx, Grundrisse, 620, 637. Marx’s use 
of the expression ‘the life-process of capital’ (see also Capital 1, 425) cuts across his entire critique of 
political economy, but the second volume of Capital is arguably unmatched in its contribution to our 
understanding of the relation between the concept of capital and the philosophical concept of life.  
9 See, in particular, Tombazos, Time in Marx, Chapter Eleven, ‘Capital as Syllogism’, and Chapter 
Twelve, ‘Capital in Marx, or “Life” in Hegel’.  
10 Ibid. 140.  
11 ‘The living being is the syllogism whose very moments are inwardly systems and syllogisms…but 
they are active syllogisms, or processes; and within the subjective unity of the living being they are 
only One process. Thus, the living being is the process of its own concluding with itself, which runs 
through three processes.’ G.W.F. Hegel, The Encyclopaedia Logic (Part I of the Encyclopaedia of 
Philosophical Sciences with the Zusätze) [1817, 1830], trans. T.F. Geraets, W.A. Suchting and H.S. 
Harris (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1991, 292 (§217).  
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be taken any further here.12 It must suffice to state that the circuits of money capital, productive 
capital and commodity capital make up, respectively, the ‘valorisation, conservation and auto-
critique/self-control of value’13, such that, as a ‘triple autonomous movement’, as a ‘rich and 
complex organisation of rhythms’14, ‘total social capital’ is Marx’s most complete expression 
of the ‘life of capital’. This leads us to the following passage in the second volume of Capital, 
Marx’s most comprehensive passage on total social capital:  
 
The total circuit presents itself for each functional form of capital as its own specific 
circuit, and indeed each of these circuits conditions the continuity of the overall 
process; the circular course of one functional form determines that of the others. It is 
a necessary condition for the total-production-process [Gesamtproduktionsprozeß], in 
other words for the social capital, that this is at the same time a reproduction-process, 
and therefore the circuit of each of its moments. Different fractions of the capital 
successively pass through the different stages and functional forms. Each functional 
form thus passes through its circuit simultaneously with the others, though it is always 
a different part of the capital that presents itself in it. A part of the capital exists as 
commodity capital that is being transformed into money, but this is an ever-changing 
part, and is constantly being reproduced; another part exists as money capital that is 
being transformed into productive capital; a third part as productive capital being 
transformed into commodity capital. The constant presence of all three forms is 
mediated by the circuit of the total capital through precisely these three phases. 
As a whole, then, the capital is simultaneously present, and spatially coexistent, 
in its various phases. But each part is constantly passing from one phase or functional 
form into another, and thus functions in all of them in turn. The forms are therefore 
fluid forms, and their simultaneity is mediated by their succession. Each form both 
follows and precedes the others, so that the return of one part of the capital to one form 
is determined by the return of another part to another form. Each part continuously 
describes its own course, but it is always another part of capital that finds itself in this 
form, and these particular circuits simply constitute simultaneous and successive 
moments of the overall process.  
It is only in the unity of the three circuits that the continuity of the total-process 
is realised...total social capital always possesses this continuity, and its process always 
contains the unity of the three circuits.15 
                                                          
12 Of interest here is the manner in which, from the standpoint of total social capital, ‘production’ (the 
circuit of productive capital) simply represents the capacity of the living organism to preserve/maintain 
itself, not the sense in which this being reproduces itself as more than itself – as ‘giving birth’ to more 
than what it already is (this is the function of the circuit of money capital). To put this a different way, 
whereas the production-process in the first volume of Capital obviously corresponds to the production 
of surplus-value, this is, from the standpoint of the second volume of Capital, expressed by the circuit 
of money capital, not the circuit of productive capital. As Marx expresses it, ‘the general form of the 
movement P…P’ is the form of reproduction, and does not indicate, as does M…M’, that valorisation 
is the purpose of the process.’ Marx, Capital 2, 172.  
13 Tombazos, Time in Marx, 140. 
14 Ibid. 144. 
15 Karl Marx, Das Kapital: Kritik der politischen Ökonomie, Zweiter Band: Der Zirkulationsprozeß 
des Capitals [1885], herausgegeben von Friedrich Engels (hereafter Kapital 2), in Marx and Engels, 
MEW, Band 24 (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1963), 108 (Capital 2, 184). Consider also Marx, Capital 2, 180: 
‘if we take all three forms together, then all the premises of the process appear as its result, as premises 
produced by the process itself. Each moment appears as a point of departure, of transit, and of return.’ 
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This passage raises many questions which might foster some speculative conclusions. 
Namely, is Marx’s concept of accumulation – at the level of ‘total social capital’ – a model of 
historical time? That is, does total social capital secure the manner in which the expansion of 
human needs can be understood as history? Is total social capital ultimately what totalises and 
temporalises history? Is it the comprehensive historicalising, and therefore de-historicalising, 
subject? These questions may come across as unrelentingly abstract and hence as orientating 
human history and its ‘real material basis’ in precisely the opposite direction which Marx and 
Engels desire in The German Ideology. Indeed, they may seem to disregard Marx and Engels’s 
exhortation in The Holy Family that ‘history does nothing, it does not “possess vast wealth”, 
it does not “fight battles”! Rather, it is humans, actual, living humans, who do all that, who 
possess and fight; it is not “history” that uses humans as a means to pursue its own ends, as if 
it were a person apart. History is nothing but the activity of humans pursuing their ends.’16 
Yet to read these questions as complicit in the mystification of ‘history’ is to forget precisely 
what kind of ‘subject’ capital – total social capital – is. It is to forget that, in capitalism, total 
social capital is the comprehensive subject which makes human historical acts possible, which 
provides the unity of the human act with its historical intelligibility. As Marx declares, after 
the passage quoted above: ‘those who consider the autonomisation [Verselbstständigung] of 
value as a mere abstraction forget that the movement of industrial capital is this abstraction in 
action.’17 The point to take from this is not that this autonomisation is not produced by human 
beings, but rather that human beings are equally, and in fact asymmetrically, produced by this 
autonomisation, such that this autonomisation makes possible the idea that ‘history is nothing 
but the activity of humans pursuing their ends.’ ‘Human history’ is only conceivable because, 
in capitalism, human beings produce and satisfy their needs as the personifications and bearers 
of the ‘movement of independent value, acting with the force [Gewalt] of an elemental natural-
process.’18 In this way, if total social capital and its process is the unity of the production- and 
circulation-processes proper19, its time, which might be characterised as ‘the time of the total-
process of capitalist production’, or indeed as ‘the unity of the time of production and the time 
of circulation’, is not, after Tombazos, the ‘organic time of capital’, but rather the historical 
time of capital, a historical time whose material basis is introduced (albeit in highly abstract 
                                                          
16 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Die heilige Familie, oder Kritik der kritischen Kritik. Gegen Bruno 
Bauer und Konsorten [1845], in Marx and Engels, MEW, Band 2 (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1962), 98 (Karl 
Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Holy Family, or Critique of Critical Criticism. Against Bruno Bauer 
and Company, in MECW, Volume 4, Marx and Engels, 1844-1845, trans. Richard Dixon and Clemens 
Dutt (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975), 93). 
17 Marx, Capital 2, 185.  
18 Marx, Kapital 2, 109 (Capital 2, 185).  
19 Marx, Capital 2, 180.  
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terms) in the second volume of Capital, and subsequently concretised in the third volume of 
Capital.20  
However – and this point guides the second part of this conclusion – it is impossible to 
imagine the ‘historical time of capital’ – the concepts of history and historical time which exist 
because of total social capital – in isolation from Marx’s concept of crisis. Inasmuch as capital 
is, as Tombazos describes it, a ‘rich and complex organisation of rhythms’, it is, and because 
of this, equally the permanent tendency towards crisis, such that its rhythmic unity contains, 
within itself, the permanent possibility of ‘a kind of “arrhythmia”…a momentary disturbance 
of the system’s coherence.’21 Generally speaking, we must attend to three different levels at 
which ‘crisis’ operates in Marx’s work, but which, when taken together as a whole, casts 
considerable doubt on the unity of Marx’s understanding of crisis, such that it is questionable 
whether one can identify a ‘concept’ of crisis in Marx.22 The first two levels are immanent to 
capitalism. They proceed from Marx’s position that, at their core, crises are manifestations of 
the ineradicable contradictions of capital: they bring ‘to the surface’ the barriers [Schranken] 
‘to the free development of the productive forces’, barriers which capitalism ‘contains within 
itself’.23 This begins – and this is the first level – with the fact that the potential for crisis is 
immanent to the value-form itself. Even the most simple metamorphosis of the commodity, 
the ongoing separation, in time and space, between its purchase and sale24, contains the seeds 
of crisis within itself, because when the ‘assertion of [the] external independence [äußerliche 
Verselbstständigung]’ of the two processes ‘which lack internal independence’ ‘proceeds to a 
                                                          
20 Tombazos’s ‘organic time’ is the comprehensive concept of the third and final section of his Time in 
Marx. It is the culminating conceptual formulation which unites ‘the time of production’ and ‘the time 
of circulation’ as, respectively, a ‘linear time’ and ‘cyclical time’. The problems with this reading aside, 
we must note that it goes hand-in-hand with a systematic lack of an analysis of the concept of need, a 
fact which results in the separation, for Tombazos, of the ‘logical’ and ‘historical’ time of capital. 
21 Tombazos, Time in Marx, 145. 
22 Much of the discussion that follows is indebted to Peter Osborne’s recent article ‘A sudden topicality: 
Marx, Nietzsche and the politics of crisis’, Radical Philosophy 160 (March/April 2010), 19-26, which 
proceeds from the premise that whereas Marx is undoubtedly a thinker of crisis, it is unclear whether 
he is a theorist of crisis, whether, that is to say, he ‘propound[s] something that might legitimately be 
called a “crisis theory”.’ Ibid. 19. This dovetails with Tombazos’s argument that Marx only analyses 
‘periodical crises linked to the industrial cycle, which are therefore “normal”, necessary and inevitable 
moments of capitalist production’, but leaves unanalysed ‘the structural crises that are abnormal or 
extraordinary in that they cannot be overcome by the spontaneous or endogenous mechanisms of the 
system.’ Tombazos, Time in Marx, 274. However, what Tombazos calls a ‘structural crisis’ is not the 
same thing as what Osborne calls ‘the all-pervasive, general-historical character of the concept of crisis 
in its modern form’, a concept of crisis which Tombazos leaves unanalysed and with which, as we will 
learn, the concept of historical time must reckon. See Osborne, ‘A sudden topicality: Marx, Nietzsche 
and the politics of crisis’, 20. 
23 Karl Marx, Economic Manuscripts of 1861-63 (Continuation), in MECW, Volume 32, Marx: 1861-
1863, trans. Renate Simpson (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1989), 157. See also Karl Marx, Theories 
of Surplus-Value, Part 2 [1861-63], trans. Renate Simpson (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1969), 528. 
24 Marx, Economic Manuscripts of 1861-63 (Continuation), in MECW, Volume 32, 140, 145. 
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certain critical point, their unity violently makes itself felt by producing – a crisis.’25 In this 
regard, ‘crisis’ can be understood as the enforced movement of interdependent processes that 
have become immobile. Crisis is therefore not just the lack of the essential movement which 
is capital, but so too ‘the forcible establishment of unity between elements that have become 
independent and the enforced separation from one another of elements which are essentially 
one.’26 ‘Alongside the interrupted circulation’, as Marx puts it elsewhere, ‘a forced circulation 
takes place.’27 
 However, and Marx regularly stresses this point, this understanding of crisis is nothing 
but the formal possibility of crisis, ‘the general, abstract possibility of crisis [that] denotes no 
more than the most abstract form of crisis, without content, without a compelling motivating 
factor.’28 In capitalism, the ‘content’ which transforms the formal possibility of crisis into an 
actual crisis is a conjunctural question, and consequently can only be known through actual 
political-economic events. Yet what, on Marx’s terms, each and every specifically capitalist 
crisis registers – and this is the second level to which we must attend – are the ‘periodic’ crises 
which characterise the cycles of industrial capital, crises which are, as Tombazos expresses it, 
‘“normal”, necessary and inevitable moments of capitalist production.’29 Osborne summarises 
this understanding of crisis nicely:  
 
1. Crises are modes of appearance of structural contradictions within the process of 
capitalist production – they bring contradictions ‘to the surface’, as Marx says. 
2. Crises are means for the temporary solution, and hence new forms of mediation, 
of such contradictions, which restore the conditions for accumulation. 
3. The restoration of conditions for accumulation is at the same time the renewal of 
the terms of the contradictions within the system that gave rise to the crisis in the 
first place.30 
 
 
From this standpoint, a crisis is a functional aspect of the expanded reproduction of industrial 
capital. At the level of total social capital, crisis can be comprehended as the manifestation of 
contradiction within one or many of the ‘life-cycles’ of capital, and the temporary (enforced) 
resolution of the consequent ‘arrhythmia’, such that crisis is in fact reproductive of the broader 
                                                          
25 Marx, Capital 1, 209. The point here is that the value-form in no way ensures that the movement of 
valorisation is continuous. Marx’s well-known critique of Say’s law summarises this: ‘no one can sell 
unless someone else purchases. But no one directly needs to purchase because he has just sold.’ Ibid. 
208-9.  
26 Marx, Economic Manuscripts of 1861-63 (Continuation), in MECW, Volume 32, 144. 
27 Marx, Grundrisse, 600. See also ibid. 443-44. 
28 Marx, Economic Manuscripts of 1861-63 (Continuation), in MECW, Volume 32, 140. 
29 Tombazos, Time in Marx, 274. 
30 Osborne, ‘A sudden topicality: Marx, Nietzsche and the politics of crisis’, 20. 
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turnover-time [Umschlagszeit] of capital.31 In this sense, a crisis is simultaneously a disruption 
of the unity of production- and circulation-time and also a condition of the renewal of what is 
already always a contradictory unity. At the level of both the potentiality (the value-form) and 
actuality (the industrial cycle) of the accumulation of capital, therefore, crisis is constitutive 
of history and historical time. The idea that ‘history’ constitutes – in and of itself – the ongoing 
self-expansion of time is (to date) predicated on capitalist crises. 
However, neither of these levels take in what Osborne calls ‘the all-pervasive, general-
historical character of the concept of crisis in its modern form (including the historico-political 
notion of a crisis of the capitalist system as a whole, as a condition of a transition to a new 
mode of production – a notion which clearly motivated Marx).’32 In opposition to this concept 
of crisis (the third and final level to which we must attend), the second level (and by extension 
the first level, which is simply the formal possibility of the second) possesses a ‘restrictedly 
conjunctural character and relatively narrow political-economic basis.’33 The difference – or 
rather the disjunction – between these three levels is crucial, because it cuts to the core of the 
philosophical and political problem that the introduction to this thesis first raised, and to which 
we can finally return: namely, capital is the condition of thinking history and hence historical 
time, but the philosophical concept of history must register the possibility (but by no means 
the inevitability) of social and historical time after capitalism. The thought of history, in other 
words, necessarily unsettles its ongoing comprehensive condition of possibility, because the 
realisation of history’s ‘true’ teleological end (there are several ways of grasping this in Marx: 
e.g. the flourishing of the ‘true’ realm of freedom, or the emergence of the ‘genuinely’ social 
individual, or the ‘absolute’ movement of becoming) hinges on the speculative chronological 
end of capitalism. In a word, the concept of historical time compels us to think ‘the time of 
history’ beyond the historical time of capital, as inclusive, that is to say, of the historical time 
of communism and its subjects. This does not mean that, unlike the historical time of capital, 
the ‘time of history’ is not grounded by the ongoing expansion of human needs and productive 
forces, or that it is not a form of self-expanding time. Far from it. It just means that capital is 
sublated as the comprehensive subject of historical time. We might put it this way: the ‘time 
of history’ must be thought from the standpoint of the sublation of the contradiction that, for 
Marx, human beings simultaneously live (to date) in pre-history and history. Hence the need 
                                                          
31 ‘…a crisis is always the starting-point of a large volume of new investment. It is also, therefore, if 
we consider the society as a whole, more or less a new material basis for the next turnover cycle.’ 
Marx, Capital 2, 264. 
32 Osborne, ‘A sudden topicality: Marx, Nietzsche and the politics of crisis’, 20. Osborne goes on to 
define this concept of crisis as ‘its fundamental political meaning at the level of its greatest historical 
generality…the generality and fundamentally historical character of the concept of crisis.’ Ibid. 22. 
33 Ibid. 20. 
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to realise the end of ‘pre-history’ (a political category) within history; that is, to negate (which 
is reversible…it can regress) the ‘pre-history’ of the ongoing historical present and, therefore, 
usher in the beginning of a new unified kind of history, which is, as Pierre Vilar puts it, ‘the 
task of another mode of production.’34 This is what the concept of crisis must register, which 
Marx’s concept of crisis does not. Politically and philosophically, ‘crisis’ is here a historical 
category, not simply a political-economic concept specific to capitalism. This is the context 
in which Osborne states that ‘analysis of the historical process demands not merely an account 
of fundamental contradictions and their expression in conflicts and crises, but an account of 
crisis as a condition of possibility of the new, in this case the qualitatively historically new: 
new forms of social production, new relations of production and forms of organisation.’35 And 
yet, despite the fact that capitalist crises intrinsically point beyond the confines of the political 
economy of capitalism (and therefore beyond the political-economic scope of Marx’s concept 
of crisis), the repetitive nature of these crises is precisely what makes it so difficult to imagine 
how the qualitatively historically new can be realised, such that this new is already structured, 
and thereby foreclosed, by the historicalising temporality of capital.36 
The crisis which brings Tombazos’s Time in Marx to a close – the ‘structural crisis’ – 
does not provide us with a solution to this problem. Framed by the promise to ‘examine the 
conceptual link between the totality-capital and historical time’37, this conception of crisis38 
actually obscures the relationship between capital and historical time39, and thus precludes the 
                                                          
34 Pierre Vilar, ‘Marxist History, a History in the Making: Towards a Dialogue with Althusser,’ New 
Left Review I/80 (July/August 1973), 105. 
35 Osborne, ‘A sudden topicality: Marx, Nietzsche and the politics of crisis’, 21. Osborne continues: 
‘crisis “theory” is thus in principle inadequate to thinking the historico-political meaning of crises – 
and this includes Marx’s own account (or “theory”) of capitalist crises, however central to such a 
thinking it might be. Hence my reluctance to think of Marx as a crisis “theorist”, with respect to the 
politics of crises, which was his ultimate concern.’ Ibid.  
36 For Osborne, ‘with regard to the temporality of crisis, the cyclical character of crises of accumulation 
tends to instil less a sense of possibility than of repetition. This serves to reinforce the main form of 
temporal abstraction associated with the experience of commodities in capitalist societies: “the new”. 
The periodic character of crisis and the commodity-form each produce modes of experience of 
temporal abstraction that undermine or erode the historical experience of crises and, thereby, function 
to repress the political possibilities they contain.’ Ibid. 24.  
37 Tombazos, Time in Marx, 275. 
38 See ibid., Chapter 24, ‘The Structural Crises’, 291-305, which, along with its appendix, does little in 
the way of constructing a concept of ‘structural crisis’ as an ‘abnormal or extraordinary’ (ibid. 274) 
crisis of capitalism, instead offering an empirical history of business cycles over roughly the past 150 
years. Why structural crises are ‘structural’, and intelligible as such as against ‘periodical crises’ (which 
would equally seem to be part of the structure of capitalist accumulation), is thus left at a descriptive 
level.  
39 Tombazos’s grasp of the relationship between capital and historical time comes out of his analysis 
of ‘structural crises’. He states: ‘far from acting in a social environment that it only conquers, capital 
produces its objective contents that are this environment. It produces its own history. Each particular 
stage of capitalism, each recovery from a structural crisis, is the peace that capital concludes with 
itself.’ Ibid. 300. After Hegel, ‘this correspondence between “subjectivity” and “objectivity” is not that 
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possibility of developing a general-historical concept of crisis out of, and in relation to, the 
endemic crises of capitalism. Yet this is precisely what must be done, insofar as ‘the political 
significance of the concept of crisis…depends upon some projected articulation of these two 
levels, some conjunctural political effectivity at the level of the mode of production, in 
response to “periodic” crisis.’40 We might go so far as to say that this is the only possible way 
to think, let alone actualise, the possibility of social and historical time after capitalism. This 
returns us to the philosophical – and brings into the conversation the political – importance of 
the category of life in Marx’s work. If ‘crisis’ can, on some level, be understood as a crisis of 
the ‘life’ of something, such that it signals the possibility of the end of this life as such, then 
the politics of historical time (a politics structured both by the understanding of capital as the 
condition of thinking history and the process of realising historical time after capitalism) must 
treat the recurring crises of capitalism (whether ‘normal’ or ‘abnormal’) from the standpoint 
of their disruption of the life-time of capital. And this ‘life-time’ is not just the (unknowable) 
duration of the life of capital, such that crises enable, but only potentially, the chronological 
end of capitalism, but, and more fundamentally, the historicalising time of the life of capital 
as it is presented in this thesis (a time which is itself the ontological ground of measuring the 
‘duration’ of capitalism41). This is, despite the absence of politics surrounding its presentation, 
the distinct political importance of the concept of ‘total social capital’ in the second volume 
                                                          
of the conceptual totality of capital with an external empirical reality, with a neutral historical time. 
Rather, it is the relative correspondence of the former with the objective determinations it produces.’ 
Ibid. Thus, ‘capital as an “Idea” is the correspondence of a logical order of time – obeying its own 
immanent criteria – with historical time. This correspondence is a permanent relation of tension and 
conflict, a relation of sometimes hidden and sometimes evident contradiction. Crises, particularly 
structural crises, are violent moments of confrontation between antagonistic forces. They open up 
various possibilities, among which is that of a new “peace” between the “subjective side” and 
“objective side” of capital. This is why capitalism is a coherent system of determinations, at the same 
time completed and open, dynamic and in movement.’ Ibid. There are two problems with this reading. 
First, history/historical time are reduced to the ‘objective side’ of the dialectic of capital, the ‘empirical 
world’ that is dialectically tied to the ‘subjective side’ – the ‘thought’ or ‘universal reason’ – of capital, 
wherein a ‘mutual fertilisation’ and ‘contradictory unity’ between the universal logic and particular 
history of capital exists. Ibid. 303. This stands against the idea of this thesis that history/historical time 
are the manifestations of the dialectic of capital itself – from both the standpoint of its objectivity and 
subjectivity. Second, Tombazos’s concept of crisis (both ‘periodical’ and ‘structural’) thus precludes 
the possibility of constructing a historical concept of crisis: the fundamentally historical character of 
crisis is here not simply limited to capital, but to the objective side of capital at that. The ‘various 
possibilities’ of crises thus become one possibility: historical repetition.  
40 Osborne, ‘A sudden topicality: Marx, Nietzsche and the politics of crisis’, 21. The ‘two levels’ here 
are the ‘historical development of the mode of production beyond its own limits, on the one hand, and 
political economy of capital, on the other’. Ibid. For Osborne, ‘the failure to adhere to the disjunction’ 
between these two levels ‘generates the quasi-theological notion of a “final” crisis of the capitalist 
system, as a whole, as some kind of event, rather than a process with a duration of many decades, if 
not centuries, appropriate to the idea of a “social” rather than a merely “political” revolution. And it is 
this notion that lies behind the substitution of a theory of breakdown for a (generational) politics of 
transformation.’ Ibid.  
41 See Chapter 4, footnote 11.  
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of Capital. What this concept begs is not just a concept of historical time whose philosophical 
scope matches the systematicity of total social capital, but a concept of historical time whose 
political scope is equally systematic, such that political practice can, on some level, be thought 
in relation to total social capital itself. The development of a historical concept of crisis is the 
necessary first step towards such a philosophy and politics of historical time.  
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